Según Kripke, las aproximaciones tradicionales acerca de la presuposición no funcionan en ciertos casos de oraciones compuestas porque habitualmente se ha considerado que las partes antecedentes de las mismas asignan presuposiciones a cada una de sus partes consecuentes por separado. Estoy de acuerdo con las críticas que Kripke dirige contra esta interpretación, pero defiendo la necesidad de tener en cuenta elementos y procesos pragmáticos a la hora de determinar el significado de las presuposiciones incluidas en dichas oraciones compuestas, algo que (...) podría solucionar ciertas dificultades que atañen a las aproximaciones puramente semánticas al problema de la proyección de la presuposición, como la de Kripke. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...) latest thesis of Charles Travis and that will permit us to conclude with a semantic definition of truth for natural languages. (shrink)

En el presente escrito, los autores pretenden una nueva interpretación de las principales tesis de la más conocida obra de Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Se atiende a las nociones de a priori (y de necesidad) y a posteriori (y contingencia), la noción de designador rígido (con su explícita crítica a la teoría descriptivista fregeana de los nombres) y su revisión de los conceptos metafísicos de modalidad de dicto y modalidad de re. Más tarde, se definirá mínimamente la noción de realismo (...) y se intentará situar a Kripke en el tipo que más cómodamente se adapte a sus presupuestos teóricos de carácter ordinario. Todo ello permitirá situar la teoría kripkeana de los nombres dentro de un marco realista que posibilitará, en otro momento ulterior, formular ciertas críticas a esta Teoría Causal de la Referencia y al realismo metafísico a ella asociada. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...) latest thesis of Charles Travis and that will permit us to conclude with a semantic definition of truth for natural languages. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...) latest thesis of Charles Travis and that will permit us to conclude with a semantic definition of truth for natural languages. (shrink)

In Words and Meaning in Metasemantics, Juan José Colomina-Almiñana argues that language meaning determination requires close attention to the constant interaction between speech communities, speaker's intentions, and the audience's uptakes.

Este texto pretende analizar algunas incongruencias presentes en un reciente estudio fisiológico acerca del lenguaje que parte de la idea chomskyana de la existencia de una ‘instancia’ en la mente humana (reducible para ellos, por supuesto, al cerebro). Para ello, comenzaremos analizando la implausibilidad de esta tesis en apariencia reductivista que ha cobrado fuerza en los últimos años (la posibilidad de la existencia de un órgano del lenguaje) para mostrar que su naturalismo responde más a un dualismo de propiedades que (...) a un verdadero estudio sobre la intención lingüística (algo que expondremos en un segundo apartado). Para concluir, expondremos cómo consideramos que debe tratarse la convención lingüística, teniendo en cuenta tanto los últimos aportes de la semántica cognitiva como los últimos avances en biología evolutiva. (shrink)

Tal vez la idea más controvertida de la filosofía de Daniel C. Dennett sea ésta: los seres humanos no son más que mecanismos dotados de intencionalidad derivada configurada por la evolución de las especies. Esto ha sido considerado por algunos como una afrenta porque relega al humano al estatus de simple artefacto: las acciones del ser humano no responden a sus propios intereses sino que se ven programados por «agentes internos especializados para recibir la información disponible en la periferia del (...) cuerpo» que constituyen.…. (shrink)

En los últimos años, ha ido radicalizándose cada vez más una separación entre los defensores del análisis semántico del lenguaje y los partidarios de una visión pragmática del mismo. En base a establecer los inicios de dicha separación, presentamos en este texto las primeras disputas entre Austin y Strawson respecto de las nociones de verdad y significado, con la pretensión de establecer los términos en los cuales tendrán lugar los desarrollos posteriores. También presentaremos el origen de una dicotomía actual respecto (...) de la determinación del significado : actualmente se considera posible diferenciar entre lo que se dice y lo que se quiere decir. Defenderemos la visión austiniana de la determinación del significado, más allá de la intencionalidad presente en el lenguaje puesta de relieve por Grice, que apuesta por una visión contextualista del significado que tendrá implicaciones para la actual Teoría del Conocimiento y la actual Filosofía de la Mente. Este texto, además, pretende defender una concepción de la filosofía austiniana que haga justicia al leng uaje y a su naturaleza, al significado y a su determinación y al conocimiento y su justificación, intentando presentar, a su vez, una particular teoría del significado acorde con las actuales polémicas entre literalistas y contextualistas. In last years, has gone becoming more radical increasingly a separation between the defenders of the semantic analysis of language and the supporters of a pragmatic vision of language. On the basis of establishing the origins of above mentioned separation, we show the first disputes among Austin and Strawson on meaning and truth. Also we will present the beginning of a dichotomy respect the determination of meaning : nowadays it is considered possible to differ between what is said and what is meant. We will defend the austinian point of view from the determination of meaning, beyond the speaker's intention in language put from relief for Grice, who bets for a contextualist view of meaning that will have implications for Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy of Mind. In this paper, in addition, we try to defend a conception of the austinian philosophy that does justice to language and his nature, to meaning and his determination and to knowledge and his, trying to present, in turn, a particular theory of meaning according to the current polemics among literalists and contextualists. (shrink)

, 3661–3678, 2020) argues that a positivistic defense of science’s objectivity is incoherent because bias in the generation of scientific theories (implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. Even though this is an idea easy to agree with, this approach is flawed for two different but related reasons. First, Dellsén’s notion of bias does not account for many ordinary biases. Second, Dellsén’s use of bias at the community-level is inconsistent. It shifts from individual scientists generating new (...) theories and making decisions to scientific communities evaluating and accepting what theories are valid. This article offers a stronger response than Dellsén’s about aseptic objectivity in science by providing a more adequate account of bias, where psychological and behavioral aspects of individual scientists and community-level scientific practices are considered. (shrink)

Nuestra intuición nos dice que a pesar de pertenecer a un mundo determinado físicamente somos libres. Nosotros argumentaremos que tras este postulado se encuentra una concepción errónea de sujeto, que ilusoriamente nos hace creer que nosotros elegimos hacer lo que acabamos haciendo. Contra este argumento, Galen Strawson plantea una objeción basada precisamente en la imposibilidad del agente de configurarse a sí mismo, pero es una objeción que recae en la misma equivocada noción de sujeto. A partir de aquí analizaremos los (...) argumentos dennettianos a favor del compatibilismo, lo que nos permitirá concluir apuntando a la correcta dirección que debería recorrer todo intento de estipulación de una noción de individuo plausible.Our intuition says us that in spite of belonging to a determinate world we are physically free. We will argue that after this postulate is an erroneous conception of subject that very falsely makes us think that we chose to do what we ended up doing. Against this argument, Galen Strawson raises an objection based indeed on the impossibility of the agent to form itself, but it is an objectionthat falls to the same one mistaken subject notion. From this point, we will analyze the dennettian arguments in favour of the compatibilism which will allow us to conclude pointing at the correct direction that would have to cross all attempt of stipulation of a reasonable notion of individual. (shrink)

In Words and Meaning in Metasemantics, Juan José Colomina-Almiñana argues that language meaning determination requires close attention to the constant interaction between speech communities, speaker's intentions, and the audience's uptakes.

In his work Bruno, Schelling elaborates for the first time a concept of freedom and independence of the finite that extends through his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804, to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811—Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The question we will address in this article—taking a necessary detour through Bruno themes—concerns the status of the finite as such and how it is at all possible (...) to admit both the existence of a world of finite beings as it appears to consciousness and the positing of an Absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling’s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real. The split opened by the duality of the two principles will continue in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 and will become more evident in the other works of the 1800s that are the subject of our broader philosophical interest. In analyzing Bruno, we fill for the first time a major existing gap in Schelling’s now-renowned middle metaphysics culminating in his Freedom Essay of 1809 as well as proving its inception in the unresolved problems of the system prior to 1809. (shrink)

The dialogue Bruno of 1802 is arguably the natural starting point for any investigation on the concepts of finitude, evil and human freedom in Schelling’s middle metaphysics. In this dialogue the author elaborates for the first time in his system a concept of freedom and independence of the finite, which extends via his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811 – Stuttgart Private Lectures and The (...) Ages of the World. The central ontological problem of the dialogue relates to the possibility of a separation between the absolute and the world as space of finite beings, which, according to the system of identity first presented in 1801, cannot exist as such. The question we will then address concerns the status of the finite as such and how would it be possible to admit both its existence for consciousness and the positing of an absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling’s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real. (shrink)

Se trata de pensar y abrir el horizonte del ser-con desde los análisis fenomenológicos vertidospor Heidegger en la I Sección de su libro Ser y Tiempo, respetando y aceptando sus propiaslimitaciones intrínsecas y a pesar del carácter aparentemente negativo que rodea a este existenciario,a fin de radicalizarlo, extenderlo y ubicarlo en su posibilidad más genuina. Por esta razón, a través deuna interpretación de corte fenomenológico, se ha querido potenciar los posibles rendimientos de unser-con en propiedad, enfatizando la necesidad de interpretar (...) el opus magnum heideggeriano desdeel horizonte de la mismidad del Dasein. La conclusión apunta sobre dos vías temáticas, a saber: a) atomar la mismidad del Dasein, por cuanto constituye una posibilidad ejecutiva de existir conforme alo que este ente es, en tanto condición necesaria y suficiente para pensar un ser-con en propiedad; b) aestablecer, casi a modo de esbozo, una relación entre ser-con, libertad y mismidad, la cual tiene su basetemática en una presumible igualdad de orden pre-ontológico. (shrink)

In this article, we present for the first time Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804–1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature (...) and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an ‘infinite task’. Schelling’s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand. (shrink)

This article presents three studies examining the importance of identification with characters in research on media entertainment. In Study 1 it was found that identification with characters was associated with spectators' degree of enjoyment of feature films of different genres. Study 2 showed that identification with characters predicts the affective impact of a dramatic film and, also, it was associated with greater cognitive elaboration and a more complex reflexive process during the viewing of the dramatic film. In Study 3 it (...) was observed that identification with characters predicted the incidental impact of a full length fictional film on attitudes and beliefs. These results support the centrality of the construct of identification with characters in narrative persuasion research. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal del artículo es terminar quién es el Dasein desde el aparecer del mundo en la obra de Martin Heidegger Ser y tiempo. Para ello, se plantea la posibilidad de aprehensión del horizonte del sí mismo del Dasein, en contra de los propios análisis heideggerianos sobre el uno, y, también, se muestra de qué manera la mismidad del Dasein se presupone ya en el modo de aparición del mundo-entorno a través del existenciario significatividad. La conclusión del artículo (...) intentará descubrir los posibles rendimientos fenomenológicos de la apertura del horizonte del sí-mismo del Dasein.The main goal of the paper is to determine who is the Dasein itself from the appearance of the world in the Book of Martin Heidegger Being and time. For this, it raises the possibility of understanding the horizon of the self of Dasein itself differently to Heidegger’s analysis about the they and also it shows how the Selfhood of Dasein is presupposed already in the appearance of the world-environment through the existential meaningfulness. The conclusion of this paper will try to discover the phenomenological yields of Dasein’s openness as horizon of its Selfhood. (shrink)

The main aim of this work is to indirectly display, through an analysis of the concepts of world, God, and human freedom, the shift from a harmonious concept of nature to another chaotic, darker, and pre-rational. It is important to relate this transformation, which takes place around 1807, to the change in Schelling’s ideas about the relationship between God and the world to weaken a previous Spinozist monistic standpoint. These changes in turn affect Schelling’s view of the concept of unity. (...) He now modifies the notions of immanence and pantheism in favour of a dualistic doctrine of particular and finite existence that we could relate to Kierkegaard and later existentialists. Finally, we introduce Schelling’s theory of love. Love is a mode of union through free will and personal choice that neutralizes the totalizing metaphysics of identity associated to the systematic construction of idealism from Spinoza to Hegel, and that Schelling criticizes, in his middle and late philosophy, as a resource to a self-transparent and overdetermining Absolute. (shrink)

Hay en la obra de Juan José Sebreli, más allá de la diversidad de los temas, una sorprendente continuidad. En esta obra, ambiciosa y de madura reflexión, Sebreli encara la síntesis de los problemas que lo han obsesionado desde los años 60. Los analiza ahora desde una perspectiva originalísima, a la que contribuyen sin duda los cambios experimentados por el mundo y por él mismo. El asedio a la modernidad, publicada en Argentina en 1991 y totalmente revisada para la (...) actual edición, es una apasionante y apasionada revisión crítica de las ideas predominantes en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. A partir de hilos constructores hábilmente detectados por el autor, a través de marcas y huellas que señalan semejanzas o diferencias, aparecen unidas corrientes de pensamiento tan distintas a primera vista como el existencialismo heideggeriano, Nietzsche, el estructuralismo, las filosofías críticas de la historia, la antropología culturalista, el funcionalismo, el psicoanálisis junguiano y lacaniano, el posestructuralismo, la reconstrucción, el posmodernismo. La abundancia de información, la coherencia metodológica y la originalidad de los planteamientos estimulan la lectura e instigan en algunos casos a la polémica. Sebreli no teme desdecirse, autocriticarse, romper con el pasado; si no es complaciente consigo mismo, tampoco lo es con el lector, a quien no trata de halagar. El asedio a la modernidad es, por lo tanto, un libro provocativo e ineludible, que despertara en el lector una seria curiosidad por los nuevos rumbos del conocimiento. (shrink)

Este libro está dirigido a quien desee familiarizarse con los problemas clásicos y contemporáneos de la ética. Pero también está escrito desde un punto de vista y refleja una posición personal de l autora en torno a esta disciplina. En este libro se encontrarán nociones sobre un saber sistematizado que constituye el corazón de los conocimientos filosóficos. Pero en cuanto que la ética nos muestra esa pequeña pero poderosa arma que constituye la voluntad de transformación, liberación y cambio del ser (...) humano cabe esperar que la lectura de este tratado iniciador en la disciplina contribuya a la mejora de la vida y la sociedad humanas. (shrink)

This paper regards Leonardo Polo’s motivation for his proposal of a new method in metaphysics, the science of being. It is presented a brief comparison with similar motivations in the area of Thomistic thought. The three main points of the proposal are: the problem of the mental limit, the notion of habitual knowledge, the distinction between metaphysics and the transcendental anthropology.

This article presents a systematic literature review on quality management and social responsibility (focusing on ethical and social issues). It uses the literature review to identify the parallels between quality management and social responsibility, the extent to which qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods are used, the countries that have contributed most to this area, and how the most common quality management practices facilitate social responsibility. The literature review covers articles about quality management and social responsibility (focusing on ethical and social (...) categories) based on a computer search in three databases, namely ABI Inform, Emerald and Science Direct, and includes articles dealing with the subject that were found in the lists of references of the articles found in the primary search, as well as a search in six top management journals. The results show (1) the journals most likely to publish this type of article; (2) the range of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods used; (3) the most productive countries in this field; (4) the parallels between quality management and social responsibility; and (5) how the most common quality management practices facilitate ethical behaviour and social aspects. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza ciertas controversias en torno a las interpretaciones biopolíticas de Arendt. Recientemente, algunos de sus comentaristas han enfatizado las nuevas perspectivas teóricas que ciertos conceptos claves de Arendt («Natalidad», «Libertad», «Poder», «Vida») podrían ofrecer desde el paradigma biopolítico. Sin embargo, estas reinterpretaciones no parecen ser fieles al fundamento original de tales conceptos —la fenomenología—. Intentaré mostrar aquí que es necesario: a) precisar la viabilidad de estas interpretaciones; b) calibrar su alcance; y c) hacer visible el riesgo de operar (...) con ellas una tergiversación del pensamiento aredtiano. Si es plausible mostrar esta incompatibilidad, podremos mostrar también algunos de los límites interpretativos del paradigma biopolítico. (shrink)