The rapid turnover of senatorial families during the Principate is a well-known phenomenon, but one which awaits satisfactory explanation. Comparative evidence shows the rate of turnover to have been unusually high. For example, the old aristocratic families of early modern Europe gave way to new at a much slower rate. Patterns of Roman property-holding and of the transmission of wealth from one generation to the next must have been closely associated with this rapid turnover. When an aristocratic family produced no (...) offspring who reached adulthood, the normal pattern of passing the bulk of the estate from one generation to the next within the family was interrupted. On the other hand, if a family produced many children, it might well become impoverished in the process of providing for all of them. Consequently, to perpetuate the family line with its status intact required careful financial and family planning. It was necessary to use or to take into account the various laws and customs regarding the family, including those regulating division of the estate among heirs, adoption, dowry and so on. (shrink)

The paper elaborates the classical pragmatist understanding of cognition as a transformational process. The pragmatists’ emphasis on the situatedness of cognition, on abductive moves and feeling will also be discussed in the light of the contemporary debate on conceptuality and givenism. Our inquiry on a classical pragmatist approach shifts today’s emphasis on knowledge qua justification of belief and suggests ways to transcend the dualism of conceptuality vs. non-conceptuality. Reconsidering the Peircean category of Firstness, Dewey’s quality of situations and Gendlin’s felt (...) sense as subtle tacit moments in cognitive processes enhance a fine-grained and contextualized understanding of cognition in terms of a transformative process. (shrink)

Martial wrote about himself and his participation in the everyday life of Rome more than any other extant poet of the post-Augustan Principate. More particularly, dozens of his epigrams describe the life of the ordinary client and his treatment by great and often arrogant patrons. Unfortunately for social and literary historians, however, Martial was writing satirical epigrams, not autobiography. Consequently, his poetry cannot be taken at face value as a direct reflection of Roman life. With regard to literary patronage, the (...) difficulties of interpretation have allowed modern scholars to reach diametrically opposed conclusions. One editor and commentator baldly labelled Martial ‘a chronic beggar’ who ‘despite his numerous friends and the many patroni to whom he paid court,…dragged on a hand-to-mouth existence’. In a recent and more detailed study, on the other hand, Martial is portrayed as a man of independent means, who looked to his powerful amici not for financial support so much as for help in publicizing his work and for protection in literary squabbles. (shrink)

In this paper I am going to present several ideas selected from the field of two important current inputs to the interface of philosophy and psychoanalysis. First, there is the study of Linda Brakel who confronts Freudian unconscious with meaning theory, i.e. the philosophy of Donald Davidson. Brakel feels that the approach of Davidson/Cavell misinterprets the Freudian concepts and robs it of its central characteristics. She insists in the primary process which she describes as representational, contentful and a-rational. The second (...) input is to be found within today’s reception of Kant in the epistemological field. The debates depart from the controversial issue of whether Kant was a conceptionalist or a non-conceptionalist and frequently refer to McDowells Mind and World. Then I will present my own approach that combines psychoanalytical ideas with an application of Peircean categories. My aim is to show that this approach contributes to the understanding of mind in general. In comparing the philosophical concepts with psychoanalytical ones, I will point out the specific place of psychoanalytical concepts within the theory of knowledge. I will conclude by pleading for the integration of the psychoanalytic ideas into a broader theory of thinking. Furthermore, the meaning of this integration on psychoanalysis itself will be evaluated. (shrink)

Wie kann der Prozess des Denkens erfasst werden, wenn doch unsere Reflexionen bereits das Resultat dessen sind, was erfasst werden soll? Die Tatigkeit des Denkens in Worte zu fassen, scheint dazu verurteilt zu sein, hinter dem Phanomen her zu hinken, das erfasst werden sollte. Das Denken zu untersuchen, ohne seine Prozesshaftigkeit auszuklammern, kann als radikale Reflexion bezeichnet werden. Sie behauptet nicht, ihren Gegenstand als unabhangig von der Art des Herangehens "gegeben" zu beschreiben, sondern stellt sich der Denkerfahrung und auch den (...) Gefuhlsnuancen, die eine wichtige Rolle beim Denken und Artikulieren spielen. Sie manifestiert sich in originellen Ansatzen aus Philosophie, Psychotherapie, Anthropologie und Kognitionswissenschaften und bringt innovative Denkstile jenseits hergebrachter Dualismen hervor. Mit Beitragen von Vincent Colapietro, Terrence Deacon, Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, Eugene Gendlin, Steven Hayes, Claire Petitmengin, Vera Saller, Donata Schoeller und Susan Stuart. (shrink)

I. THE TASK OF DOGMATICS As a theological discipline dogmatics is the scientific self- examination of the Christian Church with respect to the content of ...

Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant (...) can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on two questions. First, what is Kant's understanding of the sense in which our faculties form a unified system? And, second, what are the implications of this for the metaphysical relationships between the faculties within this system? To consider these questions, I begin with a brief discussion of Longuenesse's groundbreaking work on the teleological unity of the understanding as the faculty for judgment. In doing so, I argue for a generalization of Longuenesse's account along two (...) dimensions. The result is a picture of our faculties as forming a teleological system—unified under the overarching aims of reason as the highest rational faculty. Then I discuss the recent debate between “additive” and “transformative” interpretations of the relationship between sensibility and the understand- ing, before proposing that we should interpret Kant as endorsing a moderate form of the “transformative” reading, which captures important elements of both the “additive” and the “transformative” account. (shrink)

Die These von einer Achsenzeit in der Weltgeschichte Die zentrale Annahme dieses Buches ist die universalgeschichtliche These von einer Achsenzeit (880-200 v. Chr.) in der Weltgeschichte, in der voneinander unabhangig in China, Indien und dem Abendland strukturell ahnliche kulturelle Revolutionen und Aufbruche erfolgt sind. Inwieweit diese Aufbruche fur das kulturelle Leben in der Gegenwart weiterhin bedeutsam sind, wird heute in kulturwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen wie der Religions- und Kultursoziologie, der vergleichenden Kulturtheorie, der Theorie der Moderne u.a. neu diskutiert. Neben der These von (...) der Achsenzeit wird in Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte u.a. der Stellenwert von Wissenschaft und Technik in der Moderne erortert; es werden Uberlegungen uber eine mogliche Welteinheit (im Sinne eines Weltfriedenszustandes) angestellt sowie zeitgeschichtliche Tendenzen in der Politik (z.B. Totalitats- und Planungsideologien) kritisiert, die im Gegensatz zu Jaspers' liberalem Ethos der Freiheit und der Humanitat stehen. (shrink)

Argues that there are two distinct senses in which knowledge is incompatible with accidental truth - each of which can be traced to a distinct role played by everyday knowledge attributions.

The intent of Jaspers' philosophizing then is simply to recall us to our authentic situation. This recall is not itself a doctrine; it is only the stimulus to an inward action each must perform for himself in communication with others. Jaspers' Existenz-philosophy is thus an attempt to consider and enact human honesty; it is philosophy, not as wisdom, but as the love of wisdom.

Many sophisticated essays and books have been written about the topic of consciousness. My own contributions date back some twenty-five years in an essay entitled 'Problems concerning the structure of consciousness' (Pribram 1976), and five years before that in delineating the difference between brain processes that are coordinate with awareness and those that are coordinate with habitual behavior (Pribram 1971a). I have been intrigued by what has been written since and take this occasion to reassess a few of the major (...) issues that have arisen. (shrink)

This is one of Barth's most important works - far more important than may appear at first sight.... Here we have not merely one great theologian taking the measure of another. That in itself would be interesting enough. But in addition to that we are here shown one great theologian clarifying and crystallizing, in conversation with another, his own ideas as to the nature of theology and of the theologian's task. Scottish Journal of Theology.

The present book tries to show that the transcentendal-pragmatic approach to discourse ethics can reconstruct the genesis of this situation and provide a ...

With the publication of Reason and Existenz, originally delivered as a series of five lectures at the University of Groningen in 1935, one of the most important of Jaspers's philosophic works is made available to the English-speaking world. It concerns itself with a general statement of the principal philosophic categories which have given uniqueness to Jaspers's thinking: existence, freedom, and history, and the limit-situations of death, suffering, and sin. Written shortly after Jaspers's major systematic work and before his analysis of (...) the problem of truth, Reason and Existenz occupies a primary position in the development of his thought. (shrink)

Julius Sachs (1832–1897), who has been quite rightly called “the father of plant physiology,” was a German physiologist of international standing, whose research interests contributed to virtually every branch of the plant sciences, and whose work presaged plant molecular biology and systems biology. Here, we focus on one of his last publications, from 1892, wherein he argued that the term “cell” (_Zelle_) is misleading and should be replaced by “energid” (_Energide_), which he defined as “a nucleus together with the corresponding (...) protoplasm that is governed by it,” based on his observations of coenocytic algae such as _Caulerpa_ whose nuclei “can only control” so much cytoplasm. Although most of his colleagues did not accept this novel terminology for the description of the “basic, minimal living unit” (_Elementarorganismus_) of animals, plants, and microbes, we argue that the energid concept prefigured the subsequent discovery of mRNA. We also argue that the resistance to the energid concept revolved around a deep-seated philosophical debate between those adhering to cell theory versus organismal theory. The first English translation of the seminal work by Sachs, “Physiologische Notizen. II. Beiträge zur Zellentheorie. a) Energiden und Zellen,” originally published in _Flora_ (75: 57–67, 1892), is provided as a separate article in this volume as part of the journal’s “Classics in Biological Theory” collection ( https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00399-w ); the original German version is available here as supplementary material in the online version of this article. (shrink)

Provides a thorough background study of the postmodern assault on the standpoint of the subject as a foundation for philosophy, and assesses what remains today of the philosophy of subjectivity.

In a new foreword to this edition, Richard M. Owsley provides a brief overview of Jaspers' life and achievement.

The roles played by physics in the study of the life sciences have taken many forms over the past 100 years. Here we analyze how physics can be brought to bear on the contemporary study of morphogenesis, where new tissue-scale forms arise out of simpler, more homogenous, initial structures. We characterize how morphogenesis has been studied through reductionist approaches and discuss their limitations. We suggest that an alternative way of approaching morphogenesis that begins with a consideration of the whole may (...) also serve as a fruitful mode of scientific inquiry. Through historical analysis of concepts relevant for contemporary systems biology, we illustrate how physical thinking oriented toward the biological whole (“holistic biophysical thinking”) was exemplified in the biological theories presented earlier by D’Arcy Thompson (1860–1948) and Pere Alberch (1954–1998). We contrast the use of physics to develop the conceptual foundations of holistically oriented systems biology with the more prevalent contemporary use of physics that focuses on technological development and quantification, embedded within reductionist strategies. As an in-depth contemporary case study, we describe how in our research we have used holistic biophysical thinking to develop biological theories of vertebrate morphogenesis that account for and extend beyond genetic, molecular, and cellular processes. We propose a theory of skin development where _both_ molecular _and_ morphological patterns are orchestrated by emergent physical processes at the supracellular scale. We further posit that holistic biophysical thinking at the supracellular scale may advance theories of diseases such as cancer. (shrink)

Castoriadis portrays the psyche in its originary state as a ‘psychic monad’ - an infantile psyche that experiences itself as omnipotent, omnipresent, undifferentiated and sufficient unto itself. According to Castoriadis, this totality is fragmented in a ‘triadic phase’ through the experience of desire, which brings to the fore the encounter with the Other. In contrast, Marcel Gauchet rejects the concept of the psychic monad, arguing that the unformed psyche enters the world with a primordial openness to being formed and transformed. (...) Psychic tension does not arise from the immersion of the closed monad in a hostile world, but from within the psyche itself, for the psyche must form itself and be formed by the world. Gauchet’s understanding of an inherent psychic tension provides an important corrective to Castoriadis’s theory of the monad that nevertheless remains consistent with Castoriadis’s anthropology. (shrink)