En situant l’œuvre de Pannenberg comme une réponse à K. Barth et à la théologie dialectique, l’article analyse le renouvellement apporté au concept de révélation : non seulement l’histoire toute entière est révélation de Dieu, mais la résurrection du Christ anticipe de manière proleptique le sens et la fin de l’histoire. L’œuvre dogmatique de Pannenberg développe ces affirmations sans en négliger les conséquences anthropologiques.

La signification de la Torah pour l’éthique chrétienne se prête à trois perspectives différentes : la création divine, la rédemption en Christ, la sanctification par l’Esprit Saint. Selon la première approche, examinée à partir de Thomas d’Aquin, la Torah affirme que la « loi naturelle » est inscrite par le Créateur dans le coeur de l’homme. Selon la seconde, christologique, suivie dans les écrits de Luther, la relation créatrice se trouve reprise dans la dialectique Loi-Évangile, en évitant à la fois (...) des tendances antinomistes et légalistes. Dans la dernière perspective, pneumatologique, présente entre autres chez Barth et Bonhoeffer, la Torah est, toujours à nouveau, un « enseignement » qui forme le caractère du chrétien à l’image du Christ. Le « commandement concret » ne se découvre que dans la situation même de la décision, en tant que parole concrète de l’Esprit Saint. (shrink)

Le rire est un phénomène qui touche aussi bien le corps que l’âme de l’homme. Helmuth Plessner l’interprète comme le signe d’une existence contradictoire propre à la condition humaine, une existence à la frontière, marquée par l’ambivalence de la relation corps-âme. Quant au comique, un des déclencheurs principaux du rire, la plupart des philosophes le décrivent aussi comme l’apparition d’une contradiction et d’une incongruité. Dans l’histoire de la théologie, le rire a souvent été critiqué ou même interdit. Par contre, le (...) Moyen-Age connaît une culture du comique et même une valorisation théologique du rire. Le rire du chrétien ne peut-il être compris comme expression de son existence contradictoire de pécheur et de justifié ? Placé « à l’extérieur de lui-même », en tant que pécheur gracié, le chrétien est désormais capable de rire. Laughter is a phenomenon that affects man’s body as well as his soul. Helmuth Plessner interprets it as the sign of the contradictory existence which is peculiar to the human condition, a border existence, marked by the ambivalence of the body-soul relationship. The person who is most successful in triggering laughter is the comic; most philosophers describe him also as the appearance of contradiction and incongruity. In the history of theology laughter has often been criticized or even forbidden. In the Middle Ages, however, there was a culture of the jester and even a theological esteem of laughter. Could not the Christian’s laughter be understood as the expression of his contradictory existence of being sinner and justified? Placed « outside himself » as a sinner who has been pardoned, the Christian is henceforth able to laugh. (shrink)

Le concept de personne humaine joue sans aucun doute un rôle clé dans les débats bioéthiques de nos jours, notamment en ce qui concerne le début et la fin de la vie humaine. Les difficultés d’un recours à cette notion sont pourtant réelles, comme le montre l’opposition emblématique de deux penseurs, Peter Singer et Robert Spaemann, qui défendent des positions contraires quant à la relation entre l’appartenance à l’espèce humaine et le statut de personne. Par le biais d’une analyse de (...) leurs réflexions, nous remettrons en question la force argumentative de ce concept, puis nous proposerons une approche qui se base davantage sur la notion de « téléologie humaine ». (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) est l'un des penseurs contemporains les plus lus parmi les théologiens, qui ont très tôt salué sa capacité à porter la philosophie au devant de la Bible et de la théologie. Des théologiens des Facultés de Heidelberg et de Strasbourg voudraient ici, pour la première fois, rendre compte de la réception théologique de l'oeuvre philosophique de Paul Ricoeur dans leurs champs respectifs : l'exégèse biblique (M. Oeming, G. Theißen), l'histoire du christianisme (A. Noblesse-Rocher), la théologie systématique (F. (...) Rognon, D. Frey), et la théologie pratique (F. Lienhard, J. Cottin). (shrink)

L’unité des disciplines théologiques n’est pas toujours facile à percevoir. L’étude des textes bibliques, d’une part, et la réflexion sys­tématique, d’autre part, suivent chacune leur logique et leurs méthodes, pour ne rien dire des disciplines historiques et pratiques ! Afin de répondre à la demande toujours grandissante d’une approche interdisciplinaire, les soussignés, tous deux enseignants à la Faculté de théologie protestante de l’Université Marc Bloch, l’un bibliste, l’autre éthicien, a..

I discuss the relationship between different versions of the equivalence principle in general relativity, among them Einstein's equivalence principle, the weak equivalence principle, and the strong equivalence principle. I show that Einstein's version of the equivalence principle is intimately linked to his idea that in GR gravity and inertia are unified to a single field, quite like the electric and magnetic field had been unified in special relativistic electrodynamics. At the same time, what is now often called the strong equivalence (...) principle, related to the local validity of special relativity, can also be found in Einstein's writings, albeit by a different name and clearly separated from what he calls the equivalence principle. I discuss both the development of Einstein's thoughts on the different versions of the equivalence principle, their relationship to the relativity principle, as well as later reflections and variants proposed. (shrink)

Karsten M. Thiel interpretiert die Genealogie der Moral neu. Er rückt Nietzsches Kritik an der Geschichtsschreibung ins Zentrum der Betrachtung und nimmt so seiner Moralkritik alles Schrille, das ihr gewöhnlich anhaftet. Für Nietzsche muss die Geschichtsschreibung über einen belastbaren Begriff von Vergangenheit verfügen. Doch wie konnte es zu einer Geschichtsschreibung ohne einen solchen Begriff überhaupt kommen? Nietzsches Antwort ist verblüffend. Für ihn war Geschichtsschreibung bisher fast immer teleologisch, ausgerichtet auf ein Ideal statt auf die Vergangenheit. Sein Gegenmodell ist die (...) Genealogie: Sinn vergeht, indem er von späterem Sinn "überschrieben" wird. In der Genealogie der Moral ist ein solches Überschreiben mehrfach zu beobachten. die Sklavenmoral erobert den Sinn der Herrenmoral, der archaische Vertrag zwischen Schuldner und Gläubiger wird immer wieder neu ausgelegt, wird zu Gerechtigkeit, schlechtem Gewissen und Schuld. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Foucault’s theory of power and subjectification challenges common concepts of freedom in social philosophy and expands them through the concept of ‘freedom as critique’: Freedom can be defined as the capability to critically reflect upon one’s own subjectification, and the conditions of possibility for this critical capacity lie in political and social institutions. The article develops this concept through a critical discussion of the standard response by Foucault interpreters to the standard objection that Foucault’s thinking obscures freedom. The standard response (...) interprets Foucault’s later works, especially The Subject and Power, as a solution to the problem of freedom. It is mistaken, because it conflates different concepts of freedom that are present in Foucault’s work. By differentiating these concepts, this article proposes a new institutionalist approach to solve the problem of freedom that breaks with the partly anarchist underpinnings of Foucault scholarship: As freedom as critique is not given, but itself a result of subjectification, it entails a demand for ‘modal robustness’ and must therefore be institutionalized. This approach helps to draw out the consequences of Foucault’s thinking on freedom for postfoundationalist democratic theory and the general social-philosophical discussion about freedom. (shrink)

Despite its linguistic roots in ancient Greek, the concept of empathy is of recent intellectual heritage. Yet its history has been varied and colorful, a fact that is also mirrored in the multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. In its philosophical heyday at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, empathy had been hailed as the primary means for gaining knowledge of other minds and as the method (...) uniquely suited for the human sciences, only to be almost entirely neglected philosophically for the rest of the century. Only recently have philosophers become again interested in empathy in light of the debate about our folk psychological mindreading capacities. In the second half of the last century, the task of addressing empathy was mainly left to psychologists who thematized it as a psychological phenomenon and process to be studied by the method of the empirical sciences. Particularly, it has been studied by social psychologists as a phenomenon assumed to be causally involved in creating prosocial attitudes and behavior. Nevertheless, within psychology it is at times difficult to find agreement of how exactly one should understand empathy; a fact of which psychologists themselves have become increasingly aware. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the concept of empathy by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. (shrink)

Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Karsten Schubert liefert die erste systematische Rekonstruktion der sozialphilosophischen Debatte um Freiheit bei Foucault und eine neue Lösung für das Freiheitsproblem: Freiheit als die Fähigkeit zur reflexiven Kritik der eigenen Subjektivierung – kurz: Freiheit als Kritik – ist das Resultat von freiheitlicher Subjektivierung in politischen Institutionen. Der Band zeigt so die Konsequenzen von Foucaults Freiheitsdenken für die Demokratietheorie und die allgemeine sozialphilosophische Freiheitsdiskussion auf.

Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated by results that can be described as involving changes in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In our paper we take issue with this problem on two accounts. First, we elucidate what is (...) meant by “becoming another person” from a conceptual point of view. After critically discussing two broad approaches we concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we discuss several approaches to determine what distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function model” highlighting the importance of specific dependency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure changes in individual identity and argue that many of the instruments now commonly used in selecting and monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this purpose. Future research in this area is advised combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as a basis of sound ethical appraisal. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a revived interest in super-substantivalism, the idea that spacetime is the only fundamental substance and matter some kind of aspect, property or consequence of spacetime structure. However, the metaphysical debate so far has misidentified a particular variant of super-substantivalism with the position per se. I distinguish between a super-substantival core commitment and different ways of fleshing it out. I then investigate how general relativity and alternative spacetime theories square with the different variants of super-substantivalism.

The famous definition of landscape by Joachim Ritter unmistakably names the aesthetic act of construction that makes landscape vision possible: “Landscape is nature that is aesthetically present in the sight for a feeling and sensing observer”. Landscape is an aesthetic construct, in whose act of construction, however, social, cultural, individual and other constitutional factors flow. Following Karl Popper’s 3-world theory, a physical landscape (world 1), an individual landscape (world 2) and a social landscape (world 3) can be distinguished. In each (...) case, aesthetic and other constitutional factors are interconnected in a complex and complicated way. In addition, this situation is aggravated by the fact that different scientific basic positions (essentialism, positivism, constructivism) find their way into corresponding analyses (partly unreflected) and make scientific understanding difficult. Finally, this scientific starting position produces different paradigms, theories and terminology, which are often played off against each other and can lead to unfruitful dissent in science. The lecture counters this with a “neopragmatic” approach that can show that and how different paradigms, theories and conceptualisations can be related to each other in such a way that unfruitful dissent can be avoided and instead the advantages of the scientific plurality of theories, concepts and paradigms can be used and made fruitful for concrete research goals. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to folklore, Einstein never really cared for geometrizing the gravitational or the electromagnetic field; indeed, he thought that the very statement that General Relativity geometrizes gravity "is not saying anything at all". Instead, I shall show that Einstein saw the "unification" of inertia and gravity as one of the major achievements of General Relativity. Interestingly, Einstein did not locate this unification in the field equations but in his interpretation of the geodesic equation, the law of motion (...) of test particles. (shrink)

In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy (...) thesis.Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings about empathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance.Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists--who defend various forms of the empathy thesis--and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactive empathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections to empathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates. Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, although empathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations. (shrink)

Ever since Aristotle, metaphor has been placed in the context of a mimetic theory of language and of art. Metaphors are in some sense about reality. The poet uses metaphor to help reveal what is. He, too, serves the truth, even if his service is essentially lacking in that "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."1 Thus it is an improper naming. This impropriety invites a movement of interpretation that can come to rest only (...) when metaphorical has been replaced with a more proper speech. This is not to say, however, that such replacement is possible nor that interpretation can ever come to rest. What metaphor names may transcend human understanding so that our language cannot capture it. In that case, proper speech would be denied to man. But regardless of whether we seek proper speech with man, for example, with the philosopher, or locate it beyond man with God, or think it only an idea that cannot find adequate realization, as long as we understand metaphor as an improper naming, we place its telos beyond poetry. · 1. Aristotle Poetics 21. 1457b. 6-7. Karsten Harries, chairman of the department of philosophy at Yale University, is the author of several works on aesthetics, including The Meaning of Modern Art: A Philosophical Interpretation. He is currently writing a book on the Bavarian rococo church. See also: "On Thinking about Aristotle's 'Thought'" by James E. Ford in Vol. 4, No. 3. (shrink)

The Commission's recentinterpretation of the Precautionary Principleis used as starting point for an analysis ofthe moral foundation of this principle. ThePrecautionary Principle is shown to have theethical status of an amendment to a liberalprinciple to the effect that a state only mayrestrict a person's actions in order to preventunacceptable harm to others. The amendmentallows for restrictions being justified even incases where there is no conclusive scientificevidence for the risk of harmful effects.However, the liberal tradition has seriousproblems in determining when a (...) risk of harm isunacceptable. Nevertheless, reasonable liberalarguments in favor of precaution can be basedon considerations of irreversible harm andgeneral fear of harm. But it is unclear whenthere considerations can be overridden.Within the liberal framework, the Commissionadvocates a so-called proportional version ofthe Precautionary Principle. This should beclearly distinguished from a welfare-basedapproach to precaution based on risk-aversiveweighing up of expected costs and benefits.However, in the last resort, the Commissiondoes seem to make a covert appeal to suchconsiderations. (shrink)

Education is astonishingly simple. We have all been through it, whether as children or later in life—indeed, many of us are still going through it in some form or other; we all know what works; and we are all committed to realising its individual and social potential. Such a view of the matter might dispense with the need for philosophy of education altogether as the problems of education are seen as little more than puzzles to be solved. We know (or (...) think that we know) what we want to achieve, the challenge is how to do so most efficiently. If only the virtues of education were that perspicuous, that simple. If only the vices were so easily identified and expunged. It turns out that education is astonishingly complex. The following chapters aspire to re-introduce a certain complexity that abstains from an all-too-easy understanding. They seek not to offer solutions, but complications, disruptions and dissensions. The authors assume positions against the usual associations and evaluations regarding certain words and phrases—a revaluation that turns the virtues to vices and the vices to virtues. (shrink)

In this article I will challenge a received orthodoxy in the philosophy of social science by showing that Collingwood was right in insisting that reenactment is epistemically central for historical explanations of individual agency. Situating Collingwood within the context of the debate between simulation theory and what has come to be called “theory theory” in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology, I will develop two systematic arguments that attempt to show the essential importance of reenactment for our understanding of rational (...) agency. I will furthermore show that Gadamer’s influential critique of the reenactment model distinguishes insufficiently between the interpretation of certain types of texts and the explanation of individual actions. In providing an account of individual agency, we are committed to a realistic understanding of our ordinary scheme of actionexplanations and have thus to recognize the centrality of reenactment. Nevertheless, Collingwood’s emphasis on reenactment is certainly one-sided. I will demonstrate its limitations even for accounting for individual agency, and show how it has to be supplemented by various theoretical considerations, by analyzing the different explanatory strategies that Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen use to explain the behavior of the ordinary men in Reserve Battalion 101 during World War II. (shrink)

I describe how relativistic field theory generalizes the paradigm property of material systems, the possession of mass, to the requirement that they have a mass–energy–momentum density tensor T µ associated with them. I argue that T µ does not represent an intrinsic property of matter. For it will become evident that the definition of T µ depends on the metric field g µ in a variety of ways. Accordingly, since g µ represents the geometry of spacetime itself, the properties of (...) mass, stress, energy, and momentum should not be seen as intrinsic properties of matter, but as relational properties that material systems have only in virtue of their relation to spacetime structure. (shrink)

In deze beschouwing ordent Karsten Harries zijn gedachten over het fenomeen ‘kitsch’. Hij gaat daarbij uit van de vraag of kitsch eigenlijk wel zo afkeurenswaardig is. Of hoort ze bij de menselijke natuur en haar hang naar romantiek en nostalgie? We kwalificeren iets als kitsch als we denken dat het voortkomt uit onoprechtheid en getuigt van slechte smaak. Maar is de nostalgie, het dromerige of stichtelijke van kitsch niet beter dan postmoderne ironie of moedeloosheid? Daar staat tegenover dat kitsch (...) onder het mom van authenticiteit de werkelijkheid afbeeldt, maar deze feitelijk met zijn leugens aan het zicht onttrekt. Iets dergelijks geldt ook voor kitsch en religie: niet langer tracht het kunstwerk een werkelijkheid uit te beelden die ons voorstellingsvermogen te boven gaat, maar het wordt in de plaats van die werkelijkheid gesteld. In de politiek kan eenzelfde esthetisering de werkelijkheid een schijn van betekenis geven die mensen blind maakt voor de menselijkheid van hun medemensen. Niet kitsch, maar alleen het ‘aura’ van kunst kan en moet ons ontvankelijk maken voor deze werkelijkheid, die uitstijgt boven wat de rede kan bevatten. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss Danish perspectives on nature, showing the interdependence of conceptions of ‘nature’ and ‘nationhood’ in the formations of a particular cultural community. Nature, thus construed, is never innocent of culture and cannot therefore simply be ‘restored’ to some pristine, pre-lapsarian state. On the other hand, invocations of nature are effectively calls to action, often of a sort that involves a degree of restoration and conservation.

This article will defend the centrality of empathy and simulation for our understanding of individual agency within the conceptual framework of folk psychology. It will situate this defense in the context of recent developments in the theory of mind debate. Moreover, the article will critically discuss narrativist conceptions of social cognition that conceive of themselves as alternatives to both simulation and theory theory.

Translated by Henrik Rosenmeier, _A History of Ancient Philosophy_ charts the origins and development of ancient philosophical thought. For easy reference, the book is divided chronologically into six main parts. The sections are further divided into philosophers and philosophical movements: *Pre-Socratic Philosophy, including mythology, the Pythagoreans and Parmenides *The Great Century of Athens, including the Sophists and Socrates *Plato, including The Republic, The Symposium and The Timaeus *Aristotle, including The Physics, The Metaphysics and The Poetics *Hellenistic Philosophy, including the Sceptics, (...) the Stoics, the Epicureans and Cicero *Late Antiquity, including Neoplatonism, Origen and St Augustine. This comprehensive and meticulously documented book is structured to make ancient philosophical thought and ancient thinkers accessible. It contains: *full references to primary sources *detailed interpretations of key philosophical passages, including surveys of previous philosophical readings *an overview of the development of ancient philosophical thought *discussions of the relationships between philosophers and their ideas *analyses of key philosophical concepts and ideologies including ontology, epistemology, logic, semantics, moral and political philosophy, theology and aesthetics *explanations of Greek philosophical terminology. (shrink)

In seiner theoriegeschichtlichen Untersuchung rekonstruiert Karsten Fischer Entwicklungslinien zivilisationstheoretischer Kulturkritik von Nietzsche, Freud und Max Weber zu Adorno. Dies dient ihm zur Klärung der systematischen Frage nach einem möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen menschlicher Naturbeherrschung und sozialer Mutmaßung, dass ein ursprünglicher, zivilisationspsychologischer Zusammenhang zwischen der ideologischen Selbstermächtigung des Menschen zu gewaltsamer Unterwerfung der Natur und seiner Gewaltbereitschaft gegenüber seinen Artgenossen besteht, lässt sich weniger auf hegelianisch-marxistische Motive zurückführen als vielmehr auf Nietzsche, bei dem Horkheimers und Adornos These von der dialektisch in (...) Barbarei zurückschlagenden Aufklärung bereits angelegt ist. Von Nietzsche führt eine direkte Verbindung zu Sigmund Freud, dessen These, dass die zivilisatorische Tabuisierung zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt aus deren ursprünglicher Ausübung resultiert, von Adorno variiert wird. Statt der 'Tabuisierung' zwischenmenschlicher Gewalt problematisiert er die 'Legitimierung" gewaltsamer menschlicher Naturbeherrschung, was ein Interesse an Webers Rationalisierungstheorem begründet, das untergründige Verbindungen mit Freuds Zivilisationspsychologie aufweist. Auf der Basis dieser theoriegeschichtlichen Verortung, mit der eine grundlegend neue Lesart Adornos vorgeschlagen wir, lässt sich sein Theorem schließlich als Erklärungsangebot für die auch ins Abendland zurückgekehrten barbarischen Gewaltexzesse wie auch für das Problem fortschreitender Naturzerstörung diskutieren. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

MANY, PERHAPS MOST OF US, tend to connect art with the past. Faced with the art of our own time we become unsure: everything important seems to have been done, the vocabulary of art exhausted, and attempts to develop new vocabularies more interesting than convincing. Ours tends to be an autumnal view of art. The association of art and museum has come to replace such older associations as art and church, or art and palace. As we know it, the museum (...) is a comparatively recent institution, emerging only in the first half of the nineteenth century, thus lagging somewhat behind such related phenomena, as e.g., archeology, art-history, and neo-gothic architecture, all expressions of a museal [[sic]] attitude extending far beyond art to religion and even to nature. Consider the significance of setting aside a certain part of nature as a national monument. Monuments serve to commemorate, most often the dead. What do such natural monuments commemorate? Perhaps nature herself? But does nature need commemorating? Does it, too, lie behind us? Will future generations know nature only in the form of natural monuments? We do indeed live in an age which increasingly forces us to question whether nature still has a place in the modern world, whether it is not rather a relic from the past. By trying to preserve nature in specially created parks or monuments we show that this loss, although perhaps inevitable, is nevertheless felt to be serious. (shrink)

The problem of motion in general relativity is about how exactly the gravitational field equations, the Einstein equations, are related to the equations of motion of material bodies subject to gravitational fields. This article compares two approaches to derive the geodesic motion of matter from the field equations: the ‘T approach’ and the ‘vacuum approach’. The latter approach has been dismissed by philosophers of physics because it apparently represents material bodies by singularities. I argue that a careful interpretation of the (...) approach shows that it does not depend on introducing singularities at all and that it holds at least as much promise as the T approach. (shrink)

Einstein regarded as one of the triumphs of his 1915 theory of gravity - the general theory of relativity - that it vindicated the action-reaction principle, while Newtonian mechanics as well as his 1905 special theory of relativity supposedly violated it. In this paper we examine why Einstein came to emphasise this position several years after the development of general relativity. Several key considerations are relevant to the story: the connection Einstein originally saw between Mach's analysis of inertia and both (...) the equivalence principle and the principle of general covariance, the waning of Mach's influence owing to de Sitter's 1917 results, and Einstein's detailed correspondence with Moritz Schlick in 1920. (shrink)

One thing this book attempts to show is that Kant's antinomies open a way towards an overcoming of that nihilism that is a corollary of the understanding of reality that presides over our science and technology. But when Harries is speaking of the antinomy of Being he is not so much thinking of Kant, as of Heidegger. Not that Heidegger speaks of an antinomy of Being. But his thinking of Being leads him and will lead those who follow him on (...) his path of thinking into this antinomy. At bottom, however, the author is neither concerned with Heidegger’s nor Kant’s thought. He shows that our thinking inevitably leads us into some version of this antinomy whenever it attempts to grasp reality in toto, without loss. All such attempts will fall short of their goal. And that they do so, Harries claims, is not something to be grudgingly accepted, but embraced as a necessary condition of living a meaningful life. That is why the antinomy of Being matters and should concern us all. (shrink)

Wie wollen und können wir die Zukunft gestalten? Wie die Herausforderungen, die technische Innovationen, Digitalisierung und Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) mit sich bringen, meistern? In diesem Band kommen Philosophen, Ingenieur- und Naturwissenschaftler ebenso zu Wort wie Juristen, Bildungswissenschaftler und Ökonomen. Sie alle blicken vom speziellen Standpunkt ihres Fachs auf die Gestaltung der Zukunft. Als Brücke erweist sich dabei die Philosophie, welche die verschiedenen Perspektiven verknüpft und eint. Das Selbstverständnis von APHIN, des wissenschaftlichen und gemeinnützigen Arbeitskreises philosophierender Ingenieure und Naturwissenschaftler, – die (...) Offenheit für die Fragen und Probleme des jeweils anderen – ist damit in allen Beiträgen gegenwärtig. (shrink)

Even when we confine ourselves to poetry, we have to agree with Ortega y Gasset's observation that "the instrument of metaphoric expression can be used for many diverse purposes." It can be used to embellish or ennoble things or persons—Campion's poem offers a good example. Such embellishment need not involve semantic innovation. Metaphors can also function as weapons turned against reality. There are metaphors that negate the referential function of language so successfully that talk about truth or, for that matter, (...) about lattices or lenses seems inappropriate. Yet as poetry pushes towards this extreme, it may acquire a revelatory power all its own: from the ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic congruence but a silence that is heard as the language of transcendence. This is not to deny that metaphors can effect semantic change or help to establish a new world. As David Tracy's contribution to this symposium shows, Scripture furnished the most obvious example. Heidegger's claim that poetry establishes the world can indeed be shown to rest on this paradigm. It is a claim that tends to ascribe something of the prophetic power of Scripture to all great poetry. But, although we may long to rediscover the prophet in the poet, to what extent does the scriptural paradigm help to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially, the poetry of this godless age? Most modern poetry has an aesthetic character that is incompatible with a religious world view. Theories of poetic metaphor cannot afford to neglect the history of poetry, just as general theories of metaphor cannot afford to neglect the many uses of metaphor. (shrink)