Pufendorf makes a clear distinction between the physical constitution of human beings and their value as human beings, stressing that the latter is justified exclusively by the regular use of the free will. According to Pufendorf, the regular use of free will requires certain inventions (divine as well as human) imposed on the free will and called moral entities. He claims that these inventions determine the moral quality of a human being as well as the standards according to which human (...) beings and their actions are able to be judged. This article examines the normative aspects of Pufendorf’s concepts of moral value and moral estimation in regard to the epistemological question of the accessibility of moral entities for human beings. In the first part, it reconstructs Pufendorf’s doctrine of moral entities and the place of moral estimation in this doctrine. In the second part, it presents Pufendorf’s account of the moral philosophy as a science in order to explain his theory of moral normativity as imposed, and the role of a person in regard to the own moral status. In the last part, it illustrates some consequences in regard to the problem of slavery in Pufendorf. (shrink)

In his "Elementa Iuris Naturae et Gentium" Johann Gottlieb Heineccius presents a unique account of love as the principle of natural law, referring to the main concern of early modern protestant theories of natural law: the importance of securing subjective rights by a law. Heineccius accepts the universal character of subjective rights derived from human nature, claiming their protection as natural duties required by a law. This chapter provides an attempt to explain the specific ways in which Heineccius deals with (...) the paradoxical situation that the protection of subjective rights by a natural law theory requires certain limitations of the use of such rights, in order to avoid the mutual collision of such rights. For this purpose it focuses on the rights to free thought and free speech, which are very good example for that. While the first part reconstructs the way in which Heineccius claims the specific concern of natural law and points out continuities and discontinuities with his predecessors, the second part focuses on the requirement of natural law for limitation of free thought and free speech in case of collision of subjective rights. (shrink)

The articles contained in this collection look at the displacements, upheavals and dislocations in the traditional definition of obligation as experienced in the 18th and early 19th centuries from the perspective of the humanities and cultural studies. The works in this volume not only focus on Kantian moral philosophy, as the pinnacle of a specific modern development, but also examine the diverse other concepts of obligation and how they were formulated through literature, aesthetics, politics and pedagogy.

Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk has a place among the early Kantians in Halle as both a theologian and a philosophical thinker. After situating Tieftrunk within this intellectual history and determining his theological and philosophical position, this paper provides a chronological account of the concept of hope—which lies at the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy—in Tieftrunk’s writings on philosophy of religion. In particular, the discussion centers on the relationship between the foundation of hope in the moral law and the exclusion of a (...) legalistic fulfilment of hope. The “love of the law,” which emerges especially in Tieftrunk’s work, takes a prominent position in the interpretation. The investigation is accompanied by an evaluation of Tieftrunk’s role in the early reception of Kant. (shrink)

This paper considers the systematic relationship between faith and reason in Kant’s grounding and limiting of moral faith in the Canon of Pure Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first section addresses the interrelationship between Kant’s critique of knowledge and his critique of faith. The second section defines the complex interplay of theoretical and practical issues in Kant’s critical question of what a morally acting agent may hope for regarding the overall outcome of his actions. The third section (...) investigates Kant’s positioning of faith in relation to the epistemic modi of opining and knowing, and defines the specific status of moral faith in Kant. The textually based systematic analyses focus on the complementary relationship in Kant’s work between the way rational critique limits theoretical knowledge in favor of moral faith and the way this critique limits religious faith through moral consciousness. (shrink)

This Thesis is analyzing the transformation of Kant's argumentation on space from "Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume" (1768), "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis" (1770), and "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1781/87).

A history of the development of the concept of hope in German philosophy immediately after Kant.

This paper examines the concept of hope in the epistemology and psychology of Immanuel Kant and Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766-1827). The decisive question is how according to Kant hope can impair the objectivity of judgements about future and what are the positive and negative effects of this impairment. While for Kant hope is not essentially considered as an affect, he admits that it could transform into an affect and in this way it can impair the mood and its cognitive faculties (...) negatively. In my paper I examine this argumentations of Kant and their reception in the psychology and psychopathology of Hoffbauer, where hope as affect is even considered as a cause of madness and where Hoffbauer seems to suggest that the clinical state of madness can be effect of inappropriate use of the cognitive faculties of the soul. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of hope in the epistemology and psychology of Immanuel Kant and Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766-1827). The decisive question is how according to Kant hope can impair the objectivity of judgements about future and what are the positive and negative effects of this impairment. While for Kant hope is not essentially considered as an affect, he admits that it could transform into an affect and in this way it can impair the mood and its cognitive faculties (...) negatively. In my paper I examine this argumentations of Kant and their reception in the psychology and psychopathology of Hoffbauer, where hope as affect is even considered as a cause of madness and where Hoffbauer seems to suggest that the clinical state of madness can be effect of inappropriate use of the cognitive faculties of the soul. (shrink)

Moral judgements usually concern the moral responsibility of an acting person. Someone is considered praiseworthy or blameworthy for an action based on whether this action is according to or against moral norms. According to a Kantian account, the essential issue is the motivation of the acting person since this is a measure for being a moral cause of the action i.e. for intending it. Only moral causation allows the moral imputation of the action to the acting person. And moral motivation (...) always implies the use of practical reason, as the capacity of acting in accordance to rules, while there are two kinds of rules (categorical and hypothetical). To give priority to one of these would lead to moral merit or to moral guilt. The latter considers the acting person as treating himself or others merely as a means instead to respecting himself or others as persons i.e. as individuals able to act according to their own aims and to be responsible for that. We find such an account in Johann Christoph Hoffbauer’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of free will. While Kant is occasionally accused of inconsistency in claiming evil actions are real and imputable while claiming only good actions are free (and therefore imputable), Hoffbauer offers a consistent version of Kant’s theory of free will. In this paper, I analyze his interpretation, sketching first its pre-Kantian theoretical context, and second discussing Hoffbauer’s Kantian interpretation of the concepts of will and the faculty of choice, and using the case of a lie as an illustration. (shrink)