What sort of mental state is a delusion? What causes delusions? Why are delusions pathological? This book examines these questions, which are normally considered separately, in a much-needed exploration of an important and fascinating topic, Kengo Miyazono assesses the philosophical, psychological and psychiatric literature on delusions to argue that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Delusions belong to the same category as beliefs but - unlike healthy irrational beliefs - fail to play the function of beliefs. Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical (...) Inquiry will be of great interest to students of philosophy of mind and psychology and philosophy of mental disorder, as well as those in related fields such as mental health and psychiatry. (shrink)

In this essay, Chaya Herman explores the interaction between two powerful global dynamics that have affected educational institutions and society at large: one is neoliberalism, with its attendant notions of marketization and managerialism; the other is the resurgence of ethnic and religious, often fundamentalist, communities in the search for identity. The essay is based on a larger research project that explores the profound effects of the ideological and managerial restructuring process in Johannesburg’s Jewish community schools, the broader context for (...) which has been South Africa’s transformation to democracy. Herman suggests that these two dynamics are synergetic forces and that their accumulated effect has the power to shift the discourse of the community toward ghettoization and toward the creation of a homogenous community founded on a narrowly defined common identity. (shrink)

This paper presents a streamlined taxonomy for categorizing offensive language in Arabic, specifically Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the Levantine dialect. Addressing a gap in the existing literature, which has mainly focused on Indo-European languages, our taxonomy divides offensive language into seven levels (six explicit and one implicit). We adapted our framework from the simplified offensive language (SOL) taxonomy by (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara, Slavko Žitnik, Anna Bączkowska, Chaya Liebeskind, Jelena Mitrovic & Giedre Valunaite Oleškeviciente. 2021a. Lod-connected offensive language ontology and (...) tagset enrichment. In Shubert R. Carvalho & Renato R. Souza (eds.), Proceedings of the workshops and tutorials held at ldk 2021 co-located with the 3rd language, data and knowledge conference, Vol. 3064, 135–150. CEUR Workshop Proceedings), customizing it to reflect the unique linguistic and cultural nuances of Arabic. To validate this taxonomy, we created a new dataset from various social media platforms, primarily focusing on Twitter. This dataset was manually curated by human annotators and is described in detail within the paper, serving as both a validation tool for our taxonomy and a foundation for future research on offensive language detection in Arabic. Initial analysis of the dataset reveals complex patterns of offensive expressions in MSA and Levantine Arabic, underscoring the need to account for linguistic and cultural variations in studying online abuse. Our taxonomy and dataset are vital for advancing research in Arabic sociocultural studies, natural language processing, and linguistic analysis, and contribute to the study of low-resource languages. (shrink)

One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagination in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a preservative source, of justification. In other words, imagination generates new justification above and beyond prior justification provided by other sources. After clarifying the generation/preservation distinction (Section 2), we present an argument for generationism (...) about imagination, which can be divided into two parts; the philosophical part and the empirical part. In the philosophical part of our argument (Section 3), we claim that generationism about imagination follows from what we call “INACCESSIBILITY”. According to INACCESSIBILITY, imagination is properly constrained by the imaginative constrainers (i.e., the prior representations that constrain the development of a scenario in imagination) to which non-imaginative belief-forming processes do not have access. In the empirical part of our argument (Section 4), we claim that INACCESSIBILITY is plausible in light of relevant studies and theories in the empirical literature, especially the literature on mental simulation (Section 4.1), core cognition (Section 4.2), and intuitive physics (Section 4.3). (shrink)

Where is imagination in imaginative resistance? We seek to answer this question by connecting two ongoing lines of inquiry in different subfields of philosophy. In philosophy of mind, philosophers have been trying to understand imaginative attitudes’ place in cognitive architecture. In aesthetics, philosophers have been trying to understand the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. By connecting these two lines of inquiry, we hope to find mutual illumination of an attitude (or cluster of attitudes) and a phenomenon that have vexed philosophers. Our (...) strategy is to reorient the imaginative resistance literature from the perspective of cognitive architecture. Whereas existing taxonomies of positions in the imaginative resistance literature have focused on disagreements over the source and scope of the phenomenon, our taxonomy focuses on the psychological components necessary for explaining imaginative resistance. (shrink)

This article describes how ethical issues in health are approached and resolved within the framework of Jewish bioethics. Its main purpose is to explore the range of sources and methodologies used to determine the appropriate hierarchy of values for various ethical scenarios. Its major thrust is to illustrate how a divinely based but humanly negotiated ethical code stands firm upon ‘red flag’ principles, while at the same time, allowing for ‘shades of gray’ flexibility informed by given contexts. It provides significant (...) insights and practical tools that can be instrumental in decision making for nurses and other health providers of all faiths. The following ethical domains are addressed: respect for patient autonomy, truth-telling and allocation of resources. (shrink)

In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...) her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it “the systems reply” to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the “the systems reply” to Searle’s Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak’s claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply. (shrink)

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by (...) an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that “The Organization” painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all. (shrink)

The prevalence of sensationalized headlines and deceptive narratives in online content has prompted the need for effective clickbait detection methods. This study delves into the nuances of clickbait in Hebrew, scrutinizing diverse features such as linguistic and structural features, and exploring various types of clickbait in Hebrew, a language that has received relatively limited attention in this context. Utilizing a range of machine learning models, this research aims to identify linguistic features that are instrumental in accurately classifying Hebrew headlines as (...) either clickbait or non-clickbait. The findings underscore the critical role of linguistic attributes in enhancing the performance of the classification model. Notably, the employment of a machine learning model resulted in an impressive accuracy of 0.87 in clickbait detection. Moving forward, our research plan encompasses dataset expansion through the best machine learning model assisted labelling, with the objective of optimizing deep learning models for even more robust outcomes. This study not only advances clickbait detection in the realm of Hebrew but also emphasizes the fundamental importance of linguistic features in the accurate classification of clickbait. (shrink)

Narratives by survivors of abuse offer compelling entries into the experiences of abuse and its effects on health. Reading such stories can enlarge the clinician's understanding of the complexities of abuse. Furthermore, attention to narrative can enhance the therapeutic options for abuse victims not only in mental health arenas, but also in other medical contexts. In this article we define the genre of survivor narratives, examine one such narrative in particular (Push by Sapphire, 1996), and explore the clinical implications of (...) narrative in abuse victims' clinical care. (shrink)

Providing versus foregoing enteral nutrition is a central issue in end-of-life care, affecting patients, families, nurses, and other health professionals. The aim of this article is to examine Jewish ethical perspectives on nourishing the dying and to analyze their implications for nursing practice, education, and research. Jewish ethics is based on religious law, called Halacha. Many Halachic scholars perceive withholding nourishment in end of life, even enterally, as hastening death. This reflects the divide they perceive between allowing a fatal disease (...) to naturally run its course until an individual’s vitality (life force or viability) is lost versus withholding nourishment for the vitality that still remains. The latter they maintain introduces a new cause of death. Nevertheless, coercing an individual to accept enteral nourishment is generally considered undignified and counterproductive. A minority of Halachic scholars classify withholding enteral nutrition as refraining from prolonging life, permitted under certain circumstances, especially in situations where nutritional problems flow directly from a fatal pathology. In the very final stages of dying, moreover, there is a general consensus that enteral nourishment may be withheld, providing that this reflects the dying individuals’ wishes. In the event of enteral nourishment becoming a source of overwhelming discomfort, two Halachic ethical mandates would come into conflict: sustaining life by providing nourishment and alleviating suffering. As in all moral conflicts, these would have to be resolved in practice. This article presents the issue of enteral nourishment as it unfolds in Halacha in comparison to secular and other religious perspectives. It is meant to serve as a foundation for nurses to reflect on their own practice and to explore the implications for nursing practice, education, and research. In a world that remains broadly religious, it is important to sensitize health practitioners to the similarities and differences among religions and between secular and religious approaches to ethical issues. (shrink)

A slow but steady trend to decline routine immunization has evolved over the past few decades, despite its pivotal role in staving off life-threatening communicable diseases. Religious beliefs are among the reasons given for exemptions. In the context of an overview of various religious approaches to this issue, this article addresses the Jewish religious obligation to immunize. The latter is nested in the more general obligation to take responsibility for one’s health as it is essential to living a morally productive (...) life. Furthermore, the individual’s responsibility extends to supporting communal health by contributing to herd immunity. Judaism embraces evidence-based information regarding immunization safety and efficacy and holds the resulting professional guidelines to be religiously binding. From a Jewish perspective, government bodies need to weigh respect for individual autonomy to refrain from immunization against preserving public safety, such that waiving autonomy should be reserved for immediately life-threatening situations. Nurses’ knowledge and understanding of the Jewish legal approach as explicated in this article and those of other religions in which similar principles apply (such as Islam and Christianity) can enrich their awareness of how revering God can go hand in hand with an obligation to prevent illness for the self and the community by immunizing. (shrink)

An introduction to how the latest psychological studies are fundamentally altering our philosophical understanding of the mind.

In the previous discussions of irrationality in philosophy and psychology, the focus has been on irrationality at the level of individuals, such as irrational reasoning, irrational judgment, irrati...

The two-factor theory (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen 2001; Coltheart 2007; Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton 2010) is an influential account of delusion formation. According to the theory, there are two distinct factors that are causally responsible for delusion formation. The first factor is supposed to explain the content of the delusion, while the second factor is supposed to explain why the delusion is adopted and maintained. Recently, another remarkable account of delusion formation has been proposed, in which the notion of (...) “prediction error” plays the central role (Fletcher & Frith 2009; Corlett, Krystal, Taylor & Fletcher 2009; Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher & Krystal 2010). According to this account, the prediction-error theory, delusions are formed in response to aberrant prediction-error signals, those signals that indicate a mismatch between expectation and actual experience. -/- In this chapter, we examine the relationship between the two-factor theory and the prediction-error theory in some detail. Our view is that the prediction-error theory does not have to be understood as a rival to the two-factor theory. We do not deny that there are some important differences between them. However, those differences are not as significant as they have been presented in the literature. Moreover, the core ideas of the prediction-error theory may be incorporated into the two- factor framework. For instance, the aberrant prediction-error signal that is posited by prediction-error theorists can be (or underlie) the first factor contributing to the formation of some delusions, and help explain the content of those delusions. Alternatively, the aberrant prediction-error signal can be (or underlie) the second factor, and help explain why the delusion is adopted and maintained. (shrink)

As innovations in the field of vascular composite allotransplantation (VCA) progress, whole-eye transplantation (WET) is poised to transition from non-human mammalian models to living human recipients. Present treatment options for vision loss are generally considered suboptimal, and attendant concerns ranging from aesthetics and prosthesis maintenance to social stigma may be mitigated by WET. Potential benefits to WET recipients may also include partial vision restoration, psychosocial benefits related to identity and social integration, improvements in physical comfort and function, and reduced surgical (...) risk associated with a biologic eye compared to a prosthesis. Perioperative and postoperative risks of WET are expected to be comparable to those of facial transplantation (FT), and may be similarly mitigated by immunosuppressive protocols, adequate psychosocial support, and a thorough selection process for both the recipient and donor. To minimize the risks associated with immunosuppressive medications, the first attempts in human recipients will likely be performed in conjunction with a FT. If first-in-human attempts at combined FT-WET prove successful and the biologic eye survives, this opens the door for further advancement in the field of vision restoration by means of a viable surgical option. This analysis integrates recent innovations in WET research with the existing discourse on the ethics of surgical innovation and offers preliminary guidance to VCA programs considering undertaking WET in human recipients. (shrink)

: Sinhababu’s Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representations from Hume’s discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some (...) questions about the details. The aim of asking these questions is not to challenge Sinhababu’s proposal, but rather to point at some interesting issues arising out of his proposal. The questions are about the nature of vividness, the effects of vivid representations, and Sinhababu’s account of alief cases. Keywords: Vivid Representation; Desire; Procrastination; Akrasia; Alief Le rappresentazioni vivide e i loro effetti Riassunto: Humean Nature di Neil Sinhababu contiene molte idee interessanti e importanti; tuttavia in questo breve commento intendo concentrarmi sulle rappresentazioni vivide. Sinhababu eredita l’idea di rappresentazione vivida dalle analisi di Hume, in particolare dall’analisi delle passioni calme e violente. Condivido l’intento di sviluppare questa intuizione di Hume, ampiamente trascurata dai filosofi. Credo che Sinhababu e Hume siano sulla strada giusta. Quanto intendo fare in questo breve commento è sollevare alcune questioni di dettaglio, il cui fine non è quello di mettere in discussione la proposta di Sinhababu, quanto piuttosto di indicare alcuni punti interessanti che emergono dalla sua proposta. Le mie questioni investono la natura della vividezza, gli effetti delle rappresentazioni vivide e la descrizione di Sinhababu dei casi di alief. Parole chiave: Rappresentazione vivida; Desiderio; Temporeggiare; Akrasia; Cattiva volontà. (shrink)

The article Social epistemological conception of delusion, written by Kengo Miyazon and Alessandro Salice, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 17 September 2020 without open access.

This paper investigates the role of group identification in empathic emotion and its behavioral consequences. Our central idea is that group identification is the key to understanding the process in which empathic emotion causes helping behavior. Empathic emotion causes helping behavior because it involves group identification, which motivates helping behavior toward other members. This paper focuses on a hypothesis, which we call “self-other merging hypothesis (SMH),” according to which empathy-induced helping behavior is due to the “merging” between the helping agent (...) and the helped agent. We argue that SMH should be interpreted in terms of group identification. The group identification interpretation of SMH is both behaviorally adequate (i.e., successfully predicts and explains the helping behavior in the experimental settings) and psychologically plausible (i.e., does not posit psychologically unrealistic beliefs, desires, etc.). Empathy-induced helping behavior, according to the group identification interpretation of the SMH, does not fit comfortably into the traditional egoism/altruism dichotomy. We thus propose a new taxonomy according to which empathy-induced helping behavior is both altruistic at the individual level and egoistic at the group level. (shrink)

Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of paternalism that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people’s choice by modifying contextual factors (the “choice architecture”). This paper explores the possibility of an epistemic analogue of libertarian paternalism. What I call “epistemic libertarian paternalism” is a weak form of epistemic paternalism that recommends “epistemic nudges” rather than stronger paternalistic interventions. Epistemic nudges influence people’s beliefs and judgments by modifying contextual factors (the “epistemic choice architecture”). The main (...) aim of this paper is to defend epistemic libertarian paternalism from the “irrationality problem”, which I take to be the most urgent problem for epistemic libertarian paternalism; given how epistemic nudges work (i.e. they typically co-opt psychological biases), nudged beliefs are irrational. In response to the irrationality problem, I admit that nudged beliefs are often (not always, though) irrational, but insist that there are conditions in which epistemic nudging can be justifiable nonetheless. I will propose two conditions that are jointly sufficient for justifiable epistemic nudging: “Veridicality Condition” (which says that nudged beliefs are more likely to be true than non-nudged beliefs) and “Not-More-Irrationality Condition” (which says that nudged beliefs are not more likely to be irrational than non-nudged beliefs). (shrink)

The repertory grid method was used to determine what terminology respondents use to distinguish between different applications of genetic engineering drawn from food- related, agricultural, and medical applications. Respondents were asked to react to fifteen applications phrased in general terms, and results compared with a second study where fifteen more specific applications were used as stimuli. Both sets of data were submitted to generalized Procrustes analysis. Applications associated with animals or human genetic material were described as causing ethical concern, being (...) unnatural, harmful, and dangerous. Those involving plants or microorganisms were described as beneficial, progressive, and necessary. The results were validated in survey research, which indicated that general applications ofgenetic engineering were perceived as either positive or negative, whereas specific applications were more highly differentiated in perceptual terms. The results imply that the public debate about genetic engineering must take due account of the complexity of public concerns. (shrink)

This article argues that Hume is committed to the cognitive phenomenology of believing. For Hume, beliefs have some distinctively cognitive phenomenology, which is different in kind from sensory phenomenology. I call this interpretation the “cognitive phenomenal interpretation” (“CPI”) of Hume. CPI is coherent with, and supported by, the textual evidence from A Treatise of Human Nature as well as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In both texts, Hume talks about the distinctive “manner” of believing, and CPI provides us with the (...) best explanation of Hume’s remarks on this distinctive “manner.”. (shrink)

The central hypothesis of this book, Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry (Routledge, 2019), is that delusions are malfunctional beliefs (Chapter 1); they belong to the category of belief (Chapter 2) but, unlike mundane false or irrational beliefs, they fail to perform some functions of belief (Chapter 3). More precisely, delusions directly or indirectly involve some malfunctioning cognitive mechanisms, which is empirically supported by the two-factor account of delusion formation (Chapter 4).

Declan Smithies’ The Epistemic Role of Consciousness is a defense of “Phenomenal Mentalism” according to which, necessarily, which propositions X has epistemic justification to believe at any given time is determined solely by X’s phenomenally individuated mental states at that time. Smithies offers two kinds of arguments for Phenomenal Mentalism: the ones that appeal to particular cases such as blindsight and the ones that appeal to general epistemic principles such as the JJ principle. My focus is on the former. More (...) precisely, I focus on a particular argument from below in Chapter 3, which I call “Argument from Blindsight”. According to this argument, the cases of blindsight show that consciousness is necessary for perceptual justification. In response, I raise two worries about Argument from Blindsight: first, it is difficult to find a plausible interpretation of “full rationality” according to which the premises are true and, second, the argument oscillates between empirical and stipulative discussions of blindsight in a potentially problematic manner. (shrink)

SULLIVAN-BISSETTEMA, BRADLEYHELEN, AND NOORDHOFPAUL oup. 2017. pp. 272. £50.

This article explores “Inner Speech Account of Introspection”, according to which inner speech is the source of our introspective self-knowledge. The view hypothesizes that we come to know that we are thinking that p by being aware of the sentence of inner speech “p” accompanying the thought. I argue for Inner Speech Account by showing that it explains six explananda imposed for the philosophical theories of introspection; peculiar access, privileged access, detection condition, the lack of phenomenology, occurent/dispositional distinction, and content/attitude (...) distinction. (shrink)

A number of philosophers claim that visual experiences have a peculiar phenomenal character that is “presentational”. According to what I call the “Visual Presentationality Thesis”, this peculiar phenomenal character, presentational phenomenology, is not merely a contingent feature but is a necessary feature of visual experiences. Necessarily, visual experiences have presentational phenomenology. The main aim of this paper is to argue against the Visual Presentationality Thesis. I refute the Visual Presentationality Thesis by giving some counterexamples to it. In particular, I give (...) counterexamples from derealization, which is a psychopathological condition that is characterized by the subjective impression of unreality or detachment from one’s surroundings. Derealization is a condition in which patients have visual experiences without presentational phenomenology. I defend this hypothesis about derealization on the basis of an inference to the best explanation; this hypothesis provides the best explanation of (otherwise puzzling) subjective reports by patients with derealization. (shrink)

The paper tests conversational Large Language Models, instructed to produce stance expression types (affective, relational, epistemic, and moral) and their contexts in Opinion (Speech) Events (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara, Chaya Liebeskind, Anna Baczkowska, Jurate Ruzaite, Ardita Dylgjeri, Ledia Kazazi & Erika Lombart 2023. Opinion events: Types and opinion markers in English social media discourse. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 19(2). 447–481). In the first part an opinion taxonomy proposed in (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara, Chaya Liebeskind, Anna Baczkowska, Jurate Ruzaite, Ardita Dylgjeri, Ledia Kazazi (...) & Erika Lombart 2023. Opinion events: Types and opinion markers in English social media discourse. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 19(2). 447–481) is discussed in terms of Explicit (direct or indirect) and Implicit opinionated texts, categorized as positive, negative, ambiguous, or balanced. The further part discusses our previous attempts at Explicit (direct/indirect) and Implicit opinion type generation, performed by means of a series of prompts with LLMs (ChatGPT and Gemini) (Liebeskind, Chaya & Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk. 2024a. Opinion identification using a conversational large language model. In FLAIRS conference Proceedings. Florida, Liebeskind, Chaya & Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk. F 2024b. Navigating opinion space: A Study of explicit and implicit opinion generation in language models. Santiago de Compostella: EAIS conference publication), while this paper presents further LLM experiments with chatGPT and Gemini as well as their results, based on the analysis of stance expression types, which lead to increased success in opinion context generation. (shrink)

Source credibility has been thought to bean important determinant of peoples‘ reactions toinformation about technology. There has also been muchdebate about the need to communicate effectively withthe public about genetic engineering, particularlywithin the context of food production. Questionnaireswere used to investigate the impact of sourcecredibility, admission of risk uncertainty, andinitial attitude towards genetic engineering onattitudes of respondents after information provision.120 respondents with positive attitudes towardsgenetic engineering in food production were providedwith persuasive information about the technology,where both source attribution and admission (...) of riskuncertainty were systematically varied within theexperimental design. Impact on perceptions of sourcecredibility, informational qualities, and postintervention attitudes were examined, and compared toa second group of respondents who held initiallynegative attitudes towards genetic engineering, andwho had been exposed to similar informationinterventions. As predicted by Social Judgment Theory,initial attitude was found to be an importantdeterminant of post-intervention attitude. However,admission of risk uncertainty was also found to beinfluential in increasing acceptance and reducingrejection of the technology, possibly through thefacilitation of elaborative processing. Contrary toprevious research, prior attitudes had an impact onperceptions of both source credibility andinformational quality. In terms of effectiveinformation provision about genetic engineering, itwas concluded that scientific honesty is the bestpolicy, and that lay understanding of scientificprocess is probably greater than hitherto assumed byexperts. (shrink)

Within social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the debate about shared agency. In this debate, group identification is appealing to many because it appears to explain important forms of intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way. This paper argues that, unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function ascribed to (...) this notion for an understanding of shared agency remains dubious at best and unfulfilled at worst. This paper offers such a clarification by distinguishing and describing two different mental processes that constitute group identification: adoption of the group perspective and transformation in self-understanding. It is claimed that the latter process consists in the production of what Ruth Millikan labels “Pushmi-Pullyu representations” and that it is developmentally prior with respect to the ability of adopting the group perspective. (shrink)

In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...) prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation. (shrink)

In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require (...) abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world. (shrink)