Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari who lived from 1710 to 1812 in Borneo, Indonesia, applied a model of integrating uses of the Banjarese tradition into Islamic Jurisprudence based on a dialectical constitution of qiyās, the legal argumentation theory for parallel reasoning and analogy, he learned from the Shāfi‘ī-school of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Our paper focuses in the model of integration proposed and practiced by Al-Banjari, a rational debate grounded on a dynamic view on legal systems. We will illustrate the method with (...) the help of two different kinds of qiyās deployed by Al-Banjari in order to argue for the rejection of some traditional Banjarese offering-rituals for avoiding disease or calamities (manyanggar and mambuang pasilih), and for the acceptance of the use of consuming the traditional drink called lahang made of the juice of sugar-palm. As our dialogical reconstruction shows, the development of the debates, particularly the first one, is quite sophisticated, with a Banjarese opponent that does not surrender easily to the rejection of his use of those rituals. (shrink)

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the (...) most comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

In the Muslim conception of religion, hadiths are considered as the se-cond source after the Ḳurʾān. In the minds of those who believe in the Ḳurʾān, there is no hesitation about the authenticity of this divine book since it has come to us through tawātur. As for the hadiths, since their relation to the Prophet is determined by the method of isnād, criticisms are mostly concentrated at this point. Muslim scholars resorted to the science of al-Djarḥ wa’l-taʿdīl to solve the (...) problem of the attribution of hadiths to Prophet Muhammad. There are criticisms directed towards hadiths and scholars who played significant roles in the formation of the Islamic schools of thought by non-Muslim schloars living in Islamic regions as well. George Tarabishi, a Syrian writer and translator, is a scholar who has written numerous works on Islam and the Arab civilization shaped by Islam. This study focuses on his criticisms of al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of hadith in his work, From the Islam of the Qur’an to the Islam of Hadith. Tarabishi’s criticisms against al-Shāfiʿī in his work were identified through document analysis technique and examined through the descriptive method. (shrink)

: While Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī is known to posterity primarily as a historian and commentator on the Qurʾan, his most creative work may have been in the law, and Ibn al-Nadim places his main entry on al-Ṭabarī in Book VI of the Fihrist, on law. Unfortunately, most of his legal works have been lost. Building on and revising George Makdisi’s analysis of the relationship between the ṭabaqāt genre and the theoretical justification of the legal madhhabs, this study (...) argues that one of these lost books, Marātib al-ʿulamāʾ “Degrees of the Scholars,” was devoted to the generations of jurists and intended to provide a theoretical basis for the authority of the Jarīrī madhhab, one among a number of pieces of evidence that suggest al-Ṭabarī was consciously designing and creating his own legal madhhab, in contrast to earlier jurists, such as Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī, whose legal madhhabs were created by subsequent generations of students. (shrink)

Māturīdism is an Ottoman identity and this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire. It maintained its formal existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly (...) in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. The new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. However, even in this period, Māturīdism was remarkably reflected in the muqaddimāt-i arba‘a literature which was directly sponsored by Meḥmed II. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. Shiism and its all other variants were bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. Unfortunately such a refutational approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in the refutation texts against Ṣafawids. This brought to the fore at first the Ḥanafite and then the Māturīdite identity. This paper attempts to analyze this changing emphasis on Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the political and intellectual factors that supported and nourished it. -/- SUMMARY It can be argued that the debates around Ash‘arism and Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the resulting meant more than attempts of the members of the two sides to understand each other and that Māturīdism, particularly from the 16th century onwards, was gradually brought fore as the identity of Ottomans. In fact, this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire; it maintained, in form, its existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. In this period, Ottoman scholars still embraced the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī line in their theological views. Ḫiḍir Beg’s al-Qaṣīda al-Nūniyya, and al-Khayālī’s commentary upon it, and the commentary written by Aḥmad b. Oġuz Dānishmand al-Aḳshahrī on al-I‘timād of Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were the most noticeable Māturīdite texts from that time. Besides, al-Khayālī’s supercommentary (ḥāshiya) upon the commentary of al-Taftāzānī written on al-‘Aqā’id of Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī was also of central importance. However, the new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. But, this should not be taken to mean that Māturīdism lost its ground of existence. That the Ash‘arite works produced in this new paradigm were transferred to and fully integrated in the madrasa curriculum was not because they were Ash‘arite texts but because they were the most original and highest achievements of the philosophical theology. These texts that aimed at combining all fields of knowledge on a single platform, despite the Ash‘arism they included, constituted the peak of the Islamic thought of the time. In the preference of these texts, the fact that the Māturīdī tradition generally stood, in course of time, distant to the philosophy and chose to continue the kalām in the classical line also played a role. Māturīdī theologians Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, partly, but Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Maḥbūbī, to a greater extent, were notable exceptions to this general Māturīdī tendency. These figures were theologically Māturīdite, but their framework of producing discourse was the combination of philosophy and kalām as with their Ash‘arī counterparts. Therefore, Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and through him, of against the Ash‘arism in the context of muqaddimāt arba‘a was wholeheartedly supported by the Ottoman ulama. Even it was Meḥmed II who sponsored the debates regarding muqaddimāt arba‘a. The works written by such scholars as Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Kastallī, al-Ṣamṣūnī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-‘Arabī, Mollā ‘Arab al-Anṭākī, Khaṭībzāde, Sa‘dī Chalabī during his and his son Bāyazid II’s reigns were the supercommentaries written upon the related chapter of al-Talwīḥ, al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s al-Tawḍīḥ where the former responded to the criticism of the latter from an Ash‘arī point of view. The Ottoman ulama, in their workswere forced to choose between the two scholars and they mostly supported Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a and Māturīdism. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. The reflex of of identifying oneself through ‘the other’ made, to a certain extent, the theological and philosophical debates regarding faith meaningless, and gradually gave the Ottoman Sunnism a doctrinal and political tone. In such a context, the Ottomans’ paradigm of producing thought in line with the philosophical kalām began to lose its function, and, the focus of scholarhsip shifted; Shiism with its all variants were began to be bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. When the refutation texts composed from the reign of Bāyazid II onward to criticize the Ṣafawids are chronologically analyzed, it is seen that the contents of the texts evolved from criticism of Rāfiḍa to criticism of Sūfism. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in these refutations. So the fatwās issued against Rāfiḍa and Ṣūfīs in malāmatī line in earlier centuries in different contexts for different reasons were employed to criticize the new opponents. This caused two important results: First, such an approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḫalwatīs, Bayrāmīs, Gulshanīs, Baktāshīs and Mawlawīs were the sufi groups influenced by this situation in varying degrees. Second, Sunnism was exposed to the narrowization and centered around the fiqh, particularly Ḥanafī fiqh, in the context of Ḳāḍīzādelīs who were the main adversaries of above mentioned groups. The culture of catechism (‘ilm-i ḥāl) that came to the fore through the efforts of Ḳāḍīzādelīs was a crystallization and was mainly fuelled from this tension. Such a crystallization led the Ṣūfīs, the opponents of Ḳāḍīzādelīs, to a higher level of discourse deemphasizing the Ḥanafī aspect: They underscored the discourse of Ahl al-Sunna and four madhhabs, and mostly turned towards the Shāfiʿī and Ash‘arī traditions to look for support fortheir views. This process during which the emphasis of sharī‘a and tradition began to come to the fore once again paved the way for the zuhd and fiqh-centered religious thought that was maintained from the time of the Seljukids in Anatolia and was influential until Meḥmed II’ reign. Therefore in the Ottomans, particularly starting with the reign of Suleymān I, an intensive emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa was witnessed. Abū Ḥanīfa was at the very center of the debates revolving around zuhd and fiqh which came about in the same period and in which the sharī‘a sensitivity was a determining factor. Al-Māturīdī, whose name was overshadowed for a long time by the name of Abū Ḥanīfa, but who became prominent in the tradition with Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, had to transfer his gains for a period of time to Abū Ḥanīfa. Emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa looks like a rope that when pulled, all the tradition comes with it. When the topics began to be discussed in a manner that would also include the theological context, the contribution of the works ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa, namely al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Waṣiyya and al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta‘allim to the discussions would be limited. For this reason, the need to refer to al-Māturīdī or to the theological formation bearing his name was inevitable. So, the literature on the points of disagreements between the Ash‘arism and the Māturīdism developed both vertically and horizontally in the 18th century and, corollary to that, the debates of free will as a corolloary to that, once again brought Māturīdism to the fore. (shrink)

I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories "Islam, Iman," and "Ihsan" are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that "shari'a" refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding of "shari'a" as simply Islamic "law," and an alternative understanding of "usul al-fiqh" as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of (...) reason in Islamic moral epistemology via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī. (shrink)

The Prophet, whom Allah sent the whole universe and humanity as mercy, produced not only many judicial rules and practices regarding the relations of a person with Allah and other people in Islam but also uttered sentences about the explanation of holy book, Qur’an, and about how this book can be put into practice. The issue whether and how much these sentences of the prophet (hadith) and acts of the prophet (Sunnah) are binding have been discussed by both hadith methodologists (...) and fiqh methodologists; accordingly, a great many studies were produced. In hadith methodology, the discussions about Sunnah of the Prophet had their reflections in the studies of fiqh methodology; and especially Hanafi jurists propounded considerations about this issue. Hussein b. Ali al-Saymerî (d. 436/1045) one of these jurists, is the student of Muhammad b. Mûsa al-Khwârizmî (d. 403/1012), who is the student of Abû Bakr al-Jassâs (d. 370/980), who is an authority in Hanafi methodology. al-Saymerî, who adopted the method of al-Jassâs in fiqh methodology, systematically categorized several fundamental issues which were discussed and were related to fiqh methodology during his time; and he defended the views of Hanafi scholars about these issues primarily against Shâfiʿîs and several fiqh and kalam schools. While presenting the views and evidences of Hanafis, al-Saymerî initially applied for the views of founder imams of Hanafi sect such as Abû Hanîfa, Abû Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybânî; following these scholars, he greatly benefited from Hanafi scholars from Iraq region, such as Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhî (d. 340/952) and his student, Abu Bakr al-Râzî al-Jassâs. When the relevant parts of his study is analysed, it is seen that the effect of al-Jassâs is especially noticeable. In this article, we will study the binding issue of the Sunnah of the Prophet within the context of al-Saymerî’s study, which has extant and is called Mesâilu’l-hilâf fi usûli’l-fiqh. We consider that the different attitude of al-Saymerî about the Sunnah of the Prophet from the other methodologists and hadith scholars and the underlying reasons of these differences are worth to be investigated and emphasized. (shrink)

Prophethood (nubuwwah) is a divine institution that teaches the healthy progression of relations between Allah and humans, as well as between humans and the universe. However, from another perspective, it is also considered a human institution. Some opponents of religion, lacking strong evidence to challenge the existence of Allah, direct their objections towards prophethood, which is seen as a manifestation of Allah’s attribute of speech (kalām). To counter the rejection of prophethood, scholars of theology (kalām), hadith, and Prophetic biography (sīrah) (...) have compiled a body of literature known as Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah (Proofs of Prophethood). Their aim has been to collect proofs supporting prophethood as a response to these refutations and to dispel doubts regarding it. All extraordinary events occurring from before the birth until the death of Prophet Muhammad are considered evidence.During the fifth century, a notable figure in this tradition was the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Māwardī, who defended prophethood in his book Aʿlām al-nubuwwah (The Signs of Prophethood). Aʿlām al-nubuwwah has inspired subsequent works in this field due to its clarity and robust proofs. It became known by both names, Aʿlām al-nubuwwah and Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah, as it encompassed methods of narration and debate. Within his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barāhimah, Dahriyyah, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. According to him, Barāhimah, of Indian origin is a sect that denies prophethood despite accepting the unity of Allah. Dahriyyah is a denialist sect attributing eternity to the universe and creativity to nature. Al-Māwardī considers these philosophers as infidels due to their comments on prophethood rather than outright denial. The basis of these movements' idea of denying prophethood lies in their efforts to portray reason (ʿaql) as an alternative to revelation (waḥy). Jews and Christians, on the other hand, are portrayed as groups that accept the concept of prophethood, however they reject Muḥammad’s. prophecy. Their objection stems from the fear of their religions being superseded. Al-Māwardī counters those rejecting prophethood by addressing the public interest (maṣlaḥah) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He illustrates that prophet charged with the duty of prophethood proves it through spectacular events orchestrated by Allah but carried out through his own hand. The prophet serves the public interest by conveying matters beyond human intellect and presenting them in a comprehensible manner, thereby ensuring the worldly and eternal felicity of humanity. Furthermore, he provides evidence for the Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. The biography of Prophet Muhammad’s begins before his birth, and the method of proof is used to demonstrate his prophethood. In essence, al-Māwardī’s method of proving prophethood in Aʿlām al-nubuwwah can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology and hadith. One prominent figure in this tradition during the fifth century was the Shafi'i scholar al-Māwardī who defended prophethood through his book " ʿA'lām al-Nubuwwa" (The Signs of Prophethood). In his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barahima, Dahriyya, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. While the Jews and Christians accept the concept of prophethood, they reject the prophecy of Muhammad (P.B.U.H). These groups attempt to present logic as an alternative to divine revelation (Wahy), as their objection stems from their concern that their religions may be abrogated. Al-Māwardī responds to those who reject the institution of prophethood by addressing the public interest (maslaha) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He also provides evidence for Muhammad's (P.B.U.H) prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. In short, al-Māwardī's method of proving prophethood in "A'lām al-Nubuwwa " can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology (Kalam) and hadith. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

Once upon a time, a scholar, ascetic and relig-ious man named Abu Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Shafi'i al-Ghazali (AI-Ghazali, 1058-11 II) wrote a worl, called The Incoherence qf the Philosophers, 1\ clever philosopher, Abu AI-\Valid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Hushd (Averroes, 112li-1 ID8), responded to this by writing The IlIcolurence (!l the Inroherence. In IVhat is Art;;, Tolstoy refers to the importance of art in order to ridicule itl He notes the attention paid to (...) art, music, theatre, filrn, and books in the press. IIe notes the in\'(~stment of gm'ernments in the support of museums, theatres and the like. He notes the time spent by artists and perlilrmers in learning- their craft. He presents the most sardonic description of an opera rehearsal you will ever read. He describes the eHilrt and money poured into art as "stupefying", "repulsive", "a gigantic absurdity", and "utterly incomprehensible".~ I-Imv can art be so important that a peasant should have to sell his only cow to pay the taxes that maintain the artist-producer in grand luxury~. (shrink)

The type of ‘Al-isnād al-āli’ (higher chain of authority) which has great importance for the science of ḥadīths that constitutes the second best source of the Islam, expresses the value in terms of its proximity to the period of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). If ḥadīth has ‘al-isnād al-āli’ in the works of the scholars provides us with assurance on the intend of the ḥadīth. For this reason, the values of the works of those authors who have (...) constructed their works with al-isnād al-āli undoubted in the science of ḥadīth. However the work of Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī’s (d. 228/842) named al-Juz‘ had that kind of ḥadīth, it has not appreciated by scholars, he could not get enough attention in his period and after it. His work contains famous scholar al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d’s (d. 175/791) narrative who claimed by ḥadīth scholars that his students neglected and omitted his ḥadīths and knowledge. Al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d was known doing transmission by written copies. The similarity of al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d narrations in al-Juz‘ with al-Layth narrations, which are also found in other sources, strengthens the claims of the existence of a narrative process based on the written texts in the early periods. In this study, these transfers of Abu al-Jahm reflected on other works will be examined and tried to build narrations of his teacher al-Layth Ibn Sa‘d. country, we can say that the article will contribute to the studies of the history of religions.Summary: Ḥadīth works written in the third century of hijri are the most distinguished sources. The most fundamental works in the science of ḥadīth were written in this time. In the following period, numerous studies have been committed to paper on them. One of the eminent works is the named al-Juz’, which belongs to Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī (d. 228/842). The author was not a person that was taken into consideration much during his time. It is possible to that he has been criticized about his scientific proficiency (al-Jarh). Nevertheless, al-Juz’ attracts attention due to the fact that it contains the type of ‘al-Isnād al-āli’ (higher chain of authority). Al-Isnād al-āli, which means access with the least number of narration from the author to the Prophet has very major role to determining of being dependable and certainty of the ḥadīths. The work of Abu al-Jahm which contains the ‘al-Isnād al-āli’ did not attract enough attention. However, another value of the al-Juz‘ is that its been included the narration of famous muhaddith Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd (d. 175/791). He is one of the valued mujtahid imams who have played an active and important role in second century of hijri. Al-Layth's narrations have been available insufficient amount present day. At this point the al-Juz‘ of Abu al-Jahm has great important because it contains many narrations of his shaykh Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd.The Juz‘ seems to has attracted the attention of the ḥadīths scholars in the following period. Indeed, various authors had the get authorization to narrate al-Juz‘. Furthermore, it is also known that some scholar in his period utilized his narration in their own study. For in¬stance, it was declared by Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852/1449) that al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) had a narra¬tion belonging to Abu al-Jahm in his work ‘al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī’ with a muʻallaq chain (Omit¬ting his name). In the following periods, we come across famous muhaddith such as Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), al-Ṭabaranī (d. 360/971), Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 292/905), al-Dāraquṭnī (d.385/995) and al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) who received qualify of Juz's narra¬tion. Although the narrations of Abu al-Jahm are included in the prominent works of schol¬ars, it is clearly seems that the Juz‘ had not enough value except being procure as a written text. As far as we determined there are eleven narration of Abu al-Jahm in the main ḥadīth sources. In addition, we detected that some studies which contain some ḥadīth of al-Juz’ are list them in the same layout and order. This situation indicates that al-Juz’ is owned by these people as a duplicated edition and they narrated by not only orally transmitted but also spread by writing copy. This inference strengthens the theory which conceived by Modern researcher Fuad Sezgin (1924-2018) that ḥadīth transmission had conducted not only through oral transfer but also through written copies.Even though he lived in a very active time of oral transmission of ḥadīth and the time of specific journey for learning and pursuing ḥadīth, it is seen that Abu al-Jahm formed his Juz‘ from the ḥadīths that he procured only from his six shaykhs. That was quite less amount in that period. Juz‘, has an ʿAlāʾ al-Rijāl classification (ranked according to narrators) as ex¬pected in his period method. Abu al-Jahm began his study with his shaykh Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd’s narration, then completed with Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna’s. Juz‘ includes 112 ḥadīths. Ex¬cept two muʻallaq isnāds (omitting one or more narrators), all of ḥadīth has muttaṣil isnāds (narrators in the chain connected each other without omitting). Al-Juz‘ available nowadays in a published form. It seems that some of ḥadīth datas included in the Juz‘ have content against Islamic juris-prudential judgements. For example, the Prophet’s sayings ‘One or two swallow of breast milk does not make haram’ and ‘Nobody can fast or pilgrimage for the benefit of someone else’; allowing to Subay‘a al-Aslamī to marry without waiting her ‘iddah (waiting period of a woman after the death of her husband or divorce); when she gave birth, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān’s permission to al-Rubay‘a bint Mu‘avvidh not to wait her ‘iddah; when ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar has nasal bleeding he leaves the prayer, goes to wash, then back and continue where he leave off, without taking ablution; and describing marriage with polytheist women as for¬bidden (ḥarām). Of course, all this information must be examined within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence. However, Abu al-Jahm stands alone (tafarrūd) in such issues, it can be seen as the reasons to be recognized as a censured person (majrūḥ).Al-Juz‘ included 66 isnāds of Al-Layth Ibn Sa'd’s narration. Therefore it leaves behind all the works that compile the narration of Ibn Sa'd. That is why, we hypothesize that Juz‘ is a form of Al-Layth’s study that has survived to the present days. As a matter of fact, the muhaddiths who included the narrations of Al-Layth in their works, especially Ibn ḳuṭlūbughā could not ignore the Juz‘ of Abu al-Jahm; on the contrary, they took it as reference. In this case, it should be said that Abu al-Jahm al-Bāhilī is a loyal follower of Al-Layth and the word at¬tributed to Imām Shāfi‘ī and characterizing Al-Layth’s followers with disloyalty is invalid. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Abrogation (naskh) is one of the controversial themes of Islamic studies, especially in later period that of principle of exegesis (uṣūl al-tafsīr). However, the recent studies on abrogation (naskh) do not offer a comprehensive analysis on the concept. In fact, the problem of naskh (abrogation) is in need of a systematic and holistic approach, which would only be possible with a detailed study on how the concept of abrogation (naskh) is understood in Islamic interpretive tradition (tafsīr). With this purpose in (...) mind, this article intends to examine two points regarding the term abrogation: first, the article will offer a analytical reflection on the diverse views of naskh, and then it will highlight how Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) understood and applied this term to his hermeneutical framework. By doing so, the present study aims to show Ibn Kathīr’s position in Islamic interpretive tradition on the matter of naskh. The key conclusion of this study is that although Ibn Kathīr is one of the representatives of the traditional riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) exegesis, he advances his interpretive hermeneutics with multiple aspects that also involves dirayah (personal opinion) exegesis (tafsīr). SUMMARY The problem of naskh (abrogation) is one of the most important and controversial themes of science and principle of exegesis (ʿilm wan a-l uṣūl al-tafsīr) in Islamic tradition. In order to understand naskh, which is claimed to be occurred in the Qur’ānic text, it is necessary to involve the time of the revelation of the Qur’ān. An analysis of this period reveals that first Muslims regard the naskh as a natural process of the revelation and do not dispute over this matter. In other words, the controversial theme naskh is perceived by first addresses of the Qur’ān as a hermeneutical characteristic of the Qur’ānic revelation. Therefore, naskh was not considered as a controversial concept and debated its origins based on the question whether it organically belonged to the revelation. It will be clear that the different views on naskh (abrogation), particularly after the time of the Companions is not a conceptual problem; rather Muslim scholars differed in their methodological approaches to naksh. Naskh has not been questioned as a concept in early Islamic tradition. Rather it has gradually developed over the centuries. Naskh has been elaborated with the terms of uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Law), such as takhṣīṣ (specification) and taqyīd (restriction) and its conceptual meaning has been extended after, particularly Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad b. Idris b. ʿAbbas al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820). To sum up, naskh is regarded with a methodological perspective. However, in the field of Turkish Islamic studies, especially after the Cumhuriyet, the term naskh is not regarded as a natural consequence of the process of tanzīl (revelation of the Qur’ān) neglecting the gradual aspect of revelation and the disputes over the term has been concluded either rejecting or simply accepting this concept without providing a satisfactory result on the matter. This article examines one of the most prominent Muslim exegete Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 1373) approach to the problem of naskh in the context of previous modern scholarship on naskh (abrogation). However, the analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh does not claim to be exhaustive on the matter. This requires a more comprehensive study on the concept of naskh, which is clearly beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, the present study intends to specifically focus on general aspect of Ibn Kathīr’s understanding of naskh and how his perception is presented in modern studies. When Ibn Kathīr’s commentary is analysed, it becomes clear that his understanding of naskh is significant and not necessarily in line with his riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) tafsīr (exegesis). For example, he notes the dates between abrogating and abrogated Qur’ānic verses and claims that it is necessary to find certain proofs to validate the claim of abrogation (naskh) for particular legal judgments and verses, which clearly shows that Ibn Kathīr approaches to the problem of naskh with a methodological perspective. Ibn Kathīr’s interpretation of the well known Qur’ānic verse Q 2.106 in a different sense and most importantly his consideration of the matter only in the Qur’ānic context are clear examples of his methodological approach. His interpretation of Q 2.106 simply shows that he meticulously distinguish between the acceptance of naskh as a concept and as an interpretive method. The modern studies on naskh, on the contrary, consider the matter only on the base of a conceptual analysis. Ibn Kathīr prefers to transmit the traditional opinions based on personal interpretation and interprets some Qur’ānic verses. This is clearly his method of re-interpretation based on rational thinking (taʾwīl). His way of rational reasoning leads Ibn Kathīr to the rejection of naskh (abrogation) and the restriction of Qur’ānic verses that are related to the theory of abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh-mansūkh). This clearly proves that Ibn Kathīr does not merely adopts and employs the method of riwayah, which is contrary to the supposition that he is the exegete of a commentary that heavily draws on hadith reports and transmitted traditional reports. In fact, this most importantly shows that Ibn Kathīr’s Qur’ān commentary can also be regarded as a dirayah (personal opinion) tafsīr (exegesis) and that there are enough material in traditional Muslim Qur’ānic exegesis to re-analyse the problem of naskh (abrogation). Relying on this last point, this article argues that a comprehensive analysis of naskh requires a research on the traditional interpretive sources. Therefore, it might be helpful to reconsider the matter of naskh with its conceptual background in the works of traditional Muslim exegetes rather than focusing only on whether the concept naskh exits or not in the origins of the Qur’ānic revelation. At this point, an analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh and his rational reasoning that is employed in his commentary will contribute to the understanding of the theory of naskh (abrogation) in the tradition of Qur’ānic exegesis. (shrink)

The current research investigates the interplay of board gender diversity, the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure, and the green innovation performance of a firm. It examines the moderation effect of the CSRD on the relationship between corporate GIP and BGD. The study inculcates 3,736 firm-year observations of A-share listed Chinese firms from 2010 to 2019. Least square dummy variables method, generalized method of moments, and 2SLS are employed for the analysis of the study. The findings foster an affirmative and (...) significant impact of BGD on corporate GIP in terms of green innovation patents. Moreover, the quality of CSRD is also detected for a significant moderating effect on the relationship between BGD and corporate GIP. The quality of CSRD emerges to be an indicator for social resilience and female role congruence under the purview of the social resilience theory and the role congruence theory, respectively. This research would help managers and policymakers of developing nations in formulating environmental innovation strategies for corporate sustainability. (shrink)

This paper unravels an unprecedented interplay between board gender diversity (BGD) and corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disputes among Chinese A-share-listed nonfinancial companies from 2017 to 2021. Framed within a knowledge-based and sensemaking perspective of institutional frameworks, the research not only illuminates the profound impact of internal (corporate governance ratings) and external (regional institutional development) institutional factors on this intricate relationship but also brings to light a paradigm-shifting revelation. The study employed a diverse set of empirical tests, ranging from (...) ordinary least squares regression to advanced methods such as the generalized method of moments, two-stage least squares, and propensity score matching, providing a nuanced and comprehensive analysis. The findings highlight the pivotal role of female directors in significantly mitigating ESG disputes. A mechanism analysis further uncovers that internal and external institutional quality are potent positive moderators in shaping the BGD–ESG dispute dynamic. This research has profound implications, providing valuable insights for stakeholders, policymakers, and scholars, offering a comprehensive understanding of how gender diversity fosters sustainability while unravelling the intricate tapestry of internal and external institutional dynamics that shape ESG outcomes. (shrink)

The concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan is a crucial aspect of Islamic Law: Conciliation features notably in the Qurʾanic text which gives rise to Islamic rules and regulations, Conciliation is an important dispute resolution method in an Islamic legal system, and Conciliation-related Qurʾanic textual analysis reveals a broad range of legal language and concepts. Traditional studies of Conciliation in the Qurʾan have often focussed on the process of ṣulḥ through intermediaries, particularly in marriage and between groups of Muslims, (...) whilst there is a dearth of Western scholarship in this area. Using Classical Arabic tafsīr and Western literature on Conciliation as a general concept, this paper examines holistically and analytically the concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan, investigating its scope, constituent elements, emphasis and purpose. This paper argues, based on a manual survey of the entire Qurʾan, that Conciliation is not limited to isolated contexts or verses where ṣulḥ is mentioned explicitly. The paper finds that Conciliation is a pervasive concept throughout the hierarchy of social relationships. It is achieved through behaviours such as good conduct, attitudes such as ‘Differentiation’ and ‘Externalisation’ and preventative strategies of dispute avoidance, and sometimes includes a contract or Reconciliation process. It is emphasised in the Qurʾan through a range of stylistic features and is of fundamental importance in maintaining the fabric of society. (shrink)

Conciliation in the Qurʾan is an essential read in understanding how the Qurʾan persuades its audience to resolve societal conflicts. The author brings to light the central ethical notion of iḥsān (gracious conduct), and explores the challengin.

Qualities of an ideal human character, according to Islam.

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation (...) for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations). (shrink)

BackgroundInnovations in technology have contributed to rapid changes in the way that modern biomedical research is carried out. Researchers are increasingly required to endorse adaptive and flexible approaches to accommodate these innovations and comply with ethical, legal and regulatory requirements. This paper explores how Dynamic Consent may provide solutions to address challenges encountered when researchers invite individuals to participate in research and follow them up over time in a continuously changing environment.MethodsAn interdisciplinary workshop jointly organised by the University of Oxford (...) and the COST Action CHIP ME gathered clinicians, researchers, ethicists, lawyers, research participants and patient representatives to discuss experiences of using Dynamic Consent, and how such use may facilitate the conduct of specific research tasks. The data collected during the workshop were analysed using a content analysis approach.ResultsDynamic Consent can provide practical, sustainable and future-proof solutions to challenges related to participant recruitment, the attainment of informed consent, participant retention and consent management, and may bring economic efficiencies.ConclusionsDynamic Consent offers opportunities for ongoing communication between researchers and research participants that can positively impact research. Dynamic Consent supports inter-sector, cross-border approaches and large scale data-sharing. Whilst it is relatively easy to set up and maintain, its implementation will require that researchers re-consider their relationship with research participants and adopt new procedures. (shrink)

Nūr Muḥammad is one of the teachings in Sufism that studies the beginning of the creation of the universe. The Sufis discussed Nūr Muḥammad through God's tajallī (manifestation), and they believed that only Insan Kamil (Perfect Humans) possessed the perfection of His tajallī. This Sufi theory can be comprehended through the dhawqi approach. This research will deal with Nūr Muḥammad's theory of Sufism through the perspective of Tijaniyah Tarekat. The data for this study was obtained through library research utilizing a (...) documentary technique. The collected data will be analyzed using the descriptive analysis method. This study finds that the Tijaniyah Tarekat is a Sufism institution that bases its teachings and practices on the concept of Nūr Muḥammad in the form of ṣalawāt al-fātiḥ and ṣalawāt jawharah al-kamāl. This Tarekat's elucidation of Nūr Muḥammad is also built on and consistent with the explication of authoritative Sufis in Islam's intellectual and spiritual tradition. (shrink)

We present RAWLSNET, a system for altering Bayesian Network (BN) models to satisfy the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). RAWLSNET's BN models generate aspirational data distributions: data generated to reflect an ideally fair, FEO-satisfying society. FEO states that everyone with the same talent and willingness to use it should have the same chance of achieving advantageous social positions (e.g., employment), regardless of their background circumstances (e.g., socioeconomic status). Satisfying FEO requires alterations to social structures such as school (...) assignments. Our paper describes RAWLSNET, a method which takes as input a BN representation of an FEO application and alters the BN's parameters so as to satisfy FEO when possible, and minimize deviation from FEO otherwise. We also offer guidance for applying RAWLSNET, including on recognizing proper applications of FEO. We demonstrate the use of our system with publicly available data sets. RAWLSNET's altered BNs offer the novel capability of generating aspirational data for FEO-relevant tasks. Aspirational data are free from the biases of real-world data, and thus are useful for recognizing and detecting sources of unfairness in machine learning algorithms besides biased data. (shrink)

Includes an introd. of 49 p. by S. G. Abbas.

The notion of 'natural kinds' has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Although explicitly articulated by nineteenth-century philosophers like Mill, Whewell and Venn, it has a much older history dating back to Plato and Aristotle. In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance, especially among naturalist metaphysicians and philosophers of science. Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, (...) this book argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds. By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and polymer science to psychiatry, the author argues that natural kinds are nodes in causal networks. On the basis of this account, he maintains that there can be natural kinds in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an escalation in cases of cyber violence, which has had a chilling effect on users' behavior toward social media sites. This article explores the causes behind cyber violence and provides empirical data for developing means for effective prevention. Using elements of the stimulus–organism–response theory, we constructed a model of cyber-violence behavior. A closed-ended questionnaire was administered to collect data through an online survey, which results in 531 valid responses. A proposed model was tested using (...) partial least squares structural equation modeling using SmartPLS 3.0, v. Research findings show that information inequality is a strong external stimulus with a significant positive impact on digital distrust and negative emotion. However, the effects of information overload on digital distrust and the adverse effects of communication overload on negative emotions should not be ignored. Both digital distrust and negative emotions have significant positive impacts on cyber violence and cumulatively represent 11.5% changes in cyber violence. Furthermore, information overload, communication overload, information inequality, and digital distrust show a 27.1% change in negative emotions. This study also presents evidence for competitive mediation of digital distrust by information overload, information inequality, and cyber violence. The results of this study have implications for individual practitioners and scholars, for organizations, and at the governmental level regarding cyber-violence behavior. To test our hypotheses, we have constructed an empirical, multidimensional model, including the role of specific mediators in creating relationships. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a unified causal account of natural kinds. Using as a starting point the widely held view that natural kind terms or predicates are projectible, I argue that the ontological bases of their projectibility are the causal properties and relations associated with the natural kinds themselves. Natural kinds are not just concatenations of properties but ordered hierarchies of properties, whose instances are related to one another as causes and effects in recurrent causal processes. The resulting account (...) of natural kinds as clusters of core causal properties that give rise to clusters of derivative properties enables us to distinguish genuine natural kinds from non-natural kinds. For instance, it enables us to say why some of the purely conventional categories derived from the social domain do not correspond to natural kinds, though other social categories may. (shrink)

Could some social kinds be natural kinds? In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: 1) social kinds whose existence does not depend on human beings having any beliefs or other propositional attitudes towards them ; 2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances ; 3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in (...) part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them . Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind-dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked. (shrink)