Action-based legal theory is a discrete branch of praxeology and the basis of an emerging school of jurisprudence related to, but distinct from, natural law. Legal theory and economic theory share content that is part of praxeology itself: the action axiom, the a priori of argumentation, universalizable property theory, and counterfactual-deductive methodology. Praxeological property-norm justification is separate from the strictly ethical “ought” question of selecting ends in an action context. Examples of action-based jurisprudence are found in existing “Austro-libertarian” literature. Legal (...) theory and legal practice must remain distinct and work closely together if justice is to be found in real cases. Legal theorizing was shaped in religious ethical contexts, which contributed to confused field boundaries between law and ethics. The carrot and stick influence of rulers on theorists has distorted conventional economics and jurisprudence in particular directions over the course of centuries. An action-based approach is relatively immune to such sources of distortion in its methods and conclusions, but has tended historically to be marginalized from conventional institutions for this same reason. (shrink)

While crises are omnipresent in history and historiography, the meaning of the concept of ‘crisis’ is becoming more elusive than ever. The authors scrutinise how historians use this concept with respect to contemporary history, the twentieth century and modernity in general. After briefly sketching the conceptual history of ‘crisis,’ the article addresses the questions of how the concept structures historiographical narratives, what types of crises historians distinguish, and whether we should retain the concept or refrain from using it, considering its (...) vagueness, suggestive power and political instrumentalisation. (shrink)

Some of our beliefs are institutional; that is, beliefs whose content is to a large extent shaped by institutions, such as beliefs about intellectual property, trade policy, or traffic rules. In this chapter, we propose a novel account of institutional beliefs, as we call them. In particular, we argue that institutional beliefs are primarily attributable to social entities, such as groups or collectives, and only secondarily to individual agents. This is because institutional beliefs respond to specific problems that, in principle, (...) only collectives face. However, existing methodology in behavioural science primarily relies on eliciting beliefs through individual choice data, which presents challenges for empirically modelling our proposed concept of institutional beliefs. To address this challenge, we propose to speak of institutional beliefs attributable to individual agents as ‘qua beliefs’. That is, institutional beliefs attributable to individual agents acting qua members of certain institutionally shaped groups. Within this framework, individuals’ qua actions occur in a shared realm of problems that can only be addressed through collective efforts. The relationship between individuals and their groups can be rendered tractable under formalised conditions. Under these conditions, choice data collected from individuals need not obstruct the elicitation of institutional beliefs for empirical study at both the collective and the individual level. We refer to these conditions as “IS conditions”, which are developed based on the synthesis between an interpretationist understanding of mental states and standard models of revealed preference theory as used in experimental economics. For an illustration of how this approach can be operationalised experimentally, we direct our readers to chapter 10 of this volume, where an experimental study applied our account of institutional beliefs. (shrink)

Here I present the first version of the transcription of the Commentarius in Metaphysicam by Konrad Graf from Cod. Pp 183 4°, Teil 2, Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek Luzern [ZHB], Sondersammlung (ff. 1r-56v), which collects Graf's lectures in metaphysics, held at the Lucerne Gymnasium in 1635-36. The transcription of the text was carried out at the Lucerne Faculty of Theology within the SNSF project "Zwischen monastischer und reformierter Metaphysik. Die schweizerische 'Wiege' der Ontologie im Zeitalter der Reformation" (SNSF (...) project 100012_192559 - applicant: Prof. Dr. Giovanni Ventimiglia (TF- University of Lucerne), Employees: Marco Lamanna, Chiara Paladini. The project aimed to redefine the "cartography" of the Reformation in Switzerland on the traces of metaphysics teaching (Reportationes) in Swiss educational institutions and monastic poles, and thereby to gain a precise place for Swiss studies in the panorama of research on metaphysics and ontology in the early modern period. The project was based on a preliminary investigation that made it possible to recover new texts transmitting lessons on metaphysics held in Lucerne and Engelberg. The method was 1. to produce a systematic and comprehensive documentation based on an index of manuscripts and printed texts, most of them already identified, which testify to the existence of a cultural flourishing in Switzerland that has so far remained unexplored. 2. this documentation should be placed on a solid textual basis by transcribing and eventually critically editing those texts judged to be of interest in terms of their content and influence, in order to make them accessible to the scholarly community and to readers. 3. finally, we will examine the specific aspects of the teachings transmitted in these manuscripts. (shrink)

Graf Egge, der Protagonist in Ludwig Ganghofers Schloß Hubertus, und Andreas, die Titelfigur in Hugo von Hofmannsthals gleichnamigem Romanfragment, stehen in einer vergleichbaren Konstellation: Beide projizieren ihre vielfältigen triebhaften Wünsche, die sie in der Welt der sozialen Bezüge nicht ausleben können, auf die Welt der Tiere, die sie nach Gutdünken lieben, quälen oder töten, um so ihren Empfindungen Ausdruck zu geben. Darüber hinaus imaginieren sie sich selbst als Tiere. Schließlich bündeln beide Romane diese Konstellation in Schlüsselszenen, die auf dieselbe (...) Quelle zurückgehen, nämlich einen Bilderbogen Max Arco-Zinnebergs, der eine Adlerjagd im Jahr 1860 beschreibt. (shrink)

The experience of stress is receiving increasing attention in the context of adolescent mental health, which is why a valid and reliable stress assessment instrument is of great importance. For this purpose, an English-language adolescent stress questionnaire was developed, which assesses the subjective stress experience of adolescents in different areas of life. However, the latest long version of the questionnaire with 56 items was found to be too extensive, so a more economical short version ASQ-S with 27 items was developed. (...) The aim of this study was to validate a German and a Greek version of the ASQ-S. In order to investigate the psychometric properties of the German and Greek ASQ-S confirmatory factor analysis, analyses of variance and correlations were applied to sample data from Switzerland, Germany, and Greece. The results yielded only poor to moderate internal reliability across all three countries and the suggested 9-dimensional factor structure could not be confirmed. Instead, a modified 6-factor structure was tested which showed acceptable model fits while demonstrating form invariance across the three countries. Furthermore, the ASQ-S scales correlated positively with depressive symptoms and anxiety and negatively with self-esteem and life satisfaction, all of which supported adequate concurrent validity. The results revealed that the utility of the ASQ-S appears to be limited when translated to other languages and should be used with caution when administered in international contexts. (shrink)

It is known that various complexity-theoretical problems can be translated into some special spectra problems. Thus, questions about complexity classes are translated into questions about the expressive power of some languages. In this paper we investigate the spectra of some logics with Henkin quantifiers in the empty vocabulary.

Neste artigo pretendo descrever o lugar da esperança como categoria filosófica na obra de Ernst Bloch assim como sua fundamentação.

By the end of April 1923, Paul Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1981: The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods) was published by the German publishing house Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen. Based on numerous source documents from the publishers’ archives and particularly on the correspondence between the publishers Wilhelm and Gustav Ruprecht, hitherto unknown but now edited and commented on here, the present article explains that Tillich wrote his System of the Sciences (...) primarily for the publisher. It was Emanuel Hirsch who established the connection between them as the publishing house was looking for a new editor for their popular series Wege zur Philosophie (Ways to Philosophy), published since 1911. After Hirsch having brought Tillich into play, Wilhelm Ruprecht could convince the Berlin “Privatdozenten” to become the new editor of the series. As to the series, Tillich unfolded the concept of a comprehensive system design which covered 65 topics, i. e. forthcoming volumes. When the publisher then demanded that Tillich prove his abilities to write comprehensively in common language by providing a sample of a first issue of the series, he began to work on his System der Wissenschaften. Although this text contained all sorts of ideas and concepts, it was certainly not very well suited as an introduction to a series of popular accounts of the central themes and matters of philosophy. In the end, the System was published, although not as a volume of the series as having been announced by the publishing house in 1922, but as a text in its own right. (shrink)

In June 1947 Paul Tillich signed a contract with The University of Chicago Press for a “Systematic Theology” in two volumes. Having published the first volume in April 1951, he asked the publisher to split the second volume into two parts, which were published in 1957 as volume II and 1963 as volume III. In this article the different editions of “Systematic Theology” are described, and the economic aspects of writing and publishing this very influential academic book are explained. Many (...) unknown sources are presented. Some of them show Tillich as an author in real despair. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held Dec. 4-5, 1998 at the Universit'at G'ottingen.

Die University of Tokyo hatte mich zu einem Vortrag über die im Rahmen der Kritischen Gesamtausgabe als Band 9 (in drei Teilbänden) erscheinende Neuausgabe von Ernst Troeltschs “Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen” eingeladen. Das mir vorgegebene Thema lautete: “The Significance of Troeltsch’s Soziallehren for the Present”’. Im ersten Teil skizziere ich die Genese von Troeltschs christentumshistorischem Hauptwerk. Im zweiten Teil geht es um die zentralen Themen seines “Lieblingsbuches”. Im dritten Teil werden einige seiner handschriftlichen Zusätze und Marginalien kurz vorgestellt, (...) die die 2020 erscheinende Kritische Ausgabe der “Soziallehren” erstmals zugänglich macht. Abschließend entfalte ich eine Antwort auf die Frage, warum es sich auch heute noch lohnt, Ernst Troeltsch zu lesen. (shrink)

This article proposes a new approach to the question of why so few Arabic documents have survived in their original archival context. Taking the Mamluk period as a case study it argues that the category “archive” itself needs to be reconfigured, away from the idea of fixed archival spaces, or even a Mamluk state archive, toward archival practices. These archival practices were spread across the Mamluk realm and involved numerous actors, which included the central bureaucracy in Cairo, individual secretaries, and, (...) most importantly, the small-scale administration managed by officers. These archival practices emerge not from normative and narrative texts, but primarily from a consideration of archival traces on surviving documents. (shrink)

Hugely controversial on publication, this is an insightful and characteristically entertaining survey of animal behaviour and the evolution of aggression throughout the animal world.

Prospective memory is required for many aspects of everyday cognition, its breakdown may be as debilitating as impairments in retrospective memory, and yet, the former has received relatively little attention by memory researchers. This article outlines a strategy for changing the fortunes of prospective memory, for guiding new research to shore up the claim that prospective memory is a distinct aspect of cognition, and to obtain evidence for clear performance dissociations between prospective memory and other memory functions. We begin by (...) identifying the unique requirements of prospective memory tasks and by dividing memory's prospective functions into subdomains that are analogous to divisions in retrospective memory (e.g., short- versus long-term memory). We focus on one prospective function, called prospective memory proper; we define this function in the spirit of James (1890) as requiring that we are aware of a plan, of which meanwhile we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we made the plan earlier. We give an operational definition of prospective memory proper and specify how it differs from explicit and implicit retrospective memory and how it might be empirically assessed. (shrink)

Both in scholarship on the Weimar Republic and in historical research in general, many conceptions of ‘crisis’ tend to remain vague and difficult to operationalize. These operational defects of the concept of crisis arise inevitably, we argue, from the concept’s constitutive link to human perception on the one hand and from its subsumption of complex interconnections of historical processes within different subsystems on the other. Frequently today, in both ordinary and historiographical usage, this basic openness of the concept of crisis (...) is foreclosed when it is deployed with a solely negative connotation of ‘downfall’ and ‘decline’, or of something being thrown into question or jeopardy. Such uses obscure a way in which a crisis can evoke not only the pessimistic sense of a threat to the old order but also the optimistic scenario of a chance for renewal. A one-sidedly negative understanding of crisis as prelude to calamity, we argue here, is problematic for historical research for two reasons. Firstly, it obscures comprehension of the consciousness of actors in the relevant period who at any particular moment can have had no prior knowledge of the crisis’s outcome. Secondly, it tends to reify the relevant crisis and to occlude its basic character as something narratively constructed in the accounts of both contemporaries and subsequent historiography. (shrink)

Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as ‘the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan’, or ‘the jury justifiedly believes that the suspect is guilty’, as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes have the relevant epistemic status. In this paper, I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body (...) of evidence may rationalize multiple doxastic attitudes. In particular, I will make use of epistemic permissivism to provide a general recipe for generating so-called divergence cases, which demonstrate situations in which rationality requires group-level and member-level attitudes to diverge. I will call this class of cases permissive divergence cases. While other divergence cases have been discussed in the literature, permissive divergence cases prove themselves to be less susceptible to many of the worries raised against their competitors, while being directly built on an often-defended epistemological thesis. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation into the nature of epistemic justification. It brings together themes from traditional, individual-centred epistemology, and collective, group-centred epistemology. The first half of the thesis is concerned with the question of whether rationality is epistemically permissive; that is, whether one body of evidence can rationalise more than one doxastic attitude. In chapter 1, I argue that permissive cases are best understood as epistemic standard conflicts. Doing so provides us with a novel understanding of the arbitrariness objection (...) against permissivism and enables us to reduce questions about epistemic permissibility to questions about the nature of incommensurability. In chapter 2, I show that the defended understanding of permissive cases generalises by defending it against an objection from self-fulfilling beliefs. In chapter 3, I demonstrate that we can use this view of epistemic rationality to generate so-called divergence arguments which show that the epistemic status of group-level attitudes and member-level attitudes can rationally diverge. In the second half of the thesis, I develop a novel evidentialist theory of epistemic justification, called Continuous Evidentialism. Continuous Evidentialism is inspired by some general methodological reflections (chapter 4), which suggest that we should opt for a theory of epistemic justification that analyses the epistemic status of group-level attitudes and member-level attitudes continuously. According to Continuous Evidentialism, to have a justified belief is to possess sufficient evidence and utilise that evidence in an epistemically responsible way when forming the belief. While I argue that we can reduce epistemic responsibility to higher-order evidentialist requirements. In chapter 5, I develop a theory of evidence, evidence possession and epistemic basing. Chapters 6 - 8, discuss various complications of the proposed theory, having to do with the alleged defeasibility of justification (chapter 6), epistemic responsibility (chapter 7), and the proposed reduction of epistemic responsibility (chapter 8). In chapter 9, I compare Continuous Evidentialism to various extant accounts. (shrink)

Rational or epistemically justified beliefs are often said to be defeasible. That is, beliefs that have some otherwise justification conferring property can lose their epistemic status because they are defeated by some evidence possessed by the believer or due to some external facts about the believer’s epistemic environment. Accordingly, many have argued that we need to add a so-called no defeater clause to any theory of epistemic justification. In this paper, I will survey various possible evidentialist as well as responsibilitst (...) no-defeater clauses and develop a general taxonomy of defeater cases against which these clauses can be tested. Despite influential arguments that evidentialist understandings of justification are ill-equipped to handle the full spectrum of defeater cases, I will demonstrate that evidentialism has the right tools to make sense of all kinds of defeaters, including propositional and normative defeaters. Moreover, I will demonstrate that the proposed solution avoids recently influential objections against the notion of defeat. (shrink)