This paper analyses the impact of labour taxation on the labour market (its indicators), measures the relationship between labour taxes and the rate of unemployment in Lithuania, and seeks to establish whether the tax wedge has an impact on employment. The obtained results suggest that the unemployment rate in Lithuania tends to vary mainly due to cyclical economic fluctuations. However, to some extent, the level of unemployment, especially of unskilled labour, depends on its taxation. In Lithuania, the tax wedge on (...) low-wage earners, i.e. those paid a little more than the minimum wage, is relatively high in the context of other EU countries. However, the overall labour taxation (describing all labour force) is low because of a relatively low taxation of high-income individuals. The article examined the scientific literature which confirms the existence of a link between the taxation of low-skilled and low-paid workers and the unemployment rate for this group. In addition, labour taxation and benefit levels can influence people’s motivation to take up a job. The conducted estimates support a direct link between the economically inactive population (aged 20–64) and the unemployment trap indicator. A greater unemployment trap leads to a bigger percentage of the economically inactive population in the country. (shrink)

Viena iš probleminių darbo rinkos grupių yra neįgalūs žmonės. Darbingo amžiaus neįgaliųjų socialinei integracijai ir mobilumui darbo rinkoje ypač yra svarbus aktyvumo didėjimas, kurį galima vertinti remiantis vykstančiais pokyčiais. Analizuojant neįgaliųjų padėties darbo rinkoje kaitą reikšmingi statistikos duomenys. Trūksta aktualios informacijos apie tiriamą grupę, o vertinant padėtį darbo rinkoje paprastai apsiribojamatik Lietuvos darbo biržos duomenimis. Šiame straipsnyje vertinama neįgaliųjų padėtis darbo rinkoje ir integracijos į Lietuvos darbo rinką galimybės, analizuojamos neįgaliųjų užimtumo politikos priemonės. Analizė pagrįsta moksline literatūra, statistikos duomenimis, atliktų (...) specialių tyrimų (neįgaliųjų sociologinių apklausų) rezultatais. (shrink)

Disorders of Consciousness (DoCs) raise difficult and complex questions about the value of life for persons with impaired consciousness, the rights of persons unable to make medical decisions, and our social, medical, and ethical obligations to patients whose personhood has frequently been challenged and neglected. Recent neuroscientific discoveries have led to enhanced understanding of the heterogeneity of these disorders, and focused renewed attention on the medical and ethical problem of misdiagnosis. -/- This book examines the entanglement of epistemic and ethical (...) uncertainty in DoCs and other medical contexts, and how they interact to create both epistemic and ethical risks. Philosopher and bioethicist L. Syd M Johnson pulls together multiple threads in this work: the ontological mysteries of consciousness, medical uncertainty about unconsciousness, ableist bias, withdrawal of treatment in neurointensive care, and the rarely questioned view that consciousness is essential to personhood and moral status. Johnson challenges longstanding bioethical dogmas about DoC patients, and argues for an ethics of uncertainty for contexts where there is a need for decisive action in the presence of unavoidable uncertainty. The ethics of uncertainty refocuses ethical inquiry concerning persons with DoCs, placing less emphasis on their contested personhood, and more on inductive risk and uncertainty, on respect for autonomy, and especially on epistemic justice. With applications to various decisional contexts where uncertainty and ethical risk interact, this ethical approach enables surrogate decision makers facing fraught and risky choices to fulfill their obligations as moral and epistemic agents. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of (...) the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome .. (shrink)

Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their (...) ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature. (shrink)

What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the (...) direction of time, the sense we have that we are moving toward the future and not back into the past? What is the relation between the physics of time and the philosophy of time? These are the kind of dizzying questions that have been addressed by metaphysicians since antiquity, and time has remained a critical concept for many thinkers and philosophers since then (for instance, in his Confessions, St Augustine, restating an observation by Plotinus, wrote: ‘So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I seek to explain it, I do not’). Interest in the subject has also been enduring—and has blossomed anew in the past century. The Philosophy of Time is a new title in the Routledge series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s vast literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, a leading scholar in the philosophy of time, this new Major Work from Routledge brings together in four volumes the canonical and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in the field to provide a synoptic view of all the key issues and current debates. With a comprehensive introduction to the collection, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Philosophy of Time is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of time—as well as those working in related areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion—as a vital research resource. (shrink)

The period of the mid-1920s to the mid-1980s was a portentous period for Soviet psychology. As this period recedes into the past, the figure of L. S. Vygotskii rises more and more before us. Vygotskii died of tuberculosis when not quite 37 years old. He was a psychologist for only 10 years, and it was only in the last 6 of these that he did the work we now associate with his name. During those brief years Vygotskii wrote over 120 (...) works, including more than 10 large books. His was a short life — filled with inspired, indefatigable, and heroic work. A significant part of his written work has remained unpublished and indeed much of it remained unfinished. A seven-volume collection of Vygotskii's work is currently underway, and even this will not contain everything he wrote. The final volume of this collection will include his articles "The Sense of the Psychological Crisis" and "Spinoza's Theory of the Passions.". (shrink)

Despite tributes paid to Fuller as an intellectual father of ADR, little attention has been paid within the ADR field to the broader interactionist vision that underlies Fuller’s discussion about process. A closer reading of Fuller’s study of mediation, however, reveals that he intended that study to substantiate his interactionist thesis about the nature of social ordering. He understood ordering to be generated by and to reflect a particular experience of social interaction. Fuller’s interactionist vision recognizes the creative, choice-making and (...) purposive dimensions of human reality, emphasizes participation as a normative criterion for institutional design, and gives rise to a pluralistic notion of power arrangements. It appears in Fuller’s thinking about process as a kind of dialectic and integrative mindset that pervades his means-ends analysis, functional analytical approach and his emphasis on institutional design. This interactionist vision has particular relevance for the practice and research of ADR, for example, in helping to develop a more integrative approach to process pluralism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Theology of Play and the Play of Theology in Thomas AquinasDavid L. Whidden IIISTUDENTS OF THOMAS AQUINAS have argued over many issues in the last 150 years or so; in fact, it is nearly impossible to get out of the very first question of the Summa Theologiae without entering into a century-long debate about the status of sacred doctrine as an Aristotelian science. We ponder whether theology meets (...) the requirements of a scientia and argue about just how to understand the task of theology in the face of Aquinas’s concern about theology as a scientia. Part of this ongoing argument is shaped by the philosophical and epistemological needs of theologians attempting to justify their positions in an academic world driven by the secular and scientific norms of the Enlightenment. Additionally, some interest in theology as a scientia is driven by the desire to provide a philosophically acceptable alternative to secular forms of reason—thus Leo’s XIII’s promotion of Thomistic philosophy.The interest in theology as a science was shaped by the historical work of Chenu in his influential articles on the topic and then by almost every other important Thomist in the last fifty years.1 Theology as a scientia is such a pressing topic that it would almost be fair to say that Thomists have developed their own scientia of theology as a scientia. [End Page 273]Beyond the modern and, perhaps, postmodern concerns driving this interest, there are good reasons to pay attention to Aquinas on the status of theology. If we focus on theology as a scientia, it is because Aquinas invites us to do so by taking up this question in one form or another at the beginning of his major theological syntheses. We are, after all, only following his lead and pondering with him just what we are thinking about, and how we are thinking, when we think about God.Within the Thomistic corpus there is, however, a minority report with regard to the status of theology. In his prologue to his commentary on Boethius’s Hebdomads, Aquinas looks at theology in a very different way, one that can supplement our understanding of sacred doctrine in its role as both an intellectual and an affective enterprise. In this commentary Aquinas journeys into a different territory and explores theology, not as a scientia, but as a kind of play—a play that evokes delight and pleasure in the one who pursues wisdom.My approach will be first to describe Aquinas’s theology with regard to regular play—the kind of recreational activities we all engage in, whether they are physical or verbal. He takes up the question of the morality of play in several places and in a way that will inform our understanding of what he means when he describes theology as play. With this understanding of regular play in place, we will then explore theology as play, based on the supposition that there is something analogical between regular play and theology as play. I will finish with some reflections on how this might contribute to our present understanding of theological work.IWhile he scatters comments about play across his corpus and mentions it in all of his theological syntheses, Aquinas gives sustained attention to play in two places: first, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, and second, in question 168 of the Secunda secundae (in the treatise on temperance) of the Summa theologiae. From the outset one will notice that one of [End Page 274] the difficulties in thinking about play with Aquinas is that the Latin word for play, ludo, is multivalent, difficult to translate, and so can sometimes mean recreational games, sometimes word play, and sometimes making fun of or deriding someone.2 Even the context does not always make it clear exactly how Aquinas is talking about play.In these two sustained treatments of play Aquinas is concerned with two main issues: first, the purpose of play; second, the morality of games and how they can be approached virtuously—with proper order. That is, he is concerned with the why and the how of games.Aquinas pursues these issues in his commentary... (shrink)

A claim for minimalism about ‘real’ on the model of minimalism about ‘true’. The article, in effect, develops J.L. Austin’s remark that with ‘real’, the negative ‘wears the trousers’. The development is then exploited for a proposed elucidation of Plato’s discussion of the fields of knowledge and belief in his Republic. It is proposed that Plato was striving for something whose futility was a leading theme of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

This book presents three of the works of Abdu'l-Bahá, son of the founder of the Bahá'i Faith, dealing with social and political issues.00In 'The Secret of Divine Civilization' (1875) Abdu'l-Bahá supports the administrative and broader social reforms of Mirzá Hosayn Khán, but looks mainly for organic reform through the efforts of Iranian intellectuals to waken and educate the masses. In this work, Abdu'l-Bahá gives virtuous and progressive Islamic clerics a leading role among these intellectuals, indeed most of his appeals are (...) directed specifically to them. 'A Traveller's Narrative' (1889/90) is an authoritative statement of the broad lines of Bahá'i social and political thinking. 'The Art of Governance' (1892/93) was written as Iran entered a pre-revolutionary phase, and ideas that we recognise today as the precursors of political Islam were spreading. It sets out the principles underlying the ideal relationship between religion and politics and between the government and the people.00In addition to presenting the first parallel text translations of these works, the Persian texts incorporate notes on variants in the early published sources. An introduction outlines the intellectual and political landscape from which Abdu'l-Bahá wrote, and in which his expected readers lived. (shrink)

The Story of Oriental Philosophy by Lily Adams Beck offers insights into such Eastern scriptures as the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the teachings of Zen, and Indian sacred writing. Chapters include: The Aryan People of India and the teachings and lore of notable figures as Buddha, Shankara, Confucius, Lao-Tsu, Mencius and many others. The ancient wisdom of Asia awaits those seeking value in thought and knowledge. L. Adam Beck was one of the more well-known and popular novelists and biographers (...) in the 1920s. Beck's fascination with Asian culture and philosophy influenced her to write not only this book but several ""oriental fantasies"" of her era. (shrink)

Lorsqu’il laisse interagir l’expérience contextuelle et l’interprétation traditionnelle, le langage religieux apporte du neuf. L’auteur se demande si la «linguistique cognitive» offre certaines pistes de réflexion et certains modèles utiles à la recontextualisation de l’épistémologie théologique dans la situation actuelle de la postmodernité. La sémantique cognitive présente la théologie comme une approche de la réalité dans un cadre conceptuel fondamental et non dans un rapport prédéterminé entre l’ordre logique et l’ordre ontologique. La théorie de la métaphore est ici particulièrement suggestive. (...) Elle montre que certains concepts – la plupart du temps abstraits, comme AMOUR et DIEU – sont essentiellement structurés métaphoriquement, parce qu’ils sont sémantiquement non autonomes. En cinq remarques conclusives, l’auteur montre comment l’approche interdisciplinaire de la linguistique cognitive peut servir la théologie d’aujourd’hui, tout en manifestant ses limites. (shrink)

This volume brings together flux essays by an eminent scholar on the origins, development, and import of Kant's philosophy, chiefly in its metaphysical aspects. Four of these were separately published between 1924 and 1926, but until now have been difficult to obtain, despite great demand. Their appearance here will be welcomed. The thesis emerging from these studies is that the critical philosophy originates in metaphysical probings concerning the nature and presuppositions of being, and issues in doctrines which, despite psychological, epistemological, (...) and ethical presentation, are intended to have definite ontological import. --L. K. B. (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market (...) account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule? (shrink)

Transcript of speeches by a Hindu philosopher, chiefly on Hindu philosophy and Hinduism.

Au moment où il entreprend d'élaborer une preuve de l'existence de Dieu dont la force soit susceptible d'entraîner l'adhésion de tout esprit qui entend le sens des mots utilisés, s. Anselme veut faire appel à une notion de Dieu admise par tout le monde. Que signifie en effet ce mot Dieu, sinon, ce par rapport à quoi on ne saurait rien concevoir de plus parfait? La notion de Dieu et celle de la perfection la plus grande possible sont done, à (...) ses yeux, si intimement unies qu'on peut les employer l'une pour l'autre. Penser Dieu et penser 1'être le plus parfait possible, ce serait une seule et même chose. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Back to the Nineteenth Century Is ProgressJeffrey L. Geller (bio)Keywordshistory, monomania, impulse control disorders, DSMJohn Sadler Eloquently Makes the case that the phenomena of criminality, wrongful conduct, and mental illness are befuddled in current diagnostic manuals, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)-IV-TR. The lack of clarity in the “vice–mental disorder relationship” reflects centuries old struggles to create clear demarcations between “mad” and “bad.” Sadler points out that (...) the DSMs have been and are both the products of historical, cultural, and social forces and the purveyors of defining boundaries that shape contemporary psychiatric and judicial practices. Sadler does American psychiatry a great service by resurrecting a discussion that was quite rich in the nineteenth century, but generally dormant in the twentieth. I thought I could best use this commentary by bringing to the attention the readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology the scope of the debate amongst Sadler’s nineteenth-century predecessors.Sadler’s PredecessorsPhilippe Pinel, who presented the first clear modern description of the form of mental illness subsequently named moral insanity appeared well aware, in the early years of the nineteenth century, of the difficulties there would be accepting the concept of a limited or partial moral mania:There are certain rare examples of a peculiar turbulent and embittered character, who otherwise show no evidence of disturbed reason. Ought they to be included under the heading of “mania without delirium?” At any rate the authorities have preferred to have them admitted to asylums rather than let them mix with delinquents in houses of correction.(As cited by Walk 1954, 821)James Cowles Prichard, a British physician, is credited with “inventing” the term moral insanity, which he defined as “a morbid perversion of the feelings, affections, and active powers, without any illusion or erroneous conviction impressed upon the understanding” (Prichard 1837, 20; 1842). Prichard warned against the failure to recognize this form of insanity, illustrating his point with what we might now refer to as pyromania:Many lunatics, whose disorder was merely a destructive propensity, have set fire to houses or public buildings, and it is not to be doubted that men have been occasionally executed as criminals for such actions, who, if they had been kept in confinement, would have proved to be insane. Until the existence of moral insanity is distinctly recognized, there will always be a danger of this event ensuing in the trials of mischievous lunatics.(Prichard 1837, 287)Prichard referred to such acts as “instinctive madness” (Prichard 1842). [End Page 19]Isaac Ray, the first American to specifically address these matters (in the first edition of his Treatise on The Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1838), defined “partial moral mania,” indicating that, “In this form of insanity, the derangement is confined to one or a few of the affective faculties, the rest of the moral and intellectual constitution preserving its ordinary integrity” (p. 186). Ray highlighted those partial moral mania he considered to “have the most important legal relations” (p. 187): “an irresistible propensity to steal,” “an inordinate propensity to lying,” “erotic mania,” “a morbid propensity to incendiarism,” and “homicidal insanity” or “homicidal monomania” (pp. 187–234). Ray cogently described what we would categorize today as an impulse disorder: “Amid the rapid and tumultuous succession of feelings that rush into his mind, the reflective powers are paralyzed, and his movements are solely the result of a blind, automatic impulse with which the reason has as little to do, as with the movements of a newborn infant” (p. 261). Ray believed these monomanias “completely annulled... all moral responsibility for acts committed under their influence,” and consequently “the laws can rightfully inflict no punishment on their unfortunate subjects” (p. 276).Ray, like his European predecessors, was not insensitive to the conundrum these partial moral manias would likely produce:True, cases of a disputable character sometimes occur—cases in which we may well doubt whether the active principle is depravity or disease. I have no wish to conceal any difficulty which this subject may present(Ray 1861, 120).The English translation of Esquirol’s treatise in 1854 supported Ray’s views. In a lengthy chapter on the different forms of... (shrink)

I know about you only from your valuable books and from the little that was communicated to me by telephone in Moscow in September. Nevertheless, we share a warm interest in Greek culture generally and philosophy in particular.

Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov is one of the most original and as yet inadequately studied Russian thinkers. Neither a professional philosopher, nor a well-known scholar, nor a critical essayist, he led a kind of double existence while working as an ordinary civil servant, developing his original philosophy at his leisure in the hours free from his intensive daily work. Fedorov's life was one of selflessness and self-denial, not at all eventful outwardly. He graduated from the Gymnasium in Tambov and completed three (...) years of study in the Law Department of the Richelieu Lyceum in Odessa, after which he taught for a number of years in the Borovsk, Lipetsk, Podol'sk, and other regional schools. The quarter century he spent working in the Library of the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow was the most stable period in Fedorov's life. Fedorov's ideas attracted the attention of outstanding cultural figures. F.M. Dostoevskii became acquainted with them in 1878 through Peterson, and on March 24 of that year he wrote: "I am essentially in full accord with these ideas. I read them as if they were my own." L.N. Tolstoy, who knew Fedorov personally, said, "I am proud to be living in the same times as such a man." V.S. Solov'ev, who also associated with Fedorov, wrote to him as follows in the mid-1880s: "Your ‘project’ is the human spirit's first advance along the path of Christ since the advent of Christianity. As for me, I can only acknowledge you as my teacher and spiritual father." A.M. Gorky was especially impressed by the activism in Fedorov's views. But none of this precludes the many and very essential divergences of these authors from Fedorov. One can find some links with his ideas in A.N. Belyi, V. Ia. Briusov, N.A. Zabolotskii, V.V. Maiakovskii, A.P. Platonov, M.M. Prishvin, I.L. Sel'vinskii, O.D. Forsh, and V.N. Khlebnikov. The artist B.N. Chekrygin drafted a large fresco entitled The Resurrection of the Dead [Voskreshenie mertvykh] and a philosophical work entitled The Synod of the Resurrecting Museum [Sobor voskreshaiushchego muzeia], both inspired by Fedorov's teachings. (shrink)

A lo largo del mes de marzo de 1992, el profesor Aranguren dictó en la Residencia de Estudiantes de Madrid, ante un nutrido auditorio, las cuatro conferencias cuyo extracto ofrecemos a continuación. Con ellas se inauguraban las Conferencias Aranguren que el Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas proyecta organizar anualmente con el fin, según rezaba el programa de mano de esta primera edición, «de acoger en el futuro el diálogo plural entre las muchas maneras de hacer filosofía (...) en nuestra lengua, en un momento en que se aprecian signos de renovada actualidad del pensamiento filosófico hispánico y en el que éste se encuentra requerido por la urgencia de hacer frente al desafío de un mundo en crisis». Isegoría desea agradecer a José Luis L. Aranguren, que ha estado vinculado al Instituto de Filosofía desde su fundación como presidente de su Patronato. la oportunidad de dar a conocer este texto inédito, al que en su momento seguirá la publicación de las sucesivas Conferencias, cuya próxima edición correrá a cargo del profesor Ernesto Garzón Valdés de la Universidad de Maguncia. (shrink)

The question addressed here is whether evidence concerning defendants' past criminal records should be introduced at their trials because such evidence reveals their character and thus reveals whether they are the kinds of persons likely to have committed the crimes with which they are currently charged. I strongly caution against the introduction of such evidence for a number of reasons. First, the link between defendants' past criminal records and claims about their standing dispositions to think and act is tenuous, at (...) best. Second, noncharacter, or trace, evidence should have primacy in determining the guilt or innocence of defendants. Third, character evidence will vary in its freshness and specificity. Other things being equal, only relatively fresh and specific character evidence has probative value. Moreover, such evidence will have greater probative value in criminal cases where the issue before the court is whether a crime has been committed than in cases where the issue is whether it was the defendant who committed the crime. Finally, we might be more sanguine about the introduction of fresh and specific character evidence under conditions likely to work against its misuse or misinterpretation. However, the relevant conditions may not often be satisfied in the real world of criminal trials and defendants. (shrink)

As past president of both the History of Science Society and the American Society of Church History, Ronald L. Numbers is uniquely qualified to assess the historical relations between science and Christianity. In this collection of his most recent essays, he moves beyond the clichés of conflict and harmony to explore the tangled web of historical interactions involving scientific and religious beliefs. In his lead essay he offers an unprecedented overview of the history of science and Christianity from the perspective (...) of the ordinary people who filled the pews of churchesor loitered around outside. Unlike the elite scientists and theologians on whom most historians have focused, these vulgar Christians cared little about the discoveries of Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein. Instead, they worried about the causes of the diseases and disasters that directly affected their lives and about scientists preposterous attempts to trace human ancestry back to apes. Far from dismissing opinion-makers in the pulpit, Numbers closely looks at two the most influential Protestant theologians in nineteenth-century America: Charles Hodge and William Henry Green. Hodge, after decades of struggling to harmonize Gods two revelationsin nature and in the Biblein the end famously described Darwinism as atheism. Green, on the basis of his careful biblical studies, concluded that Ussher's chronology was unreliable, thus opening the door for Christian anthropologists to accommodate the subsequent discovery of human antiquity. In Science without God Numbers traces the millennia-long history of so-called methodological naturalism, the commitment to explaining the natural world without appeals to the supernatural. By the early nineteenth century this practice was becoming the defining characteristic of science; in the late twentieth century it became the central point of attack in the audacious attempt of intelligent designers to redefine science. Numbers ends his reassessment by arguing that although science has markedly changed the world we live in, it has contributed less to secularizing it than many have claimed. Taken together, these accessible and authoritative essays form a perfect introduction to Christian attitudes towards science since the 17th century. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est une critique de la philosophie politique de M. Eric Weil. Par opposition à M. Weil, l'auteur définit la „politique" ici comme l'art du réalisable, à préciser comme : l'art d'arriver à court terme à une organisation de la société qu'on estime meilleure, et cela en employant tous les moyens permis. L'homme politique n'est pas, ainsi que l'affirme M. Weil, un „saint de Vtmiversel”, qui, en ce qui concerne l'emploi de la violence, se trouve au-dessus (...) de la loi. Ce „politicien-éducateur” est en vérité l'appui des régimes totalitaires et est d'ailleurs inconcevable en dehors de ceux-ci. En outre la théorie de M. Weil contient un certain nombre de contradictions internes et, si on la mesure à la pratique, elle se trouve être déficiente à beaucoup d'égards. Contre la conception platonicienne de M. Weil l'auteur défend la thèse que la politique n'est pas une infraction, regrettable mais inévitable, à „la morale”. C'est la tâche de l'homme politique de supprimer toutes les absurdités, inconséquences et injustices qui entachent les structures de la société. Ce qui, concrètement, est absurde, inconséquent ou injuste n'est pas déterminé par „la morale”, mais par la conscience du droit et par le sentiment moral d'une époque donnée. Les „certitudes” d'où part l'homme politique ne sont pas des Idées platoniciennes, mais des hypothèses de travail, qui dérivent leur contenu non pas de la contemplation des Idées, mais d'une notion de ce qui est juste et désirable, notion qui est déterminée par les conditions matérielles et spirituelles et qui se trouve dans un changement continuel. (shrink)

1. Hŏryŏng, t'ŏng piŏ yŏnghwarhan maŭm -- 2. Ajik tŭrŏnaji anŭn maŭm esŏ chigak i kanŭng han'ga -- 3. Mibal kwa kijil ŭn ŏttŏn kwan'gye in'ga -- 4. Umjiginŭn maŭm kwa koyohan maŭm -- 5. Chigak ŭi sŏnggyŏk kwa kŭ yŏnwŏn e kwanhan munje.

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.