Abstract:A brief response to papers presented by Herman Saatkamp, Krzysztof Skowroński, Eric Weber, and John Stuhr on the occasion of John Lachs' retirement from Vanderbilt University.

Male cats mate happily with any female in heat in the neighborhood. Something similar occurs in colleges as nearness and availability overwhelm all other considerations. So we see young men and women marry people who happen to be at hand when the time is ripe.

The most enduring philosophical concepts are prereflective. They are firmly founded in primitive experience. By their use the most improbable of our philosophical fancies acquires plausibility: for however much what we say might seem a free construction, do we not see the same features and the same process, attenuated perhaps but real, before our eyes?

John Lachs, one of American philosophy's most distinguished interpreters, turns to William James, Josiah Royce, Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, and George Santayana to elaborate stoic pragmatism, or a way to live life within reasonable limits. Stoic pragmatism makes sense of our moral obligations in a world driven by perfectionist human ambition and unreachable standards of achievement. Lachs proposes a corrective to pragmatist amelioration and stoic acquiescence by being satisfied with what is good enough. This personal, yet modest, philosophy offers (...) penetrating insights into the American way of life and our human character. (shrink)

Whatever specific beliefs pragmatists share concerning experience, knowledge, value, and meaning, they generally agree that a central part of the business of life is to make life better. James speaks of the ideal of meeting all needs, Royce of defeating evil, and Dewey of making experience richer and more secure. They are at one in thinking that human intelligence can make a vast difference to how well we live, and they extol the possibility of improving our circumstances. They tend to (...) be dissatisfied with the status quo and see indefinitely sustained amelioration as the solution to our problems. Stoics, in sharp contrast, are quick to call attention to the limits of our powers and recommend accepting them without complaint. They tend to think that only our beliefs and attitudes fall securely in our control. Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius agree that anything we would consider an improvement of the human condition is temporary and that, in any case, fulfilling our desires accomplishes little. The key to living well, they maintain, is control over self, not over circumstance, and they embrace inner calm in the face of whatever misfortune befalls us. Even such a brief characterization of these two great philosophical traditions makes it clear that pragmatic ambition and... (shrink)

Offers clear and instructive wisdom on how love of life enriches and drives human existence, even in the face of inevitable sadness, loss, and death.

Leading Harvard philosophy professor William Ernest Hocking , author of 17 books and in his day second only to John Dewey in the breadth of his thinking, is now largely forgotten, and his once-influential writings are out of print. This volume, which combines a rich selection of Hocking's work with incisive essays by distinguished scholars, seeks to recover Hocking's valuable contributions to philosophical thought.

If I have been correct in my surmise that Weiss is no reductionist in the ordinary sense, then it is evident that he can offer no definition of mind in any ordinary or straightforward manner. The only way in which he could offer a definition would be, on the basis of the ontological reducibility of mind, by reference to Actuality of which it is asserted to be a function. But Weiss has not provided such a definition, nor is it easy (...) to see how this omission could be rectified. For the proposition that mind is an expression of the self, the most obvious candidate for a definition, does not identify mind uniquely: there are expressions of the self which are not mental. Thus what is needed is a differentia, a characteristic distinguishing mind from all the other expressions of the self. (shrink)

Many studies have documented gender differences in attitudes toward and experiences with science. Compared to men, for example, women are less likely to study science and to pursue careers in science-related fields. Given these findings, should we expect gender differences in support for scientific involvement in U.S. environmental policy? This study empirically examines the relationship of gender to attitudes toward science and preferred roles of scientists in environmental policy among various environmental policy participants. Data collected in 2006 and 2007 from (...) national surveys of four different groups involved in environmental policy and management suggest that social context, including education and occupation, shapes the way that gender matters. Specifically, we find that gender is less important among scientists and managers than among interest groups and the general population regarding attitudes toward science and views about preferred roles of scientists in environmental decision making. (shrink)

Marxist Philosophy: A Bibliographical Guide.

The history of philosophy resembles a convention of deaf-mutes. Each participant attempts to communicate the secrets of his private imagination through a swirl of silent gestures. Intent on disclosing his own insight, each is confined in his own world: he has no ear for the language of others and often little knowledge of how to make them understand his. The carnival of controversy which ensues is grotesque in the eyes of the outsider but tragic for the thoughtful participant. For in (...) the history of philosophy many more messages are sent than are received, and the ones that are received come to us mutilated, infected by our own perspective and interests. In our own way each of us distorts or discards the central judgments of almost everyone else. The dead sign-language of the printed word is inadequate to span a century. Philosophers signal like wild semaphores that lost their common code. (shrink)

John Lachs claims that we are surrounded by people who seem to know what is good for us better than we do ourselves. Lachs discusses the joy of choice and the rare virtue of leaving others alone to lead their lives as they see fit. He does not mean that we abandon them in their genuine hour of need, but that we aid them on their own terms and not make help conditional upon adopting approved beliefs and behaviors. Lachs believes (...) help needs to be temporary to discourage dependence. He contends that leaving others alone in this fashion will create a community that is caring and responsive to the needs of others. All it takes is an urge not to meddle, even when we think it's for someone else's own good. (shrink)

To show that this contention is unfounded I will examine six of the most popular arguments against the impotence hypothesis. Each of these arguments has been considered conclusive against epiphenomenalism by one distinguished philosopher or another. My strategy will be to separate the arguments into three major groups; I will then state each as clearly as I can, and attempt to assess their force impartially.

This essay responds to Eric Weber's article, "The Responsibilities and Dangers of Pragmatism" (in this issue of PCW). It reflects on the question of what academic philosophy can contribute to the contemporary world. Its conclusions are modest but animated by hope that philosophy can help to gradually improve the human condition.

With The Relevance of Philosophy to Life, eminent American philosopher John Lachs reminds us that philosophy is not merely a remote subject of academic research and discourse, but an ever-changing field which can help us navigate through some of the chaos of late twentieth-century living. It provides a clear-eyed look at important philosophical issues--the primacy of values, rationality and irrationality, society and its discontents, life and death, and the traits of human nature--as related to the human condition in the modern (...) world. (shrink)

Professor Weiss thinks that nothing less than a complete explanation of all there is will do for a philosophy. This desire to be all-encompassing defines the kind of multiplication of entities he believes to be necessary. For him the method of philosophy is dialectical, and dialectic is the recognition and provision of that which would complete the given. The technique is similar to what some psychologists have called "eduction of the correlate"; it is similar also to Kant's transcendental method of (...) proof, which proceeds from our actual experience to the conditions under which alone such experience is possible. (shrink)