Looking at responsibility within a Lévinasian sense, human beings are firstly seen not in the philosophically traditional sense, of being egocentric, but rather seen as ethical subjects based on “the other” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). The purpose of this paper is to examine the notion of responsibility as Lévinas conceptualized in the idea that human beings are responsible for not only themselves but for others. Lévinas within “Ethics as First Philosophy” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989) states that before all other forms (...) of being in the world there must be responsibility to the Other (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). Lévinas defines this to mean that before freedom of the subject, and their subjectivity, before self-consciousness, before the consciousness of consciousness, before being, and before relativity there is “responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75). Perhaps, Lévinas is saying that a human beings obligation comes before all of what follows from our being in this world, our obligation to the Other beginning with the “face to face” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75), interaction, which is our first and foremost responsibility, the responsibility to the Other. And to be ethical beings who begin with responsibility we rely on the fundamental relationship of others. This notion of responsibility appears when we encounter, in the face-to-face interaction, the unknowable other. However, does this responsibility extend to more than two individuals and to those outside our immediate proximity? For example, Lévinas states that it is the “face to face” notion of seeing one in distress, yet what if it is a group of people, and what if they are not in close proximity but on the other side of the world? What if they are on the other side of a screen that can also be artificial intelligence in our modern era. Are we still responsible? And if we are responsible, how does Lévinas’s concept of responsibility fit into that situation or is it limited? I want to examine responsibility in terms of proximity through a Lévinasian ethical lens and plurality, defined as more than two individuals, by questioning responsibility in terms of relationality, and vulnerability. I will be looking mainly at five authors Emmanuel Lévinas, Ernst Van Alphen, Judith Butler, Kevin Quashi, and Lisa Guenther, to answer the question of whether Lévinas’s definition of responsibility includes proximity, and plurality. (shrink)

I have come to the realization that we cannot regulate what we cannot define. However, the public sphere should be a place where dialogue is readily stated even if it makes someone uncomfortable, and this is not hate speech. Otherwise, we begin to stop talking about difficult things, and secondly, there is not anything I can say that is not going to offend someone if the crowd is large enough. Who defines hate? This is an insoluble problem; thus, it should (...) not be regulated. That is why we need the public sphere so desperately so that those with an invested advantage do not make our decisions for us. Western society lives in worldless times. The salvation of worldlessness is firstly, a world that is based in continuity and permanence, even though human beings require the unpredictability and uncertainty of a controlled outcome, and secondly, thinking that is driven by meaning-making, reason, and wonder, rather than the reverence of sciences and technology and lastly, an education that provides children deployment of trust from the world in order to reproduce. I will begin by defining the intricacies of worldlessness an Arendtian term, defining what thinking is, and how worldlessness relates to thinking. I will then demonstrate how various forms of thinking can be detrimental to society, and the public sphere. Additionally, I will investigate the prolific use of technology and sciences as an affecting mechanism in the way human beings think. Finally, I will be taking a closer look at how culture is formed or deformed through worldlessness and what the model of education needs to be in order for future generations to become more thoughtful thinking adults. (shrink)

I have come to the realization that we cannot regulate what we cannot define. However, the public sphere should be a place where dialogue is readily stated even if it makes someone uncomfortable, and this is not hate speech. Otherwise, we begin to stop talking about difficult things, and secondly, there is not anything I can say that is not going to offend someone if the crowd is large enough. Who defines hate? This is an insoluble problem; thus, it should (...) not be regulated. That is why we need the public sphere so desperately so that those with an invested advantage do not make our decisions for us. Western society lives in worldless times. The salvation of worldlessness is firstly, a world that is based in continuity and permanence, even though human beings require the unpredictability and uncertainty of a controlled outcome, and secondly, thinking that is driven by meaning-making, reason, and wonder, rather than the reverence of sciences and technology and lastly an education that provides children deployment of trust from the world in order to reproduce. I will begin by defining the intricacies of worldlessness an Arendtian term, defining what thinking is, and how worldlessness relates to thinking. I will then demonstrate how various forms of thinking can be detrimental to society, and the public sphere. Additionally, I will investigate the prolific use of technology and sciences as an affecting mechanism in the way human beings think. Finally, I will be taking a closer look at how culture is formed or deformed through worldlessness and what the model of education needs to be in order for future generations to become more thoughtful thinking adults. (shrink)