Using land-use models in deliberative planning is promoted as an example of how environmental decision-making can be subject to both: 1) facts about how the interaction between human action and natural processes; and, 2) local perspectives on how land-use planning processes can incorporate normative concerns. This ‘normative’ input is often shaped and limited by the presentation of the modelled facts. This paper, however, shows that the selection and measurement of indicators, the primary outcomes of modelling exercises, are subject to a (...) highly particular assessment, influenced by social factors, political choices and technical limitations. This revised understanding does not invalidate the use of models in participatory planning. But it does open up considerable space for stakeholders in deliberative contexts to question and challenge the evidence-based policy implications of so-called ‘fact-based’ modelling exercises. (shrink)

Few topics have been addressed through as large a range of perspectives and interests as urban agriculture (UA), yet the literature has been loosely characterized by a divergence and disconnect between research conducted in the global north (GN), and that in the global south (GS). In cities of the global south, UA is widely analyzed through a productivist lens, focusing on food production and individual or household-level contributions of urban farming to food security, household income, and livelihoods. Meanwhile, in cities (...) of the global north, engagement with UA also speaks to food production and food security but is just as often focused on environmental and social movements, civic engagement and justice, and more recently urban sustainability and resiliency. We argue that productivist and post-productivist dichotomies are somewhat displaced as differences between the GN/GS are becoming less pronounced. Furthermore, such a dichotomy reinforces assumptions about the nature of urbanization itself, eliding both the commonalities among urban spaces and specificities that come from each place. By examining how UA is approached and written about in different contexts, we hope to highlight the gaps, but also to illustrate convergent themes, particularly those that increasingly characterize contemporary UA research. After elaborating on these tensions, we will build on the increasing relevance of the convergences by suggesting some potentially fruitful future directions for UA research. We conclude with ideas about how novel theoretical concepts might be used to identify overlapping themes in useful and insightful ways, and to increase the significance and reach of UA research. (shrink)

For Freud, what appears to reason is already predetermined by an unconscious that distorts and censors the “true” meaning behind the explicit one that is allowed to appear to us. The evidences of dreams make this clear. Explicit thoughts or symbols that ultimately connect to our waking life and reality are mere vehicles for the expression of unconscious “thoughts”. Furthermore, dreams evidence a censoring mechanism (that is relaxed in the state of sleep) that keeps these unconscious “thoughts” from rising to (...) the surface in our waking state. So how does Freud have an “epistemology”? Dreams also exhibit rational and cultural mediation. Censorship involves “knowledge” of what to prohibit and what to allow according to normative dictates. Ego-consciousness (or reason) is theultimate arbiter between unconscious and rational demands. Unconscious thoughts are, therefore, ultimately subject to rational deliberation. (shrink)

Hegel’s critique of traditional metaphysics is well-known. The first half of the Phenomenology, in particular, attempts to expose the faults underlying the metaphysics of the thing, and the subject-object dualism that arises out of it. This section in the Phenomenology aligns Hegel with Modern Philosophy, thematizing the tensions between thing-in-itself and appearance, the one and its properties, and substance and accidents. For Hegel, the thing is exposed as Spirit, albeit Spirit frozen and isolated from itself. By bringing up Locke in (...) this context, I show how Locke’s own conclusions confirm Hegel’s. A close reading of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding shows that Hegel’s conclusions about the thing is immanent to the empiricist’s very own formulations of the problem. The theme of the presentation is both an apology for Hegel and a critique of Locke. (shrink)