On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...) to account for it. This paper pursues three interrelated aims: (i) it examines the contrast between reductive and non-reductive views of (triadic) joint attention, by bringing into focus the notion of recursive mindreading; (ii) it assembles, advances, and discusses a number of arguments against reductive views; (iii) finally, in dialogue with some prominent non-reductive views, it outlines the case for a non-reductive view that gives pride of place to the idea that co-attenders relate to one another as a ‘you’. (shrink)

A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend (...) a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I distinguish two (...) versions of ascriptivism: reductive versus non-reductive ascriptivism. According to reductive ascriptivism, competent users of a concept have the ability to infer truths involving such concept from lower-level truths, whereas according to non-reductive ascriptivism, all that is required in order to be a competent user of a concept is to be able to infer truths involving that concept from other truths, which need not be lower-level truths. I argue, first, that the a priori entailment thesis is committed to reductive ascriptivism, and secondly, that reductive ascriptivism is problematic because it trivializes the notion of a priori knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that Chalmers and Jackson have not presented a convincing case for the claim that microphysical truths entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths a priori, especially when we understand this claim in the sense that is relevant for their argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

Resumen: A fines del siglo XV convergen múltiples experiencias de orden global que contribuyeron a producir una imagen de mundo específica tradicionalmente asociada al recorrido complejo de la modernidad. En este espacio de convergencias global y diferenciado, la Addizione Erculea de 1492 cumple ella misma una función de expresión de conflicto en la transformación del espacio público y de la representación iconográfica del poder hasta entonces vinculado con los frescos del Pallazo Schifanoia. En este artículo analizaremos esa transferencia, sus continuidades (...) y discontinuidades, poniendo especial énfasis en la historia urbana como diálogo con las tensiones entre las nociones teológicas de civitas dei, civitas deorum y città que surgen con su propia conflictividad en la tendencia a la producción de un espacio abstracto de administración del poder en la modernidad. (shrink)

Den Philosophen und Theologen Friedrich Schleiermacher und den dänischen Philosophen, Mineralogen und Theologen Henrik Steffens verband nicht nur eine enge Freundschaft, sondern sie verstanden sich – kurz nacheinander 1804 an die Universität Halle berufen – auch als wissenschaftliches Pendant. Grundlegend für den gefühlten Gleichklang beider Köpfe ist der romantische Gedanke progressiver Universalität, der auf der Suche nach einer angemessenen wissenschaftlichen Methodik gleichermaßen die Forderung nach System und Antisystem, System und seine Subversion generiert. Trotz dieser häufig konstatierten wissenschaftlichen Entsprechung beider Denker (...) ist ihr systematisches Verhältnis bis dato in der Forschung kaum bedacht und ebenso Desiderat wie die philosophische Literatur zu Steffens Werk überhaupt. Die Beiträge des Bandes gehen biographischen Spuren nach, thematisieren die Einheit des Wissens im Spannungsverhältnis von System und Subversion, untersuchen das Wechselverhältnis von Ethik und Physik, Naturphilosophie und Naturwissenschaft und fragen auch nach den im Verlauf ihrer Freundschaft zunehmenden Differenzen im Denken beider Philosophen, die sich nicht zuletzt in ihren theologischen und kirchenpolitischen Schriften manifestieren. (shrink)

The claim that Descartes could have derived the certainty of his existence from the infallibility of the self?referential use of T is rejected because it fails to take account of the hyperbolical hypothesis. Recognizing the constraints which the latter involved, Descartes tried to secure Sum by an argument in modus ponens, which requires an incorrigible statement about experience as a minor premiss. Because he had an incorrect conception of the nature of statements, Descartes failed to realize that the circumstances described (...) in the hypothesis exclude the conditions necessary for any statements or thoughts whatsoever. This, in turn, led to a systematic conflation of statements with sentences. The incoherence of the argument follows from the fact that Cogito could at best be a sentence and not a statement and, as such, could not provide the required minor premiss. It is a further consequence of Descartes's conflation of statements with sentences that the subject of the hypothesis cannot be identical with the subject responsible for the hypothesis and that Descartes's hypothesis cannot therefore be about himself. (shrink)

Given any finite graph, which transitive graphs approximate it most closely and how fast can we find them? The answer to this question depends on the concept of “closest approximation” involved. In [8,9] a qualitative concept of best approximation is formulated. Roughly, a qualitatively best transitive approximation of a graph is a transitive graph which cannot be “improved” without also going against the original graph. A quantitative concept of best approximation goes back at least to [10]. A quantitatively best transitive (...) approximation is a transitive graph that makes the minimal number of mistakes against the original graph. In other words, the sum of the edges that are removed from and are added to the original graph is minimal. (shrink)