Drawing on a career-long exploration of 1960s French philosophy, Leonard Lawlor seeks a solution to 'the problem of the worst violence'. The worst violence is the reaction of total apocalypse without remainder; it is the reaction of complete negation and death; it is nihilism. Lawlor argues that it is not just transcendental violence that must be minimised: all violence must itself be reduced to its lowest level. He offers new ways of speaking to best achieve the least violence, which (...) he creatively appropriates from Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari as 'speaking-freely', 'speaking-distantly' and 'speaking-in-tongues'. (shrink)

"The compiling of a bibliography requires both a thorough knowledge of the subject . . . and the ability to discriminate effectively. Success depends as much on the clear definition of focus as on the evaluation of the texts considered. Orr succeeds on each count, thereby rendering an invaluable service to students and scholars alike. . . . Particularly interesting is the inclusion of works devoted to the interrelatedness of existentialism and the political and social sciences. And extremely helpful are (...) the notations referring the researcher to sections of a work either of particular significance or pertinent to a specific point of view. An excellent introduction emphasizes the movement away from the fundamental (ontological) concerns of existential thought. . . . Orr's effort to resituate the research within the original dimensions of existentialism and phenomenology as exploratory processes, as opposed to intellectual systems, is most commendable."FRENCH REVIEW. (shrink)

The renormalization group is used to analyze the behavior of certain gravitationally significant renormalized coupling constants under a scaling of the spacetime curvature. After discussing a simple example, the results are summarized for a class of grand unified theories.

We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some differences across group sizes. The mechanism operates marginally better with three or four compared to two players. However, (...) this effect is mainly driven by players’ behavior rather than by differences in the beliefs they form about the realization probabilities. (shrink)

Abstract:Because the demand for intensive care unit (ICU) beds exceeds the supply in general, and because of the formidable costs of that level of care, clinicians face ethical issues when rationing this kind of care not only at the point of admission to the ICU, but also after the fact. Under what conditions—if any—may patients be denied admission to the ICU or removed after admission? One professional medical group has defended a rule of “first come, first served” in ICU admissions, (...) and this approach has numerous moral considerations in its favor. We show, however, that admission to the ICU is not in and of itself guaranteed; we also show that as a matter of principle, it can be morally permissible to remove certain patients from the ICU, contrary to the idea that because they were admitted first, they are entitled to stay indefinitely through the point of recovery, death, or voluntary withdrawal. What remains necessary to help guide these kinds of decisions is the articulation of clear standards for discontinuing intensive care, and the articulation of these standards in a way consistent with not only fiduciary and legal duties that attach to clinical care but also with democratic decision making processes. (shrink)

I agree with Jecker et al that “the headline-grabbing nature of existential risk (X-risk) diverts attention away from immediate artificial intelligence (AI) threats…”1 Focusing on very long-term speculative risks associated with AI is both ethically distracting and ethically dangerous, especially in a healthcare context. More specifically, AI in healthcare is generating healthcare justice challenges that are real, imminent and pervasive. These are challenges generated by AI that deserve immediate ethical attention, more than any X-risk issues in the distant future. Almost (...) 50 years ago, John Knowles edited a volume titled Doing Better and Feeling Worse: Health in the United States. We are ‘doing better’ because numerous advances in medical technologies are saving more lives and improving the quality of our lives. But we are ‘feeling worse’ because the additional costs are unsustainable, are threatening funding for other social goods and are increasing injustices regarding the allocation of those resources. This is precisely the situation we are faced with regarding AI in medicine today. Exploding healthcare costs have generated increasing pressure to control those costs, often with unjust consequences. AI is touted as a critical mechanism for controlling healthcare costs, often with little thought given to justice-relevant consequences. Consider, for example, …. (shrink)

I fundamentally agree with Childress et al. (2023) in the scenario they have constructed with Mr. J. None of the arguments they critically assess are ethically persuasive enough to justify removing...

This essay argues that our national efforts at health reform ought to be informed by eleven key lessons from Oregon. Specifically, we must learn that the need for health care rationing is inescapable, that any rationing process must be public and visible, and that fair rationing protocols must be self-imposed through a process of rational democratic deliberation. Part I of this essay notes that rationing is a ubiquitous feature of our health care system at present, but it is mostly hidden (...) rationing, which is presumptively unjust. Part II argues that the need for health care rationing is inescapable. Although Oregon is flawed as a model of health rationing, it gives us worthy moral lessons for health reform at the national level, which I analyze and defend in Part III. The most significant of these lessons is the importance of rational democratic deliberation in articulating fair rationing protocols for a community. In Part IV I sketch the philosophic justification for this approach and respond to some important criticisms from Daniels. Keywords: cost containment, democratic deliberation, fairness, justice, rationing CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Accelerated approval of aducanumab for mild Alzheimer's by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on June 7, 2021, has generated substantial medical, scientific, and ethical controversy. That approval was contrary to the nearly unanimous judgment of the FDA's Advisory Committee that little reliable evidence existed of significant benefit, even though the drug did reduce β‐amyloid. Three major ethical problems were created by this approval: (1) Medicare resources would be unjustly squandered, given the drug's $56,000 annual price and the 3.1 million (...) older potential American patients needing the drug; (2) physicians will feel ethically compelled to provide the drug to desperate, insistent patients, given FDA approval and in spite of side effects of brain bleeds and brain swelling; (3) and false hopes are generated for patients. A needed corrective by the federal government would reduce reimbursement to the bare cost of producing the drug (plus only a modest profit) until a phase IV trial has been successfully completed. (shrink)

Social scientific development has been greatly influenced by Galilean-Newtonian thought which emphasized formulation of abstract hypotheses valid throughout all time and space and independent of human characteristics. This influence has resulted in an artificial hiatus between social science and social problem-solving. Dissolution of certain Galilean-Newtonian assumptions has opened the way for integrating aspects of another stream of thought, the Hegelian-Marxian one, into the social scientific endeavor. Hegelian-Marxian thought emphasizes the individual becoming self-conscious of, and involved in, the social-historical process. The (...) uniting of certain aspects of Galilean-Newtonian and Hegelian-Marxian thought provides a genuinely experimental social science in which abstract hypothesis-testing is united with social action that is based on persons' awareness of relevant hypotheses viewed in historical perspective. (shrink)

Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit zeitgenössischen Strömungen der Philosophie nahm in Nelsons Lehrtätigkeit und Veröffentlichungen breiten Raum ein. Neben konkurrierenden Ausprägungen des Neukantianismus grenzte er sich gegen Pragmatismus, Positivismus und die phänomenologische Schule ab, vor allem aber auch gegen Autoren wie Bergson und Spengler, die einem Paradigma von Philosophie verpflichtet waren, das Nelson in seinen Vorlesungen mit dem Ausdruck "intuitive Philosophie" bezeichnete. Nelsons Kritik beschränkt sich nicht darauf, dieser Art Philosophie Begründungsmängel vorzuwerfen. Vielmehr sieht er die "intuitive Philosophie" in dem klassischen (...) Denkfehler befangen, gehaltvolle Aussagen aus bloßen Begriffen herzuleiten und die Gültigkeit ihrer Thesen durch die fälschliche Berufung auf begriffliche Tatsachen zu erschleichen. Wie für Wittgenstein sind auch Nelsons leitende Ideale in der Philosophie Klarheit und kompromisslose Konsequenz. Wenn irgendwo, dann erweist sich Nelson mit diesem Text als analytischer Philosoph im besten Sinne - als ein Philosoph, für den die "Kunst, zu philosophieren" zuallererst in der Kunst des richtigen Argumentierens besteht und für den diese Kunst insbesondere durch die Analyse der Argumentationen und Fehlargumentationen anderer Philosophen erworben wird. (shrink)

In the study of human thought there could hardly be a more fundamental con cern than language and reasoning. In the tradition of Western philosophy, humans are distinguished by their ability to speak and to think rationally. And language is often considered a prerequisite for rational thought. If psycholoQists, then, are ever to discover what is truly human about their species, they will have to discover how language is produced and understood, and how it plays a role in reasoning and (...) other forms of rational thought. Within psychology there has been an imperative to study language and rea soning together. Since Wundt, psychologists have succeeded in building a the oretical foundation for both language and reasoning. What has become clear from these beginnings is that the two are inextricably bound to each other. Like the two players ina chess game, take away one of them and the game no longer exists. On the one hand, producing and understanding speech re quires an intricate process of reasoning. Speakers must rationally choose sentences that will affect their listeners in ways they intend, and listen ers must infer what speakers could conceivably have meant in selecting the sentences they did. Reasoning, inference, and rational thought lie at the very center of speaking and listening. On the other hand, logical reasoning begins with, and is influenced by, the language in which a problem is stated. (shrink)

Human cultural groups appear well designed, but is this apparent design due to altruism or due to self-serving behaviours? Sober and Wilson argue that human cultures are founded on group-selected altruism. This argument assumes that individually selected self-serving traits are not being misidentified as altruistic. A simple definition of individual selection suggests that Sober and Wilson fail to separate one such trait, called benevolence, from altruism. Benevolent individuals act selfishly but provide an incidental benefit to their neighbours. The female-biased Hamiltonian (...) sex ratios are used to illustrate benevolence, and a financial analogy is used to emphasize why such traits are individually advantageous. Benevolence can only evolve in a spatially structured population, illustrating the importance of separating individual selection in structured and unstructured populations. Unlike benevolence, altruism can only evolve by group selection and, as a result, is vulnerable to selfish ‘cheats’ that exploit the self-sacrifice of altruists. (shrink)

Whether animals fare well or not is of ethical significance. For this reason, their capacity for wellbeing, i.e., how good or bad the lives of animals can go, is of ethical significance as well. I assume that the wellbeing of most animals is mainly determined by their phenomenally conscious experiences. If consciousness differences between species determine wellbeing differences, then the kinds of conscious experience species are capable of may entail that some species systematically (can) have higher or lower wellbeing than (...) others. Then, I argue that not all phenomenally conscious states contribute to wellbeing equally. I discuss which features of consciousness are constituents of wellbeing and which can, for ethical purposes, be ignored. In addition, I scrutinize how much different features of experience contribute to wellbeing and how their presence can be detected empirically. This way, this paper exemplifies a novel consciousness-centered approach for the empirical investigation of animal wellbeing. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are analyzed. While subsequent research is needed to refine the framework, I already note some preliminary implications for animal ethics. (shrink)

This paper compares the views of Hegel and Schelling regarding the problem of individuation, i.e. the question of what makes an individual (a) numerically distinct from others and (b) the very individual it is. My focus is on how Hegel approaches this problem in his metaphysics and how that relates to Schelling’s views as articulated in his ‘negative philosophy’. While Hegelians like Robert Stern and Karen Ng are optimistic that Hegel can solve the problem of individuation, I argue that Schelling (...) puts forward an objection that both challenges Hegel’s account and provides a rationale for taking seriously Schelling’s own insistence on a pre-logical dimension of being. (shrink)

De Bie et al. (2023) call attention at the conclusion of their essay to the “novel questions” generated by complete ectogenesis. The question I explore is how complete ectogenesis from conception t...

This essay challenges a growing consensus among Aquinas scholars who attribute to him a pro-passion attitude, linking his virtue theory to accounts of emotion that see the emotions in a primarily positive light. There are good reasons for thinking Aquinas far more skeptical of the role to be played by emotion in the virtuous life—indeed, one can safely argue, in agreement with Aquinas, that the emotions are often threats to and so in need of control by the virtues. I focus (...) on the ideal of reason’s control over the emotions in the essay in contrast with the work of Robert Miner whose understanding of Aquinas on the passions and virtues tends to downplay the dominating role that reason plays in the moral theory of Aquinas. For Aquinas IRC is central to the normativity of the virtues that relate to the emotions. In contrast, Miner appears to minimize the need for the emotions to be controlled, which entails a certain elevation of the emotions to a nearly co-equal status with reason in Aquinas’s moral theory. Miner adopts two argumentative strategies to achieve this valorization of emotion in Aquinas, but I find both exegetically inaccurate and experientially deficient. (shrink)

John Rawls has held up as a model of public reason the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the Dobbs Court is justifiably criticized for failing to respect public reason. First, the entire opinion is governed by an originalist ideological logic almost entirely incongruent with public reason in a liberal, pluralistic, democratic society. Second, Alito’s emphasis on “ordered liberty” seems completely at odds with the “disordered liberty” regarding abortion already evident among the states. Third, describing the embryo/fetus from conception until (...) birth as an “unborn human being” begs the question of the legal status of the embryo/fetus, as if an obiter dictum settled the matter. Fourth, Alito accuses the Roe court of failing to exercise judicial restraint, although Alito argued to overturn Roe in its entirety. In brief, the Dobbs opinion is an illiberal, disingenuous, ideological swamp that swallows up public reason and the reproductive rights of women. (shrink)

Let us begin by assembling some signs of the present philosophical situation. On the one hand, the most important living French philosopher, Alain Badiou, calls for a “return to Plato,” despite the movement of anti-Platonism that dominated French and German thought in the 20 th century. On the other hand, the present moment sees a resurgence of naturalism in philosophy in general (including and especially Anglophone analytic philosophy), despite the criticisms of naturalism that have appeared throughout the 20 th century. (...) Phenomenology seems to be at the center of both of these movements. On the one hand, it is the idea of a mathematized ontology that requires the return to Plato, a mathematized ontology constructed without a reflection on its transcendental grounds. On the other, the resurgence of naturalism is so strong that a book could be imagined and published with the bastard name of Naturalizing Phenomenology , as if the transcendental moment of phenomenology did not transform the very meaning of nature. These signs seem to indicate that we have entered into a phase of regression or even decline in philosophical thinking. If this interpretation of the signs is correct, if we have indeed entered into a phase of regression -- a twofold regression toward Platonism and toward naturalism -- we must ask the following question: is it possible for us to define something like a project or even a research agenda that would allow us to define a way of thinking that might lead us out of the present situation, a situation, it must be said, that seems dire for philosophy in general? If we can determine such a research agenda, perhaps we can also begin to understand what the tradition of “continental philosophy” has stood for. (shrink)

Written by Derrida scholars, philosophers, and classicists, Derrida and Antiquity analyses a dialogue with the ancient world in the work of one of the greatest ...