This paper argues that Reason Responsiveness (RR) accounts of rationality, proposed for example by Benjamin Kiesewetter and Error Lord, fail to explain structural irrationality (i.e., the irrationality involved in holding incoherent attitudes). Proponents of RR hold that rationality consists in correctly responding to available reasons. Structural irrationality, they argue, is just a “by‐product” of incorrect reason‐responding. Applying this idea to cases of means–end incoherence, this paper shows that RR accounts must rely on a certain transmission principle. Roughly, this amounts to (...) the principle that necessarily, if (1) A has decisive available reason to intend to E and (2) A has decisive available reason to believe that intending to M is necessary for E‐ing, it follows that (3) A has decisive available reason to intend to M. By considering an example, this paper argues that even the most plausible version of this transmission principle does not hold true. It follows that one can correctly respond to one's available reasons while being means–end incoherent. (shrink)

This paper analyses and (tentatively) rejects Julian Fink's argument for the existence of normative process-requirements. According to Fink, only process-requirements allow us to give appropriate normative credit to a subject S who violates certain state-requirements but is undergoing a process that will eventually lead to their satisfaction. I will show that Fink's argument applies, at best, only to a restricted set of cases—namely, when S's undergoing a process has not resulted in the formation of new mental states. In these remaining (...) cases, however, it is implausible to give S normative credit for undergoing the relevant process. Thus, we can assign the correct degree of the corresponding normative property solely in terms of state-requirements. To the extent that this holds, Fink's argument does not entail that there are normative process-requirements. (shrink)