The Erdős–Moser ([Formula: see text]) theorem says that every infinite tournament admits an infinite transitive subtournament. We study the computational behavior of the [Formula: see text] theorem with respect to the arithmetic hierarchy, and prove that [Formula: see text] instances of [Formula: see text] admit low[Formula: see text] solutions for every [Formula: see text], and that if a set [Formula: see text] is not arithmetical, then every instance of [Formula: see text] admits a solution relative to which [Formula: see text] (...) is still not arithmetical. We also provide a level-wise refinement of this theorem. These results are part of a larger program of computational study of combinatorial theorems in Reverse Mathematics. (shrink)

A left-variable word over an alphabet A is a word over $A \cup \{\star \}$ whose first letter is the distinguished symbol $\star $ standing for a placeholder. The ordered variable word theorem ( $\mathsf {OVW}$ ), also known as Carlson–Simpson’s theorem, is a tree partition theorem, stating that for every finite alphabet A and every finite coloring of the words over A, there exists a word $c_0$ and an infinite sequence of left-variable words $w_1, w_2, \dots $ such that (...) $\{ c_0 \cdot w_1[a_1] \cdot \dots \cdot w_k[a_k] : k \in \mathbb {N}, a_1, \dots, a_k \in A \}$ is monochromatic. In this article, we prove that $\mathsf {OVW}$ is $\Pi ^0_4$ -conservative over $\mathsf {RCA}_0 + \mathsf {B}\Sigma ^0_2$. This implies in particular that $\mathsf {OVW}$ does not imply $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ over $\mathsf {RCA}_0$. This is the first principle for which the only known separation from $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ involves non-standard models. (shrink)

Ramsey’s theorem asserts that every k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$ admits an infinite monochromatic set. Whenever $n \geq 3$, there exists a computable k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$ whose solutions compute the halting set. On the other hand, for every computable k-coloring of $[\omega ]^2$ and every noncomputable set C, there is an infinite monochromatic set H such that $C \not \leq _T H$. The latter property is known as cone avoidance.In this article, we design a natural class of Ramsey-like theorems encompassing (...) many statements studied in reverse mathematics. We prove that this class admits a maximal statement satisfying cone avoidance and use it as a criterion to re-obtain many existing proofs of cone avoidance. This maximal statement asserts the existence, for every k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$, of an infinite subdomain $H \subseteq \omega $ over which the coloring depends only on the sparsity of its elements. This confirms the intuition that Ramsey-like theorems compute Turing degrees only through the sparsity of its solutions. (shrink)

Every function over the natural numbers has an infinite subdomain on which the function is non-decreasing. Motivated by a question of Dzhafarov and Schweber, we study the reverse mathematics of variants of this statement. It turns out that this statement restricted to computably bounded functions is computationally weak and does not imply the existence of the halting set. On the other hand, we prove that it is not a consequence of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. This statement can therefore be seen (...) as an arguably natural principle between the arithmetic comprehension axiom and stable Ramsey’s theorem for pairs. (shrink)

A function is diagonally non-computable if it diagonalizes against the universal partial computable function. D.n.c. functions play a central role in algorithmic randomness and reverse mathematics. Flood and Towsner asked for which functions h, the principle stating the existence of an h-bounded d.n.c. function implies Ramsey-type weak König’s lemma. In this paper, we prove that for every computable order h, there exists an ω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\omega}$$\end{document} -model of h-DNR which is not a not (...) model of the Ramsey-type graph coloring principle for two colors and therefore not a model of RWKL. The proof combines bushy tree forcing and a technique introduced by Lerman, Solomon and Towsner to transform a computable non-reducibility into a separation over ω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\omega}$$\end{document} -models. (shrink)

${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is the statement asserting that any infinite subtree of $\mathbb {N}^{<\mathbb {N}}$ has an infinite path or an infinite antichain. In this paper, we study the computational strength of this theorem from a reverse mathematical viewpoint. We prove that ${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is robust, that is, there exist several characterizations, some of which already appear in the literature, namely, the statement $\mathsf {SHER}$ introduced by Dorais et al. [8], and the statement $\mathsf {TAC}+\mathsf {B}\Sigma ^0_2$ (...) where $\mathsf {TAC}$ is the tree antichain theorem introduced by Conidis [6]. We show that ${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is computationally very weak, in that it admits probabilistic solutions. (shrink)

The infinite pigeonhole principle for 2-partitions asserts the existence, for every set A, of an infinite subset of A or of its complement. In this paper, we study the infinite pigeonhole pr...

There exist two main notions of typicality in computability theory, namely, Cohen genericity and randomness. In this article, we introduce a new notion of genericity, called partition genericity, which is at the intersection of these two notions of typicality, and show that many basis theorems apply to partition genericity. More precisely, we prove that every co-hyperimmune set and every Kurtz random is partition generic, and that every partition generic set admits weak infinite subsets, for various notions of weakness. In particular, (...) we answer a question of Kjos-Hanssen and Liu by showing that every Kurtz random admits an infinite subset which does not compute any set of positive effective Hausdorff dimension. Partition genericity is a partition regular notion, so these results imply many existing pigeonhole basis theorems. (shrink)

The thin set theorem for n-tuples and k colors states that every k-coloring of $[\mathbb {N}]^n$ admits an infinite set of integers H such that $[H]^n$ avoids at least one color. In this paper, we study the combinatorial weakness of the thin set theorem in reverse mathematics by proving neither $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {TS}}}^n_k$, nor the free set theorem imply the Erdős–Moser theorem whenever k is sufficiently large. Given a problem $\mathsf {P}$, a computable instance of $\mathsf {P}$ is universal (...) iff its solution computes a solution of any other computable $\mathsf {P}$ -instance. It has been established that most of Ramsey-type problems do not have a universal instance, but the case of Erdős–Moser theorem remained open so far. We prove that Erdős–Moser theorem does not admit a universal instance. (shrink)

A set of integers A is computably encodable if every infinite set of integers has an infinite subset computing A. By a result of Solovay, the computably encodable sets are exactly the hyperarithmetic ones. In this article, we extend this notion of computable encodability to subsets of the Baire space, and we characterize the Π10-encodable compact sets as those which admit a nonempty Σ11-subset. Thanks to this equivalence, we prove that weak weak König’s lemma is not strongly computably reducible to (...) Ramsey’s theorem. This answers a question of Hirschfeldt and Jockusch. (shrink)

A problem is a multivalued function from a set of instances to a set of solutions. We consider only instances and solutions coded by sets of integers. A problem admits preservation of some computability-theoretic weakness property if every computable instance of the problem admits a solution relative to which the property holds. For example, cone avoidance is the ability, given a noncomputable set A and a computable instance of a problem ${\mathsf {P}}$, to find a solution relative to which A (...) is still noncomputable.In this article, we compare relativized versions of computability-theoretic notions of preservation which have been studied in reverse mathematics, and prove that the ones which were not already separated by natural statements in the literature actually coincide. In particular, we prove that it is equivalent to admit avoidance of one cone, of $\omega $ cones, of one hyperimmunity or of one non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definition. We also prove that the hierarchies of preservation of hyperimmunity and non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definitions coincide. On the other hand, none of these notions coincide in a nonrelativized setting. (shrink)

The widespread conviction that we are living in a post-truth era rests on two claims: that a large number of people believe things that are clearly false, and that their believing these things reflects a lack of respect for truth. In reality, however, fewer people believe clearly false things than surveys or social media suggest. In particular, relatively few people believe things that are widely held to be bizarre. Moreover, accepting false beliefs does not reflect a lack of respect for (...) truth. Almost everyone’s beliefs are explained by rationally warranted trust in some sources rather than others. This allows us to explain why people have false beliefs. (shrink)

Proponents of mechanistic explanation all acknowledge the importance of organization. But they have also tended to emphasize specificity with respect to parts and operations in mechanisms. We argue that in understanding one important mode of organization—patterns of causal connectivity—a successful explanatory strategy abstracts from the specifics of the mechanism and invokes tools such as those of graph theory to explain how mechanisms with a particular mode of connectivity will behave. We discuss the connection between organization, abstraction, and mechanistic explanation and (...) illustrate our claims by looking at an example from recent research on so-called network motifs. (shrink)

Consciousness, or its lack, is often invoked in debates in applied and normative ethics. Conscious beings are typically held to be significantly more morally valuable than non-consious, so that establishing whether a being is conscious becomes of critical importance. In this paper, I argue that the supposition that phenomenal consciousness explains the value of our experiences or our lives, and the moral value of beings who are conscious, is less well-grounded than is commonly thought. A great deal of what matters (...) to us and about us can be explained by functional and representational properties that may not be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. I conclude with some reflections on how these claims might affect debates in ethics. (shrink)

Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.

Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic (...) dopamine system that typifies addictions causes the generation of a mismatch between the top-down model of the world that reflects the judgment that the addict ought to refrain from drugs, and bottom-up input caused by cues predictive of drug availability. This constitutes a powerful pressure toward revising the judgment and thereby attenuating the prediction error. But the new model is not stable, and shifts under the pressure of bottom-up inputs in different contexts; hence the oscillation of all-things-considered judgment. Evidence from social psychology is adduced, to suggest that a similar process may be involved in ordinary cases of weakness of will. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The United States Supreme Court hasrecently ruled that virtual child pornographyis protected free speech, partly on the groundsthat virtual pornography does not harm actualchildren. I review the evidence for thecontention that virtual pornography might harmchildren, and find that it is, at best,inconclusive. Saying that virtual childpornography does not harm actual children isnot to say that it is completely harmless,however. Child pornography, actual or virtual,necessarily eroticizes inequality; in a sexistsociety it therefore contributes to thesubordination of women.

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has successfully become institutionalized as the preeminent global framework for voluntary corporate environmental and social reporting. Its success can be attributed to the “institutional entrepreneurs” who analyzed the reporting field and deployed discursive, material, and organizational strategies to change it. GRI has, however, fallen short of the aspirations of its founders to use disclosure to empower nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The authors argue that its trajectory reflects the power relations between members of the field, their strategic (...) choices and compromises, their ability to mobilize alliances and resources, and constraints imposed by the broader institutions of financial and capital markets. The authors draw three notable implications from this study. First, institutional theory needs to pay more attention to economic structures, strategies, and resources. Second, institutional entrepreneurship by relatively weak societal groups such as NGOs is inherently constrained by the structural power of wider institutions and by the compromises required to initiate change. Third, the strategies of NGOs represent a form of power capable of shifting, if not transforming, the field of corporate governance. (shrink)

Hunting and gathering is, evolutionarily, the defining subsistence strategy of our species. Studying how children learn foraging skills can, therefore, provide us with key data to test theories about the evolution of human life history, cognition, and social behavior. Modern foragers, with their vast cultural and environmental diversity, have mostly been studied individually. However, cross-cultural studies allow us to extrapolate forager-wide trends in how, when, and from whom hunter-gatherer children learn their subsistence skills. We perform a meta-ethnography, which allows us (...) to systematically extract, summarize, and compare both quantitative and qualitative literature. We found 58 publications focusing on learning subsistence skills. Learning begins early in infancy, when parents take children on foraging expeditions and give them toy versions of tools. In early and middle childhood, children transition into the multi-age playgroup, where they learn skills through play, observation, and participation. By the end of middle childhood, most children are proficient food collectors. However, it is not until adolescence that adults (not necessarily parents) begin directly teaching children complex skills such as hunting and complex tool manufacture. Adolescents seek to learn innovations from adults, but they themselves do not innovate. These findings support predictive models that find social learning should occur before individual learning. Furthermore, these results show that teaching does indeed exist in hunter-gatherer societies. And, finally, though children are competent foragers by late childhood, learning to extract more complex resources, such as hunting large game, takes a lifetime. (shrink)

Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I (...) divide these replies into two groups: we might confront the threat, showing that it does not have the claimed implications for morality; or we might bite the bullet, accepting that the claims have moral implications, but incorporating these claims into morality. I suggest that unless we are able to bite the bullet, when confronted by cognitive scientific challenges, there is a real possibility that morality will be threatened. This fact gives us a weighty reason to adopt a metaethics that makes it relatively easy to bite cognitive scientific bullets. Moral constructivism, in one of its many forms, makes these bullets more palatable; therefore, the cognitive scientific challenges provide us with an additional reason to adopt a constructivist metaethics. (shrink)

Can our cultural membership excuse us from responsibility for certain actions? Ought the Aztec priest be held responsible for murder, for instance, or does the fact that his ritual sacrifice is mandated by his culture excuse him from blame? Our intuitions here are mixed; the more distant, historically and geographically, we are from those whose actions are in question, the more likely we are to forgive them their acts, yet it is difficult to pinpoint why this distance should excuse. Up (...) close, historically or geographically, we tend to be less forgiving: few of us excuse the Taliban for what they did to women and homosexuals; and if there is less of an outcry concerning treatment not all that dissimilar in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, this is probably only because these actions are less well publicized. (shrink)

Often scholars who call themselves social scientists have not meant by the term science the sort of activity which has generally concerned those calling themselves natural scientists. In the latter sense very little of what has been called “social science” can also be called scientific. The term “social science” as used here refers primarily to the studies which have gone under such titles as Politics, Sociology, Anthropology, Social and Clinical Psychology, and Economics. To some degree much of what will here (...) be said does not apply with equal justice to the field of Economics. It has a more highly developed system of general abstractions and considerably more precise techniques of analysis than have generally characterized the other social sciences. The difference, however, is one of degree not kind. Many of the difficulties mentioned below certainly plague the field of Economics as well as the others. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its (...) own right than the set of beliefs Funkhouser identifies. (shrink)

Several ethicists have argued that research trials and treatment programs that involve the provision of drugs to addicts are prima facie unethical, because addicts can’t refuse the offer of drugs and therefore can’t give informed consent to participation. In response, several people have pointed out that addiction does not cause a compulsion to use drugs. However, since we know that addiction impairs autonomy, this response is inadequate. In this paper, I advance a stronger defense of the capacity of addicts to (...) participate in the programs envisaged. I argue that it is only in certain circumstances that addicts find themselves choosing in ways that conflict with their genuine preferences. Research and treatment programs have none of the features that characterize choices in these autonomy-undermining circumstances, and there is therefore no reason to think that addicts lack the capacity to give informed consent to these programs. (shrink)

In applied ethics, debates about responsibility have been relentlessly individualistic and synchronic, even as recognition has increased in both philosophy and psychology that agency is distributed across time and individuals. I therefore warmly welcome Brown and Savulescu’s analysis of the conditions under which responsibility can be shared and extended. By carefully delineating how diachronic and dyadic responsibility interact with the long-established control and epistemic conditions, they lay the groundwork needed for identifying how responsibility may be inter-individual and intra-individual. Unsurprisingly, I (...) don’t agree with every aspect of their rich account. I strongly suspect that the privileged place the individual continues to occupy in their taxonomy is a residue of the kind of internalist intuitions which dominate WEIRD thinking.1 2 However, I won’t pursue this line of thought here. Instead, I apply Brown and Savulescu’s analysis. Moving beyond the programmatic level at which they develop their account, I will show how it provides a basis for excusing many individuals, focusing not on the dyadic level but the diachronic. Most of the …. (shrink)

Most people believe that we have a duty to gather evidence on both sides of central moral and political controversies, in order to fulfil our epistemic responsibilities and come to hold justified cognitive attitudes on these matters. I argue, on the contrary, that to the extent to which these controversies require special expertise, we have no such duty. We are far more likely to worsen than to improve our epistemic situation by becoming better informed on these questions. I suggest we (...) do better to embrace the views of experts who are also morally wise. I argue that this is likely to lead to more accurate beliefs about these political and moral controversies; in any case, it will avoid the incoherence and irrationality which are the likely consequence of open-minded evidence gathering. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning – once sufficiently safe and effective – should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is pernicious; it (...) tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability. (shrink)

According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately (...) reflects the nature of reasoning in a range of everyday cases. But, as I show, it is quite false with regard to controversial questions, like philosophical disputes. In these, evidence against our best judgments continues to exert a hold on us. Thus, the claimed disanalogy between practical and theoretical reasoning fails. (shrink)

Abstract:In this essay, I argue against the bright-line distinction between ideal and nonideal normative political theory, a distinction used to distinguish “stages” of theorizing such that ideal political principles can be deduced and examined before compromises with the flawed political world are made. The distinction took on its familiar form in Rawls and has enjoyed a resurgence of interest in the past few years. I argue that the idea of a categorical distinction — the kind that could allow for a (...) sequencing of stages of theorizing — is misconceived, because wholly “ideal” normative political theory is a conceptual mistake, the equivalent of taking the simplifying models of introductory physics (“frictionless movement in a vacuum”) and trying to develop an ideal theory of aerodynamics. Political organization and justice are about moral friction in the first instance. I examine both logical and epistemological arguments for the position that we need the uniquely idealizing assumptions of ideal theory in order to arrive at, or to know, a genuine theory of justice or political morality; and I find them wanting. Such assumptions as full compliance, consensus, and the publicity principle of universal knowledge about consensus can sometimes be useful, if used carefully and with justification; but they are not categorically different from other idealizing and abstracting assumptions in generating normative theory. What is referred to as “nonideal” theory is all that there is, and it is many kinds of theory, not one — the many ways in which we learn about justice and injustice, and seek to answer questions of practical reason about what ought to be done in our political world. (shrink)

Theories of self-deception divide into those that hold that the state is characterized by some kind of synchronic tension or conflict between propositional attitudes and those that deny this. Proponents of the latter like Al Mele claim that their theories are more parsimonious, because they do not require us to postulate any psychological mechanisms beyond those which have been independently verified. But if we can show that there are real cases of motivated believing which are characterized by conflicting propositional attitudes, (...) however, the parsimony argument against incongruent mental state accounts is undermined. I argue that anosognosia presents us with a real-life example of motivated belief together with (sub)-doxastic conflict. (shrink)

Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of (...) compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history‐sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history‐sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

The main purpose of this second article devoted to T. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (the first was published in the previous issue of Actuel Marx) is to introduce our alternative reading of history. The tendencies manifest during the last decades of the 20th century and the early 21st century are not, it is argued, the replication of the tendencies which prevailed prior to World War I. The starting-point for our analysis is the beginning of the 20th century, a (...) moment characterized by the dynamics of a “managerial capitalism” built around the “tripolar” class pattern of capitalists, managers, and popular classes. The main quantitative manifestation of these trends was the steady rise in the share accounted for by wages (compared to capital income) in the income of upper classes (notably the top 1 percent). In place of Piketty’s impact of shocks, we focus on the chain of successive configurations of class domination and alliances, in a succession of “social orders” marking the historical advance of managerial capitalism : the first financial hegemony, in the years leading up to the Great Depression ; the postwar social-democratic compromise ; and its successor, neoliberalism, involving a new alliance to the right, between the managerial and popular classes. (shrink)

Abstract The liberalism of fear urged by Judith Shklar emphasizes the dangers of political violence, cruelty, and humiliation. Those dangers clearly mark ethnic and cultural conflicts, so the liberalism of fear is an especially appropriate political ethic for an age marked by such conflicts. A multiculturalism of fear keeps its attention on those central political dangers while also noting that some kinds of cruelty and humiliation might not be appreciated without reference to the larger ethnic and cultural context, and that (...) treating ethnicity and culture as completely outside of politics is not the best way to prevent cruelty. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that (...) the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth. (shrink)

McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what (...) issues and what voices we attend to. (shrink)

Impostor Syndrome is the belief or feeling that one is passing oneself off as much more capable than one really is. Anecdotally, it is experienced more by members of historically disadvantaged groups, but the empirical data seems inconsistent with this view. I argue that impostor syndrome occurs because (a) it is normal, appropriate and often even necessary to engage in some degree of pretense in order to acquire specialist expertise, but (b) we are much more likely to be aware of (...) our own pretense than that of others. I argue that we are especially likely to notice pretense when we’re made self-conscious, and that failing to match the stereotype of one’s profession or domain of expertise tends to give rise to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is elicited by certain cues; this fact explains not only the greater vulnerability of the members of some groups to it, but also explains why the empirical data has not yet provided evidence for this greater vulnerability. I end with some suggestions for reducing the prevalence or impact of impostor syndrome. (shrink)