The myelin basic proteins are a set of peripheral membrane polypeptides which play an essential role in myelination. Their most well‐documented property is the unique ability to ‘seal’ the cytoplasmic aspects of the myelin membrane, but this is probably not the only function for these highly charged molecules. Despite extensive homology, the individual myelin basic proteins (MBPs) exhibit different expression patterns and biochemical properties, and so it is now believed that the various isoforms are not functionally equivalent in myelinating cells. (...) We now think that while the major MBPs are intracellular adhesion molecules, some of the quantitatively less abundant isoforms that are expressed very early in development may have regulatory effects on the myelination program. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive (...) payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game. (shrink)

A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.

This clear and lively introduction to psychology assumes no prior knowledge of the subject. Extensively revised and updated, this third edition describes psychology as it is taught at universitues. Examples are used throughout to illustrate fundamental ideas, with a self-assessment quiz focusing readers' minds on a number of intriguing psychological problems. The differences betwen psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis are explained, and the professions and careers associated with psychology are explored. Suggestions for further reading and useful internet sites are included.

Psychology plays an increasingly important role in today's society. Its influence can be seen all around us - be it in the home, the workplace, the school or our private lives. A uniquely diverse discipline, it ranges from social psychology to biological aspects of behaviour, and from basic research to the applied professions. This _Companion Encyclopedia_ covers all these main branches of psychological research and professional practice. The thematic arrangement is the result of the Editor's extensive research into syllabi, from (...) which he distilled the 13 most frequently taught units. Students can consult and be referred to sections relating to their lecture programme, and can find lucid definitions of frequently used terms in the Glossary. Headings and sub-headings are clearly highlighted at the beginning of each chapter - ideal for quick reference. * Provides authoritative and in-depth reference material on all major branches of psychological research and professional practice * Contributors include many of the world's most eminent psychologists * Written in a lively style without assuming previous knowledge of the subject * Structured according to the core topics appearing most often as discrete modules in contemporary psychology courses * Detailed bibliographies, further reading sections, exhaustive index and glossary of technical terms * Containing 165 supporting illustrations. (shrink)

Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...) knowledge assumptions, enabling players to anticipate their co-players' strategies. Under these assumptions, disparate anomalies emerge. Instrumental rationality, conventionally interpreted, fails to explain intuitively obvious features of human interaction, yields predictions starkly at variance with experimental findings, and breaks down completely in certain cases. In particular, focal point selection in pure coordination games is inexplicable, though it is easily achieved in practice; the intuitively compelling payoff-dominance principle lacks rational justification; rationality in social dilemmas is self-defeating; a key solution concept for cooperative coalition games is frequently inapplicable; and rational choice in certain sequential games generates contradictions. In experiments, human players behave more cooperatively and receive higher payoffs than strict rationality would permit. Orthodox conceptions of rationality are evidently internally deficient and inadequate for explaining human interaction. Psychological game theory, based on nonstandard assumptions, is required to solve these problems, and some suggestions along these lines have already been put forward. Key Words: backward induction; Centipede game; common knowledge; cooperation; epistemic reasoning; game theory; payoff dominance; pure coordination game; rational choice theory; social dilemma. (shrink)

It is well known that the medieval scholastics did not begin their philosophy systematically with an explicit theory of knowledge. Unfortunately many people have concluded from that fact that the very idea of an epistemology, and especially the idea of a critique of knowledge, was completely foreign to them. Within recent years authors such as Professor Van Steenberghen and Father Copleston have done a great deal to spread a correct understanding of St. Thomas’s views on this matter. Much evidence might (...) be adduced from the principal work of John Duns Scotus to show that he also took steps to justify man’s spontaneous conviction that some natural knowledge of truth with certainty can be attained. In this article we will consider some of these elements of Scotus’s philosophy as they are found in the volumes that have so far appeared in the critical edition of his works. (shrink)

Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that maximize against (...) their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning. (shrink)

In the introductory remarks to his inaugural lecture Professor Isaiah Berlin laments that so little attention is payed by professional philosophers to studies “about the ends of life”. Studies such as those to which the Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory is dedicated “spring from and thrive on discord”. He observes.

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team (...) reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality. (shrink)

Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...) unexplained. Team reasoning solves problems of coordination and cooperation, but aggregation of individual preferences is problematic. (shrink)

Mealey's interesting interpretation of sociopathy is based on an inappropriate two-person game model. A multiperson, compound game version of Chicken would be more suitable, because a population engaging in random pairwise interactions with that structure would evolve to an equilibrium in which a fixed proportion of strategic choices was exploitative, antisocial, and risky, as required by Mealey's interpretation.

The problem of values has given rise to a bewildering variety of theories. Louis Lavelle set himself the task of expounding and systematizing these diverse doctrines, of making “une sorte de tableau de toutes les directions dans lesquelles s’est engagée la reflection humaine au cours de son histoire, lorsqu’il s’est agi de definir pour elle la valeur absolue et les valeurs particulières”. He tried to bring order into the work of ages, situating it in a vaster order according to his (...) own views of man’s privileged place in the universe. Of course the study of values made by this great psychologist–metaphysician was far more than a lifeless gathering together of dry concepts: it involved a representation, from a new angle, of his entire philosophy of being. “Le problème essentiel de la métaphysique, le seul dont la solution puisse éclairer notre vie et guider notre conduite, c’est le problème du rapport entre l’être et la valeur”. M. Wesley Piersol now presents a fine compendium of Lavelle’s thought on value. He divides his study into four parts, aiming at thus keeping close to the line of development of the philosopher’s views. In the first part is found Lavelle’s analysis of the faculties of the moi, sentiment, will, preference, judgment of value. From this analysis is derived his understanding of the characters of value. Next comes a section on the incarnation of value by liberty in time: thus a psychology of value develops into a metaphysics of value. Finally, there is a section on the relation between axiology and ontology. The book is well planned and the matter clearly presented but, as anybody who is acquainted with Lavell’s writings must know, clarity and charm in presentation do not eliminate difficulty. (shrink)

Only someone who has written or lectured, through the medium of Irish, on philosophy can fully appreciate the magnificent work done by Fr. Colmn Ó Huallachin in compiling this Philosopher’s Dictionary. Philosophy, like every specialised science, has its own vocabulary. Philosophers, physicists, biologists, economists must all use terms that are not found in everyday language. Before the publication of Foclir Fealsaimh, a philosopher who used Irish as a medium had to work under a serious handicap because he had no dictionary (...) to which he could refer to find the exact term he needed. Many of these terms were already in Irish but they were scattered through books and manuscripts written by Irish philosophers and theologians of the past and not readily available to-day. Other terms were new, terms that were not known when Irish was a normal medium of philosophical and theological thought, and these terms did not exist in Irish at all. As a result, the philosopher who lectured or wrote in Irish often had to spend much time looking for the exact term he needed or finding the best root on which to base a new Irish term. (shrink)

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the (...) moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behavior in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms. (shrink)

Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex is the first book to examine how nonhuman animals are used in war and the military. Animals and War contributes significantly to the fields of social justice, animal rights, and anti-war/peace activist communities. This book also will be read by peace, conflict, social justice, and critical animal studies scholars, students, and practitioners.

Colman shows that normative theories of rational decision-making fail to produce rational decisions in simple interactive games. I suggest that well-formed theories are possible in local settings, keeping in mind that a good part of each game is the generation of a rational approach appropriate for that game. The key is rationality defined in terms of the game, not individual decisions.

Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.

Orthodox game theory and social preference models cannot explain why people cooperate in many experimental games or how they manage to coordinate their choices. The theory of evidential decision making provides a solution, based on the idea that people tend to project their own choices onto others, whatever these choices might be. Evidential decision making preserves methodological individualism, and it works without recourse to social preferences. Rejecting methodological individualism, team reasoning is a thinly disguised resurgence of the group mind fallacy, (...) and the experiments reported by Colman et al. Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (this issue). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica, do not offer evidence that uniquely supports team reasoning. (shrink)

Although in modern times and clinical settings, we rarely see the old characteristics of tribal shamanism such as deep trances, out-of-body experiences, and soul retrieval, the archetypal dreams, waking visions and active imagination of modern depth psychology represents a liminal zone where ancient and modern shamanism overlaps with analytical psychology. These essays explore the contributors' excursions as healers and therapists into this zone. The contributors describe the many facets shamanism and depth psychology have in common: animal symbolism; recognition of the (...) reality of the collective unconscious; and healing rituals that put therapist and patient in touch with transpersonal powers. By reintroducing the core of shamanism in contemporary form, these essays shape a powerful means of healing that combines the direct contact with the inner psyche one finds in shamanism with the self-reflection and critical awareness of modern consciousness. The essays draw from the contributors' experiences both inside and outside the consulting room, and with cultures that include the Lakota Sioux, and those of the Peruvian Andes and the Hawaiian Islands. The focus is on those aspects of shamanism most useful and relevant to the modern practice of depth psychology. As a result, these explorations bring the young practice of analytical psychology into perspective as part of a much more ancient heritage of shamanistic healing. Contributors: Margaret Laurel Allen, Norma Churchill, Arthur Colman, Lori Cromer, Patricia Damery, C. Jess Groesbeck, Pansy Hawk Wing, June Kounin, Carol McRae, Pilar Montero, Jeffrey A. Raff, Janet S. Robinson, Meredith Sabini, Dyane N. Sherwood, Sara Spaulding-Phillips, Bradley A. Te Paske and Louis M. Vuksinick. (shrink)

This essay comments on the articles by Loretta M. Kopelman and Anita Silvers. It extends their analyses and concludes that consistency and the total absence of conflict may be unavailable when one interprets and applies the Americans with Disabilities Act.

This article, which is an adaptation of a lecture delivered at Villanova University in the Fall of 2015, proposes a reading of Augustine’s Confessions with the assistance of the notions of absorption and theatricality. The very use of those notions is meant to counterbalance the readings generated by our overfamiliarity with Augustinian interiority. By replacing interiority with a concept that, heretofore, is alien to the Augustinian vocabulary, it becomes possible to block facile access to mystical interpretations of conf. on the (...) one hand, and to embark upon the task of reassessing the nature of “confessing” on the other. This new reading demonstrates the difficulties involved in approaching the confessor fully involved in his act of sustained confessing. A comparison is also made with the notion of absorption in the visual arts. Just as spectatordom becomes problematic vis-à-vis a painting whose personae look inward rather than outward, so too the position of the reader vis-à-vis a text whose confessing creator uninterruptedly addresses his Confessee demands a redefinition of the reader’s role and place in the process. (shrink)

Religions; Islam; relations; Christianity; Judaism; Christianity and other religions; Other (Philosophy); religious aspects; Islam.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:M. C. Dillon LOVE IN WOMEN IN LOVE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Despite his sexism, his turgid prose, and his antiquated social conscience, Lawrence is on every bookshelf. This is not merely because of the vicarious erotic entertainment to be found in the saga of John Thomas and Lady Jane, but because Lawrence remains a major guru of romance. We take him seriously, look to him for guidance, measure ourselves (...) against Ursula and Birkin. If he is on our shelves—and his thoughts not far from our pillows—then his ideas starid in need of scrutiny. Women in Love is as much a treatise as a novel: we witness more talking about than making of love. The agon of ideas engulfs the agon of flesh. Hence, the book suits the present purpose. It cannot be taken as Lawrence's definitive statement on love—later works, notably Lady Chatterly's Lover, move in different directions—but it is his most philosophical treatment and, I think, most clearly expresses his conceptual framework, the parameters which define and limit his thinking. What he says about love in Women in Love may therefore illumine his depictions of the behavior of lovers in other works. Lawrence is a romantic. In the popular sense of the word he is one who makes of romance or erotic adventure a dominant life value. Lawrence is also a romantic in another sense insofar as he takes the transcendence or unattainability of the other as essential to the project of loving. These two senses are conceptually compatible but existentially in conflict. That is, if one's major undertaking in life is to seek erotic satisfaction, and if one desires only so long as the object is beyond reach, then one has established the groundwork for continual frustration. This, I will try to show, is what Lawrence has done. I Many writers have tried to bring the ideas implicitly present in and constitutive of romantic love to the level of explicit reflective awareness. 190 M.C.Dillon191 The most successful treatment I know is given by a writer who did not know—or at least did not say—that he was writing about romantic love. Sartre purports to reveal the inner structures of love itself—the unqualified, unrestricted essence of love. As I have tried to show elsewhere,1 he fails at this. But he succeeds admirably in unveiling the inner contradictions of romantic love. Our project here is to draw upon Sartre's insights: first, to develop a conception of romantic love, and then to discern the model of Eros which informs Women in Love. The key idea in romantic love is transcendence. Something is transcendent when it is beyond me, when I cannot adequately prehend it conceptually or master it with my will. The role of transcendence in romantic love is demonstrated clearly in Denis de Rougemont's book on Love in the Western World.2 There he shows that Tristan's passion for Iseult is directly proportional to her distance from him: he is increasingly attracted as she becomes further removed. On the other hand, when through various deeds of gallantry and subterfuge, he succeeds in winning her to his side, he loses interest and must create circumstances which put her again beyond his reach. The culmination of romantic love, according to de Rougemont, is death—it sets the other absolutely beyond reach. It also arrests and preserves at their apices the youth and beauty of the lovers and the intensity of the erotic relationship. It is, I believe, this complex of ideas that led Kierkegaard to this cynical reflection on the nature of romantic love: "When two beings fall in love with one another and begin to suspect that they were made for each other, it is time to have the courage to break it off; for by going on they have everything to lose and nothing to gain."3 The same idea, qualified by increased optimism, underlies Stendhal's notion of crystallization in his book On Love.* Love is predicated on the attribution of perfection to the beloved. Just as a plain bough emerges from the salt-saturated waters of the Salzburg mines encrusted with beautiful crystals... (shrink)

Polybius II. 39. 9: ο μν λλá γε καί πεр тŵν μφσβηтοтμΈνων πÉрεψαν θηβαîοι καί λακεδαιμόνιοι μόνοις рŵν Έλλήνων Χαιοας, ο πρòς рήν δùναμν ἀποβλÉψανрες, σΧÉδον γαρ λαΧασрην рòрε γεрων έλλήνωνεîΧον рó δÉ πλεαον, εας νήν πασрν καα λην καλοκαγαθααν Strabo VIII.