By definition, the implicit commitment of a formal theory $$\textrm{Th}$$ Th consists of sentences that are independent of the axioms of $$\textrm{Th}$$ Th, but their acceptance is implicit in the acceptance of $$\textrm{Th}$$ Th. In Cieśliński (2017, 2018), the phenomenon of implicit commitments was studied from the epistemological perspective through the lenses of the formal theory of believability. The current paper provides a comprehensive proof-theoretic analysis of this approach and compares it to other main theories of implicit commitments. We argue (...) that the formal results presented in the paper favour the believability theory over its main competitors. However, there is still a fly in the ointment. We argue that in its current formulation, the theory cannot deliver all the goods for which it was defined. In particular, being amenable to a generalised conservativeness argument, it does not support the view that the notion of truth is epistemically light. At the end of the paper, we discuss possible ways out of the problem. (shrink)

The aim of this paper was to analyze the relationship between attitudes toward physical activity and participation in water sports events and to recognize the main motives for involvement in these kinds of events. A written paper–pencil diagnostic survey was conducted among 394 participants in two traditional and two modern sports events on water held in Poland to ascertain whether innovative events are needed in society, and whether they cause an increase in interest in physical activity. The research results showed (...) that modern sports events on water did not have any more power to attract physically inactive people than traditional water events, did not produce a greater desire to lead an active lifestyle, and did not encourage people to more regularly practice water sports. Moreover, modern events, compared to traditional events, were only a one-time experience and the people who completed survey often wanted to return to traditional sports events which provided participants with greater positive emotions than a modern event. In the case of socio-demographical variables, there was no statistically significant relationship between gender and choice of modern or traditional event, but older people were more likely to choose a traditional event than younger people; modern water events were an attractive option primarily for young people under 30 years of age, furthermore, modern events more often attracted people who had completed higher education. However, it turned out that a modern event on water often attracted more people who had had no experience in this sport discipline rather than people who chose traditional water events. In a sense, modern events are therefore effective in promoting water sports in Polish society. We also distinguished five main groups of participants: healthy lifestyle managers, lovers of sports emotions, water sports malcontents, water sports enthusiasts, and neutrals to water sports. Additionally, we looked into gender-related motives for participation in modern and traditional water events: social and health-related motives proved to be more important for women and men who participated in modern water events. The research results presented in the article expand on the current state of knowledge about mass participation in sport, the impact of sporting events on the promotion of physical activity, and show the motivation behind participation in modern and traditional water sporting events. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a speech-act based account of presumptions. Using a score-keeping model of illocutionary games, I argue that presumptions construed as speech acts can be grouped into three illocutionary act types defined by reference to how they affect the state of a conversation. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first one, I present the score-keeping model of speech act dynamics; in particular, I distinguish between two types of mechanisms—the direct mechanism of illocution and the (...) indirect one of accommodation—that underlie the functioning of illocutionary acts. In the second part, I use the presented model to distinguish between the unilateral act of individual presumption, the point of which is to shift the burden of proof by making the hearer committed to justifying his refusal to endorse the proposition communicated by the speaker, whenever he refuses to endorse it, the bilateral act of joint presumption—‘bilateral’ in that it is performed jointly by at least two conversing agents—the function of which is to confer on the proposition endorsed by the speaker the normative status of jointly recognized though tentative acceptability, and the indirect or back-door act of collective presumption, the purpose of which is to sustain rules and practices to which the conversing agents defer the felicity of their conversational moves. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide a new interpretation of Martha C. Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s views on the ethical role of literature. I pursue this aim in a threefold manner. First of all, I shortly discuss and provide a critique of previous comparisons by other authors. Afterwards, based on the presented critique of other comparisons, I present concise summaries of their respective views. Finally, I propose a double context for interpreting and assessing their views together. The main claim of (...) the paper is the following: despite several differences in their philosophical underpinnings, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on literature can be interpreted together using the context of John Rawls and Jacques Rancière. This interpretation consists of showing how uncovering a shared Rawlsian characteristic of Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views paves a way for explaining how literature actually does ethical work, using some concepts of Rancière. Such a contextual reading allows for both a more thorough understanding of their respective projects and assessing their shared shortcomings. (shrink)

It is possible to overcome dificulties connected with vagueness of natural language with the help of mathematical tools such as fuzzy sets and characteristic functions. The main goal of this paper is to propose an interpretation of generalised characteristic function as identical with the probability calculated from density function (probability distribution) defined on certain set. This set is identified with the quasi-model interpretation of unary predicate of a natural language.

Artykuł prezentuje w ujęciu historycznoliterackim powieść szpiegowską okresu PRL. Analiza książek z serii „Labirynt” wskazuje, że funkcja propagandowa dominuje w nich nad rozrywkową, co jest charakterystyczne dla różnych obszarów kultury popularnej w PRL. Serię „Labirynt” wydawało w latach 1957–1991 Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. Ukazywały się w niej „zwykłe” powieści milicyjne, ale przede wszystkim powieści szpiegowskie. Podobnie jak powieść milicyjna, również powieść szpiegowska w PRL obok funkcji rozrywkowej musiała spełniać funkcję propagandową. Przejawia się to m.in. nawiązaniem do konwencji wczesnych powieści szpiegowskich (...) w literaturze europejskiej z przełomu XIX i XX wieku, czyli przedstawianiem PRL jako kraju, który tylko broni się przed szpiegami, sam natomiast nie wykrada tajemnic innych państw. Równie daleki od rzeczywistości i wyłącznie propagandowy był obraz Polski jako kraju wytwarzającego liczne wynalazki i technologie, na które polują szpiedzy z Zachodu. Propagandowy charakter ma też obraz wroga i skontrastowany z nim wizerunek własnych agentów. Szpiedzy z BND czy CIA nie cofają się przed morderstwami, są bezwzględni także dla swoich współpracowników i ogólnie reprezentują bardzo niski poziom moralny. Często są byłymi nazistami, a zależy im tylko na zarobku. Z kolei funkcjonariusze kontrwywiadu PRL to ludzie ideowi, z oddaniem służący ojczyźnie, przewyższający pod każdym względem swych przeciwników, także na płaszczyźnie życia prywatnego. Każda z tych historii kończy się oczywiście zwycięstwem „naszych” i – podobnie jak powieść milicyjna – nie pozostawia czytelnikowi żadnych wątpliwości co do tego, po czyjej stronie są w tym konflikcie wszystkie racje – zarówno polityczne, jak i moralne. (shrink)

Author: Musiał Maciej Title: INTIMACY AND CULTURE. ANTHONY GIDDENS’ CONCEPTION OF PURE RELATIONSHIP IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIO-REGULATIVE THEORY OF CULTURE (Intymność a kultura. Czysta relacja Giddensa w perspektywie społeczno-regulacyjnej koncepcji kultury) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 347-360 Keywords: INTIMACY, CULTURE, PURE RELATIONSHIP, FUNCTIONAL AND AUBJECTIVE-RATIONAL EXPLANATION Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The aim of the thesis is an attempt to applicate Jerzy Kmita’s theory of culture (...) into the issues included in the domain of intimacy. The first part of the paper is focused on intimacy as a part of culture. To be precise, if the concept of culture is understood after Kmita, it follows that, intimacy is considered as a set of norms and directives respected by the community and regulating intimate praxis in rational-subjective terms. The second part of the thesis is concentrated on the conception of “pure relationship” created by Anthony Giddens, which constitutes one of the most interesting approaches of describing contemporary tranformations of intimacy. Although, the author agrees with most of Giddens’ ideas, he perceives the conception of “pure relationship” as one-sided. Theory of culture created by Kmita, especially the idea of functional and aubjective-rational explanation, is used as a tool to indicate methodological mistakes, which are the reasons for sidedness of Giddens’ perspective. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical analysis of the skeptic’s conviction that his doubts about the truth of thought on existence of the world outside the mind are not equivalent to real the doubts about existence of the world alone, but they are only a theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge. The main case of this criticism is based on the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy, precisely, on his theory of truth.

Biological reality does not consist of chemistry and physics of organism alone. It also includes their information content. This information regulates developmental and reproductive processes. Its quantity is finite. We observe mixing of information (mating patterns, reduction division, hybridisation, genetic engineering), its loss (species extinction, reduction of genetic diversity in domestication, isolation, inbreeding) and increase of useless or injurious information (duplications, neutral and harmful mutations, genetic load). On the other hand we do not observe new useful biological information arising (positive (...) mutations). New useful information does not appear by accident. Nature and man made selections reduce the information resources, mutations debilitate them, population reduction and its isolation cause accidental losses of information. Acquired resistance to antibiotics or herbicides, which is often presented as an example of increase of information, is only a defence mechanism against loss of functionality of an organism or population (e.g. by immunological adaptation). Such mechanisms belong to the already existing information content. No new organs or functions are produced. Until natural sciences come up with an indication of the mode by which useful information resources can be increased in nature, by which new functions or organs are produced, the theory of evolution will remain a hypothesis without substantiation in facts. (shrink)

We study the notion of weak amalgamation in the context of diagonal conjugacy classes. Generalizing results of Kechris and Rosendal, we prove that for every countable structure M, Polish group G of permutations of M, and \, G has a comeager n-diagonal conjugacy class iff the family of all n-tuples of G-extendable bijections between finitely generated substructures of M, has the joint embedding property and the weak amalgamation property. We characterize limits of weak Fraïssé classes that are not homogenizable. Finally, (...) we investigate 1- and 2-diagonal conjugacy classes in groups of ball-preserving bijections of certain ordered ultrametric spaces. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to resist four arguments, originally developed by Mark Siebel, that seem to support scepticism about reflexive communicative intentions. I argue, first, that despite their complexity reflexive intentions are thinkable mental representations. To justify this claim, I offer an account of the cognitive mechanism that is capable of producing an intention whose content refers to the intention itself. Second, I claim that reflexive intentions can be individuated in terms of their contents. Third, I argue that (...) the explanatory power of the theory of illocutionary reflexive intentions is not as limited as it would initially seem. Finally, I reject the suggestion that the conception of reflexive communicative intentions ascribes to a language user more cognitive abilities than he or she really has. (shrink)

The field of war ethics changes its focus, and grows, in reaction to salient conflicts of the day – and this is how things should be. World War II made the deficiencies of contemporary law and policy crystal clear, remaining the obvious reference point up to this day. It was in reaction to the atrocities of the Vietnam War that Michael Walzer and others made just war theory relevant again, featured in military academies and politician’s speeches. The Iraq War inspired (...) the so-called revisionists in just war theory and fixated military ethicists’ glance on the complex conundrums of counterinsurgency, while G.W. Bush’s War on Terror ignited debates on torture, use of private military contractors and targeted killing. Had these wars been different, contemporary ethics of war would have dealt with different problems, or at the very least it would apportion attention and expertise differently. Consequently it is no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched clandestinely in April 2014 and escalated in February 2022, has generated its own ethical problems. A rare large scale, conventional, inter-state conflict, fought both with legacy Soviet systems and cutting edge contemporary technologies, the Russo-Ukrainian War is different from the asymmetrical, low-end (though not low harm) conflicts of the last thirty years. It is also marked by the almost complete disregard shown by the aggressor side to the issues of justice, both ad bellum and in bello ones. Indeed, as I write these words, use of nuclear weapons in offensive warfare is being openly threatened, and one is to assume, considered, by the Kremlin. Both frost and hunger are being weaponized against civilians, with the inhabitants of Ukraine being far from the only target, or casualty, of such policies. In a globalized world, the suffering is also global. While the issue of ad bellum justice is uncharacteristically straightforward, many other questions are anything but answered. Nuclear blackmail, and nuclear-backed imperialism, stand out as theoretically underappreciated yet vastly important problems. So does the role of the global community in limiting the spillover effects of the war from hurting the most vulnerable. Devising an appropriate international response to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed by a nuclear power, yet by conventional means, offers another set of stark problems. These heavyweight questions are just the very first ones that spring to mind when one contemplates the events of the current war. Russian attacks on power plants and heating stations, conducted at the verge of winter, unfortunately may be said to have some precedent in the actions of Western powers in Serbia and Iraq. Whether such attacks are legal under international laws of armed conflict, and, if they are legal, whether the laws should change is another subject ripe for debate. So is the issue of POW’s notorious vulnerability to wanton and needless cruelty, once again exposed by this war. The internment of Mariupol garrison commanders in Turkey seems to offer a glimpse of a solution far more civilized than the current system. As far as the ethics of novel military technologies are concerned, the widespread use of armed drones, permeating to ever lower levels of military organization has major, though unclear implications both for the future of drones and that of autonomous weapons. Does the wildfire proliferation of armed drones prove the attempts to frame them as illegitimate, morally suspect weapons were naïve and futile? Or does it prove ethicists should double down their efforts to shackle such technologies in their infancy? The general problem is far from the only one. What about the use of drones or autonomous weapons that cannot be tied to a particular actor against critical infrastructure, such as the Nord Stream pipelines? How are such attacks to be responded to or deterred? Regarding technology, this is also the first conflict of this size followed almost in real time by a truly global audience of sympathizers, spectators and trolls capable of impacting political and military outcomes through influence campaigns, donations, volunteer online work etc. It is clear that trying to sway one’s government to increase or cease support for a side of this conflict is not morally neutral, nor is transferring money for the war effort. How should we think of these new forms of extended participation in conflict? And given their importance, how should those who report the truth about the ugly realities of war proceed? What about pundits and commentators with large audiences – what are their responsibilities, and what standards can we expect of them? The questions that may be asked about the behavior of essentially private citizens may of course also be asked about the behavior of governments – and corporations. What degree of assistance to the victim state may be required? What degree of involvement with the aggressor state is permissible? What these and many other conundrums placed in the spotlight by the Russian invasion have in common is that they need answers – most quite urgently. Consequently we invite a variety of learned and considerate voices to opine on these in our journal’s special issue. Among questions and doubts, one thing is certain – when confronted with the evils of war, we cannot stay silent, and we cannot cease to reflect. (shrink)

Author: Chlewicki Maciej Title: A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE DISPUTE ABOUT PLATO (Stulecie Sporu o Platona) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 559-571 Keywords: PLATO, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, MARBURG NEO-KANTIAN SCHOOL, THEORY OF IDEA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The aim of this paper is to present the main theses and the importance of Tatarkiewicz’s article The dispute about Plato (Spór o Platona) in polish reception of Plato’s philosophy. (...) This article – which was published by Tatarkiewicz a hundred yeas ago (1911) – was the first presentation of the new and interesting interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas which was inspired by Marburg neo-Kantian school. In Tatarkiewicz’s view the Plato’s philosophy is not some kind of metaphysics but it is generally the theory of knowledge. We can agree this is still unusual approach to Plato and we have a good reason to remind this early Tatarkiewicz’s essay. (shrink)

The paper focuses on a specific type of referring legal provisions, in which the referring phrase contains a component that indicates the position of a certain fragment of the same text of a normative act by determining the position of that fragment in relation to the fragment in which the given referring phrase is located. Despite the fact that these referrals, called deictic, may be perceived as uncomplicated in structure and as functioning correctly in legal texts, many theoretical as well (...) as practical problems arise during their drafting and legal interpretation. The article attempts to reveal, organize and name these problems basing on the conceptual grid formulated by Studnicki, Łachwa, Fall and Stabrawa as a universal, although not widely known outside Polish jurisprudence, tool for analysing and solving referring provisions as elements of various legal systems, especially continental ones. Texts of selected Polish Codes have been chosen as an illustrative material of deictic referrals which have been incorrectly formulated as leaving space for interpretative doubts in terms of place of indication and place of reference, which also causes a potential problem of the deferred ostension phenomenon noticed by Quine. The author argues that proper drafting of referring legal provisions with deictic indication requires that the legislator should have extensive pragmalinguistic knowledge and is an essential part of law-making oriented towards achieving comprehensibility of texts of normative acts, especially as important as Codes. (shrink)

In this paper we present a solution to Saul Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief Meaning and use, Dordrecht, 1979) based on Kaplan’s metaphysical picture of words. Although it is widely accepted that providing such a solution was one of the main incentives for the development of Kaplan’s theory, it was never presented by Kaplan in a systematic manner and was regarded by many as unsatisfactory. We agree with these critiques, and develop an extension of Kaplan’s theory by introducing the notion of (...) “conservative” word uses, as well as arguing for the restriction of Kripke’s Disquotational Principle only to such uses. This restriction allows us to solve Kripke’s Puzzle by arguing that the assent of the puzzle’s protagonist does not allow disquotation and ascription of corresponding inconsistent belief, as it contains the non-conservative use of a proper name. At the end of the paper, we defend two of Kaplan’s theses that we find essential for our argument to work: that individuation of word tokens involves taking into account the intention of the speaker, and that different uniquely referring proper names of the same shape should be regarded as different homonymous words. (shrink)

The paper develops a speech act-based model of verbal irony. It argues, first, that ironic utterances are speech actions performed as conforming to a socially accepted procedure and, second, that they are best understood as so-called etiolated uses of language. The paper is organized into four parts. The first one elaborates on Austin's doctrine of the etiolations of language and distinguishes between the normal or serious mode of communication and its etiolated mode. The second part discusses the dominant approaches to (...) verbal irony and argues that the irony-as-a-trope theories can be viewed as attempts to describe ironic utterances as cases of normal speech, whereas the metalinguistic theories seem to treat them as etiolated uses of language. The third part proposes a set of felicity conditions for ironic acts and puts forth a hypothesis that echo and overt pretence are complementary techniques of linguistic etiolation used for ironizing. The fourth part uses the proposed model to discuss the social dimension of ironizing and argues that utterances intended as acts of ironizing may trigger the accommodating process of context-repair. The take-home message is that ironic utterances are essentially social actions: acts performed by invoking a socially accepted procedure. (shrink)

The paper develops a score-keeping model of illocutionary games and uses it to account for mechanisms responsible for creating institutional facts construed as rights and commitments of participants in a dialogue. After introducing the idea of Austinian games—understood as abstract entities representing different levels of the functioning of discourse—the paper defines the main categories of the proposed model: interactional negotiation, illocutionary score, appropriateness rules and kinematics rules. Finally, it discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in illocutionary games and (...) argues that the proposed model presupposes an externalist account of illocutionary practice. (shrink)

The paper aims to develop an interactional account of illocutionary practice, which results from integrating elements of Millikan's biological model of language within the framework of Austin's theory of speech acts. The proposed account rests on the assumption that the force of an act depends on what counts as its interactional effect or, in other words, on the response that it conventionally invites or attempts to elicit. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first one reconsiders Austin's and Millikan's (...) contributions to the study of linguistic practice. The second part presents the main tenets of the interactional account. In particular, it draws a distinction between primary and secondary conventional patterns of interaction and argues that they make up coherent systems representing different language games or activity types; it is also argued that the proposed account is not subject to the massive ambiguity problem. (shrink)

This book is about time and its powerful influence on our personal and collective daily life. It presents the most comprehensive and up-to-date overview of contemporary knowledge on temporal psychology inspired by Zimbardo's work on Time Perspective (TP). With contributions from renowned and promising researchers from all over the globe, and at the interface of social, personality, cognitive and clinical psychology, the handbook captures the breadth and depth of the field of psychological time. Time perspective, as the way people construe (...) the past, the present and the future, is conceived and presented not only as one of the most influential dimensions in our psychological life leading to self-impairing behaviors, but also as a facet of our person that can be de-biased and supportive for well-being and happiness. Written in honor of Philip G. Zimbardo on his 80th birthday and in acknowledgement of his leading role in the field, the book contains illustrations of the countless studies and applications that his theory has stimulated, and captures the theoretical, methodological and practical pathways he opened by his prolific research. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of faultless disagreement for predicates of taste may be fruitfully explained by appealing to the vagueness of predicates of taste and the epistemicist reading of vagueness as defended by Timothy Williamson (1994). I begin by arguing that this position is better suited to explain both the “faultless” and “disagreement” intuition. The first is explained here by appealing to the necessary ignorance of the predicate’s boundaries and a plausible account of constitutive norms of (...) taste assertions, while the second by insisting on classical, absolutist semantics for judgments containing predicates of taste. Furthermore, I analyze the arguments against the reading of taste predicates as vague based on the alleged epistemic privilege concerning one’s taste and on the lack of definite cases. Responding to these objections, I develop a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, comment on the assumed epistemic privilege concerning taste ascriptions and provide a more detailed account of sources of the vagueness of predicates of personal taste, which I dub “super-vagueness.”. (shrink)

The common view has it that there are two families of approaches towards the logical structure of impossible worlds – Australasian and North American. According to the first, impossible worlds are closed under the relation of logical consequence of one of the non-classical logics. The North American approach is more liberal, allowing for impossible worlds where no logic holds. After pointing out the questionable consequences of each view, I propose a third one. While this new perspective allows for worlds where (...) no logical consequence holds, it also imposes some constraints on what worlds are built upon. This renders the proposed view not as restrictive as the Australasian approach and not as liberal as the North American approach. Due to its intermediary nature, I have named this perspective ‘the Pacific’ approach. (shrink)

Artykuł oferuje nowe rozwiązanie problemu usytuowania umysłu (situated cognition), polegające na wykazaniu, jak i dlaczego ludzki umysł wydobywa z otoczenia nie informację, lecz wiedzę. Wiedza jest definiowana jako informacja posiadająca dla organizmu określoną wartość. Zaprezentowany został mechanizm, za pomocą którego owa wartość zostaje do bodźca informacyjnego wprowadzona. Usytuowanie – według tej interpretacji – polega na tym, że część poznania procesów człowieka wykonują za niego inni ludzie, mianowicie ci, którzy wytworzyli jego otoczenie poznawcze. Otoczenie poznawcze jest definiowane jako suma wartościowych bodźców (...) informacyjnych. Wiedza wydobyta z otoczenia definiuje różne style poznawcze człowieka, które – z uwagi na zewnętrzne źródło klasyfikacji – nazywane są ekotypami poznawczymi. Wyróżnione zostają cztery ekotypy poznawcze człowieka, na podstawie kształtu ich otoczenia poznawczego (rodzaje ofert ucieleśniających wartościową informację) oraz kompetencji poznawczych niezbędnych do wydobycia wiedzy z otoczenia. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger’s Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle’s account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings.