Con il presente lavoro l'A. si propone di dimostrare che l'introduzione nel lessico tecnico latino di materia, come traduzione di hyle, è antecedente al De inventione ciceroniano e al De rerum natura di Lucrezio, i primi testi a presentare questa innovazione nei campi rispettivamente della retorica e della filosofia. Dall'esame dei passi più significativi delle due opere, tra quelli in cui compare materia, e da considerazioni esterne ai testi stessi, si ricava, a giudizio dell'A., che il termine venne utilizzato come (...) parte integrante de/lessico tecnico preesistente, poiché mancano quegli elementi che accompagnano una neoformazione semantica alla sua prima comparsa certificandone, esplicitamente o implicitamente, la valenza traslata. (shrink)

The aim of the book is to encourage discussion among experts on De ira, a text of philosophical nature, by reading it page by page, from a philosophical, philological, and literary perspective (a multidisciplinary choice which is the conditio sine qua non of all judicious research on Seneca). Moreover, the way in which each of these close readings is conducted adds an additional value: they each deal with a section of the text, presenting all the data necessary for its understanding. (...) All together, they cover the whole work. Each of them is also an attempt at a global interpretation of the treatise, examined through the particular framing of the textual passage around which the “Lectures plurielles” are conceived. Around this “polyphonic” analysis of the text, we have built a structure that aims to offer the reader a complete reference work on all the issues of the De ira. Sources, manuscript tradition, images, political and philosophical concepts, posterity – in short, all the aspects that a traditional commentary of the text would not have allowed us to distinguish so clearly – find their place here. This book is therefore aimed at specialists as well as students or anyone interested in the thought of emotions in antiquity. (shrink)

Bibliography focusing on L. Annaeus Seneca as a philosopher. Sorry about the image, which, of course, doesn't depict Seneca. We didn't select it.

In his most recent book, Ermanno Bencivenga offers a stylistically and conceptually exciting investigation of the nature of language, mind, and personhood and the many ways the three connect. Bencivenga, one of the most iconoclastic voices to emerge in contemporary American philosophy, contests the basic assumptions of analytic (and also, to an extent, postmodern) approaches to these topics. His exploration leads through fascinating discussions of education, courage, pain, time and history, selfhood, subjectivity and objectivity, reality, facts, the empirical, power (...) and transgression, silence, privacy and publicity, and play—all themes that are shown to be integral to our thinking about language. Relentessly bending the rules, Bencivenga frustrates our expectations of a "proper" theory of language. He invokes the transgressions of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein even as he appropriates the aphoristic style of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Written in a philosophically playful and experimental mode, A Theory of Language and Mind draws the reader into a sense of continual surprise, therapeutic discomfort, and discovery. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical analysis of the rising interest in the notion of 'noise'. The term 'noise' no longer pertains only to aesthetic judgement, for instance of acoustic or visual 'noise', but also to domains as varied as communication theory, physics and biology. This book investigates if there can be a coherent understanding of 'noise' that is effectively shared among the natural-and human sciences, technology and the arts, revealing 'noise' to be a properly philosophical problem. Drawing the philosophical consequences (...) of `noise' for the theory of knowledge, a philosophical revaluation of C. Shannon and W. Weaver's theory of 'information entropy' here serves as a basis upon which to problematize the common idea that 'noise' can be reduced to notions of error, disorder or disorganization. The wider consequences of this analysis relate the technological and scientific aspect of 'noise' with its cultural and psycho-social aspects. The heart of Malaspina's argument is the contestation of the ground upon which we judge and distinguish noise from information, finally exploring its emancipatory potential. (shrink)

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A THEORY OF REFERENCE AS AN INTENTIONAL ACT, INDEPENDENT OF THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A REAL (AND COMMON) WORLD. ACCORDING TO THE THEORY, SPEAKERS REFER TO ENTITIES IN THEIR COGNITIVE SPACES. DIFFERENT SPEAKERS HAVE DIFFERENT SPACES, WHICH AT ANY GIVEN TIME MIRROR THEIR BELIEF-SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. OBJECTS IN COGNITIVE SPACES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM IDEAS, "SINNE", AND MEINONGIAN NON-EXISTENTS, AND SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEORY ARE DISCUSSED: AMONG THEM, HOW TO HANDLE COMMUNICATION AND TRUTH.

Logic is often seen as the bedrock of intellectual life. It aims to be straight-forward, true, clear. But in this provocative book of postmodern philosophy, Ermanno Bencivenga presents an extended reflection on the subversive nature of logic--logic that is not stable and certain, but deceptive and tortuous. The author uses Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury at the end of the eleventh century, as his case study to show how human reason can be devious. In Anselm's famous texts, his beliefs (...) are not at stake, he is sure of them--he only seeks to under-stand his faith, not to prove it. But by looking at Anselm's writings as a whole, Bencivenga argues that they undermine Anselm's own interpretation. Not only can reason be more effective than force in fighting the unorthodox, but it can also be a subtle way of undermining orthodoxy. Bencivenga demonstrates how reason plays different roles at the different levels of Anselm's project. For its authoritarian subject, reason imposes a limit on its rebellious character. For its subversive subject, reason opens up an infinite arena for experimentation whose end will never be reached. Ultimately, Logic and Other Nonsense asks hard questions about the nature of philosophy in Anselm's world, as well as our own. (shrink)

This is a highly original, wide-ranging, and unorthodox discourse on the idea of philosophy contained in Kant's major work, the Critique of Pure Reason. Bencivenga proposes a novel explanation of the Critique's celebrated "obscurity." This great obstacle to reading Kant, Bencivenga argues, has nothing to do with Kant's being a bad writer or with his having anything very complicated to say; rather, it is the natural result of the kind of operation Kant was performing: a universal conceptual revolution. Bencivenga contends (...) that in rejecting the traditional way of doing philosophy, Kant was proposing a paradigm shift comparable in magnitude to Copernicus's overthrow of the Ptolemaic view of the cosmos. Kant, however, was not successful in establishing his idea of philosophy as the new paradigm, and the old view persists in many contemporary versions. Bencivenga argues in favor of Kant's position, which he sees as entailing the view that the role of philosophy is to offer a plausible story about how objectivity might be grounded in certain principles of coherence of our mental states. This book is the story of Kant's revolutionary turnabout, what motivated it, and where it took him; it reveals Kant not only as a figure of historical importance, but as a source of ideas of great contemporary interest. (shrink)

In My Kantian Ways, Ermanno Bencivenga, one of the most creative and iconoclastic practitioners of American philosophy, sets out to explore Kant's legacy for contemporary thought. Seeking to extricate the German philosopher's work from the stranglehold of the prevailing analytic tradition, he presents his own defamiliarizing and unique interpretation of Kantianism. Kant emerges as a master thinker whose emphasis on judgment provides the basis for a new approach to the practice of philosophy as a vehicle for learning. Ranging from (...) speculations on the electronic self to a tour-de-force critique of the postmodern thought of Richard Rorty, Bencivenga's book is an inviting blend of styles and genres. Plucky, irritating, and sometimes wickedly funny, My Kantian Ways calls attention to the frequent mediocrity and false piety of much of today's professional philosophy. Through these intensely personal essays, Bencivenga reminds us just how much philosophy can matter. In My Kantian Ways, Ermanno Bencivenga, one of the most creative and iconoclastic practitioners of American philosophy, sets out to explore Kant's legacy for contemporary thought. Seeking to extricate the German philosopher's work from the stranglehold of the prevailing analytic tradition, he presents his own defamiliarizing and unique interpretation of Kantianism. Kant emerges as a master thinker whose emphasis on judgment provides the basis for a new approach to the practice of philosophy as a vehicle for learning. Ranging from speculations on the electronic self to a tour-de-force critique of the postmodern thought of Richard Rorty, Bencivenga's book is an inviting blend of styles and genres. Plucky, irritating, and sometimes wickedly funny, My Kantian Ways calls attention to the frequent mediocrity and false piety of much of today's professional philosophy. Through these intensely personal essays, Bencivenga reminds us just how much philosophy can matter. (shrink)

Few notions are more central than noise to the transformation of modern life. Noise has become synonymous with the complexity of our world and its global digitised information networks, for as the...

Urban gaming simulation appeared in American universities in the early 1960s, following the successful applications of gaming simulations in military and financial fields, when urban structures were in crisis. This guest column, by a philosopher who has speculated about philosophy and other cultural endeavors as forms of play, points out conceptual traps that specialists in UGS should avoid and decisions they ought to consider making. In particular, the author warns against making too much of the distinction between “games” and “play” (...) and advises UGS practitioners to conceive of their own activity as playful and exploratory. He argues that practitioners should approach clients not as “professionals” but rather as people with experience acquired from much play, on many different terrains. The essay concludes by suggesting that professionals in all fields—scientific and otherwise—ought to see themselves in much the same way. (shrink)

If graduate school is a kind of professional school, then graduate school in philosophy should train students in the many facets of the profession. This paper describes the nature of the “philosophy workshop” by comparing and contrasting it to two other components of graduate school: lecture courses and research seminars. In contrast to lecture courses that provide a large quantity of information in a succinct and well-guided fashion, and research seminars that concentrate on a specific topic or line of argument, (...) philosophy workshops offers students (and instructors) a more exploratory and more open-ended approach to learning philosophy. (shrink)

« Dans la première préface à la Critique de la raison pure Kant se réfère aux Métamorphoses d’Ovide pour comparer une métaphysique hors bornes à la reine Hécube. Or, ce qui semble être tu dans cette métaphore, c’est qu’Ovide fait culminer la douleur d’Hécube dans sa métamorphose en chienne enragée. Le cliché de la reine des sciences est ainsi poussée à son paroxysme : la métaphysique sauvage serait une chienne enragée! Cet article revient, par le biais de l’œuvre sonore de (...) l’artiste power noise Rosaceae (Leyla Yenirce), à une Hécube qui hante la philosophie. Hécube pose, selon l’argument exposé ici, le problème d’une aísthēsis (αἴσθησις) pure, qui hanterait la notion de raison pure comme son complément logique mais refoulé. Refoulé car, si l’idée d’une raison pure semble parfaitement innocente, celle d’une aísthēsis (αἴσθησις) pure évoque à l’inverse un scandale pour la pensée philosophique, puisque l’idée d’un objet à penser en est exclue, et puisque son spectre renvoie à tout ce qui terrorise les philosophes : la fantaisie et la folie, le désir et la culpabilité, l’enthousiasme et l’irrationalité. ». (shrink)

In 1894, the Institut Colonial International was founded in Brussels, with the aim to engage and promote transnational exchanges between jurists, scholars, politicians, colonial administrators and experts, comparing different colonial experiences. As the Institut Colonial International’s founders had hoped, its publications promoted legal debates, discussions and the prospects of specific legislation, decrees or norms to be adapted and used in entirely different colonial systems. This paper will show that the Institut Colonial International encouraged the exchange of ideas about the various (...) colonial experiences in order to create common and universal principles. International law and domestic law, or national law concerning land register systems and land law were part of the colonial discourse as it endeavoured to create and adopt universal principles of law, trying to establish a platform of common dialogue, with common premises, concerning different colonies, different colonial experiences and ultimately different cultural, social and political contexts. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on human rights. Firstly, I seek to establish his underlying conception of philosophy: although it is impossible to spell out the philosophical foundations of human rights, this does not imply that philosophical thought, in the sense of critical reason, cannot make a useful contribution and provide valuable arguments in support of human rights. Secondly, I examine the related issue of the justification of human rights and assess his theory on the basis (...) of its own conception of a possible foundation. The way we answer the question of coherence also clarifies (a) what model of civil association is compatible with such a foundation, i.e. with such a worldview; (b) what model is absolutely incompatible with it; and finally (c) what intermediate solutions are there, if there are any. I argue that the communitarian variants of the conception of rights are distortions: collective or cultural rights, i.e. rights of a community towards which all of its members have duties, appearing alongside individual rights, trump individual rights, i.e. the rights linked to personhood that once constituted the most effective legal and political means for emancipating the individual from the power of the community. I therefore consider the “Copernican Revolution” of individualism and its consequences in Bobbio’s thought. As the example of personal freedom shows, where rights are ascribed principally to groups or communities rather than to individuals, we have good reason to fear that rights will turn out to be merely the privilege of the few. Once we follow this line of though in Bobbio, the ecumenical openness to alternative approaches and the argument from “the consensus of the people” yield to a clearly universalistic perspective that derives from the Enlightenment and can be interpreted as the product of the specifically modern version of natural law theory. (shrink)

This clear, accessible account of Hegelian logic makes a case for its enormous seductiveness, its surprising presence in the collective consciousness, and the dangers associated therewith. Offering comprehensive coverage of Hegel's important works, Bencivenga avoids getting bogged down in short-lived scholarly debates to provide a work of permanent significance and usefulness.

A system of modal logic with the operator is proposed, and proved complete. In contrast with a previous one by Stalnaker and Thomason, this system does not require two categories of singular terms.

A logic is a doctrine of the logos, that is, of meaningful discourse; hence the first thing we expect from it is an account of what makes the logos meaningful — of what a meaning is. There is no single such doctrine or account: it is part of the immense richness of meaningful discourse that we can shift back and forth between several logics — several organized ways of reasoning, of providing reasons or grounds for our claims. Building on previous (...) work on Hegel's dialectical logic, the author here identifies three distinct logics simultaneously in play in our conversations. Analytic logic structures its organization of discourse around negation, contraries, and hence arguments forcing a conclusion to follow (under threat of inconsistency) from some premises. Dialectical logic's main tool is the construction of narratives, hence the attempted incorporation of interlocutors within one's own story. The third option, here labeled gradual logic, sees sorites (which are recalcitrant anomalies for the analytic approach) as ideal cases, since the bleeding of a predicate into an alleged contrary points the way to reaching an agreement among initially conflicting parties: to them eventually coming to regard themselves as stressing different aspects of one and the same thing. (shrink)

Kant was very proud of his Copernican revolution. So it is a bit ironical that the exact nature of this revolution should have turned out to be as obscure and controversial as it has. In the present paper I will try to provide a new way of looking at the issue. It is my hope that this new perspective will prove not only historically but also theoretically valuable; in particular, that it will present Kant's revolution as one that we might (...) want to take seriously, and maybe even think we still need. (shrink)

A selection of Perlman's (social service, U. of Chicago) recent essays responsibility, and who need ongoing support to better center themselves in their professions. No index. of relevance for contemporary social work, especially in its casework and groupwork forms. The selections reflect two concerns. First is the number of entrants to social work (and frequently to the most difficult publicly supported welfare programs) who have only rudimentary education in the field, and need the support of ongoing education to help them (...) maintain focus and direction. The second concern is with the number of more advanced graduates who have been prematurely placed in positions with supervisory or teaching Working from within the analytic tradition, and employing analytic tools, distinctions, and methods of argument, Bencivenga (philosophy, U. of California-Irvine) attempts to transform and save the tradition, under increasing assault by its post-analytic critics. Eleven essays (nine previously published) cover topics in aesthetics, language, logic, metaphysics, ethics, and meta-philosophy. Cloth edition (unseen), $35. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Translated by the author from his Tre Dialoghi, published in 1989 by Bollati Boringhieri Editore. In this lively collection of dialogues, Bencivenga endeavors to be true to the nature of philosophical practice- its constant superseding of its own results, its open-endedness, its paradoxical turning of a position into its opposite- as he explores issues ranging from feminism to metaphysics, from the philosophy of science to aesthetics, as well as the intrinsically dialogic nature of philosophical activity itself.

Meinong justifies the need of his Gegenstandstheorie by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full (...) import of this revolution. This is what the present paper attempts to do. (shrink)

This book offers insight into the nature of meaningful discourse. It presents an argument of great intellectual scope written by an author with more than four decades of experience. Readers will gain a deeper understanding into three theories of the logos: analytic, dialectical, and oceanic. The author first introduces and contrasts these three theories. He then assesses them with respect to their basic parameters: necessity, truth, negation, infinity, as well as their use in mathematics. Analytic Aristotelian logic has traditionally claimed (...) uniqueness, most recently in its Fregean and post-Fregean variants. Dialectical logic was first proposed by Hegel. The account presented here cuts through the dense, often incomprehensible Hegelian text. Oceanic logic was never identified as such, but the author gives numerous examples of its use from the history of philosophy. The final chapter addresses the plurality of the three theories and of how we should deal with it. The author first worked in analytic logic in the 1970s and 1980s, first researched dialectical logic in the 1990s, and discovered oceanic logic in the 2000s. This book represents the culmination of reflections that have lasted an entire scholarly career. (shrink)