Widmer sheds light on a neglected aspect of the Western philosophical tradition. Following an era of Hegelianism, the members of the neo-Kantian "Marburg School," such as Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Rudolf Stammler, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer defended socialism or left-wing ideals on Kantian principles. In doing so, Widmer breaks with two mistaken assumptions. First, Widmer demonstrates that the left-Hegelian and Marxist traditions were not the only significant philosophical sources of socialist critique in nineteenth-century Germany, as the (...) left-Kantians identified problems of normativity that the left-Hegelians could not adequately address. Second, Widmer challenges the prevailing assumption that the political philosophies developed in the Marburg School can be comprehensively characterized as a unified school of "ethical socialism." By showing that they varied fundamentally regarding their political views and their philosophical foundations of socialism, Widmer fills a gap in the studies of neo-Kantianism that is long overdue. (shrink)

After the completion of I. Kant’s “Copernican” turn in metaphysics, all subsequent European philosophy to one degree or another was under his influence. The purpose of the article is to consider the reception and transformation of the Kantian theoretical philosophy by the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. It is necessary to analyze the reasons for H. Cohen's and P. Natorp’s interpretation of Kant's criticism. To do this, one should consider (i) internalist and (ii) externalist factors in the (...) formation of the Marburg School. Neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, emerged as a response to materialism, naturalism, and post-Kantian German idealism. In addition, the Marburg School was strongly influenced by the change in the scientific paradigm in mathematical natural science at the end of the 19th century. The justification by the Marburgers of Kant’s a priori doctrine presupposed thematization, first of all, of: a) purity of thought; b) systematic unity of thought and experience; c) the orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; d) transcendental method. As a result, the Marburg School interpreted the Kantian concept of the unity of consciousness; abandoned the principle of synthetic (real) unity of consciousness in favor of systematic (logical) unity; substantiated the purity of scientific thinking; put forward the requirement of orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; developed the concept of the origin of thinking (Ursprung); abandoned the idea of “givenness” of the subject of knowledge and proved its “assignment”; changed the understanding of the essence and functions of the transcendental method; put forward the concept of thinking as “generation” (“production”); formulated a new understanding a priori. The changes that took place in the 19th century in philosophy, mathematical natural science and mathematical sciences led to a sharp activation of constructivism. It can be concluded that Kant’s epistemological paradigm was realistic constructivism. Pure constructivism became the paradigm of the Marburg School. (shrink)

Filling a gap in scholarship on 19th- and 20th-century religious thought, this book discusses the philosophy and theology of the influential Marburg School in Germany before 1914, focusing on the writings of Hermann Cohen, its leader, and on the Ritschlian theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth's teacher. In addition, Fisher examines Barth's earliest writings and clarifies the little-known liberal phase of Barth's theology.

Many readers of this review will be aware that Karl Barth, like Rudolf Bultmann, was a student of Wilhelm Herrmann and that Barth was both indebted to and critical of aspects of Herrmann's thought. Fewer, however, will have much familiarity with the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism and its influence on the thought of Herrmann and Barth. This study is intended to fill that gap. During the time that Herrmann taught at Marburg, the theological school changed from (...) a rather provincial academic setting to an international center with such distinguished teachers as Weiss, Jülicher, and Otto. At the same time the Marburg philosophical faculty became one of the leading centers for the study of Neo-Kantianism and counted among its leading scholars Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. Although Fisher believes that a case could be made for showing an enduring influence of the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy on Barth's theology, it is his intent in this book to trace the influence of this school on Barth's earliest theology, that written during the brief period that he was a pastor in Geneva immediately following his theological studies at Marburg, and before his break with theological liberalism. The first two chapters of the book are devoted to a study of Marburg Neo-Kantianism with particular reference to Cohen and Natorp, who tried to make a place for religion within the confines of a way of thinking that tended to limit knowledge claims to three spheres, logico-scientific, ethical, and aesthetic. Initially Cohen reduced religion to ethics but later sought to make a special place for religion. Natorp proposed a religion without God in which religious feeling was identified with the hidden psychic motivation of all human and cognitive striving. Herrmann, who is discussed in the third chapter, regarded his own work as complementary to Cohen and Natorp and sought to mediate between knowledge of the world represented by the Marburg philosophers and the Protestant tradition of Christian faith. Following the discussion of Neo-Kantianism and Herrmann, Fischer provides an extended analysis of Barth's early work, including two unpublished manuscripts, showing the influence of the Marburg philosophers on Barth through Herrmann and at times directly through Barth's study of the works of Cohen and Natorp. (shrink)

In A Parting of the Ways Michael Friedman proposed to conceive the contemporary divide between analytic philosophy (AP) and continental philosophy (CP) as the outcome of the bifurcation between the Neokantians of Heidelbarg and Marburg. According to Friedman, Carnap can be characterized as the executor of the Marburg school, while Heidegger is to be considered as the heir of the Southwest Neokantianism. In this paper it is argued that Carnap was much closer to the Southwest (...) Neokantianism than usually recognized. To some extent, Carnap’s project in the Aufbau may be described as an attempt to modernize the Neokantian approach of the Southwest school with the help of modern relational logic. This entails that Carnap cannot be lined so easily with the Marburg school as Friedman assumes. (shrink)

The primary goal of this paper is not to argue for the “influence” of Cassirer, but rather to make known the reception of Cassirer in Japanese philosophy, illustrate the interconnection between Cassirer’s critique of culture and that of Japanese philosophy, and hopefully spark interest in what might be a fruitful dialog between Cassirer scholars and those working in Japanese philosophy. Historically, the paper defines Japanese philosophy and makes known its engagement with Western philosophy and the (...) Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and its project of a critique of culture during its own self-development. Systematically, the paper points to the possible interconnection between Cassirer’s critique of culture and that of Japanese philosophy and makes the case for a mutually productive dialog between Cassirer scholars and those working in Japanese philosophy. Implicitly, the paper attempted to show that an engagement with Japanese philosophy from the perspective of a critique of culture forces us to question the Western dichotomy between philosophy and religion and the importance of this for the further development of a non-Eurocentric critique of culture. And by extension, that a critique of culture must be cognitive of the historicity of the culture from which it speaks. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in (...) this debate. I try to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not justify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. (shrink)

Paul Oskar Kristeller, Frederick Woodbridge professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University, was a major scholar of Renaissance philosophy and Renaissance humanism. He was born Paul Oskar Gräfenberg in Berlin but took the name of his stepfather at age 14. His father died shortly after Paul Oskar's birth. He attended school at Mommsen Gymnasium in Berlin. In 1923 Kristeller started college, studying philosophy, medieval history, and mathematics at Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Marburg between the years 1923-1928. (...) He earned a Ph.D. in 1928 at the University of Heidelberg, with a thesis on Plotinus. With the rise of the National Socialist government in Germany and its racist and anti-Semitic policies, he went to Italy in 1933, remaining there until 1938 when the Mussolini regime gained more power. He obtained a position at Yale University, then a permanent faculty position at Columbia University in 1939, where he spent the rest of his career. His talk, Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition, was given as part of the Wimmer Memorial Lecture Series at Saint Vincent in 1961, and was published two years later. The widely-published and internationally-recognized scholar died in 1999 at the age of 94. (shrink)

The article reconstructs some of the basic decisions underlying Hermann Cohen′s theoretical philosophy by drawing a line to some claims of Winfrid Sellars′ and to one aspect of Robert Brandom′s philosophy. The first part is concerned with a comparison of the main theses of Cohen′s book Kants Theorie der Erfahrung and Sellars′ early essay entitled “Some remarks on Kant′s Theory of Experience,” both authors reading the Critique of Pure Reason as the discovery of a new, holistic concept of (...) experience. The second part discusses some of the parallels between Cohen′s and Sellars′ respective critique of the myth of the given, and it is shown how Cohen′s later critique of Kant can be understood against this background. In the third part I suggest interpreting Cohen′s logic along the lines of Robert Brandoms inferentialism. It is the declared intention of both philosophers to explain the origin of the content of epistemic claims without making use of any claim about mental representations. The article ends with a comparison of Cohen′s and Sellars′ visions of the systematic character of philosophy. It is argued that while both assume the compatibility of scientific realism with an irreducibly normative ethics, Cohen′s approach is more ambitious, insofar as it requests ethics to develop its own ethical theory of man, the task of which is to overcome the mythical presuppositions of our common sense views on morals. (shrink)

Analyzes the philosophical ideas of two famous neo-Kantian philosophers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who worked together in the Marburger Schule research institute from 1880 to 1912. In volume 1, mentions differences of opinion between them, partly due to Cohen's Jewishness, noting that Cohen resented the prevalence of antisemitism and discrimination. Cohen felt that Natorp's opposition to his ideas was motivated by antisemitism. The second volume is a collection of documents and correspondence between the two and others, where antisemitism is (...) frequently mentioned (see the index). (shrink)

According to Michael Friedman, Ernst Cassirer’s “outstanding contribution [to Neo-Kantianism] was to articulate, for the first time, a clear and coherent conception of formal logic within the context of the Marburg School” (Friedman 2000, p. 30). In his paper “Kant und die moderne Mathematik” (1907), Cassirer argued not only that the new relational logic of Frege1 and Russell was a major breakthrough with profound philosophical implications, but also that the logicist thesis itself was a “fact” of modern mathematics. (...) Cassirer summarizes his evaluation of Russell’s work: Here logic and mathematics have been fused into a true, henceforth indissoluble unity; and from this inner connection there arises for each... (shrink)

This chapter presents an overview of the Neo‐Kantian movement in philosophy that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that was concentrated geographically in Germany. Following a summary of the institutional and intellectual context surrounding Neo‐Kantianism, the chapter explores the core philosophical principles associated with the movement, attending in particular to the ways in which Neo‐ Kantian philosophers appropriate and depart from the core tenets of Kant's critical philosophy. After briefly surveying the context in which Neo‐Kantianism (...) took shape, the chapter surveys the two major “schools” into which the movement crystallized around 1880: the Marburg School, comprised primarily of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, and the Baden, or Southwest School, comprised principally of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Both schools of Neo‐ Kantianism are marked by a rich and fascinating process of internal conceptual development. (shrink)

Postmodernism is a philosophical description that encompasses philosophy, the arts, a period of history, and many other aspects of today’s existence. This dissertation examines the extent to which Indiana public school superintendents use postmodern philosophy as opposed to modern philosophy to inform their practice. This was accomplished by examining eight leadership concepts through the application of questions with decisions related to either modernism or postmodernism. The study described by this dissertation used a quantitative research method assembling (...) data and determining the correlation of operant philosophy by a superintendent with their tenure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary PhilosophyFrederick BeiserRudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, editors. Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. Pp. ix. + 331. Paper, $27.95.This collection of essays testifies to the growing interest in neo-Kantianism in the Anglophone world. The editors boast that “it is the first of its kind published in English,” though they have been beat to the post by (...) an issue of the The Philosophical Forum (Vol. XXXIX, no. 2, Summer 2008), Back to Kant: Neo-Kantianism and its Relevance Today, edited by Andrew Chignell, Terence Irwin, and Thomas Teufel. Still, claims to priority are of small moment where quality is concerned, and the many valuable essays in this volume more than compensate for second place. In their introductory essay, Makkreel and Luft make a convincing case for the continuing relevance of neo-Kantianism in contemporary philosophy. Basically, nearly every philosophical movement of the twentieth century—phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, positivism, Frankfurt school—was influenced by, or grew out of a reaction to, neo-Kantianism, so that we cannot understand and assess these movements unless we have a handle on neo-Kantianism itself. The editors missed a trick, however, when they failed to mention the concept of normativity, which plays such a big role in contemporary philosophy, and whose roots lie in neo-Kantianism.Despite the high quality of many of its essays, this volume suffers from a lack of balance and perspective. Contemporary scholars on neo-Kantianism tend to focus on the Marburg school, especially the work of Cohen, Cassirer, and Natorp. This volume reflects this bias: almost all the articles are centered on these figures. Only two essays focus on the Southwestern or Baden school: one on Emil Lask by Steven Crowell, another on Dilthey and the neo-Kantians by Makkreel. The latter article, however, is more a defense of Dilthey than a study of the neo-Kantians. The important contributions of the Southwestern school to value-theory, and the logic of history and the social sciences, receive scant treatment.The lack of balance is especially evident in the case of the neo-Friesian school, which is never mentioned. This school of neo-Kantianism prospered in Göttingen in the early twentieth century under the leadership of Leonard Nelson. Its members—the theologian Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), the psychiatrist Arthur Kronfeld (1886–1941), the Nobel Prize winner Otto Meyerhoff (1884–1951), and the mathematician Gerhard Hessenberg (1874–1925)—were eminent in their own right and advocated noble social and political causes. Their circle is of great cultural interest, and it deserves a place in history no less than the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Following Fries, Nelson developed an anthropological interpretation of Kant competing with the logicist interpretation of the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Nowadays Heidegger is given credit for the anthropological interpretation, though its origins ultimately go back to Fries.The bias in perspective becomes explicit in the essay by Manfred Kühn, “Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians.” Kühn attempts to find the common [End Page 145] interpretation of Kant in the Marburg and Southwestern schools, and locates it in the Platonized version of Kant of the later Cohen, an interpretation that eliminates sensibility and stresses the autonomy of pure thought. Kühn’s generalization is problematic for three reasons: (1) It ignores the anthropological interpretation of the Friesian school; (2) it scarcely works for the Southwestern school, which never eliminated Kant’s sensibility (Kühn bases his interpretation on a single later essay by Rickert, as if it held for all his earlier work and for Windelband and Lask); and (3) it applies only to the later Cohen, who took the plunge toward an objective idealist interpretation only in his 1896 Einleitung mit kritischen Nachtrag zur neunten Auflage der Geschichte des Materialismus. Although there are indeed Platonic tendencies to Cohen’s thinking even in the late 1860s, they do not erase the Kantian dualism between understanding and sensibility, which remains well in place even in the second edition of Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung (1885). On the whole, Kühn’s interpretation is very anachronistic... (shrink)

In this paper I compare and contrast Natorp’s and Husserl’s philosophies as to their programmatic and systematic profiles. I will begin by giving an assessment of their relationship and mutual influence, something that many scholars believe had been done exhaustively in Kern’s initial study of 1964 on the relation between Husserl and Kant and the neo-Kantians. Indeed, this topic – in general, the relation between phenomenology and „critical“ philosophy – deserves a new look now that more material has appeared (...) in the Husserliana, forcefully demonstrating the „transcendental Husserl“ and the Kantian influence on his phenomenology, and given the overall growing interest in neo-Kantianism. I will show that, despite fundamental differences in their philosophical outlooks, Natorp and Husserl share the same principal premise as to the relation between life, science and philosophy, and thus the role of philosophy itself in the midst of „culture“ and „lifeworld“ respectively. Hence, the similarities between Natorp’s Marburg School neo-Kantianism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology outweigh the differences, opening up new avenues to pursue transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant sought to explain the objectivity of cognition by describing the operation of certain human cognitive activities. That is, in some sense Kant explained cognition's objectivity by appealing to features of the mind. A century later, the Marburg School Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp would insist that philosophers must explain cognition's objectivity without appeal to the subject's mind. Once at the center of the Kantian account of objectivity, the mind had (...) been expunged from it. This shift was the emergence of anti-psychologism, the view that the mind has no place in philosophical accounts of cognition's objectivity. This dissertation offers an account of how that shift happened. Chapter 1 argues that a central section of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction, is a description of a cognitive operation—namely, the apperception's synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition. Because this operation is necessary, it determines the structures that a subject's cognition must conform to, and thus explains cognition's objectivity for Kant. But Kant's view that the mind is characterized by necessary cognitive operations was abandoned in the nineteenth century in favour of purely empirical conceptions of the mind. Chapter 2 argues that, in response to this change and in particular to the psychologism of the Back to Kant movement, Cohen developed an anti-psychologistic account of cognition's objectivity: for him, objectivity must be explained by appeal to the principles and laws of mathematics and pure natural science. But his account fails, since he does rot explain why those laws explain cognition's intersubjectivity. Chapter 3 examines Wilhelm Wundt's and Ernst Mach's attempts to articulate purely empirical conceptions of the mind, and to explain cognition's objectivity by appeal to the mind so conceived, as well as Hermann Lotze's anti-psychologism. Chapter 4 argues that, for Natorp, fundamental physical laws constitute the intersubjective content of cognition because they are invariant across space and time, and so different subjects can share representations of them despite having different points of view on the world. Natorp thus finally articulates a successful anti-psychologistic alternative to Kant's account of objectivity. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The article elucidates and assesses the Marburg School’s account of the cognition. The characteristic feature of epistemology from this School is the rejection of the mirroring and acceptance of the cognitive transformation. The criticism of the mirroring theory is implicitly contained in Paul Natorp’s and Hermann Cohen’s cognitive relationism. Ernst Cassirer articulated this critical epistemology in his philosophy of the symbolic form and his conception of the symbolic representation. The historical bases of this criticism has been (...) reconstructed as a main purpose of this article. (shrink)

The essays in this book take a new approach to the subject, engaging substantially with the philosophical texts of members of the Kyoto School, and ...

This article analyses the text of Natorp's lecture given at the Kantgesellschaft in Halle in 1912 (Kant und die Marburger Schule) and attempts to describe what is meant by "transcendental method" for Paul Natorp. The aim is to compare the theses of the Marburg philosopher with the Kantian dictates of the first Critique and to show how Kant's philosophy of culture can be defined. Furthermore, it will be shown here how the dense account of '12 is also a (...) fundamental tool from the point of view of the critical examination of the New Kantian's reflection, since it was presented in the same year as the publication of the Natorpian Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, one of the philosopher's most controversial and debated works. (shrink)

Description of the Center for the Advancement of Philosophy in the Schools (CAPS) program at California State University, Long Beach. The program places undergraduate philosophy students in area schools to lead pre-college students in various philosophical learning activities.

Description of the Center for the Advancement of Philosophy in the Schools (CAPS) program at California State University, Long Beach. The program places undergraduate philosophy students in area schools to lead pre-college students in various philosophical learning activities.

This book presents the thought of the Kyoto School in comparison with continental philosophers better known in the West and addresses the affiliation of some of its members with the militarism of the 1930s and 1940s.

Aristotle began his great study on causes, which he called Metaphysics, with a simple connection to physics: "All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses." Catholic high school physics teacher Matt D'Antuono makes a similar connection in his own teaching. While discussing the nature of science with his physics students, Matt pointed out that their topic of conversation was technically not science any more. Instead, when they were talking (...) about the nature of science, they were doing philosophy. The students then wanted Matt to teach them some philosophy, and Philosophy Fridays became a classroom tradition. Every secondary school teacher will find within this book the kind of practical wisdom that enlightens the young mind and engages their students in the act of contemplating all the wonders of our world, both physical and metaphysical. (shrink)

Nishida Kitaro, originator of the Kyoto School and 'father of Japanese Philosophy' is usually viewed as an essentially apolitical thinker who underwent a 'turn' in the mid-1930s, becoming an ideologue of Japanese imperialism. Political Philosophy in Japan challenges the view that a neat distinction can be drawn between Nishida's apolitical 'pre-turn' writings and the apparently ideological tracts he produced during the war years. In the context of Japanese intellectual traditions, this book suggests that Nishida was a political (...) thinker form the very beginning of his career, and consequently, his later political works cannot be dismissed as peripheral to his philosophical project. Counter-intuitively however, Christopher Goto-Jones argues that a consistently political reading of his philosophy reveals a dissenting standpoint even during the height of the Pacific War. This book argues that the prevailing postwar tendency to dismiss interwar and wartime Japanese culture as fascist or ultra nationalist en total neglects a lively political discourse, which contained some serous and profound political insight and even dissent. By suggesting that Nishida tetsugaku was a voice of dissent during Japan's Great East Asia War, Goto-Jones presents a case for the rehabilitation of Nishida as a political thinker, and as an example of a Japanese resistance, able to make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates about international political, globalization , and inter-cultural relations. Offering a unique and potentially controversial view of the subject of Nishida and the Kyoto School, The Political Philosophy of Japan will be of huge interest to anyone studying Japanese History, Political Philosophy and comparative philosophy alike. (shrink)

The relation between free will and necessity is one of the most important issues regarding the problem of “free will”. This is because of the rule which indicates that “being not necessary, an event would not be came off”. There has been an ongoing debate among theologians, philosophers and Jurists on whether this rule includes free actions. Sadrain Philosophers believe that this rule is inclusive of human free actions, while followers of the Na’eeni school endorse the opposite. In this (...) article, after reviewing the views of philosophers and jurists on the stages of a free action, I shall explore the question whether human actions, stages of which are understood deterministic, could be regarded as free, and so, whether Na’eenian criticisms against philosophers are justified. Besides, I shall put forth some innovative ideas of Allameh Ja’fari concerning the issue, whose view, while revises some philosophers’, is not compatible with that of Na’eeni. (shrink)

There has recently been a great deal written about philosophy in schools and in this article I shall be addressing some of the main concerns raised in objection to philosophy with young people. By young people I have in mind those in primary school from reception through to Year 6.