_Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GOD, EMOTION, AND CORPOREALITY: A THOMIST PERSPECTIVE 1 MARCEL SAROT University of Utrecht Utrecht, The Netherlands I. Introduction WHEN WE TAKE" impassibility" to mean" immutbility with regard to one's feelings or the quality of ne's inner life," 2 the number of adherents to the doctrine of divine impassibility has continuously decreased during the present century. Slowly but surely the concept of an immutable and impassible God has given (...) way to the concept of a sensitive, emotional, passionate God. Before the Second World War this tendency was restricted to British theology,3 but since then it has spread to the rest of Europe, notably to France and Ger1 A first draft of this paper was presented at a meeting of the Aquinas Research Group of the Catholic Theological University of Utrecht (The Netherlands ) in May, 1990. I would like to thank the other participants for their useful comments. The paper also profited from the valuable comments of Prof. Dr. Vincent Brummer and Dr. Christoph Schwi:ibel. The writing of this paper forms part of a research project on divine passibility, supported by the Dutch Research Foundation for Theology and Religious Studies (STEGON), and funded by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Research (NWO). 2 I have argued for this definition in my article " Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the Suffering of God: Some Historical and Systematic Considerations," Religious Studies 26 (1990) : 363-375. a See A. van Egmond, De Lijdende God in de Britse Theologie van de Negentiende Eeuw: De Bijdrage van Newman, Maurice, McLeod Campbell en Gore aan de Christelijke Theopaschitische Traditie (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1986); J. Kenneth Mozley, The Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), pp. 127-166; Doctrine in the Church of England: The Report of the Commission o·n Christian Doctrine Appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922 (London: SPCK, 1938), pp. 55-56. 61 62 MARCEL SAROT many, to the United States and to Asia.4 By now most of the theologians who explicitly state their views on divine impassibility hold that this doctrine is to a greater or lesser degree false, and Ronald Goetz rightly asserts "that the rejection of the ancient doctrine of divine impassibility has become a theological commonplace." 5 Nevertheless the debate on this issue is not yet closed. Recently Richard Creel published a thorough study in defense of divine impassibility,6 which, I expect, will prove quite influential. Other theologians who defend the doctrine can be cited as well.7 To a large extent, the arguments which these theologians put forward in favor of divine impassibility are taken from the classic Christian theological texts. Among these, the writings of Aquinas are not the least important and no one will be surprised to hear that he is frequently cited in this connection. However, what has surprised me in my study of the debate on the issue of divine impassibility is that one of the most important arguments Aquinas 4 On passibilist tendencies in modern theology, see Richard Bauckham, " ' Only the Suffering God Can Help ' : Divine Passibility in Modern Theology," Themelios 9 (1984) : 6-12; Warren McWilliams, The Passio1i of God: Divine Swffering in Contemporary Protestant Theology (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985); Van Egmond, De Lijdende God, pp. 28-31, and "Theopaschitische Tendenzen in de Na-Oorlogse Protestantse Theologie," Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift 79 (1979): 161-177; Marcel Sarot, "De Passibilitas Dei in de Hedendaagse Westerse Theologie: Een Literatuuroverzicht," Kerk en Theologie 40-3 (1989) : 196-206. 5 Ronald Goetz, "The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy," The Christian Century 103 (1986): 385. Also see the literature cited in the preceding note. 6 Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 7 See, for instance, Brian Davies, Thinking about God (London: Chapman, 1985), pp. 155-158; William J. Hill, "Does Divine Love Entail Suffering in God?," in: B. L. Clarke & E. T. Long, eds., God and Temporality (New York: Paragon House, 1984), pp. 55-71 ; id., " The Doctrine of God after Vatican II," The Thomist 51 (1987); pp. 412-414; Herbert McCabe, "The Involvement of God," New Blackfriars 66 (1985) : 464-476, reprinted in Herbert McCabe... (shrink)

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...) do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

Recent discussions of the notion of the act in Lacan and Žižek have made the act out to be something like a stand in for the old idea of freedom. And so, the debate tends to be about whether acts are spontaneous or not, whether they result from decisions coming from a conscious subject or not, and what relation acts have to the circumstances that precede them. But much of this debate may be a red herring. I will be taking (...) the view here that, despite important similarities, the major difference between Badiou and Žižek on this point can be traced back to their differing views on the subject. By thinking the subject as a void, or as negative, Žižek’s subject looks more like a decisionist, even Sartrean subject. Badiou’s subject seems more fully post-phenomenological, and this difference has an important effect on how the act is conceived in his work.How Badiou’s subject fits within a psychoanalytic perspective is something I will explore in my second part. Badiou’s theory seems to have taken a psychoanalytic and Lacanian perspective very much to heart when thinking about the act. I will explain how this is so by using two models for an act coming from two different artistic practices: the surrealist practice of automatic writing, which I will compare to psychoanalytic free association, and the practice that Marcel Duchamp dubbed “over-censorship,” which I will compare to “working-through”. Each gives us a different model for the production of truth, and, in line with Badiou’s call to become the “pitiless censors of ourselves,” I argue that Duchamp’s technique has quite a bit to teach us about the structure of an act. It also helps to shed light on some aspects of Žižek’s view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics ed. by Marcel DanesiNathan HaydonMarcel Danesi (Ed) Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2022, vii + 1383, including indexFor one acquainted with C.S. Peirce, it is hard to see Springer's recent Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics (editor: Marcel Danesi) through none other than a Peircean lens. Short for the cognitive science of mathematics, such a modern, scientific pursuit into the nature (...) and study of mathematical practice would no doubt be found agreeable to Peirce. The fact that references to Peirce appear often throughout the Handbook is a welcome find, with Peirce's ideas being a key subject of half a dozen chapters, and where a reader of any other chapter may well find further connections to Peirce's ideas. After spending time with the Handbook, it is clear that cognitive mathematics has not only embraced some of Pierce's ideas but may be at an important forefront of Peirce studies. In the end, the field may well be an area a Peircean should pay attention to.The book itself is pitched as a reference volume to the field (p. v) with the necessary background to familiarize oneself with the aims and results. The connection to cognitive science may call to mind detailed cognitive models [Ch. 10–14], theories on the origins of numeracy and other theories behind the biological and evolutionary requirements of mathematical thought [Ch.15–18], and the like. These are all present. But a key theme of the Handbook is to situate mathematics not just within more traditional 'cognitive' faculties and the more formal, i.e. algebraic, presentations of mathematics, but also to place mathematics within other human faculties and practices, from the arts to language [Ch. 19–22], within education and learning more broadly [Ch. 23–26], and in relation to the significant, though at first perhaps less quantitative parts of mathematics, like the use of metaphor, gesture, analogy, [End Page 243] abstraction, as well as further cultural and ethnographic considerations [Ch. 5–8]. The Handbook has explicitly taken a broader, more interdisciplinary approach (p. vi–vii) towards the scientific aspects of mathematical practice—choosing to regulate the study not by antecedently drawn opinions about what mathematics is (or has traditionally been taken to be) but by what future quantifiable and diverse study may come to bear on the practice and have to say about those engaging in it.This broad interdisciplinarity has a pragmatist ring, where theory cannot so easily be separated from the normative, social, and, more generally, the more thoroughly human aspects that we encounter and employ when we engage in it. Two further commitments of cognitive mathematics steer us even closer towards Peirce's views. The first—going back, for example, to Lakoff and Núñez's Where Mathematics Comes From (2000), which is taken to be a key early work in shaping the field—is that mathematics is taken to be a language like any other and as such must be learned and situated within our other cognitive faculties (p. vi, Ch. 4). The second—and largely, one imagines, following from a concern for seeing how mathematics is actually practiced—is that mathematics is essentially diagrammatic, involving as it does experimenting in diagrams and employing other signs (one may think here even of the mathematician sketching equations or geometric figures on a sheet of paper). What is perhaps initially most noteworthy about Peirce's philosophy of mathematics is his early concern for both these aspects of the practice.The book (more like a tome of over 1300 pages) is too large to be covered here in all its aspects, hence the review will focus on those aspects a Peircean or Pragmatist may find of interest. In particular, this review focuses on several of the themes above—situating mathematics more broadly within our everyday (cognitive) lives, the necessarily diagrammatic, fallible, and creative aspects of the practice, and, finally, what these aspects may have to say about Peirce's philosophy more generally, particularly with respect to (scientific) inquiry.A Peircean reader may well begin with Pietarinen's "Pragmaticism as Philosophy of Cognitive Mathematics" [Ch. 39] and "Peirce on Mathematical... (shrink)

Philosophy and the Historical Perspective contains fourteen chapters, each of which is an attempt to enrich our conception of the relationship of analytical philosophy to history. Some chapters seek insight from the philosophical canon: Robert Pippin offers an insightful discussion of Hegel's historiographical methodology, and Brian Leiter presents aspects of Nietzsche's. Many of the chapters set research agendas that would deserve entire volumes. For instance, van Ackeren asks whether there are transhistorical philosophical problems, and Thomas Grundmann what philosophical progress looks (...) like. Christof Rapp casts doubt on the idea that hard-core... (shrink)

Il lavoro di dottorato condotto apre la ricerca filosofica ed etica, riguardo il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura, alla possibilità teoretico-pratica e valutativa di un’analitica della relazione fondamentale, originaria e vivente sussistente tra essere e speranza nella dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura. Attraverso un’ermeneutica del rapporto contemporaneo tra cura, limite e speranza nel tempo della tecnica, sviluppata a partire dalle riflessioni avanzate su tali questioni da Heidegger, Jaspers e Marcel, si sono venute ad individuare, affrontare e verificare, (...) nella prima parte analitica del lavoro, le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dalla possibilità di un necessario confronto con la concettualizzazione della dimensione e del tempo dell’aver cura nell’analitica heideggeriana dell’esserci, dalla ricomprensione della chiarificazione jaspersiana di situazione limite quale orizzonte ermeneutico della cura, così come dalla possibilità dell’apertura marceliana alla speranza nelle situazionalità concrete dell’aver cura, la ricerca ha potuto dunque indirizzarsi, nella seconda parte sintetica, verso la possibilità di un’ontologia esistenziale della speranza; così come verso la messa in luce della trascendenza valoriale propria della dimensione della cura. La possibilità di ricerca di un’ermeneutica ontologico-esistenziale e trascendente della speranza, a partire dalle pratiche ontiche dell’aver cura della vita e della salute, ha permesso così di avanzare, grazie al confronto interdisciplinare intrapreso con le rispettive e integrative riflessioni di Heidegger, Jaspers e Marcel sulle questioni della cura, del limite e della speranza e l’ermeneutica teoretico-pratica operata a partire da queste, una valutazione circa la possibilità di un’analitica della dimensione della cura alla luce della speranza. In tale orizzonte ermeneutico si sono manifestati, infine, i possibili apporti ontologico-esistenziali del lavoro ad una filosofia ed etica dell’aver cura che si ricerchi quanto più autentica e omnicomprensiva, alla luce di una speranza aperturale di bene comunionale che si invera quotidianamente e straordinariamente nella dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura. (shrink)

Il presente lavoro di ricerca apre il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura della vita e della salute all’analitica della relazione fondamentale tra essere e speranza nella dimensione della cura. Attraverso l’analisi del rapporto tra “cura”, “limite” e “speranza” nel tempo della tecnica, si sono ricercate le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dal confronto con la concettualizzazione heideggeriana dell’ “aver cura”, dalla ricomprensione della nozione jaspersiana di “situazione limite” e (...) dalla possibilità dell’ “apertura” marceliana alla speranza nelle pratiche concrete della cura, la ricerca si è indirizzata verso la valutazione di un’analitica della cura alla luce della speranza e l’indicazione della trascendenza valoriale della cura. La speranza emerge infatti quale «fondamento originario e originante della cura», radice di un con-essere curante comunionale proteso «tra situazionalità limite dell’esistenza e apertura trascendente della speranza». In tale orizzonte si sono scorti gli apporti alla filosofia ed etica della cura, alla luce della speranza di bene che apre e illumina «la dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura». (shrink)

Although the topic of emotions was long ignored in British and American analytic philosophy and psychology, it remained a rich and exciting subject in Continental Philosophy. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche celebrated the passionate life. In phenomenology Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Ricoeur all made major contributions. Heidegger pursued a highly original thesis concerning the vital role of moods in human life, notably angst and boredom. Jean‐Paul Sartre added the tantalizing thesis that (...) our emotions are strategies to help us cope with the difficulties in life. Max Scheler gave us the stunning expression, “the emotional a priori,” the idea that emotions are basic structures of human existence. In this essay, I want to expand on the contributions of the classic phenomenologists and existentialists and do more of what they were doing by way of an “original” project of phenomenological investigation. (This follows publication of the first two volumes of a three‐part study of the emotions, Not Passion's Slave and In Defense of Sentimentality, both published by Oxford University Press.). (shrink)

This anthology of classic essays focuses on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and the philosophical movement to which his writings gave impetus: phenomenology. Sixty contributions from a wide variety of scholars provide an introduction to phenomenology and existentialist phenomenology. Among the contributors are Frege, Chisholm, Merleau-Ponty, Schmitt, Tillman, Gendlin, Sellars, Linsky, Dreyfus, Ryle, Solomon, Schlick, Ricoeur, Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, Brentano, Olafson, Camus, and de Beauvoir.

Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles’ distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles (...) and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition, but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth proposition of the De causis. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation, but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of “St Thomas’ Averroism”, as Chossat wanted. (shrink)

The review is devoted to a joint monograph of Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values published in 2019. The peculiarity and novelty of this monograph is that it is devoted not so much to the cognitive and epistemological aspects of phenomenology of intersubjectivity as to ethical, existential and value problems of relations with the Others, presented in various phenomenological concepts. One of the advantages of the work is the pluralistic approach, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the solutions (...) to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by a number of the most prominent phenomenologists, i. e. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Levinas and others. The book traces the idea that emerging of the topic of intersubjectivity in phenomenology caused a socio-ethical and axiological shift in the phenomenological movement. Considering moving of modern philosophy towards “the intersubjective paradigm”, the aim of the authors of the monograph to show the relevance and innovation of phenomenology in discussing the problems of the Other, communication and ethics can be assessed as a promising theoretical project. Whereas critics of the phenomenological movement reproached “methodological solipsism” of phenomenology, which develops Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, a serious analysis of the works of the most prominent representatives of the phenomenological tradition leads the authors of the monograph to the conclusion that a phenomenological subject is social in its essence. The review draws a conclusion that the joint monograph brings into sharp focus that phenomenology is in possession of deep and diverse ways of studying the common being of people and collectively shared values. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

In several accounts of what models are and how they function a specific view dominates. This view contains the following characteristics. First, there is a clear-cut distinction between theories, models and data and secondly, empirical assessment takes place after the model is built. This view in which discovery and justification are disconnected is not in accordance with several practices of mathematical business-cycle model building. What these practices show is that models have to meet implicit criteria of adequacy, such as satisfying (...) theoretical, mathematical and statistical requirements, and be useful for policy. In order to be adequate, models have to integrate enough items to satisfy such criteria. These items include besides theoretical notions, policy views, mathematisations of the cycle and metaphors also empirical data and facts. So, the main thesis of this chapter is that the context of discovery is the successful integration of those items that satisfy the criteria of adequacy. Because certain items are empirical data and facts, justification can be built-in. (shrink)

I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses "Sequence Hypothesis" and "Central Dogma" in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificity and its potential to counter claims about (...) causal parity of DNA and other cellular components. I first show that causal specificity is a special kind of invariance under interventions, namely invariance of generalizations that range over finite sets of discrete variables. Then, I show that this notion allows the articulation of a middle ground in the debate over causal parity. (shrink)

Offers a fascinating snapshot of magic throughout various cultures as well as deep sociological and religious insights still very much relevant today.

BackgroundFunctional changes after spinal cord injury are related to changes in cortical plasticity. These changes can be measured with electroencephalography and has potential to be used as a clinical biomarker.MethodIn this longitudinal study participants underwent a total of 30 sessions of robotic-assisted gait training over a course of 6 weeks. The duration of each session was 30 min. Resting state EEG was recorded before and after 30-session rehabilitation therapy. To measure gait, we used the Walking Index for Spinal Cord Injury (...) Scale, 10-Meter- Walking Test, Timed-Up-and-Go, and 6-Min-Walking Test. Balance was measured using Berg Balance Scale.ResultsFifteen participants with incomplete SCI who had AIS C or D injuries based on American Spinal Cord Injury Association Impairment Scale classification were included in this study. Mean age was 35.7 years and the mean time since injury was 17.08 months. All participants showed clinical improvement with the rehabilitation program. EEG data revealed that high beta EEG activity in the central area had a negative correlation with gait and balance measured at baseline, in a way that greater high beta EEG power was related to worse clinical function at baseline. Moreover, improvement in gait and balance had negative correlations with the change in alpha/theta ratio in the parietal area.ConclusionIn SCI, functional impairment and subsequent improvement following rehabilitation therapy with RAGT correlated with the change in cortical activity measured by EEG. Our results suggest that EEG alpha/theta ratio may be a potential surrogate marker of functional improvement during rehabilitation. Future studies are necessary to improve and validate these findings as a neurophysiological biomarker for SCI rehabilitation. (shrink)

Δύο ἐπιγραφικά εὑρήματα πού δημοσιεύτηκαν πρόσφατα ἴσως μᾶς ἐπιτρέψουν νά προσδιορίσουμε σέ δύο σημεῖα τό ὁδοιπορικό πού ἀκολούθησε ὁ Παυσανίας στό Ἄργός. Τό πολιτικό κέντρο τῆς πόλης ἦταν ἐγκαταστημένο στους πρόποδες τῆς Λάρισας, κατά μῆκος του δρόμου ἀπό τήν Κόρινθο στήν Τεγέα· στό σημεῖο αὐτό συγκλίνουν οἱ δρόμοι πού ὁδηγοῦν στήν Τίρυνθα καί στήν Ἐπίδαυρο ἀφ' ἑνός, στό Ήραῖο καί στό βορειοανατολικό τμῆμα τῆς 'Αργολίδας ἀφ' ἑτέρου. Φαίνεται πώς θά πρέπει νά γυρέψουμε τήν πύλη τῆς Εἰλιθυίας ἀπό ὅπου ἔφτασε κανείς (...) στό Ήραῖο κάπου πάνω στον ἄξονα τῆς σημερινῆς ὁδοῦ Θεάτρου καί λίγο βορεινότερα. Μιά ἐπιγραφή πού θά μποροῦσε νά προέρχεται ἀπό τό ἱερό τοῦ Διονύσου καί βρέθηκε κοντά στήν ἐκκλησία τοῦ Ἁγίου Πέτρου φαίνεται νά βεβαιώνει τήν ὑπόθεση τοῦ Boethius ὅτι ἡ Κοίλη πρέπει νά ἀναζητηθεῖ σ' αὐτόν τόν τομέα. (shrink)