La ville de Münster, en Westphalie, abrita en 1534-35 une communauté anabaptiste dont on ne connaît souvent que certains traits : son écrasement par les forces « de la réaction », sa réforme du mariage qui défraya la chronique ou la prépondérance des femmes dans sa population…, parfois associés dans l’image d’une société révolutionnaire, libertaire, dans lesquelles les femmes avaient un grand rôle – qu’en est-il de ces idées reçues? Après un bref rappel de ce qu’est l’anabaptisme et de (...) ce que fut cet épisode dans l’histoire de la Réforme, l’auteur analyse le texte justifiant l’instauration de la polygamie, ainsi que son traitement par l’historiographie et tente par ce biais de rétablir les faits dans leur contexte. (shrink)

Le crime de viol conjugal, très récemment incriminé par le droit français, n’existe pas sous l’Ancien Régime. La sexualité conjugale est définie par le droit canon et séculier comme un sacrement dont la validité repose sur le principe de l’échange d’un consentement libre. La consommation nuptiale vient confirmer ce consentement initial et ratifie le mariage mais elle impose également aux époux le devoir conjugal. Ainsi, le consentement sexuel inaugural prévaut pour l’ensemble de la vie maritale, empêchant en théorie toute (...) évocation de viol conjugal. L’absence d’incrimination spécifique des violences sexuelles entre époux n’empêche pourtant pas leur poursuite judiciaire par des voies détournées. Par la mobilisation d’un corpus d’affaires matrimoniales variées entre 1600 et 1750 (requêtes de séparation d’habitation, de nullité de mariage pour impuissance sexuelle ou de mariage forcé), cette enquête permet d’accéder à de rares témoignages et expériences féminines de ces violences, de mieux comprendre ce qui était considéré comme violent dans la sexualité conjugale et de réfléchir à ce que ces comportements et leur répression disent de l’ordre de genre patriarcal. (shrink)

La criminalisation des violences sexuelles faites aux femmes est le résultat d’une longue évolution dans le monde romain : si la pénalisation des rapports sexuels illicites s’opère à partir du ier siècle av. notre ère à la suite de la promulgation de la loi Iulia de adulteriis, un édit de Constantin datant probablement de 326 réprime pour la première fois le raptus comme crime distinct. Le principal écueil que pose cette évolution législative est d’ordre sémantique, la notion de viol n’étant (...) pas juridiquement définie. Durant les premiers siècles de l’Empire, ce problème se reflète non seulement dans le discours du droit, mais aussi dans le méta-discours que les écoles de rhétorique tiennent. La présente étude met en relation les deux discours pour examiner des éléments-clés de la logique éducative à partir de laquelle les Romains analysaient les catégories relatives à ce que nous entendons aujourd’hui par “viol”. Elle permettra de constater que la société romaine du Haut Empire avait une forte conscience du phénomène dans ses aspects les plus problématiques, et peut-être même des réponses aux défis forgés par le droit à son égard. (shrink)

Port du foulard ou de la burqa, interdits alimentaires, boycotts de certains cours à l’école, créationnisme, refus de se faire soigner par un médecin de sexe opposé, mariages arrangés ou forcés, crimes d’honneur ; fatwas lancées contre des écrivains ou des caricaturistes blasphémateurs ; compétition mémorielle entre diasporas victimisées ; conflits interreligieux ou interethniques importés, actions terroristes anti-occidentales… Ce sont quelques-uns des symptômes les plus connus (ou les plus...

Résumé Au Burkina Faso, parmi la multiplicité des instances informelles de règlement des conflits, les espaces islamiques de conciliation occupent une place non négligeable et paradoxalement peu visible. Cet article examine les formes de justice islamique pratiquées dans un pays où l’islam est pluriel. Il montre que les autorités islamiques en charge de la résolution des conflits de famille font preuve d’une grande capacité à conjuguer les normes islamiques avec les pratiques locales et les demandes des justiciables. Ainsi, dans les (...) milieux ruraux soufis, la notion appelée sulufu exprime la nécessité de privilégier le principe de conciliation à l’amiable en s’écartant des lectures littéralistes du Coran. En ville, cette importance donnée à l’ « arrangement » constitue un frein pour les couples souhaitant divorcer. En effet, les élites islamiques s’accordent pour reconnaître que le droit islamique autorise le divorce, tant pour les hommes que pour les femmes, mais dans les faits, elles se refusent à le cautionner. Ceci révèle la force de l’injonction sociale quant au mariage et à la pérennité du couple. (shrink)

Lors de la séparation des parents, l’enfant est confronté à leur demande implicite de confirmer leur généalogie. Au travers d’une étude de situation, nous montrerons l’intérêt de l’utilisation du test de l’arbre généalogique, comme outil de compréhension de la dynamique conflictuelle et des enjeux de la transmission de la filiation.

Self-Interest before Adam Smith inquires into the foundations of economic theory. It is generally assumed that the birth of modern economic science, marked by the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776, was the triumph of the 'selfish hypothesis'. Yet, as a neo-Epicurean idea, this hypothesis had been a matter of controversy for over a century and Smith opposed it from a neo-Stoic point of view. But how can the Epicurean principles of orthodox economic theory be reconciled with the (...) Stoic principles of Adam Smith's philosophy? Pierre Force shows how Smith's theory refutes the 'selfish hypothesis' and integrates it at the same time. He also explains how Smith appropriated Rousseau's 'republican' critique of modern commercial society, and makes the case that the autonomy of economic science is an unintended consequence of Smith's 'republican' principles. (shrink)

Dick Popkin and James Force have attended a number of recent conferences where it was apparent that much new and important research was being done in the fields of interpreting Newton's and Spinoza's contributions as biblical scholars and of the relationship between their biblical scholarship and other aspects of their particular philosophies. This collection represents the best current research in this area. It stands alone as the only work to bring together the best current work on these topics. Its primary (...) audience is specialised scholars of the thought of Newton and Spinoza as well as historians of the philosophical ideas of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. (shrink)

A CLOSE READING OF HUME’S ESSAY, "OF MIRACLES", REVEALS THAT HUME SPECIFICALLY AIMS HIS SCEPTICAL ARGUMENT AT THE PROOF OF CHRISTIAN REVELATION VIA FULFILLED PROPHETIC PREDICTIONS AS WELL AS AT MIRACLES. JOHNSON IS UNAWARE OF THIS FACT AND SO I CONCLUDE THAT HE HIMSELF HAD NOT READ THE ESSAY CLOSELY, THAT HE PROBABLY ONLY KNEW THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE ARGUMENT AT SECOND HAND THROUGH BOSWELL.

The French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) is known primarily for his conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, which was an essential reference for the later Foucault. An aspect of his work that has received less attention is a set of methodological reflections on intellectual history and on the relationship between philosophy and history. Hadot was trained initially as a philosopher and was interested in existentialism as well as in the convergence between philosophy and poetry. Yet he chose (...) to become a historian of philosophy and produced extensive philological work on neo-Platonism and ancient philosophy in general. He found a philosophical rationale for this shift in his encounter with Wittgenstein's philosophy in the mid-1950s (Hadot was one of Wittgenstein's earliest French readers and interpreters). For Hadot, ancient philosophy must be understood as a series of language games, and each language game must be situated within the concrete conditions in which it happened. The reference to Wittgenstein therefore supports a strongly contextualist and historicist stance. It also supports its exact opposite: presentist appropriations of ancient texts are entirely legitimate, and they are the only way ancient philosophy can be existentially meaningful to us. Hadot addresses the contradiction by embracing it fully and claiming that his own practice aims at a coincidence of opposites (a concept borrowed from the Heraclitean tradition). For Hadot the fullest and truest way of doing philosophy is to be a philosopher and a historian at the same time. (shrink)

Taking Pascal's appropriation of Montaigne as its main example, this article asks what it means to "say something new" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It argues that literary and philosophical innovation is best understood in reference to the rhetorical tradition, and it analyzes what "saying something new" means in terms of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, decorum, and ethos. Close attention is also paid to the relationship between economy and equity (in the rhetorical sense of these terms). For Pascal and Montaigne, (...) the "new" is desirable not for its own sake, but rather as an exercise for the soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Montaigne and the Coherence of EclecticismPierre ForceSince the publication of Pierre Hadot's essays on ancient philosophy by Arnold Davidson in 1995,2 Michel Foucault's late work on "the care of the self"3 has appeared in a new light. We now know that Hadot's work was familiar to Foucault as early as the 1950s.4 It is also clear that Foucault's notion of "techniques of the self" is very close to what (...) Hadot calls "spiritual exercises." At the same time, there are important differences between the views of these two philosophers, and Hadot has often expressed his regret that Foucault's untimely death prevented them from exploring these differences.5 One important point of disagreement was the status of eclecticism. In Foucault's interpretation of ancient philosophy, the "constitution of the self" implied a personal choice among disparate philosophical references: "Writing as a personal exercise done by the self and for the self, is an art of disparate truth."6 In a 1989 article Hadot argued from a historical point of view that, so far as Stoicism and Epicureanism were concerned, [End Page 523] eclecticism had no place in a mature practice of philosophy. Foucault's favorite example, Seneca's Letters to Lucilius, in which Stoic arguments were invoked along with Epicurean arguments, was a work for beginners. In a mature practice of Stoicism, one would stick to the arguments of the Stoic school, choose them for their coherence, and instead of trying to forge a spiritual identity for oneself through writing, one would "liberate oneself from one's individuality in order to raise oneself up to universality."7 Hadot added that "it is only in the New Academy—in the person of Cicero, for instance—that a personal choice is made according to what reason considers as most likely at a given moment."8 This discussion of Foucault may give the impression that Hadot was somewhat dismissive of eclecticism. Yet in a 2001 interview Hadot claimed that he had always admired Cicero's intellectual independence, and he proposed a reappraisal "of an attitude that has always had a bad reputation: eclecticism."9Something very similar is a stake in the work of Alexander Nehamas, as Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy showed in their study of his Art of Living. In the conception of philosophy as a "way of life" (Hadot) or "care of the self" (Foucault) or "self-fashioning" (Nehamas), a central issue is the relationship between theoretical coherence and the coherence of the person who theorizes. Elaborating on Nehamas's chapter on Montaigne, Anderson and Landy argue that there is a move in Montaigne away from doctrinal coherence and towards a coherence of the self. As they put it, "the harmonious whole Montaigne commends [... ] is not a coherent body of fact or theory; it is the unified self of the theorizer."10 Anderson and Landy show that this brings up all kinds of difficulties: can this unified self be other than a fiction? If that is the case, how can philosophy be a way of life? Nehamas's answer is very much in the spirit of the late Foucault: there is a coherence of the self in Montaigne, and this coherence is the product of writing as a philosophical activity. The self is fashioned through writing.Because Montaigne writes in the ancient tradition of philosophy as a way of life, one may recall Hadot's suggestion that Foucault's notion of [End Page 524] "writing the self" is an intriguing but historically inaccurate description of ancient philosophical practice. But perhaps Hadot agrees with Foucault after all, since in his most recent interviews, he speaks favorably of eclecticism, a notion that is central to Foucault's analysis of self-fashioning through writing. The case of Montaigne is particularly interesting for these purposes, not only because the Essays seem to be the prototypical example of "writing the self," but also because eclecticism is both discussed and practiced throughout the Essays. I propose to take a fresh look at this issue by investigating the status of eclecticism in Montaigne's Essays. This must start with an examination of the philosophical tradition most closely associated with... (shrink)

L’accès à la grand-parentalité engage des remaniements identitaires profonds du fait notamment de l’inscription dans une nouvelle forme de filiation et de la découverte d’un rôle social et familial inédit. L’ensemble de ces mouvements psychiques reconvoque des liens conscients et inconscients du sujet à lui-même, à ses enfants mais aussi à ses propres parents et grands-parents. Cet article propose d’exposer le cas de Catherine, rencontrée dans le cadre d’une recherche longitudinale auprès de patients migraineux, ceci à titre d’illustration du parcours (...) individuel d’un sujet devenu grand-parent pendant la période de ladite recherche. L’épreuve projective Rorschach lui a été proposée à deux temps différents, au début de la prise en charge de sa symptomatologie migraineuse et huit mois plus tard. Entre temps, la symptomatologie s’est très nettement améliorée et les protocoles Rorschach ont révélé des remaniements psychiques denses sous-tendus par l’accès à la grand-parentalité. (shrink)

III. INTERPRÉTATION ET CONTRARIÉTÉS 1. Contrariétés et apologétique Le Père Garasse justifie l'existence de contradictions dans la Bible en comparant les Ecritures au corpus des textes législatifs, que les juristes ont souvent du mal à ...

Professor Margaret Jo Osler of the University of Calgary, an historian of early modern science and philosophy (and a member of the Board of Directors of the Journal of the History of Philosophy since 2002) died on September 15, 2010. Born on November 27, 1942, she proudly proclaimed herself to be a "red diaper baby" and particularly delighted in telling her right-wing friends how her middle name was her parents' homage to Stalin. An energetic scholar with a vibrant and positive (...) personality, Maggie, as everyone who worked with her came to call her, never considered retirement and was actively working right up to her diagnosis with pancreatic cancer in early July, 2010.After graduating from Swarthmore College in .. (shrink)

This article revisits what has often been called the of Voltaire's historical work. It looks at the methodological and philosophical reasons for Voltaire's deliberate focus on modern history as opposed to ancient history, his refusal to in judging the past, and his extreme selectiveness in determining the relevance of past events to world history. Voltaire's historical practice is put in the context of the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns, and considered in a tradition of universal history going back (...) to Bossuet and leading up to nineteenth-century German historicism. Paradoxically, Voltaire is a major figure in the history of historiography not in spite of his presentism (as Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay have argued), but because of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:166 HUME'S INTEREST IN NEWTON AND SCIENCE Many writers have been forced to examine — in their treatments of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with scientific theories of his day — the related questions of Hume's knowledge of and acquaintance with Isaac Newton and of the nature and extent of Newtonian influences upon Hume's thinking. Most have concluded that — in some sense — Hume was acquainted with and (...) influenced by Newton's thought in particular and scientific thought in general. The genesis of this paper is the recent point of view put forward by Peter Jones which challenges the many permutations of this almost ritualistic standard line by removing Hume entirely from the Newtonian and the scientific scenes of thought. Jones argues that Hume knew less about Newton and science, and needed to know less about Newton and 2 science, than he believes is required by the above interpretation. Indeed, Jones argues that Hume's fundamental assumptions, which, according to Jones, derive ultimately from a form of Ciceronian humanism, drive a "wedge" between Newton's thought and that of 3 Hume. Even Hume's introductory remarks in the Treatise about his universal "science of man" are, for Jones, a declaration of independence from the materialistic trend (as Jones sees it) of Newtonian 4 science and not, as so many commentators have maintained — however tenuously or strongly evidence for linkage of Hume's project with Newtonian or scientific thought. Jones baldly argues that Hume totally lacked interest in science in general and in Newton and Newtonian science in particular. Following J. H. Burton's observation that Hume's work is surprisingly free from the "opinions" of contemporary scientists, 167 Jones states there is no evidence that Hume ever studied science at the University of Edinburgh or that he "pursued" scientific studies of any formal sort. Regarding Newtonian scientific thought, he emphasizes the paucity of specifically Newtonian scientific textbooks in the early eighteenth century 7 which might have been available for Hume to study and argues that nowhere in Hume's writings is there evidence of precise and detailed knowledge of Newton's science beyond what is available in Q Chamber's Cyclopaedia. Jones acknowledges that, in the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume utilizes a "general version" of Newton's "Regulae Philosophandi" from the beginning of Book III of Newton's Principia. Nevertheless, in Jones' view, Hume's fundamentally humanistic orientation separates him completely from g any Newtonian influence. Finally, according to Jones, Hume does not betray the least bit of knowledge of Newton's mathematics and its role in Newton's experimental methodology. On this evidence Jones grounds his central claim of Hume's "total lack of interest in contemporary science." What references there are to Newton and to science in Hume's works Jones finds "traceable to essentially literary predecessors such as Fontenelle or Montesquieu, or to standard works of theologians ] 2 or free-thinkers." The absence of clearly direct references to what Jones feels are scientific works results both from Hume's "total lack of interest in science" and from his commitment to a form of Ciceronian humanism which is "inimical" to what Jones finds to be the obvious materialistic tendencies of 13 science in the early modern period. Jones' account of the Ciceronian and French contexts of Hume's thought is excellent. But his claim that Hume had no interest whatsoever in science 168 is simply too strong and finally forces us to view science in Hume's day as equivalent to science in our own time, a manifestly anachronistic point of view. Throughout this paper, my argument will be conditioned by my view that Hume's interest in science cannot be separated from his epistemology or his religious scepticism. Hume's interest in science was precisely that of a man of letters of the eighteenth century vitally engaged in determining the proper use of scientific methodology in establishing the limits of the secular science of man once it has 14 been freed from the fetters of theology. Hume's interest in theological and epistemological issues inevitably gave rise to a strong interest on his part in the science of his day and in Newton's contributions... (shrink)

THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SUPPORT KEMP SMITH’S INTERPRETATION THAT PHILO, IN THE "DIALOGUES", SPEAKS FOR HUME "FROM START TO FINISH." THIS INTERPRETATION HAS RECENTLY BEEN QUESTIONED BY PROFESSOR JAMES NOXON WHO BELIEVES THAT PHILO IS A TRUE PYRRHONIAN SCEPTIC AND THEREFORE DOES NOT REPRESENT THE MITIGATED SCEPTICISM OF HUME. I SUPPORT KEMP SMITH’S INTERPRETATION BY SUGGESTING WHY PHILO SEEMS TO REVERSE HIMSELF AT THE END OF THE "DIALOGUES" AND TO ACCEPT THE DESIGN ARGUMENT AS SUPPORT FOR A (...) VAGUE SORT OF THEISM: HUME INTENDS PHILO’S ’REVERSAL’ TO APPEASE NOT THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HE DESPISES, BUT THE SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HE RESPECTS. (shrink)

This latest book, whose editors were among those who prepared the first two volumes, centers on Popkin's crucial role in bringing together scholars from around ...

Ethics consultation has become an integral part of the fabric of U.S. health care delivery. This article summarizes the second edition of the Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. The core knowledge and skills competencies identified in the first edition of Core Competencies have been adopted by various ethics consultation services and education programs, providing evidence of their endorsement as health care ethics consultation (HCEC) standards. This revised report was prompted (...) by thinking in the field that has evolved since the original report. Patients, family members, and health care providers who encounter ethical questions or concerns that ethics consultants could help address deserve access to efficient, effective, and accountable HCEC services. All individuals providing such services should be held to the standards of competence and quality described in the revised report. (shrink)

Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of the (...) central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting. This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people. A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it. (shrink)

Future robots should have common sense about the world in order to handle the problems they will encounter. A large part of this commonsense knowledge must be naive physics knowledge, since carrying out even the simplest everyday chores requires familiarity with physics laws. But how should one start codifying this knowledge? What kind of skills should be elicited from the experts (each and every one of us)? This paper will attempt to provide some hints by studying the mental models of (...) force and motion. (shrink)