Uptake and Conventionality in Illocution The aim of this paper is to put forward a new way of conceiving of the conventionality of illocutionary acts, grounded in a new look at Austin's original ideas. While the indispensability of uptake has correctly been deemed to be a hallmark of illocution, it has also been taken as evidence of the intention-based nature of illocutionary acts as opposed to their alleged conventionality. After discussing the readings of the "securing of uptake" offered by Strawson (...) and Searle and commenting on the consequently established divide between "communicative" and conventional speech acts, I claim that illocutionary acts are conventional, first of all, because they have conventional effects. I show that Austin took such effects to be essential to illocution and argue that the bringing about of conventional effects is bound up with the indispensability of uptake. (shrink)

In this closing chapter, Marina Sbisà replies to the volume’s contributors, while clarifying important aspects of her deontic model of speech actions.

Introduction Marina Sbisà University of Trieste 1. Pragmatics and philosophy It is well known that pragmatics – like many branches of the social and even ...

This book collects seventeen essays published between 1984 and 2020, in which Marina Sbisà develops her distinctive approach to speech acts and related pragmatic phenomena. Drawing inspiration from the work of J. L. Austin, the essays examine the categories of speech act theory and apply these categories in the context of natural discourse and conversation, with the aim of providing an accurate analysis of how speech can be action. Sbisà devotes particular attention to normative aspects of language and language (...) use: speech acts reshape the normative context in which they occur by assigning or unassigning deontic properties to relevant parties. Emphasis is placed on the normative aspect of linguistically mandated presuppositions as well as the rational grounds of implicature. The conventionalist view of speech acts developed here turns on the role of intersubjective agreement in deontic updating, in a framework that shifts focus from single utterances to discursive sequences and conversational interaction. This view challenges the main tenets of a Gricean intentionalist understanding of speech act performance, paving the way for a theory of speech actions centred on the normatively transformative power of illocution. Throughout the essays, examples and applications are given to illustrate how the view put forward contributes to understanding the social and political dimensions of linguistic activity, such as hidden persuasive strategies, power imbalances both within and outside the context of conversation, and the relevance of language and discourse to gender issues. (shrink)

The received picture of rationality, nowadays in trouble, is contrasted with the "argumentative" conception, inspired by Paul Grice's proposal to define rationality as an agent's desire that his or her moves are supported by reasons and a capacity to satisfy that desire at least to some extent. Some implications of the argumentative conception of rationality are unfolded: it involves a first-person perspective, requires criteria for the attribution of the capacity to justify one's moves, and allows for failures to behave or (...) think rationally. Attribution of argumentative rationality to a human being does not follow from final evidence, but , coincides with the acknowledgement of personhood, which in turn, being at least to some extent a matter of choice, is revealed to be an ethical task. So the argumentative conception of rationality may help us see why it still make sense to think of man as a rational being. (shrink)

Austin rejected the objectification of “meanings” and was also critical of the identification of meaning with truth-conditions. Much of his work appears to be inspired by a conception of meaning as use. In particular, apparently at least, his “performative utterances” are utterances whose understanding amounts to the understanding of their use. But Austin did not endorse the tendency, common in Ordinary Language Philosophy, to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use alone. His distinction between locutionary meaning (...) and illocutionary force was designed to avoid such a reduction. But it is unclear whether speech act theory can escape paying the price of a new objectification of meaning. (shrink)

The paper outlines an analysis of the act of commenting within the author’s Austin-inspired speech-act theoretical framework. The general lines of that framework are concisely expounded, and it is suggested that the act of commenting should be described as belonging to Austin’s Expositives. The preliminary problem whether the act of commenting is illocutionary at all (given the absence of a performative use of the verb “to comment”) is discussed, and it is argued that nothing stands in the way of analyzing (...) it as illocutionary. Some difficulties that can be found in dealing with commenting as an illocutionary act, concerning the variable linguistic form and the diversity of functions of the utterances that can be taken to be comments, are illustrated and discussed within the theoretical framework adopted. The characterization of commenting as having (among others) also a specifically expositive illocutionary effect is illustrated. Finally, some open problems worthy of further discussion are highlighted. (shrink)

This paper argues for a reorientation of speech act theory towards an Austin-inspired conception of speech acts as context-changing social actions. After an overview of the role assigned to context by Austin, Searle, and other authors in pragmatics, it is argued that the context of a speech act should be considered as constructed as opposed to merely given, limited as opposed to extensible in any direction, and objective as opposed to cognitive. The compatibility of such claims with each other is (...) discussed. Finally, the context-changing role of speech acts is analyzed differentiating between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary dimension. (shrink)

On the one hand, Austin appreciates truth as the aim not only of science, but also of philosophy. On the other hand, truth in his works is demythized, contextualized, or even relativized. I analyze this ambivalence by considering some aspects of Austin’s thought which may appear close to pragmatism: his claims that the bearer of truth is assertion as a speech act, that speech acts are to be assessed as felicitous and infelicitous before being assessed as true or false, and (...) that the truth/falsity judgment is concerned with assertions in their contexts, including the participants’ goals and knowledge. These claims are, however, argued for in full coherence with a corrispondentist conception of truth. At a closer examination, Austin’s conception of truth appears to be an independent, “heretic” development of that of Frege. In taking distance from Frege, albeit on a Fregean basis, Austin went some length in the direction in which pragmatists too had gone, without actually sharing any properly pragmatist assumption. (shrink)

This paper argues that understanding speech in terms of action requires dispensing with propositions. Austin's outline of speech act theory did not give any role to propositions, which were introduced into speech act theory later on, in order to cope with criticism leveled by Strawson and Searle at Austin's characterization of the locutionary act and his view of the truth/falsity assessment. The introduction of propositions had weakening effects on the claim that speech is action, foregrounding again the received picture of (...) linguistic communication. I show that, in order to make sense of Austin's characterization of the locutionary act, propositions are not needed and give some suggestions as to how one could give an account of the truth/falsity assessment, compatible with the claim that speech is action, without resorting to propositions. (shrink)

Considering data concerning the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, I reflect on how it is that discrimination of individuals or of categories of people can take place in this discipline, and on what approaches can be adopted to analyse and contrast the discrimination of women in particular. I consider Louise Antony’s distinction between two different approaches: “Different Voices”, according to which women are discriminated in philosophy because of their difference, and “Perfect Storm”, according to which such discrimination is caused by (...) a combination of independent factors. Accepting Antony’s criticism of the Different Voices approach, I offer a few considerations that hope to supplement the Perfect Storm approach by showing how the factors that combine to cause the discrimination of women in philosophy are interconnected. In so doing, I discuss the normative role of gender stereotypes, the role of care-giving in society and its place in our value system, and women’s difficult path towards the indispensable condition of being autonomous subjects and agents. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the status of argumentative discourse. We argue that argumentation can contribute to instances of different discourse genres, regardless of whether it is functional to their purposes. By analyzing examples from the daily press in the light of an approach to discourse analysis inspired by pragmatics, we show that also texts that are not expected to be argumentative have underlying argumentative structures and that a text’s being argumentative is a matter of degree: the (...) understanding of underlying argumentative structures contributes to a varying extent to the understanding of what a text as a whole means and of its point in the speech situation. This role of argumentative structures in text understanding suggests considering argumentation as a cognitively-based dimension of discourse, connected to human rationality. (shrink)

The chapter aims to provide the theoretical background that is necessary to understand the research questions addressed by the chapters in this collection. We identify and discuss the key claims grounding Sbisà’s deontic approach to speech actions, while locating her contribution within the broader literature on speech acts and their nature. In particular, we focus on her distinctive Austinian-inspired understanding of the conventionality of illocutionary acts, their core effects, and the role of presupposition accommodation in force assignment. We close with (...) an outline of the collection’s structure and contents. (shrink)

White lies, lies that are beneficial to the addressee and uttered out of concern for them, are pervasive in daily life. This raises a prima facie question: if white lies are so common, are they still lies? I tackle this question from the perspective of speech act theory, using the case of white lies to shed light on the broader question of whether lying itself can be considered a type of speech act. Adopting Sbisà’s (Uptake and Conventionality in Illocution. Lodz (...) Papers in Pragmatics 5 33–52. Reprinted in Marina Sbisà (forthcoming), Essays on Speech Acts and Other Topics in Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) neo-Austinian approach that places the emphasis on the achievement of certain conventional effects, I claim that malicious lying cannot be a type of speech act. However, white lies are a type of speech act, a claim which finds support in three types of evidence: the conventionality of means by which white lies are performed, their online processing, and their acquisition. Moreover, the existence of a continuum between white (harmless) lies (which are a type of speech act) and malicious (harmful) lies (which are not) suggests that whether an utterance performs a certain type of speech act or not can be a matter of degree. In other words, the property itself of being a speech act of a certain kind, an utterance’s speech-act-hood, so to speak, may be graded. This is an interesting result, which applies to speech acts more generally, beyond lying. (shrink)

The volume provides a thorough look into Marina Sbisà’s distinctive, Austinian-inspired approach to speech acts. By gathering original essays from a world-class lineup of philosophers of language, linguists, social epistemologists, action theorists, and communication scholars, the collection provides the first comprehensive critical treatment of Sbisa’s outstanding contribution to speech act theory.

Midway through How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays (...) an instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of How to Do Things With Words is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction. (shrink)

Marina Sbisà’s remarks on illocutionary pluralism suggest but do not constitute a full-blown theory. In this chapter I discuss two different attempts to build on those remarks. The first, illocutionary relativism, is my own attempt to develop the ideas presented in Sbisà’s remarks. The second, from Marcin Lewiński, differs in important ways. I then briefly compare these two varieties of illocutionary pluralism.

Marina Sbisà has long advocated that we think of the illocutionary force of a speech act in terms of the act’s (predictable) systematic effects on the normative relationship between a speaker and her audience. Building on this idea, I argue that the hypothesis of distinctive speech act norms can be used to explain how participants in a conversation coordinate the normative expectations they have of one another in conversation. Such an explanation earns its keep by explaining how speakers render (...) themselves illocutionarily intelligible to their audiences—thereby enabling us to articulate the sense of mutuality that characterizes speech exchanges. One important upshot of my reflections is that we should reject both Austin’s thesis that the successful performance of an illocutionary act depends on audience uptake and Sbisà’s claim that Austin’s thesis is required if we are to make sense of the illocutionary dimension of speech in terms of an act’s systematic effects on participants’ normative expectations of one another. (shrink)

Drawing on work from Marina Sbisà’s “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition” (1999), Rae Langton has developed a powerful account of the subtle mechanisms through which hate speech and propaganda spread. However, this model has a serious limitation: it focuses too strongly on individual speech acts isolated from their wider context, rendering its applicability to a broader range of cases suspect. In this chapter, I consider the limits of presupposition accommodation to clarify the audience’s role in helping hate (...) speakers, and claim the necessary mechanisms are much more active and social than Langton suggests, with effects not capturable in the analysis of isolated speech acts. I revisit Sbisà’s work on presupposition and develop an alternative model that (1) improves upon the Langtonian model for explaining the power of hate propaganda, and (2) is more in line with Sbisà’s original approach to ideology and the normative aspects of presupposition. (shrink)

In articles such as “Speech Acts without Propositions?” (2006), Marina Sbisà advocates a “strong” conception of speech acts as means by which speakers modify their own and others’ deontic statuses, including their rights, obligations, and commitments. On this basis Sbisà challenges an influential approach to speech acts as typically if not universally possessing propositional contents. Sbisà argues that such an approach leads to viewing speech acts as primarily aimed at communicating propositional attitudes rather than carrying out socially and normatively (...) significant action. For this reason she advocates eschewing propositions from speech act theory’s conceptual toolkit; she also proposes a liberalization of the distinction between illocutionary force and semantic content, which are widely thought to be mutually exclusive. In this chapter we examine Sbisà’s reasoning and argue that while it does justify denying propositional attitudes a central role in communication, it does not justify dispensing with propositions or other contents in our theorizing about speech acts. In addition, we endorse Sbisà’s proposal for liberalizing the force/content distinction, and show a variety of ways in which force indicators may also possess semantic content. (shrink)

Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions embraces papers focused on the performative dimension of language. While all texts in the volume recognize speech primarily as a type of action, the collection is indicative of the multifaceted nature of J.L. Austin’s original reflection, which invited many varied research programmes. The problems addressed in the volume are discussed with reference to data culled from natural conversation, mediated political discourse, law, and literary language, and include normativity, e.g. types of norms operative in speech (...) acts, speaker’s intentions and commitments, speaker-addressee coordination, but also speech actions in discursive practice, in literal and non-literal language, performance of irony, presupposition, and meaningful significant silence. -/- Contributors are: Brian Ball, Cristina Corredor, Anita Fetzer, Milada Hirschová, Dennis Kurzon, Marcin Matczak, Marina Sbisà, Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Maciej Witek, and Mateusz Włodarczyk. (shrink)

The debate about the determination of the illocutionary force of a speech act revolves around the notion of uptake and the role played by the audience: many scholars consider the hearer’s recognition of the force of the locution a necessary condition for the performance of an illocution. A variety of theories has been put forward. According to Langton (Philosophy and Public Affairs 22: 293–330, 1993), the hearer’s uptake determines whether a successful act has been performed. According to Kukla (Hypatia 29(2): (...) 440–457, 2014), the hearer’s uptake constitutes the nature of the act performed. According to McDonald (The Philosophical Quarterly 72(4), 918–939, 2022), the illocutionary force of a speech act is the result of a process of negotiation between hearer and speaker. Drawing on the theoretical tools provided by Marina Sbisà’s work, I will show how the theories giving the audience a central role in fixing the illocutionary force of a speech act fall short. The topic proves relevant not only for theoretical reasons, but also for social and political ones. In particular, it has a bearing on debates about pragmatic phenomena of illocutionary distortion such as discursive injustice and silencing, where marginalized speakers have trouble performing particular speech acts they are entitled to perform. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to use Marina Sbisà’s idea of interactional negotiation to consider what it is for conversing agents to follow illocutionary conventions or, as John L. Austin would put it, what it is for an illocutionary act to be done as conforming to a convention. The chapter is organized into two parts. In the first one, I use the Austinian notions of uptake and response as well as the Lewisian concept of accommodation to discuss a (...) few examples of force negotiation and develop a model of its underlying mechanisms. In the second part, I suggest that interactional negotiation plays a key role in the functioning of all language conventions—phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, etc.—construed along the Millikanian lines, i.e., as families or lineages of linguistic precedents. My contention is that the ideas I propose in this chapter are compatible with Sbisà’s theory of speech acts and can be regarded as its possible extension. (shrink)

The ability to sequence individual genomes is leading to the identification of an increasing number of genetic risk factors for serious diseases. Knowledge of these risk factors can often provide significant medical and psychological benefit, but also raises complex ethical and social issues. This paper focuses on one area of rapid progress: the identification of mutations causing long QT syndrome and other cardiac channel disorders, which can explain some previously unexplained deaths in infants (SIDS) and children and adults (SUDS) and (...) prevent others from occurring. This genetic knowledge, discovered posthumously in many cases, has implications for clinical care for surviving family members who might carry the same mutations. The information obtained from genetic testing, in the context of personal and family history, can guide individually tailored interventions that reduce risk and save lives. At the same time, obtaining and disclosing genetic information raises difficult issues about confidentiality and decision making within families. We draw on the experience of the Montefiore-Einstein Center for Cardiogenetics, which has played a leading role in the genetic diagnosis and clinical management of cardiac channel diseases, to explore some of the challenging ethical questions arising in affected families with adolescent children. We focus on the related issues of (1) family confidentiality, privacy and disclosure and (2) adolescent decision making about genetic risk, and argue for the value of interdisciplinary dialogue with affected families in resolving these issues. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how different aspects of aesthetic theory can be utilized in education so as to contribute to a workable, coherent, and multifaceted arts integration approach in elementary education. The authors begin by presenting specific aspects of aesthetic theory as indicative of the basic theoretical and philosophical approaches to the phenomenon of art. They then refer to examples of activities designed on the basis of these different aesthetic aspects, and finally, they present the findings (...) that came out of these activities’ pilot implementations in preschool and school classrooms. Based on the methodological analysis of these implementations, the authors examine the benefits of the activities deriving from each of the different aspects of aesthetic theory; how they differ depending on the aspect from which they arise; and how the implementation of these types of activities as multi-theoretical sets can reveal a new way to design a coherent and multifaceted arts integration curriculum. What the authors attempt to do is show that the variety of approaches to the definition of art and the analysis of aesthetics can be the touchstones for organizing arts integration in elementary education. (shrink)

El artículo propone indagar cómo los sujetos se vinculan con lo cultural a través de prácticas y consumos que están inscriptas en diversos vínculos de sociabilidad —que recomiendan, llevan, acompañan— y que se combinan y entrelazan para conformar repertorios culturales complejos. Esta indagación fue desplegada a través de una reconstrucción de biografías culturales que se basó en la realización de entrevistas semi-estructuradas con un conjunto de sujetos que fuimos definiendo a través de los criterios del muestreo teórico. Del conjunto de (...) entrevistados, seleccionamos algunos casos que nos permitían construir perfiles de practicantes culturales. El desarrollo concluye con una caracterización de las prácticas culturales registradas como “sociales”, “reflexivas” e “interconectadas”, y apunta a describir un proceso emergente de singularización de las trayectorias culturales de los sujetos y de constitución de perfiles de gusto plurales y heterogéneos. (shrink)

Una cultura política orientada al entendimiento y la paz requiere, sostendré, no sólo que se tengan las disposiciones correctas, sino, ante todo, la convicción de que incluso nuestras disposiciones morales se encuentran enraizadas en la razón y la reflexión. Bajo este punto de vista, el cultivo de una cultura política respetuosa del otro y sensata supone que tanto la sociedad como sus instituciones ya han contribuido a un clima moral deliberativo, uno que no cree simplemente que la moral es sólo (...) el resultado de poseer la psicología o sensibilidad correctas, sino que sostiene que la moral debe ser promovida en la discusión pública y reflexiva. Por esta razón, en mi artículo examino y rechazo algunas fundamentaciones de la moral que separan demasiado tajantemente la razón del sentido moral. Examino la así llamada posición “internalista”, cuya figura más prominente fue Bernard Williams, y la confronto con una postura que admite una mayor participación de la deliberación racional en las decisiones morales, en particular en aquellas que conciernen la elección de principios de justicia. Sostengo que el internalismo moral sólo sirve a una teoría política que reduce la razón humana a la mera voluntad de poder. (shrink)

This article presents an interdisciplinary analysis of the glamorization of the courtesan image as proposed by Baz Luhrmann’s film Moulin Rouge. The film sparked the appearance of high-street fashion inspired by the image of the 19th-century Parisian courtesan, which prompted the authors to examine how and why such images might appeal to female consumers. The critical analysis reaches beyond the images themselves to identify and discuss the modes of circulation of such images, and their function in achieving both the material (...) ends of capitalism and the promotion of one of the system’s core values. Moreover, the article hopes to illustrate the possibilities offered by integrating cultural and structural analyses of current social phenomena. (shrink)

This is a review of the book Mozg - kultura - socium. Kantianskaya programma v cognitivnykh issledovaniyakh by Bazhanov V.A. The author`s main aim is a reconsideration of some fundamental principles of epistemology and philosophy of science in the light of state-of-the-art advancements of neurosciences. According to the author of the book, social and cultural revolution in neurosciences has been crucially modifying the initial Kantian program of consciousness research and the modes of linguistic representation of its results. In particular, in (...) epistemology the universal concept of transcendental subject has been altered with regard to neurobiological and social data, which concern some preconditions of cognitive activity. In philosophy of science such a shift of research perspective allows to implement a naturalistic interpretation of natural sciences, clarifies the problem of empirical foundations of mathematics and sheds a new light on the problem of apriori elements of mathematical thought. The analysis of evolutionary and neurobiological preconditions of logical thought leads to the sort of revival of psychologism program in logic, which enables author to put forward an original interpretation of the problem of plurality of logical systems. Finally, some topics of social sciences as well as problems of genesis of art, ethical and religious systems, can acquire new interpretation with respect to modern investigations in cognitive science. (shrink)

Interest in Japanese language, and consequently the number of students of the Japanese language is constantly growing, both globally, and on the national level. Pula University undergraduate study program of Japanese Language and Culture and graduate program of Japanese studies with Japanese Language Teaching module, the first accredited Japanese study programs in Croatia, open up the possibility of introducing the subject curriculum of the Japanese language in secondary schools in the Republic of Croatia. Creation of educated teaching staff and the (...) publication of Japanese language textbooks in Croatian are important prerequisites for teaching in secondary schools, as the results of surveys in secondary schools and the number of students enrolled in Japanese study program indicate a great interest in this language. The aim of this paper is to develop a proposal for a subject curriculum of the Japanese language for secondary schools in the Republic of Croatia with content and structure based on an analysis of existing Japanese language curricula of foreign countries (the curricula of Germany, Serbia, Canada, and Ireland) and on the foreign language subject curricula of the Republic of Croatia (French, Serbian, Greek and Latin). The proposal presents parts of the elaborated learning outcomes and suggests selected topics and language content for two classes of secondary schools. In addition, cross‑subject topics correlated with Japanese language were also listed. (shrink)

: The concepts of intention and intentionality were particularly significant notions within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic medieval philosophical traditions, and they regained philosophical importance in the twentieth century. The theories of intention and intentionality of the medieval Islamic philosopher and physician Ibn Sina and the phenomenological philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl are examined, compared, and contrasted here, showing that Ibn Sina's conception of intention is naturalistic and, in its naturalism, is influenced by the medical professional culture to which Ibn (...) Sina belonged. As well, Husserl's anti-naturalistic conception of intentionality is influenced by his background as a mathematician and by his desire to ground mathematics and the empirical sciences in a truly scientific philosophy. In conclusion, an argument is presented for the superiority of the Husserlian transcendentalist account of intentionality over the Avicennian naturalistic account, on the grounds that the latter falls prey to psychologism and reductionism, the two specters that according to Husserl must haunt all naturalistic accounts of consciousness. (shrink)