The originality of Leibniz’s ontology rests on the fact that his legal philosophy consists of a great philosophical synthesis of legal humanism. As far as the question of delimiting the legal domain is concerned, “legal science” is actually ubiquitous in Leibniz’s metaphysical edifice: its omnipresence is evident not only when law and justice are referred to, but also in relation to the arguments on normative order. In our view, in Leibniz legal science does not constitute an autonomous field, clearly separated (...) from other branches of the humanities. By its very subject –the order of legal rules as “truths”– legal science is inscribed perfectly in the idea according to which the subject of scholarly demonstration is truth. By virtue of this theory, Leibniz determines the elements of a legal system that exist as positive, and natural law as contingent (or historical) and eternal truths. We believe this theory of legal norms showcases the characteristics of a “hyletic” ontology. Leibniz’s doctrine of natural law is indeed tantamount to a mass of truths deemed “necessary”, but deprived of obligatory force; this is unlike voluntarist ontology, according to which the rules of law are equivalent to the commands of a hierarchically superior sovereign. One of the most interesting challenges in Leibniz legal scholarship lies in displaying the harmony between the rational legal system and the irrational perplexities. (shrink)