The article takes up the difficult problem of the so-called disobedience of judges against the background of the experiences of the Polish departure from constitutional democracy in 2015–2020. The special role and responsibility of a judge in the state imposes restrictions on her freedom of opinion in the public sphere. Openly manifesting opposition to government policy, which in the case of an ordinary citizen is only the implementation of human rights and freedoms, may be described as controversial and contrary to (...) applicable ethical regulations. The main thesis of this paper is the assertion that although judges who act as impartial arbitrators in disputes should generally refrain from ostentatiously opposing the actions of political authorities, they are not deprived of the possibility of protest. Also in the exercise of office, and not outside the sphere of their duties, judges should take into account overriding moral values that should be implemented by the legal order, and not the values or declarations guiding the government policies. The integrity of the judge, which prescribes restraint in statements and actions in the public sphere, as well as the care for the dignity of the office held, should not be confused with absolute subordination to the legislature or the executive, even if the judge is obliged to apply the law. The traditional attitude of the members of the judiciary, consisting in focusing only on the application of the law in individual cases and the lack of any political involvement, is being reviewed in the face of the spread of majoritarianism and the law abuse as normal techniques of exercising public authority. The disobedience of judges—although difficult to defend at first sight—may seem to be the only possible way to draw public attention to the corruption of the state system. The ‘disobediant’ judges can even be assigned the role of ‘whistleblowers’, which should help to ease their legal liability or their future rehabilitation. (shrink)

In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the “strength” of various truth theories which are conservative over $$ PA $$. Let $${\mathfrak {Th}}$$ denote the class of models of $$ PA $$ which admit an expansion to a model of theory $${ Th}$$. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that $$\begin{aligned} {{\mathfrak {PA}}}\supset {\mathfrak {TB}}\supset {{\mathfrak {RS}}}\supset {\mathfrak {UTB}}\supseteq \mathfrak {CT^-}, \end{aligned}$$ where $${\mathfrak {PA}}$$ denotes simply the class of all models of (...) $$ PA $$ and $${\mathfrak {RS}}$$ denotes the class of recursively saturated models of $$ PA $$. Our main original result is that every model of $$ PA $$ which admits an expansion to a model of $$ CT ^-$$, admits also an expansion to a model of $$ UTB $$. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results (brought to us by Carlo Nicolai) we conclude that $$ UTB $$ is not relatively interpretable in $$ TB $$, thus answering the question from Fujimoto (Bull Symb Log 16:305–344, 2010). (shrink)

Branching is a set-theoretical model of reality that is in accord with contemporary physics. This structure is also a model for some logical calculi. However, if the formal language defined on the basis of branching is to correspond to our ways of speaking about possible events, a number of issues must be clarified. All of them are connected with the notion of possibility that is employed in this language. Yet the apparent need to supplement this language with an additional notion (...) of possibility means that branching ceases to be attractive as a candidate for a model of physical reality, as it contains considerably more elements than we would like to see in reality. Thus, the connection between this logical tool and ontology becomes questionable. (shrink)

The technological, economic and political advances of the 20th and 21st centuries have established new conditions for the development of civilization. The world economy has simultaneously expanded (the number of states/organization participating in world trade or the volume of heterogeneous transactions) and shrunk (close interrelations between transactions, no matter their geographic origins). Economic policy has gained an indispensable role in the creation of order in international relations and foreign policy. The tendency to prioritize foreign policy aims towards economic policy aims (...) has resulted in ‘reverse flow’, i.e. foreign policy has become a central part of national economic policy. The engagement of external action services and public budget in economic promotion and investments triggers (inter alia) the ethics dilemma. The mentioned ethical aspect is often omitted when discussing ‘the economic foreign policy’. For instance, the ethics dilemma can appear when development and humanitarian aid are taken into account or when it comes to assessing the results (and membership) of economic missions. In this context, the author analyses the Polish foreign policy example and attempts to answer two questions. First, are the economic activities performed by external action services effective? Second, are the mentioned activities in accordance with the social ethical code of conduct? The author focuses on three elements – development and humanitarian aid, the participation of Polish diplomats in economic promotion, and economic missions. (shrink)

This book aims to present trompe-l'oeil painting as an ambigous aesthetic ideal offered by early modern theory of art. It embodies the idea of an image identical to what it represents. It is interpreted in terms of perceptual and aesthetic illusion, mimesis, diegesis, play, irony and scientific illustration.

Angela of Foligno was certainly born in the middle of the 13th century, in a rich family. Most scholars accept, at least to a certain extent, a more exact chronology of her life, proposed by Martin-Jean Ferré.1 According to him, Angela, born in 1248, experienced a conversion in 1285 and lost her entire family – husband, children, and mother – in a few subsequent years. In this time she also sold all of her possessions. At the beginning of 1291 she (...) entered the Third Order of St. Francis and went on a pilgrimage to Assisi, during which she experienced powerful mystical graces, hearing the voice of the Holy Spirit and conversing with him almost the whole way. During her stay in Assisi, she caused a scandal, screaming... (shrink)

Celem niniejszego tekstu jest eksplikacja głównych ontologicznych założeń leżących u podstaw fenomenologii Martina Heideggera i Jeana-Paula Sartre’a. W pierwszej części zostało nakreślone pojmowanie fenomenu w horyzoncie pytania o Heideggerowskie Sein i Sartre’owskie être. Z kolei część druga umieszcza w tym samym horyzoncie zagadnienia istoty i szeroko ujmowanej zrozumiałości. W toku analiz w projekcie francuskiego filozofa została wyodrębniona sfera fenomenalna i metafizyczna, które następnie są zestawione z poziomem ontycznym i ontologicznym, obszarami, które wyłaniają się w myśli niemieckiego fenomenologa dzięki wypracowaniu różnicy (...) ontologicznej. Wniosek, który płynie z prezentowanego artykułu, zamyka się w konstatacji, że rdzeniem rzeczywistości pozostaje dla Sartre’a absurdalny, lokujący się poza fenomenem i zrozumiałością (oraz całkowicie od nich niezależny) metafizyczny grunt, podczas gdy według Heideggera jądro rzeczywistości stanowi pre-fenomenalne (nie poza-fenomenalne) źródło sensu, „będące” i dziejące się tylko poprzez dynamikę fenomenu i zrozumiałości. (shrink)

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds (...) to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. (shrink)

The main aim of our paper was to present three formal tools for comparing various axiomatic theories of truth. In Section 2 we aimed at showing that there are indeed many different approaches to defining a set of axioms for the notion of truth. In Section 3 we introduced three different \measures of strength" of axiomatic theories of truth, i.e. three reflexive and transitive relations on the set of axiomatic theories of truth. We have explained the intuition behind each of (...) them. The three relations were called : Fujimoto definability, model-theoretical strength, proof-theoretical strength. Then in the last section we described how they order the truth theories introduced in Section 2. We observed that theories made equivalent by the coarser relation can be strictly ordered by the next one. (shrink)

The current paper studies the formal properties of the Global Reflection Principle, to wit the assertion “All theorems of$\mathrm {Th}$are true,” where$\mathrm {Th}$is a theory in the language of arithmetic and the truth predicate satisfies the usual Tarskian inductive conditions for formulae in the language of arithmetic. We fix the gap in Kotlarski’s proof from [15], showing that the Global Reflection Principle for Peano Arithmetic is provable in the theory of compositional truth with bounded induction only ($\mathrm {CT}_0$). Furthermore, we (...) extend the above result showing that$\Sigma _1$-uniform reflection over a theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals ($\mathrm {UTB}^-$) is provable in$\mathrm {CT}_0$, thus answering the question of Beklemishev and Pakhomov [2]. Finally, we introduce the notion of a prolongable satisfaction class and use it to study the structure of models of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. In particular, we provide a new model-theoretical characterization of theories of finite iterations of uniform reflection and present a new proof characterizing the arithmetical consequences of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. (shrink)

The book presents a critical overview of Peirce's views on modern nominalism and offers a novel approach to the social-anthropological underpinnings of his realism, especially Pragmatic Realism vis à vis the individualist tendencies in modern thought.

This essay focuses on A Brief Response on the Controversies over Shangdi, Tianshen and Linghun by Niccolò Longobardo (1559–1654), a text that played a crucial role in the formation of European understanding of Chinese philosophy. Taken historically, the text is an important vehicle for the transmission of Chinese concepts into early modern European philosophy as well as a key intervention in the debate shaping the ideological premises of the Jesuit mission in China. It contains one of the first systematic accounts (...) of Chinese philosophy written by a European author. More importantly, it presents a narrative that links Mediterranean and Chinese intellectual history into a single historical current. In this way Longobardo plays a role analogous to the mapmaker who distorts three-dimensional spaces in order to project them together onto a two-dimensional plane. We present some of the peculiar shifts and emphases made by Longobardo in his reading of what seems to him a transhistorical current linking the Chinese and ancient Mediterranean philosophical milieus. In particular, we examine (1) the relationship between Longobardo’s attempt to situate Chinese thought in a global context and the choice to place special emphasis on the philosophy of Shao Yong 邵雍, treating him as a figure of primary importance among Song 宋 Neo-Confucian authors, and (2) the focus on the monist and cosmogonic aspects of Chinese thought, summarized by the “ten thousand things forming one body” (wanwuyiti 萬物一體) “axiom.”. (shrink)

In consequence of significant social, political, economic, and demographic changes several wildlife species are currently growing in numbers and recolonizing Europe. While this is rightly hailed as a success of the environmental movement, the return of wildlife brings its own issues. As the animals arrive in the places we inhabit, we are learning anew that life with wild nature is not easy, especially when the accumulated cultural knowledge and experience pertaining to such coexistence have been all but lost. This book (...) provides a hermeneutic study of the ways we come to understand the troubling impacts of wildlife by exploring and critically discussing the meanings of 'ecological discomforts'. Thus, it begins the work of rebuilding the culture of coexistence. The cases presented in this book range from crocodile attacks to mice infestations, and their analysis consequently builds up an ethics that sees wildlife as active participants in the shaping of human moral and existential reality. This book is of interest not only to environmental philosophers, who will find here an original contribution to the established ethical discussions, but also to wildlife managers, and even to those members of the public who themselves struggle to make sense of encounters with their new wild neighbors. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the famous The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude by Étienne de La Boétie. The author considers the theoretical premises underlying the concept of “voluntary servitude”, juxtaposing them with two modern concepts of will developed by Descartes and Pascal. An important feature of La Boétie’s project is the political and therefore intersubjective – as opposed to the individualistic perspective of Descartes and Pascal – starting point. It is therefore situated against the background of, on the one hand, (...) the historical evolution of early modern states and, on the other hand – of the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Hobbes. (shrink)

-/- Medytacje filozoficzne, Fundacja na Rzecz Myślenia im. Barbary Skargi, Warszawa 2015. -/- Publikacja współfinansowana przez Muzeum Łazienki Królewskie w Warszawie. -/- Zbiór tekstów powstałych na podstawie wykładów, które zostały wygłoszone w ramach cyklu "Medytacje filozoficzne w Łazienkach" w latach 2013-2015. -/- -/- Spis treści: -/- Cezary Wodziński, Premedytacja Krzysztof Pomian, O wyjątkowości człowieka Zygmunt Bauman, O miłości i nienawiści… Tropami Barbary Skargi Tadeusz Sławek, Ciemne liturgie. Język, historia i gest błogosławieństwa Lech Witkowski, Rozprawa z autorytetem: w strone autorytu przejścia (...) Władysław Stróżewski, Doświadczenie czasu, doświadczenie istnienia Juliusz Domański, „Pradawna waśń filozofów z poetami” a kłopoty z dziedzictwem antycznym Serhij Żadan, Wolność jako odpowiedzialność Marcin Poręba, Co to jest rzeczywistość? Szymon Wróbel, Co to jest historia filozofii? Magdalena Środa, Moralność życia publicznego Kostiantyn Tyszczenko, Po co językoznawstwu metateoria? (shrink)

Background: The number of cancer patients is constantly growing. Both WHO and IARC report that this number may reach up to 24 million new diagnosed cases in the next two decades. The proposed treatment and especially the diagnosis can have a significant impact on an individual's approach to the disease, as well as on the patient's quality of life.Objectives: The study aimed to assess the quality of life, feelings, and fear of cancer-treating oncological patients, before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.Material (...) and Methods: The study used the standardized WHOQOL quality of life questionnaire in a shortened version, the COVID-19 fear scale, and the AIS disease acceptance scale. The questionnaire survey was conducted among patients of cancer clinics. The study was conducted in two stages–before the COVID-19 pandemic and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Data from 450 correctly completed questionnaires were analyzed statistically. The obtained data were statistically processed using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U test.Results: Among the surveyed patients of the cancer clinic, the quality of life during the COVID-19 pandemic decreased by 2%, compared to the period before the pandemic. The frequency of negative feelings associated with cancer increased during the COVID-19 pandemic–by 11% more men, and 4.4% of women determined the frequency of negative feelings to be 2–3 times a week. The level of fear associated with COVID-19 was moderate, with women having a higher level of fear.Conclusion: The development of the epidemic is very important in terms of public health. COVID-19 should be considered as one of the factors that bring about sudden changes in the mental health of the population, which may result from the dynamic development of this disease, dramatic media coverage, and own experiences. It has been shown that the sudden appearance of such a large stressor causes a decrease in patients' quality of life and an increase in negative feelings associated with chronic disease. (shrink)

In this review-paper, I focus on biopsychological foundations of geometric cognition. Starting from the Kant’s views on mathematics, I attempt to show that contemporary cognitive scientists, alike the famous philosopher, recognize mutual relationships of visuospatial processing and geometric cognition. What I defend is a claim that Tinbergen’s explanatory questions are the most fruitful tool for explaining our “hardwired,” and thus shared with other animals, Euclidean intuitions, which manifest themselves in spatial navigation and shape recognition. I claim, however, that these “hardwired (...) intuitions” cannot capture full-blooded Euclidean geometry, which demands practice with cultural artifacts in various time-scales. (shrink)

This paper discusses main issues concerning Toulmin’s theory of evolutionary development of scientific knowledge. The reconstruction of Toulmin’s assumptions, which underlie the theory, and the presentation of the theory itself, is followed by the analysis of the difficulties of the conception in general. The author tries to show that these difficulties consist primarily in the discrepancy between what Toulmin aimed at and what he actually achieved. The problem is that although incorporating the means of Darwin’s theory may itself be — (...) in the context of describing the growth of scientifi c knowledge — justifi able, it is not consistent with Toulmin’s demand for the rationality of science. The purpose of creating the evolutionary theory was, as Toulmin claimed, to give an account of the development of scientific knowledge which would be non-relativistic and rationalistic. However, this purpose is, as the author argues, not achievable on the grounds of Toulmin’s accounts of rationality. Key words S. TOULMIN, SCIENCE, EVOLUTION. (shrink)

Due to the famous methodenstreit it is often well argued that Menger’s approach to social sciences can be seen as anti-historical, as according to him pure empirical studies are insufficient to establish a firm economic theory. By suggesting that some theorems have to precede historical studies, Menger may be seen as a representative of the a priori tradition in scientific method. The modern method in the mainstream of economic thinking is also to a large extent anti-historical and a priori, but (...) because of its lack of realism and extensive reliance on very limiting assumptions. The main strength of the Mengerian anti-historical approach is lesser faith in imaginary constructs, implying a higher degree of realism in theorizing. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to develop a concept of _model uncertainty_ as opposed to the existing and well-established concept of model risk. Up to date the broad literature on probability not only developed complete probability systems, but also correctly noticed limitations of probability calculus. Despite the acknowledgement of such probability restrictions, drawbacks of modeling are often related to model risk. We present an argument here to distinguish a feature limiting models even further: model uncertainty. The tenets of (...) it already exist in the literature on probability, but were not properly emphasized while the idea of model risk was developed. Our plan it to start with a broad overview of the existing knowledge about probability in order to start with fundamental principles. From them we are deriving a new concept of model uncertainty. (shrink)

In this article I demonstrate that philosophy illuminated by the Linguistic Turn is no better suited to solve the epistemological problem of realism than was transcendental epistemology. The bulk of this paper concerns a polemic with Hintikka's vision of the relation between model-theoretic semantics and the epistemological problem of realism. In this polemic I argue for three points: (1) Hintikka's assumption that there is a fundamental opposition between two visions of language, the view of language as a medium of communication (...) and the view of it as a calculus, is mistaken. I demonstrate that the latter vision of language presupposes the former one, (2) Hintikka's argument for the thesis that the view of language as a medium of communication constitutes the common source of the troublesome thesis of ineffability of semantics and semantic universalism is faulty. I demonstrate that the source of both beliefs lies in the unwarranted assumption that logical semantics against Hintikka is that logical semantics should not be interpreted as a new tool for solving the old epistemological problem. (shrink)

I would like to identify a certain weakness which is characteristic, in my view, of the ‘critique of the model of representation’ or of the project of ‘overturning the hegemony of representation’, popular in philosophical circles inspired by Heidegger’s writings. According to Heidegger’s influential interpretation of modernity — which, by the way, is indebted to Hegelian philosophy of history — the logic of the development of modern thought is entirely subordinated to one idea: the idea of absolute domination of the (...) subject as the power of discursive representation. This interpretation provides a unified vision of the history of modernity as the history of increasing relativization of all aspects of reality to the subject and its capacity to represent and to form judgements. This unified picture of modernity constitutes the common point of reference and inspiration for many intellectual enterprises under the banner of deconstruction, hermeneutics, philosophy of difference, and the critique of Enlightenment. The same interpretation is explicitly or tacitly assumed in postmodernist accounts of contemporary culture, according to which our task as post-modern thinkers is to abandon, overthrow, and shatter the model of representation. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to prove that Wittgenstein's early philosophy considers two perspectives: the first one from the view of necessary logic and the second one from the view of contingent application of logic in the natural language. The application of logic is the matter of decisions outside the logical necessity - it is arbitrary and thus it can not be anticipated by logic and can not be considered by logical notation (concept-script). According to Wittgenstein 'logic must (...) take care of itself' and only the exclusion of the contingency from the logical notation let maintain the autonomy of logic. (shrink)

This article contributes to the discussion regarding the relationship between idealisation, de-idealisation and cognitive scientific progress. In this, I raise the question of the significance of the gradual de-idealisation procedure for constructing political science theories. I show that conceptions that assume the reversibility of the idealisation process can be an extremely useful theoretical perspective in reconstructions of political science modelling and analyses of scientific progress in political science. I base my position on the results of the methodological reconstruction of Richard (...) Jankowski’s theory of voting. My reconstruction and results of empirical studies show that by gradually removing simplifying assumptions, models can emerge that more accurately identify the determinants of the voting decision and the corresponding relationships. In the case I analysed, the transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained models likely demarcates the line of scientific progress. (shrink)

The notion of implicit commitment has played a prominent role in recent works in logic and philosophy of mathematics. Although implicit commitment is often associated with highly technical studies, it remains an elusive notion. In particular, it is often claimed that the acceptance of a mathematical theory implicitly commits one to the acceptance of a Uniform Reflection Principle for it. However, philosophers agree that a satisfactory analysis of the transition from a theory to its reflection principle is still lacking. We (...) provide an axiomatization of the minimal commitments implicit in the acceptance of a mathematical theory. The theory entails that the Uniform Reflection Principle is part of one’s implicit commitments, and sheds light on why this is so. We argue that the theory has significant epistemological consequences in that it explains how justified belief in the axioms of a theory can be preserved to the corresponding reflection principle. The theory also improves on recent analyses of implicit commitment based on truth or epistemic notions. (shrink)

The article concerns two axiom systems of Słupecki for the functionally complete three-valued propositional logic: W1–W6 and A1–A9. The article proves that both of them are inadequate—W1–W6 is semantically incomplete, on the other hand, A1–A9 governs a functionally incomplete calculus, and thus, it cannot be a semantically complete axiom system for the functionally complete three-valued logic.

A method of constructing Hilbert-type axiom systems for standard many-valued propositional logics was offered by Rosser and Turquette. Although this method is considered to be a solution of the problem of axiomatisability of a wide class of many-valued logics, the article demonstrates that it fails to produce adequate axiom systems. The article concerns finitely many-valued propositional logics of Łukasiewicz. It proves that if standard propositional connectives of the Rosser–Turquette axiom systems are definable in terms of the propositional connectives of Łukasiewicz’s (...) logics, and thus, they are normal ones, then every Rosser–Turquette axiom system for a finite-valued Łukasiewicz’s logic is semantically incomplete. (shrink)

Let ${\cal T}$ be any of the three canonical truth theories CT^− (compositional truth without extra induction), FS^− (Friedman–Sheard truth without extra induction), or KF^− (Kripke–Feferman truth without extra induction), where the base theory of ${\cal T}$ is PA. We establish the following theorem, which implies that ${\cal T}$ has no more than polynomial speed-up over PA. Theorem.${\cal T}$is feasibly reducible to PA, in the sense that there is a polynomial time computable function f such that for every ${\cal T}$-proof (...) π of an arithmetical sentence ϕ, f(π) is a PA-proof of ϕ. (shrink)

We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is arithmetically conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the (...) case of the induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate. (shrink)