This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian identity (...) of the knower with the known, as well as by grounding self-knowledge in the fact of the mind’s intimate presence to itself. Ultimately, self-knowledge appears to be an ‘objectless’ knowledge, a knowledge that the mind exists rather than knowledge of what the mind is. (shrink)

Angela of Foligno was certainly born in the middle of the 13th century, in a rich family. Most scholars accept, at least to a certain extent, a more exact chronology of her life, proposed by Martin-Jean Ferré.1 According to him, Angela, born in 1248, experienced a conversion in 1285 and lost her entire family – husband, children, and mother – in a few subsequent years. In this time she also sold all of her possessions. At the beginning of 1291 she (...) entered the Third Order of St. Francis and went on a pilgrimage to Assisi, during which she experienced powerful mystical graces, hearing the voice of the Holy Spirit and conversing with him almost the whole way. During her stay in Assisi, she caused a scandal, screaming... (shrink)

The paper explores the link between contemplation of the One and happiness in Plotinus and challenges the traditional interpretation according to which a contemplative or mystical experience of the One is by necessity brief and transitory, while the experience of Intellect can become a stable state in this life. Were it so, it would not serve as a ground for the good or happy life. In order to reconcile this point with Plotinus’s other claim about contemplation, his doctrine of the (...) double activity of Intellect is invoked. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity in Augustine’s conception of spiritual exercises. It focuses on the proem to the Confessions, where, in nuce, Augustine mentions many of the great themes of his work. The relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity in this section seems to be complex, dynamic, and far from “either / or,” a detail which confirms some trends in the recent literature. This article contributes to better understanding of Augustine’s spiritual exercises as well as to the (...) long-running dispute about the role played by Neoplatonism within Augustine’s Christian philosophy. (shrink)

The article examines the nature of the self in Plotinus’ philosophy and particularly what scholars have called the mobile or fluid self, as opposed to the static, hierarchical structure of the individual soul. This freely moving self, able to fall into the sensible realm and return to the One, is one of the most intriguing ideas of Plotinus. However, there seems to have been little attempt to locate this self within the Plotinian metaphysics and anthropology. In the paper it is (...) argued that the most probable metaphysical seat of this self is the transcendent, hypernoetic aspect of the intellect, due to its inchoate and potential nature as well as to its closeness to the One. (shrink)

Augustine converted to Christianity in 386 and described his conversion in his Confessiones a decade later. Much ink has been spilled concerning the question of the specific nature of Augustine’s conversion and the ‘historical accuracy’ of his description thereof 10 years later. The Confessiones seem to describe a volte face: he radically embraced Christianity. But to what kind of Christianity did he convert? We will readdress this question, not by investigating his conversion, but by a close exegesis of Confessiones 9, (...) in which he describes the so-called Ostia-ecstasy. In the first part of our article, we discuss the description of the latter experience in Confessiones 9 and situate it within his conversion narrative, with attention to the symbolical language he used. The second part compares the Ostia-experience with the ascent of the soul as described in Plotinus’ Enneads, and with similar ‘Neoplatonic ascents’ present in the Confessiones and in writings penned by Augustine prior to or simultaneous with the Confessiones in order to elucidate the relationship between Augustine’s ‘Christian’ conversion and ‘Ostia-ecstasy’ with the Neoplatonic anabasis. (shrink)

The current paper studies the formal properties of the Global Reflection Principle, to wit the assertion “All theorems of$\mathrm {Th}$are true,” where$\mathrm {Th}$is a theory in the language of arithmetic and the truth predicate satisfies the usual Tarskian inductive conditions for formulae in the language of arithmetic. We fix the gap in Kotlarski’s proof from [15], showing that the Global Reflection Principle for Peano Arithmetic is provable in the theory of compositional truth with bounded induction only ($\mathrm {CT}_0$). Furthermore, we (...) extend the above result showing that$\Sigma _1$-uniform reflection over a theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals ($\mathrm {UTB}^-$) is provable in$\mathrm {CT}_0$, thus answering the question of Beklemishev and Pakhomov [2]. Finally, we introduce the notion of a prolongable satisfaction class and use it to study the structure of models of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. In particular, we provide a new model-theoretical characterization of theories of finite iterations of uniform reflection and present a new proof characterizing the arithmetical consequences of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. (shrink)

Boolean connexive logic is an extension of Boolean logic that is closed under Modus Ponens and contains Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses. According to these theses a sentence cannot imply its negation and the negation of a sentence cannot imply the sentence; and if the antecedent implies the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the negation of the consequent and if the antecedent implies the negation of the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the consequent. Such a logic was first introduced (...) by Jarmużek and Malinowski, by means of so-called relating semantics and tableau systems. Subsequently its modal extension was determined by means of the combination of possible-worlds semantics and relating semantics. In the following article we present axiomatic systems of some basic and modal Boolean connexive logics. Proofs of completeness will be carried out using canonical models defined with respect to maximal consistent sets. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to suggest that one should think of gardens in terms of performances and not necessarily in terms of architecture, painting, or poetry, for it is possible to show that, strangely enough, gardens seem to share certain features with performance arts. Such an approach seems fruitful since it allows one both to grasp the fact that gardens combine culture and nature and to underline the role of the latter, which cannot be reduced to a sheer (...) medium as is traditionally done. The contention is that gardens should be treated more like a continuous, dynamic, partly planned process in which people can participate in different ways on a par with other non-human ‘actors’. Moreover, the category of performance seems to offer a useful framework helping to solve certain problems inherent in traditional ways of thinking about gardens. (shrink)

The notion of implicit commitment has played a prominent role in recent works in logic and philosophy of mathematics. Although implicit commitment is often associated with highly technical studies, it remains an elusive notion. In particular, it is often claimed that the acceptance of a mathematical theory implicitly commits one to the acceptance of a Uniform Reflection Principle for it. However, philosophers agree that a satisfactory analysis of the transition from a theory to its reflection principle is still lacking. We (...) provide an axiomatization of the minimal commitments implicit in the acceptance of a mathematical theory. The theory entails that the Uniform Reflection Principle is part of one’s implicit commitments, and sheds light on why this is so. We argue that the theory has significant epistemological consequences in that it explains how justified belief in the axioms of a theory can be preserved to the corresponding reflection principle. The theory also improves on recent analyses of implicit commitment based on truth or epistemic notions. (shrink)

In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the “strength” of various truth theories which are conservative over $$ PA $$. Let $${\mathfrak {Th}}$$ denote the class of models of $$ PA $$ which admit an expansion to a model of theory $${ Th}$$. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that $$\begin{aligned} {{\mathfrak {PA}}}\supset {\mathfrak {TB}}\supset {{\mathfrak {RS}}}\supset {\mathfrak {UTB}}\supseteq \mathfrak {CT^-}, \end{aligned}$$ where $${\mathfrak {PA}}$$ denotes simply the class of all models of (...) $$ PA $$ and $${\mathfrak {RS}}$$ denotes the class of recursively saturated models of $$ PA $$. Our main original result is that every model of $$ PA $$ which admits an expansion to a model of $$ CT ^-$$, admits also an expansion to a model of $$ UTB $$. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results (brought to us by Carlo Nicolai) we conclude that $$ UTB $$ is not relatively interpretable in $$ TB $$, thus answering the question from Fujimoto (Bull Symb Log 16:305–344, 2010). (shrink)

For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the (...) sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism. (shrink)

In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of (...) concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc. (shrink)

Although all the Western Balkan countries have been offered the prospect of European Union (EU) membership, the accession process still constitutes a complicated and multi-aspect challenge. EU support and engagement in the region have resulted in a few successes, nonetheless, describing them as major breakthroughs is far from the reality. Since the establishment of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, ending the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the Balkan states have not managed to accomplish their political, ideological and civic (...) transformations yet. However, the difficult situation and frequent negotiation stalemates are not only the outcomes of the unsatisfactory progress made by the Peninsular countries. Ambiguous and unethical (in some cases) behaviour can also be noticed from the EU decision-makers’ side. The following article aims to present concrete examples of EU external policy actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina which can be described as controversial. However, the author attempts to prove the thesis that unethical external policy is not always a zero-sum game, and in particular circumstances it can be paradoxically perceived as the best solution. Taking into consideration the comprehensiveness of the problem and editorial limitations, the analysis focuses on activities of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, who used to be (during four out of seven tenures) the EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (shrink)

This article contributes to the discussion regarding the relationship between idealisation, de-idealisation and cognitive scientific progress. In this, I raise the question of the significance of the gradual de-idealisation procedure for constructing political science theories. I show that conceptions that assume the reversibility of the idealisation process can be an extremely useful theoretical perspective in reconstructions of political science modelling and analyses of scientific progress in political science. I base my position on the results of the methodological reconstruction of Richard (...) Jankowski’s theory of voting. My reconstruction and results of empirical studies show that by gradually removing simplifying assumptions, models can emerge that more accurately identify the determinants of the voting decision and the corresponding relationships. In the case I analysed, the transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained models likely demarcates the line of scientific progress. (shrink)

Celem tego artykułu jest analiza powiązań jakie zachodzą pomiędzy fenomenami metodyczności i etyczności we wczesnej filozofii Martina Heideggera. Nie pojmuje się tu ani metody jako procedury badawczej prowadzącej do określonych rezultatów, ani etyki jako odrębnej dyscypliny filozoficznej posiadająca własne pole przedmiotowe. Chodzi o dwa wymiary bycia, które wzajemnie się implikują. Na początku badana jest fenomenologia jako sposób pytania o bycie, a następnie zostaje wydobyty metodyczny sens postępowania, które Heidegger określa mianem formalnego wskazywania. W rezultacie metodyczność zostaje odsłonięta jako droga prowadząca (...) do bycia jako źródła sensu, droga, którą zapewnia samo to bycie. W dalszej kolejności analizowany jest fenomen filozofowania, który Heidegger interpretuje jako wyraźne transcendowanie. Transcendowanie to ostatecznie okazuje się wolnością, której fundamentalny charakter stanowi pozwolić-być, kładące jednocześnie fundament pod odpowiedzialność. Odpowiedzialność zaś jest odpowiedzią udzielaną na wezwanie bycia i przyjmuje postać (zobo)wiązania Dasein wobec bytu, któremu pozwoliło ono być. Etyczność odsłania się tym samym jako domaganie się takiej odpowiedzi na wezwanie bycia, która sprosta ciężarowi jego przesłania. W tym miejscu na jaw wychodzi spotkanie etyczności z metodycznością – ta ostatnia jest drogą do otwartości bycia zapewnioną przez samą tę otwartość, by postulat etyczności mógł zostać spełniony. Oznacza to, że etyczność domaga się metodyczności, a metodyczność (a wraz z nią filozofowanie) niesie ze sobą konsekwencje etyczne dla rozumienia bycia i bytu. Słowa kluczowe: Heidegger, fenomenologia, metoda, etyka, wolność, odpowiedzialność. (shrink)

The cognitive foundations of geometry have puzzled academics for a long time, and even today are mostly unknown to many scholars, including mathematical cognition researchers. -/- Foundations of Geometric Cognition shows that basic geometric skills are deeply hardwired in the visuospatial cognitive capacities of our brains, namely spatial navigation and object recognition. These capacities, shared with non-human animals and appearing in early stages of the human ontogeny, cannot, however, fully explain a uniquely human form of geometric cognition. In the book, (...) Hohol argues that Euclidean geometry would not be possible without the human capacity to create and use abstract concepts, demonstrating how language and diagrams provide cognitive scaffolding for abstract geometric thinking, within a context of a Euclidean system of thought. -/- Taking an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on research from diverse fields including psychology, cognitive science, and mathematics, this book is a must-read for cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists of mathematics, alongside anyone interested in mathematical education or the philosophical and historical aspects of geometry. (shrink)

In consequence of significant social, political, economic, and demographic changes several wildlife species are currently growing in numbers and recolonizing Europe. While this is rightly hailed as a success of the environmental movement, the return of wildlife brings its own issues. As the animals arrive in the places we inhabit, we are learning anew that life with wild nature is not easy, especially when the accumulated cultural knowledge and experience pertaining to such coexistence have been all but lost. This book (...) provides a hermeneutic study of the ways we come to understand the troubling impacts of wildlife by exploring and critically discussing the meanings of 'ecological discomforts'. Thus, it begins the work of rebuilding the culture of coexistence. The cases presented in this book range from crocodile attacks to mice infestations, and their analysis consequently builds up an ethics that sees wildlife as active participants in the shaping of human moral and existential reality. This book is of interest not only to environmental philosophers, who will find here an original contribution to the established ethical discussions, but also to wildlife managers, and even to those members of the public who themselves struggle to make sense of encounters with their new wild neighbors. (shrink)

This paper is a follow-up to [4], in which a mistake in [6] (which spread also to [9]) was corrected. We give a strenghtening of the main result on the semantical nonconservativity of the theory of PT−with internal induction for total formulae${(\rm{P}}{{\rm{T}}^ - } + {\rm{INT}}\left( {{\rm{tot}}} \right)$, denoted by PT−in [9]). We show that if to PT−the axiom of internal induction forallarithmetical formulae is added (giving${\rm{P}}{{\rm{T}}^ - } + {\rm{INT}}$), then this theory is semantically stronger than${\rm{P}}{{\rm{T}}^ - } + (...) {\rm{INT}}\left( {{\rm{tot}}} \right)$. In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable (in the sense of [11]) in the former. Last but not least, we provide an axiomatic theory of truth which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in [9]. The truth theory we define is based on Weak Kleene Logic instead of the Strong one. (shrink)

The paper addresses the question how descriptive language is used to express legal norms. Sentences we find in legislative acts, i.e. statutes, constitutions and regulations, express legal norms. Linguistically speaking, there are various grammatical and lexical ways of expressing norms, such as imperative mood, modal verbs, deontic verbs, etc. However, norms may also be expressed by descriptive sentences, namely sentences in present or future tense and indicative (declarative) mood (i.e. _The minister determines the tax rate_). In many civil law countries (...) (including Poland), this is a very common, if not the default, form of expressing norms in legislative texts. Often presented as a legal peculiarity, this phenomenon has yet to draw much academic attention. The normative meaning of descriptive sentences is usually attributed to purely pragmatic factors stemming from our shared assumptions about the legal system. However, a closer look reveals that similar grammatical constructions are ubiquitous in everyday communication and in different languages. We tend to utter various sorts of directives using descriptive sentences (_Now we add a spoon of salt to the sauce_; _credit cards are not accepted_). This suggests the possibility for a linguistic (as opposed to exclusively legal) explanation. This paper aims to offer such an explanation. Rather than resorting to formal semantics, so prevalent in legal theory, it borrows from Cognitive Linguistics to reveal the cognitive underpinnings of our surprising tendency to express normativity in descriptive terms. This involves four different, yet complementary, theories. Firstly, the theory of conceptual metaphor by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson which explains the phenomenon in question in terms of the metaphor “ ought is is ”; with “ ought ” as the more abstract target domain and “ is ” as the more concrete, cognitively simpler source domain. Secondly, the theory of speech act metonymy by Panther and Thornburg which presents descriptive legal sentences as referring to various components of the underlying cognitive scenario of obligation. Thirdly, Ronald Langacker’s notion of the virtuality of language as the explanation for non-present, including future, perpetual and directive, uses of the present tense. Fourtly, the notion of normative generics which points to the nominal, as opposed to verbal, structure of descriptive legal sentences as the source of their normativity. (shrink)

We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is arithmetically conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the (...) case of the induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate. (shrink)

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds (...) to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. (shrink)

The book presents a critical overview of Peirce's views on modern nominalism and offers a novel approach to the social-anthropological underpinnings of his realism, especially Pragmatic Realism vis à vis the individualist tendencies in modern thought.

In this paper, we focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometric cognition has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such as phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early core cognitive systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. In particular, we show that the development of Greek mathematics, enshrined in Euclid’s Elements, was driven by the use of two tightly intertwined cognitive artifacts: the use of (...) lettered diagrams; and the creation of linguistic formulae. Together, these artifacts formed the professional language of geometry. In this respect, the case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time. This practice, as we suggest, has also contributed heavily to the understanding of what mathematical proof is; classically, it has been assumed that proofs are not merely deductively correct but also remain invariant over various individuals sharing the same cognitive practice. Cognitive artifacts in Greek geometry constrained the repertoire of admissible inferential operations, which made these proofs inter-subjectively testable and compelling. By focusing on the cognitive operations on artifacts, we also stress that mental mechanisms that contribute to these operations are still poorly understood, in contrast to those mechanisms which drive symbolic logical inference. (shrink)

We present here some Boolean connexive logics (BCLs) that are intended to be connexive counterparts of selected Epstein’s content relationship logics (CRLs). The main motivation for analyzing such logics is to explain the notion of connexivity by means of the notion of content relationship. The article consists of two parts. In the first one, we focus on the syntactic analysis by means of axiomatic systems. The starting point for our syntactic considerations will be the smallest BCL and the smallest CRL. (...) In the first part, we also identify axioms of Epstein’s logics that, together with the connexive principles, lead to contradiction. Moreover, we present some principles that will be equivalent to the connexive theses, but not to the content connexive theses we will propose. In the second part, we focus on the semantic analysis provided by relating- and set-assignment models. We define sound and complete relating semantics for all tested systems. We also indicate alternative relating models for the smallest BCL, which are not alternative models of the connexive counterparts of the considered CRLs. We provide a set-assignment semantics for some BCLs, giving thus a natural formalization of the content relationship understood either as content sharing or as content inclusion. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i krytyczna analiza koncepcji uczuć egzystencjalnych, autorstwa współczesnego filozofa psychiatrii o orientacji fenomenologicznej — Matthew Ratcliffe’a. Uczucia egzystencjalne są specjalną klasą stanów afektywnych, nadającą emocjonalnego zabarwienia subiektywnemu doświadczeniu rzeczywistości. Mają one charakter przedrefleksyjny i stanowią niejawne tło świadomości fenomenalnej, które w potocznym doświadczeniu pozostaje poza polem uwagi. Uczucia te mają ścisły związek z emocjami, determinując typy przedmiotów intencjonalnych zawartych w stanach emocjonalnych i wyznaczając repertuar możliwych do doświadczenia emocji. Najważniejsze uczucia egzystencjalne, które wyróżnia Ratcliffe, to: (1) (...) poczucie rzeczywistości, czyli przedrefleksyjne i fenomenalne wrażenie o realnym istnieniu świata jako takiego; (2) poczucie przynależności, czyli przedrefleksyjne i fenomenalne wrażenie własnego istnienia i osadzenia w świecie pośród osób i rzeczy. Te dwie kategorie stanowią fundamentalne składowe pierwszoosobowego doświadczenia podmiotu, wyznaczając tym samym jego relację do innych ludzi oraz rzeczywistości w jej najbardziej ogólnym sensie. W artykule przedstawiam główne cechy i typy uczuć egzystencjalnych. Zwracam także uwagę na szczególną rolę psychopatologii w analizie i uzasadnianiu istnienia tego zjawiska. W związku z tym, za Ratcliffem, opisuję w jaki sposób określone aspekty uczuć egzystencjalnych ulegają dezintegracji w przebiegu epizodów zaburzeń psychicznych, takich jak depresja czy schizofrenia. Pokazuję także różnicę pomiędzy fenomenologicznym i poznawczo-behoawioralnym podejściem do zaburzeń psychicznych. Powołując się na badania neurobiologiczne staram się wskazać potencjalne neuronalne korelaty uczuć egzystencjalnych. Tekst wieńczą krytyczne uwagi na temat koncepcji uczuć egzystencjalnych w ujęciu Matthew Ratcliffe’a. Rozwiązanie zidentyfikowanych wad i niedociągnięć tej teorii filozoficznej zarazem nakreśla przyszłe perspektywy jej rozwoju. (shrink)

One of the logic defined by Richard Epstein in a context of an analysis of subject matter relationship is Symmetric Relatedness Logic S. In the monograph [2] we can find some open problems concerning relatedness logic, a Post-style completeness theorem for logic S is one of them. Our paper introduces a solution of this metalogical issue.

Recent increases in inflation rates around the world has lead to many discussions on the causes of such rapid adjustments, some suggesting that higher profits are responsible driving force behind inflation. Here we will focus on the United States case and demonstrate why quantity theory of money is relevant to explain what has been going on with inflation after 2020 rather than profit based theory of inflation. First section introduces the argument. Second section restates quantity theory of money with relevance (...) to the empirical literature. Third section shows why quantity theory despite some suggestions works to explain the current levels of inflation. Fourth section notices why increases in nominal profits during inflation are part of the natural adjustment path. Last section offers concluding comments. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą analizy koncepcji minimalistycznej neurofilozofii autorstwa Henrika Waltera w kontekście dyskusji dotyczącej problemu psychofizycznego. Bezpośrednio związana z ową koncepcją teoria o „zróżnicowanej metafizyce” została w tekście powiązana z ideą pluralizmu eksplanacyjnego i ukazana jako metodologiczna alternatywa dla poszukiwania fundamentalnych teorii świadomości. Jednocześnie poza ewentualnymi zaletami metafilozoficznej refleksji podejmowanej w ramach minimalistycznej neurofilozofii zarysowane zostały jej podstawowe ograniczenia i problemy związane m.in. z uznaniem superweniencji za punkt łączący różnorodne stanowiska neurofilozoficzne.