Alles, was der Mensch von sich wissen kann, lässt sich an den Werkzeugen und Medien ablesen, die er gebraucht. Diese These steht im Mittelpunkt des Werks von Ernst Kapp (1808-1896), Gymnasiallehrer für Geschichte und Erdkunde, Technikphilosoph und Farmer in Texas. Obwohl Ernst Kapp unbestritten als Begründer der modernen Technikphilosophie gilt, ist sein anthropologischer Ansatz bislang kaum systematisch rezipiert worden. Zwar wird sein Werk in Überblicken meist als wichtiger Ausgangspunkt für die Technikphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts genannt, sein heuristisches Theorem der (...) Organprojektion wird dabei jedoch oft falsch als Vorläufer der Prothesentheorie von Freud bis McLuhan eingeordnet und nicht als kulturhistorische Erkenntnistheorie verstanden. Bei dem vorliegenden Buch handelt es sich um den ersten Forschungsband zum Werk von Ernst Kapp. Mit Beiträgen von Suzana Alpsancar, Christine Blättler, Lorenz Engell, Volker Gerhardt, Frank Hartmann, Christoph Hubig, Friedrich A. Kittler, Harun Maye, Alfred Nordmann, Birgit Recki, Hans-Martin Sass, Leander Scholz, Johanna Seifert, Christiane Voss und Niels Werber"--Back cover. (shrink)

May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May's axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives. In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and avoid the so-called strong no show paradox. We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting (...) method satisfying our enlarged set of axioms, which includes some weak homogeneity and preservation axioms, agrees with Minimax voting in all three-alternative elections, except perhaps in some improbable knife-edged elections in which ties may arise and be broken in different ways. (shrink)

May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a (...) single vote from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling electoral procedure. To illustrate the conditional nature of this claim, we also identify a richer informational environment in which approval voting, not plurality rule, is supported by a May-style argument. (shrink)

A partition is finitary if all its members are finite. For a set A, $\mathscr {B}(A)$ denotes the set of all finitary partitions of A. It is shown consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ (without the axiom of choice) that there exist an infinite set A and a surjection from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$. On the other hand, we prove in $\mathsf {ZF}$ some theorems concerning $\mathscr {B}(A)$ for infinite sets A, among which are the following: (1) If there is a finitary (...) partition of A without singleton blocks, then there are no surjections from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$ and no finite-to-one functions from $\mathscr {B}(A)$ to A. (2) For all $n\in \omega $, $|A^n|<|\mathscr {B}(A)|$. (3) $|\mathscr {B}(A)|\neq |\mathrm {seq}(A)|$, where $\mathrm {seq}(A)$ is the set of all finite sequences of elements of A. (shrink)

This books presents the refereed proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods, TABLEAUX '96, held in Terrasini near Palermo, Italy, in May 1996. The 18 full revised papers included together with two invited papers present state-of-the-art results in this dynamic area of research. Besides more traditional aspects of tableaux reasoning, the collection also contains several papers dealing with other approaches to automated reasoning. The spectrum of logics dealt with covers several nonclassical logics, including modal, intuitionistic, (...) many-valued, temporal and linear logic. (shrink)

We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.

Let T be the standard Veblen 1908 ordinal notation system for Γ0 as defined, for example, in Schütte's 1977 textbook [13] on Proof Theory. We define a slight modification of the standard assignment of fundamental sequences for the limit ordinals in T and prove that Γ0 is subrecursively inaccessible for this assignment, i.e. the induced slow and fast growing hierarchy match up at Γ0 for the first time.The results of this paper also indicate that φε00 may be considered as a (...) new slow growing ordinal of PA in the sense that the induced slow growing hierarchy up to φε00 classifies the PA-provablyrecursive functions.We show how the results of this paper can be used to bui d a subrecursive hierarchyover the predicative ordinals in the spirit of Wainer's 1970 abstract [16 ]. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clear some philosophical questions about the nature of logic by setting up a mathematical framework. The notion of congruence in logic is defined. A logical structure in which there is no non-trivial congruence relation, like some paraconsistent logics, is called simple. The relations between simplicity, the replacement theorem and algebraization of logic are studied (including MacLane-Curry’s theorem and a discussion about Curry’s algebras). We also examine how these concepts are related to such (...) notions as semantics, truth-functionality and bivalence. We argue that a logic, which is simple, can deserve the name logic and that the opposite view is connected with a reductionist perspective (reduction of logic to algebra). (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion-theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed iterations of the Turing jump but below ATR $_{0}$. There is a long history of proof-theoretic principles which are THAs. Until the papers reported on in this communication, there was only one mathematical example. Barnes, Goh, and Shore [1] analyze an array of ubiquity theorems in graph theory descended from Halin’s [9] work on rays in graphs. They (...) seem to be typical applications of ACA $_{0}$ but are actually THAs. These results answer Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics [19] and supply several other natural principles of different and unusual levels of complexity.This work led in [25] to a new neighborhood of the reverse mathematical zoo: almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own are very weak. Denizens both mathematical and logical are provided. Generalizations of several conservativity classes are defined and these ATHAs as well as many other principles are shown to be conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion-theoretic ways as well. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in [19] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (THAs) occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed (recursive) iterations of the Turing Jump but below ATR $_{0}$ (and so $\Pi _{1}^{1}$ -CA $_{0}$ or the hyperjump). There is a long history of proof theoretic principles which are THAs. Until Barnes, Goh, and Shore [ta] revealed an array of theorems in graph theory living in this neighborhood, there was only one mathematical denizen. In (...) this paper we introduce a new neighborhood of theorems which are almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (ATHAs). When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own they are very weak. We generalize several conservativity classes ( $\Pi _{1}^{1}$, r- $\Pi _{2}^{1}$, and Tanaka) and show that all our examples (and many others) are conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion theoretic ways as well. We provide denizens, both mathematical and logical. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in Montalbán [2011] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong (THA) or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second order arithmetic. (shrink)

The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise (...) degrees of belief and full knowledge of all a priori truths. Ordinary subjects do not look very rational when compared to the kinds of agents usually talked about in decision theory. In this paper, I will develop an expected utility representation theorem aimed at the representation of those who are neither probabilistically coherent, logically omniscient, nor expected utility maximisers across the board—that is, agents who are frequently irrational. The agents in question may be deductively fallible, have incoherent credences, limited representational capacities, and fail to maximise expected utility for all but a limited class of gambles. (shrink)

Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are made (...) with theorems of Richard Jeffrey, Brad Armendt, and Peter Fishburn. (shrink)

The paper investigates inaccessible set axioms and their consistency strength in constructive set theory. In ZFC inaccessible sets are of the form Vκ where κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal and Vκ denotes the κth level of the von Neumann hierarchy. Inaccessible sets figure prominently in category theory as Grothendieck universes and are related to universes in type theory. The objective of this paper is to show that the consistency strength of inaccessible set axioms heavily depend on the context in (...) which they are embedded. The context here will be the theory CZF− of constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory but without -Induction . Let INAC be the statement that for every set there is an inaccessible set containing it. CZF−+INAC is a mathematically rich theory in which one can easily formalize Bishop style constructive mathematics and a great deal of category theory. CZF−+INAC also has a realizability interpretation in type theory which gives its theorems a direct computational meaning. The main result presented here is that the proof theoretic ordinal of CZF−+INAC is a small ordinal known as the Feferman–Schütte ordinal Γ0. (shrink)

Mathematical theorems are cultural artifacts and may be interpreted much as works of art, literature, and tool-and-craft are interpreted. The Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, the Central Limit Theorem of Statistics, and the Statistical Continuum Limit of field theories, all show how the world may be put together through the arithmetic addition of suitably prescribed parts (velocities, variances, and renormalizations and scaled blocks, respectively). In the limit — of smoothness, statistical independence, and large N — higher-order parts, such (...) as accelerations, are, for the most, part irrelevant, affirming that, in the end, most of the world's particulars may be averaged over (a very un-Scriptural point of view). (We work out all of this in technical detail, including a nice geometric picture of stochastic integration, and a method of calculating the variance of the sum of dependent random variables using renormalization group ideas.) These fundamental theorems affirm a culture that is additive, ahistorical, Cartesian, and continuist, sharing in what might be called a species of modern culture. We understand mathematical results as useful because, like many other such artifacts, they have been adapted to fit the world, and the world has been adapted to fit their capacities. Such cultural interpretation is in effect motivation for the mathematics, and might well be offered to students as a way of helping them understand what is going on at the blackboard. Philosophy of mathematics might want to pay more attention to the history and detailed technical features of sophisticated mathematics, as a balance to the usual concerns that arise in formalist or even Platonist positions. (shrink)

Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can have (...) credences regarding acts currently under consideration and the consequences which depend on those acts; I argue that such credences are possible. Furthermore, I argue that attempts to use Jeffrey’s non-Savagean theorem in the service of these two projects may not fare much better. (shrink)

The theorem of Bell states that certain results of quantum mechanics violate inequalities that are valid for objective local random variables. We show that the inequalities of Bell are special cases of theorems found 10 years earlier by Bass and stated in full generality by Vorob’ev. This fact implies precise necessary and sufficient mathematical conditions for the validity of the Bell inequalities. We show that these precise conditions differ significantly from the definition of objective local variable spaces and as (...) an application that the Bell inequalities may be violated even for objective local random variables. (shrink)

The foregoing set of theorems forms an effective foundation for the theory of situations and worlds. All twenty-five theorems seem to be basic, reasonable principles that structure the domains of properties, relations, states of affairs, situations, and worlds in true and philosophically interesting ways. They resolve 15 of the 19 choice points defined in Barwise (1989) (see Notes 22, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, and 45). Moreover, important axioms and principles stipulated by situation theorists are derived (see Notes (...) 33, 37, and 38). This is convincing evidence that the foregoing constitutes a theory of situations. Note that worlds are just a special kind of situation, and that the basic theorems of world theory, which were derived in previous work, can still be derived in this situation-theoretic setting. So there seems to be no fundamental incompatibility between situations and worlds — they may peacably coexist in the foundations of metaphysics. The theory may therefore reconcile two research programs that appeared to be heading off in different directions. And we must remind the reader that the general metaphysical principles underlying our theory were not designed with the application to situation theory in mind. This suggests that the general theory and the underlying distinction have explanatory power, for they seem to relate and systematize apparently unrelated phenomena. (shrink)

The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due to a tension between the grand coalition and sub-coalitions. We provide a counter-intuitive argument to demonstrate that the Coase theorem may be in complete consonance with bargaining set stability. We establish that an uncertainty concerning the formation of sub-coalitions will explain such compatibility: each agent fears that others may `gang up' against him and this fear forces the agents to negotiate. The grand coalition emerges from (...) the negotiations if each agent uses the principle of equal relative sacrifice to determine the actual allocation. We also establish the rational basis for the choice of the principle of equal relative concession by the negotiating agents. Hence we argue that the Coase theorem will be valid even if there are stable sub-coalitions. (shrink)

The no free lunch theorem is a radicalized version of Hume’s induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms—whether ‘clever’ inductive or ‘stupid’ guessing methods —have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction. According to these results, certain meta-inductive prediction strategies may dominate other methods in their predictive success. In this article this conflict is analyzed and dissolved, by (...) means of probabilistic analysis and computer simulation. (shrink)

Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert (...) space formalism of quantum mechanics. In this essay, we first show that identification of mind states with quantum states within the brain is biologically feasible, and then elaborating on the mathematical proofs of two quantum mechanical no-go theorems, we explain why quantum theory might have profound implications for the scientific understanding of one's mental states, self identity, beliefs and free will. (shrink)

Gödel's Theorem is often used in arguments against machine intelligence, suggesting humans are not bound by the rules of any formal system. However, Gödelian arguments can be used to support AI, provided we extend our notion of computation to include devices incorporating random number generators. A complete description scheme can be given for integer functions, by which nonalgorithmic functions are shown to be partly random. Not being restricted to algorithms can be accounted for by the availability of an arbitrary (...) random function. Humans, then, might not be rule-bound, but Gödelian arguments also suggest how the relevant sort of nonalgorithmicity may be trivially made available to machines. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne: Introduction Elliott Sober: Bayesianism - its scopes and limits Colin Howson: Bayesianism in Statistics A P Dawid: Bayes's Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries John Earman: Bayes, Hume, Price, and Miracles David Miller: Propensities May Satisfy Bayes's Theorem 'An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' by Thomas Bayes, presented to the Royal Society by Richard Price. Preceded by a historical introduction by G A Barnard.

Kummer's Cardinality Theorem states that a language A must be recursive if a Turing machine can exclude for any n words ω1...., ωn one of the n + 1 possibilities for the cardinality of {ω1...., ωn} ∩ A. There was good reason to believe that this theorem is a peculiarity of recursion theory: neither the Cardinality Theorem nor weak forms of it hold for resource-bounded computational models like polynomial time. This belief may be flawed. In this paper (...) it is shown that weak cardinality theorems hold for finite automata and also for other models. An explanation is proposed as to why recursion-theoretic and automata-theoretic weak cardinality theorems hold, but not corresponding 'middle-ground theorems': The recursion- and automata-theoretic weak cardinality theorems are instantiations of purely logical weak cardinality theorems. The logical theorems can be instantiated for logical structures characterizing recursive computations and finite automata computations. A corresponding structure characterizing polynomial time computations does not exist. (shrink)

Formal verification involves the use of logical and computational methods to establish claims that are expressed in precise mathematical terms. These can include ordinary mathematical theorems, as well as claims that pieces of hardware or software, network protocols, and mechanical and hybrid systems meet their specifications. In practice, there is not a sharp distinction between verifying a piece of mathematics and verifying the correctness of a system: formal verification requires describing hardware and software systems in mathematical terms, at which point (...) establishing claims as to their correctness becomes a form of theorem proving. Conversely, the proof of a mathematical theorem may require a lengthy computation, in which case verifying the truth of the theorem requires verifying that the computation does what it is supposed to do. The gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof, and twentieth-century developments in logic show most if not all conventional proof methods can be reduced to a small set of axioms and rules in any of a number of foundational systems. With this reduction, there are two ways that a computer can help establish a claim: it can help find a proof in the first place, and it can help verify that a purported proof is correct. Automated theorem proving focuses on the “finding” aspect. Resolution theorem provers, tableau theorem provers, fast satisfiability solvers, and so on provide means of establishing the validity of formulas in propositional and first-order logic. Other systems provide search procedures and decision procedures for specific languages and domains, such as linear or nonlinear expressions over the integers or the real numbers. Architectures like SMT combine domain-general search methods with domain-specific procedures. Computer algebra systems and specialized mathematical software packages provide means of carrying out mathematical computations, establishing mathematical bounds, or finding mathematical objects. A calculation can be viewed as a proof as well, and these systems, too, help establish mathematical claims. Automated reasoning systems strive for power and efficiency, often at the expense of guaranteed soundness. Such systems can have bugs, and it can be difficult to ensure that the results they deliver are correct. In contrast, interactive theorem proving focuses on the “verification” aspect of theorem proving, requiring that every claim is supported by a proof in a suitable axiomatic foundation. This sets a very high standard: every rule of inference and every step of a calculation has to be justified by appealing to prior definitions and theorems, all the way down to basic axioms and rules. In fact, most such systems provide fully elaborated “proof objects” that can be communicated to other systems and checked independently. Constructing such proofs typically requires much more input and interaction from users, but it allows us to obtain deeper and more complex proofs. The Lean Theorem Prover aims to bridge the gap between interactive and automated theorem proving, by situating automated tools and methods in a framework that supports user interaction and the construction of fully specified axiomatic proofs. The goal is to support both mathematical reasoning and reasoning about complex systems, and to verify claims in both domains. (shrink)

The objective of the present edition of this monograph is the same as that of earlier editions, namely, to provide readers with some mathemati cal maturity a rigorous and modern introduction to the ideas and principal theorems of probabilistic information theory. It is not necessary that readers have any prior knowledge whatever of information theory. The rapid development of the subject has had the consequence that any one book can now cover only a fraction of the literature. The latter is (...) often written by engineers for engineers, and the mathematical reader may have some difficulty with it. The mathematician who understands the content and methods of this monograph should be able to read the literature and start on research of his own in a subject of mathematical beauty and interest. The present edition differs from the second in the following: Chapter 6 has been completely replaced by one on arbitrarily varying channels. Chapter 7 has been greatly enlarged. Chapter 8 on semi-continuous channels has been drastically shortened, and Chapter 11 on sequential decoding completely removed. The new Chapters 11-15 consist entirely of material which has been developed only in the last few years. The topics discussed are rate distortion, source coding, multiple access channels, and degraded broadcast channels. Even the specialist will find a new approach in the treatment of these subjects. Many of the proofs are new, more perspicuous, and considerably shorter than the original ones. (shrink)

A set S of degrees is said to be an initial segment if c ≤ d ∈ S→-c∈S. Shoenfield has shown that if P is the lattice of all subsets of a finite set then there is an initial segment of degrees isomorphic to P. Rosenstein [2] (independently) proved the same to hold of the lattice of all finite subsets of a countable set. We shall show that “countable set” may be replaced by “set of cardinality at most that of (...) the continuum.” This result is also an extension of [3, Corollary 2 to Theorem 15], which states that there is a sublattice of degrees isomorphic to the lattice of all finite subsets of 2N. (A sublattice of degrees is a subset closed under ∪ and ∩; an initial segment closed under ∪ is necessarily a sublattice, but not conversely.)It seems worth noting that the proof of the present result was preceded in time by our proof [4] of the analogous theorem for hyperdegrees, and is in fact an adaptation of that proof. Thus the present work has been influenced much more directly by the Gandy-Sacks forcing construction of a minimal hyperdegree [1] than by previous work on initial segments of degrees. (shrink)

Lewis proved a Dutch book theorem for Conditionalization. The theorem shows that an agent who follows any credal update rule other than Conditionalization is vulnerable to bets that inflict a sure loss. Lewis’s theorem is tailored to factive formulations of Conditionalization, i.e. formulations on which the conditioning proposition is true. Yet many scientific and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory require a non-factive formulation, i.e. a formulation on which the conditioning proposition may be false. I prove a (...) Dutch book theorem tailored to non-factive Conditionalization. I also discuss the theorem’s significance. (shrink)

This paper critically engages Philip Mirowki's essay, "The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science." It argues that although the cold war context of anti-democratic elitism best suited for making decisions about engaging in nuclear war may seem to be politically and ideologically motivated, in fact we need to carefully consider the arguments underlying the new rational choice based political philosophies of the post-WWII era typified by Arrow's impossibility theorem. A distrust (...) of democratic decision-making principles may be developed by social scientists whose leanings may be toward the left or right side of the spectrum of political practices. (shrink)

Logics that do not have a deduction-detachment theorem (briefly, a DDT) may still possess a contextual DDT —a syntactic notion introduced here for arbitrary deductive systems, along with a local variant. Substructural logics without sentential constants are natural witnesses to these phenomena. In the presence of a contextual DDT, we can still upgrade many weak completeness results to strong ones, e.g., the finite model property implies the strong finite model property. It turns out that a finitary system has a (...) contextual DDT iff it is protoalgebraic and gives rise to a dually Brouwerian semilattice of compact deductive filters in every finitely generated algebra of the corresponding type. Any such system is filter distributive, although it may lack the filter extension property. More generally, filter distributivity and modularity are characterized for all finitary systems with a local contextual DDT, and several examples are discussed. For algebraizable logics, the well-known correspondence between the DDT and the equational definability of principal congruences is adapted to the contextual case. (shrink)

Those incompleteness theorems mean the relation of (Peano) arithmetic and (ZFC) set theory, or philosophically, the relation of arithmetical finiteness and actual infinity. The same is managed in the framework of set theory by the axiom of choice (respectively, by the equivalent well-ordering "theorem'). One may discuss that incompleteness form the viewpoint of set theory by the axiom of choice rather than the usual viewpoint meant in the proof of theorems. The logical corollaries from that "nonstandard" viewpoint the relation (...) of set theory and arithmetic are demonstrated. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that (...) circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem. (shrink)

A generalized Kochen-Specker theorem is proved. It is shown that there exist sets of n projection operators, representing n yes-no questions about a quantum system, such that none of the 2″ possible answers is compatible with sum rules imposed by quantum mechanics. Namely, if a subset of commuting projection operators sums up to a matrix having only even or only odd eigenvalues, the number of “yes” answers ought to he even or odd, respectively. This requirement may lead to contradictions. (...) An example is provided, involving nine projection operators in a 4-dimensional space. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to intuitionistic reverse mathematics. We introduce a formal system called Basic Intuitionistic Mathematics BIM, and then search for statements that are, over BIM, equivalent to Brouwer’s Fan Theorem or to its positive denial, Kleene’s Alternative to the Fan Theorem. The Fan Theorem is true under the intended intuitionistic interpretation and Kleene’s Alternative is true in the model of BIM consisting of the Turing-computable functions. The task of finding equivalents of Kleene’s Alternative is, (...) intuitionistically, a nontrivial extension of the task of finding equivalents of the Fan Theorem, although there is a certain symmetry in the arguments that we shall try to make transparent. We introduce closed-and-separable subsets of Baire space $${\mathcal{N}}$$ and of the set $${\mathcal{R}}$$ of the real numbers. Such sets may be compact and also positively noncompact. The Fan Theorem is the statement that Cantor space $${\mathcal{C}}$$, or, equivalently, the unit interval [0, 1], is compact and Kleene’s Alternative is the statement that $${\mathcal{C}}$$, or, equivalently, [0, 1], is positively noncompact. The class of the compact closed-and-separable sets and also the class of the closed-and-separable sets that are positively noncompact are characterized in many different ways and a host of equivalents of both the Fan Theorem and Kleene’s Alternative is found. (shrink)

It was shown by Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman that every computable 2-coloring of pairs admits an infinite low₂ homogeneous set H. We answer a question of the same authors by showing that H may be chosen to satisfy in addition $C\,\not \leqslant _T \,H$, where C is a given noncomputable set. This is shown by analyzing a new and simplified proof of Seetapun's cone avoidance theorem for Ramsey's theorem. We then extend the result to show that every computable (...) 2-coloring of pairs admits a pair of low₂ infinite homogeneous sets whose degrees form a minimal pair. (shrink)

This chapter sets out the theorems, and presents some examples that show in a rough way how the theorems work. It explains separability precisely, and states the theorems. The chapter starts the work of interpreting the theorems, and also explains the significance of their conclusions from a formal, mathematical point of view. It then discusses a significant assumption that is used in the proofs of the theorems. The published proofs of both the separability theorems depend on an assumption that may (...) be objectionable in some contexts. These theorems are about an ordering defined on a field of alternatives. If an ordering can be represented by an additively separable utility function, the theorem shows it can be represented by a whole family of additively separable functions. Each member of the family is an increasing linear transform of the others, and the family includes every increasing linear transform of each of its members. (shrink)

The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical character. This chapter focuses on two arguments from logic. First, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the (...) proposition is about the past, present or future. In particular, the argument goes, whatever one does or does not do in the future is determined in the present by the truth or falsity of the corresponding proposition. The second argument coming from logic is much more modern and appeals to Gödel's incompleteness theorems to make the case against determinism and in favour of free will, insofar as that applies to the mathematical potentialities of human beings. The claim more precisely is that as a consequence of the incompleteness theorems, those potentialities cannot be exactly circumscribed by the output of any computing machine even allowing unlimited time and space for its work. The chapter concludes with some new considerations that may be in favour of a partial mechanist account of the mathematical mind. (shrink)

This chapter explains the interpersonal addition theorem. The theorem leads to two remarkable points. Firstly, it links the aggregation of good across the dimension of people with its aggregation across the dimension of states of nature. The result is that, in favourable circumstances, it links the value of equality in the distribution of good with the value of avoiding risk to good. The chapter also explains this link. The second point is even more remarkable. The theorem shows (...) that general utility is the sum of individual utilities. Since these utilities represent the general and individual betterness relations, this may seem, at first glance, to say that general good is the total of individual good. Joined with the addition theorem Bernoulli's hypothesis implies the utilitarian principle of distribution, which implies in turn that there is no value in avoiding inequality in the distribution of good between people. The chapter discusses the assessment of Bernoulli's hypothesis. (shrink)

In 1999, Jeffrey Ketland published a paper which posed a series of technical problems for deflationary theories of truth. Ketland argued that deflationism is incompatible with standard mathematical formalizations of truth, and he claimed that alternate deflationary formalizations are unable to explain some central uses of the truth predicate in mathematics. He also used Beth’s definability theorem to argue that, contrary to deflationists’ claims, the T-schema cannot provide an ‘implicit definition’ of truth. In this article, I want to challenge (...) this final argument. Whatever other faults deflationism may have, the T-schema does provide an implicit definition of the truth predicate. Or so, at any rate, I shall argue. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it (...) due to Richard Jeffrey. (shrink)

Bell's theorem is expounded as an analysis in Bayesian probabilistic inference. Assume that the result of a spin measurement on a spin-1/2 particle is governed by a variable internal to the particle (local, “hidden”), and examine pairs of particles having zero combined angular momentum so that their internal variables are correlated: knowing something about the internal variable of one tells us something about that of the other. By measuring the spin of one particle, we infer something about its internal (...) variable; through the correlation, about the internal variable of the second particle, which may be arbitrarily distant and is by hypothesis unchanged by this measurement (locality); and make (probabilistic) prediction of spin observations on the second particle. Each link in this chain has a counterpart in the Bayesian analysis of the situation. Irrespective of the details of the internal variable description, such prediction is violated by measurements on many particle pairs, so that locality—effectively the only physics invoked—fails. The time ordering of the two measurements is not Lorentz-invariant, implying acausality. Quantum mechanics is irrelevant to this reasoning, although its correct predictions of the statistics of the results imply it has a nonlocal—acausal interpretation; one such, the “transactional” interpretation, is presented to demonstrable advantage, and some misconceptions about quantum theory are pursued. The “unobservability” loophole in photonic Bell experiments is proven to be closed. It is shown that this mechanism cannot be used for signalling; signalling would become possible only if the hidden variables, which we insist must underlie the statistical character of the observations (the alternative is to give up), are uncovered in deviations from quantum predictions. Their reticence is understood as a consequence of their nonlocality: it is not easy to isolate and measure something nonlocal. Once the hidden variables are found, all the problems of quantum field theory and of quantum gravity might melt away. (shrink)

We consider the set of all matrices of the form pij = tr[W (Ei ⊗ Fj)] where Ei, Fj are projections on a Hilbert space H, and W is some state on H ⊗ H. We derive the basic properties of this set, compare it with the classical range of probability, and note how its properties may be related to a geometric measures of entanglement.

In the present piece we defend predicate approaches to modality, that is approaches that conceive of modal notions as predicates applicable to names of sentences or propositions, against the challenges raised by Montague’s theorem. Montague’s theorem is often taken to show that the most intuitive modal principles lead to paradox if we conceive of the modal notion as a predicate. Following Schweizer (J Philos Logic 21:1–31, 1992) and others we show this interpretation of Montague’s theorem to be (...) unwarranted unless a further non trivial assumption is made—an assumption which should not be taken as a given. We then move on to showing, elaborating on work of Gupta (J Philos Logic 11:1–60, 1982), Asher and Kamp (Properties, types, and meaning. Vol. I: foundational issues, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 85−158, 1989), and Schweizer (J Philos Logic 21:1–31, 1992), that the unrestricted modal principles can be upheld within the predicate approach and that the predicate approach is an adequate approach to modality from the perspective of modal operator logic. To this end we develop a possible world semantics for multiple modal predicates and show that for a wide class of multimodal operator logics we may find a suitable class of models of the predicate approach which satisfies, modulo translation, precisely the theorems of the modal operator logic at stake. (shrink)

A concise proof of Bell's theorem on the necessary nonlocality of any theory which models individual measurements in correlated quantum mechanical systems is presented. A family of inequalities is derived which may be applied to a broad class of correlated systems to test the assumption of locality.