Ensayo de acercamiento general al núcleo metafísico fundamental del pensamiento de Max Stirner, principalmente expuesto en 'El Único y su propiedad' y en el opúsculo de contrargumento a las respuestas crí-ticas a su obra titulado Recensores de Stirner.

Nel suo pionieristico lavoro Conditions in Königsberg and the Making of Kant's Philosophy, Giorgio Tonelli lamentava l'assenza di un'indagine approfondita sul contesto intellettuale di Königsberg e sull'eventuale influenza che esso esercitò su alcuni aspetti del pensiero di Kant. Questo libro vuole colmare questa lacuna prestando particolare attenzione alla tradizione aristotelica, alla Schulphilosophie, e alla corrente dell'eclettismo, che dominarono l'ambiente regiomontano sino all'avvento della filosofia critica kantiana. Il lavoro mostra come dai fallimenti dei progetti logici e metafisici precritici, legati alle influenze (...) ricevute dall'ambiente di Königsberg, Kant abbia tratto le idee e gli spunti per la stesura della Kritik der reinen Vernunft. (shrink)

In this article I propose a unitary interpretation of Kant’s reflection on evil in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1792–1794). This part of Immanuel Kant’s work often presents knotty interpretative problems because the author, while reaffirming the principle of the subject’s moral freedom as set forth in Critique of Practical Reason, seems actually to be showing this freedom as conditioned by a tendency toward evil that is so compelling that it blocks and undermines the subject’s autonomy. I give (...) an account of the coherence acquired by the Kantian notion of radical evil, defined as an axiological inversion of the order of the motives, once one grasps the defective character of the notion of freedom that the philosopher employs in the work and the metaphysical orientation that backs it up. (shrink)

A critical survey of topics that play a central role in contemporary analytic ontology and metaphysics, including, identity, persistence through time, the problem of universals, the notion of ontological commitment, and the boundary between semantic issues and metaphysics proper.

Il percorso di Rosa Calcaterra all’interno della filosofia pragmatista è segnato da un’intuizione principale e originale: nonostante tutte le differenze, il progetto pragmatista è unitario. Gli articoli della raccolta Il progetto comune dei pragmatisti mostrano questa unitarietà, che Calcaterra persegue con tecnica sofisticata, facendo emergere non solo ciò che la parola dice, ma anche ciò che essa tradisce. Prima di immergersi nelle pagine del libro e rivolgere all’autrice alcune domande che...

This article proposes a follow up of Fazzo’s contributions on the stemma codicum of Aristotle’s Metaphysics – including her Chora 2015 paper, its completion in the 2017 Revue d’Histoire des Textes and, most recently, a contribution on the text of Zeta 17 in Aristotelica 1 2022. All of these are summarized and framed here in the context of today’s lively debate. We then introduce the data of Marco Ghione’s collation and comparison of the readings of the two oldest manuscripts J (...) and E : J, the Vind. phil. gr. 100, early 9th century – the so‑called “Aristotle of Vienna” – is thus extensively compared with E, Paris. gr. 1853, early 10th century, with selected reference to the earliest hands at work (J, J2, E1). Based on Paul Maas’ theory of errors, we are now in condition to face the crucial issue : does the latter depend on the former? This helps resolving the one residual opacity or incertitude concerning the upper part of the Metaphysics’ stemma. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute varias formulaciones diferentes del principio de causalidad considerando la función que tales principios pueden cumplir en argumentos cosmológicos. Se argumenta que el principio se comprende mejor como requiriendo una causa para todos los estados de cosas contingentes, en vez de requiriendo una explicación para todas las proposiciones verdaderas contingentes. Se argumenta, también, que el requerimiento de una causa para un estado de cosas no debe ser visto como el requerimiento de algo que hace necesaria la ocurrencia del (...) efecto. Varias dificultades bien conocidas pueden ser evitadas con causas que no hacen necesarias sus producciones. Se argumenta, luego, que en las teorías combinatorias de la modalidad, donde todo puede existir con o sin cualquier otro existente diferente, las formulaciones fuertes del principio de causalidad parecen falsas, pero las formulaciones débiles, donde sólo se postula una causa posible para todo estado de cosas, parecen verdaderas. Por otro lado, tanto las formulaciones fuertes como las débiles parecen verdaderas en las concepciones causales de la modalidad. Sin embargo, en las teorías causales de la modalidad la fase II del argumento cosmológico resulta mucho más difícil, esto es, parece mucho más complicado justificar que el objeto concreto necesario al que se hace referencia es omnisciente, omnipotente y moralmente perfecto. This work discusses several different formulations of the principle of causality considering the function that those principles might play in cosmological arguments. It is argued that the principle is best understood as requiring a cause for all contingent states of affairs, instead of as requiring an explanation for all contingent true propositions. It is also argued that the requirement of a cause for a state of affairs should not be seen as the requirement for something that necessitates the effect. Several well-known difficulties haunting the principle can be avoided with non-necessitating causes. It is then argued that in combinatorial theories of modality, where everything can exist with or without any other different existent, the strong formulations of the principle of causality seem false, but the weak formulations, where only a possible cause for every contingent state of affairs is postulated, seem true. On the other hand, both strong and weak formulations of the principle seem true on the causal conceptions of modality. Nevertheless, in causal theories of modality phase II of the cosmological argument turns out to be much more difficult, i. e., it seems much harder to justify that the necessary concrete object referred to is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect. (shrink)

Kalinowski conceives metaphysics as a set of propositions which can be axiomatized. This paper exposes the typical rules of an axiomatic system comparing them with the metaphysical system developed by Kalinowski. These rules are linguistic rules, but also admission-rules and transformation-rules. They always refer to the metaphysical propositions (wich are first or second propositions, as it is usual in logical systems). This paper tries to evaluate Kalinowski's attempt.

My aim in this paper is to deal with E. Husserl’s and E. Stein’s analyses on the anthropological and metaphysical questions. To perform this task it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, first of all in Husserl and then in E. Stein, underscoring the novelty of their approach to the knowledge of human being, world and God. The essay is divided in four parts; two are dedicated to Husserl’s and Stein’s investigation on the human being and (...) two to their development of metaphysical themes. Regarding the first topic we discover a significant connection between the two thinkers, regarding the second one we notice that it is possible to find a metaphysical approach to reality even in Husserl and an original development of the theme in Stein’s analysis linked up with the medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Durante las últimas décadas, filósofos de horizontes diferentes se han pronunciado contra el anti-realismo del siglo XX, mediante una forma de vuelta al realismo. Evidentemente, tal denominación es equívoca, ya que puede esconder posiciones bastante diferentes dependiendo de la definición de “realidad” que se utilice. Numerosos son los que se centran en la verdad y en la objetividad. Veremos por qué esto no es posible y por qué, como quieren los realistas metafísicos, es necesario volcarse más atrás, hasta la realidad, (...) o más bien, hasta aquello que, queramos o no, está ya dado. Además, cuestionamos la figura de una ciencia de la realidad in abstracto, que quiere servir de vía rápida de “acceso directo” a la realidad que suprimiría el análisis de las normas en virtud de las cuales esta realidad significa algo. En contra de esto, situaremos la realidad, y no sólo la verdad, donde, de una manera u otra, se ha dado efectivamente los medios para determinarla. Lo cual, inevitablemente, sólo puede hacerse en la realidad. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta a disciplina de Ontologia aos estudantes do Departamento de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa.