This essay presents Descartes’s anti-hylomorphism in The Meteors published in 1637 and in the unpublished works that precede it, The World (Treatise on Light) and the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.

SummaryMid twentieth century meteor astronomy demanded the long-term compilation of observations made by numerous individuals over an extensive geographical area. Such a massive undertaking obviously required the participation of more than just professional astronomers, who often sought to expand their ranks through the use of amateurs that had a basic grasp of astronomy as well as the night sky, and were thus capable of generating first-rate astronomical reports.When, in the 1920s, renowned Swedish astronomer Knut Lundmark turned his attention to meteor (...) astronomy, he was unable to rely even upon this solution. In contrast to many other countries at the time, Sweden lacked an organized amateur astronomy and thus contained only a handful of competent amateurs. Given this situation, Lundmark had to develop ways of engaging the general public in assisting his efforts. To his advantage, he was already a well-established public figure who had published numerous popular science articles and held talks from time to time on the radio. During the 1930s, this prominence greatly facilitated his launching of a crowdsourcing initiative for the gathering of meteor observations.This paper consists of a detailed discussion concerning the means by which Lundmark's initiative disseminated astronomical knowledge to the general public and encouraged a response that might directly contribute to the advancement of science. More precisely, the article explores the manner in which he approached the Swedish public, the degree to which that public responded and the extent to which his efforts were successful. The primary aim of this exercise is to show that the apparently recent Internet phenomenon of ‘crowdsourcing’, especially as it relates to scientific research, actually has a pre-Internet history that is worth studying. Apart from the fact that this history is interesting in its own right, knowing it can provide us with a fresh vantage point from which to better comprehend and appreciate the success of present-day crowdsourcing projects. (shrink)

A meteor that fell in northern Greece in 467 BC was said to have been predicted by Anaxagoras. It seems rather that his theory entailed (“predicted”) the possibility of such bodies. The meteor provided a rare case of an observation confirming a theory. The subsequent recognition of the meteor shows that early philosophical theories could have testable consequences and that empirical evidence was being sought to evaluate theories at this early time.

The aim of this paper is to explore the connection between moods and meteors or atmospheric phenomena in Heidegger’s thinking. The idea of the weather as something affecting our emotional state is not new but goes all the way back to Homer. However, the ontological basis of this connection is missing. In this paper, I argue that Heidegger provides exactly such an ontological account of moods and meteors not as two separate spheres but as a common atmosphere of (...) attuned elementality—a dynamic interface where beings bend into being. Being can no longer be understood solely as that which determines beings qua beings but beings inform/transform being as well. (shrink)

I argue that Descartes uses his method as evidence in the Discours and Les Météores. I begin by establishing there is a single method in Descartes’ works, using his meteorology as a case study. First, I hold that the method of the Regulae is best explained by two examples: one scientific, his proof of the anaclastic curve (1626), and one metaphysical, his question of the essence and scope of human knowledge (1628). Based on this account, I suggest that the form (...) of his early metaphysics (not its content) is similar to the method of doubt of the Meditationes. Second, I argue that Descartes’ explanation of the cause of parhelia (1629) likewise contains a formulation of this procedure. I provide a novel reading of Les Météores, where, following Descartes’ guidance in the Discours and Correspondance, I interpret his meteorology by reasoning from effects to causes, in this case, from Christoph Scheiner’s 1626 observation of parhelia to his meteorological foundation. This backwards orientation to Les Météores, I argue, reveals an instance of Descartes’ scientific method. I conclude with remarks on Descartes’ concept of evidentia, in which I explain how he incorporates a posteriori evidence and an apparent hypothetical foundation into his rationalist epistemology where he uses his method as evidence for his claims. (shrink)

This work was originally published anonymously.

Im Grunde stellt das Buch eine neue (die dritte) Ausgabe, diesmal die echt kritische Ausgabe, der sogennanten Chronik der Meteora (nach den ungenügend bearbeiteten Ausgaben von L. Heuzey und F.I. Uspenskij im 19. Jh.) dar. Außer der Ausgabe mit italienischer Übersetzung (S. 122–139) bietet aber der Herausgeber auch eine ausführliche Einführungsstudie (S. 13–120), sowie ebenso ausführliche historische Kommentare (S. 143–173). Die Ausgabe ist auf Grund der Handschriften aus dem Kl. Barlaam (heute Petrop. Gr.251.I) und Kl. des Hl. Stefan entstanden. Die (...) beiden Handschriften bestehen aus dem Text der Chronik von Ioannina, einem Horismos des Sinan-pasha und dem hier herausgegebenen Text, wobei in der Handschrift Barlaam noch verschiedene Notizen am Ende beigefügt sind. (shrink)

The meteoric rise of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing technology has ignited discussions of engineering agricultural animals to improve their welfare. While some have proposed enhancing animals, for instance by engineering for disease resistance, others have suggested we might diminish animals to improve their welfare. By reducing or eliminating species-typical capacities, the expression of which is frustrated under current conditions, animal diminishment could reduce or eliminate the suffering that currently accompanies industrial animal agriculture. Although diminishment could reduce animal suffering, there is a (...) widespread intuition that it would be wrong. One attempt to justify this intuition has been to claim that inhibiting the development of species-typical functions is wrong, even if it improves welfare. This has often been couched in terms of violating an animal’s dignity. I argue that the dignity objection to diminishment fails. In the first place, it fails to apply to some of the most troubling cases of diminishment, the creation of so-called animal microencepahlic lumps. In the second place, dignity views misplace the normative relevance of species norms; I argue that considerations from evolutionary biology should lead us to treat species norms - such as the possession of typical capacities - as merely a heuristic for rendering judgments about welfare. But diminishment cases are precisely the cases where the heuristic breaks down, and becomes a bias. I close my discussion with a sketch of my Historical Injustices Approach to animal ethics, and how it may help us vindicate our intuition that diminishment is wrong without appeal to species norms. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that in making an animal, nature acts like a “good housekeeper” who “is accustomed to throw out nothing from which it is possible to make something useful” (744b16–17). How does nature act when it “make[s] something useful” in these cases – and does it differ from other ways it acts? I defend two main claims. The first is that Meteor. 4.2’s distinction between two sorts of ‘concoction’ processes offers an underappreciated source of evidence for answering this question. My (...) second claim concerns the nature of those processes and the ends they realize. While they are both the ends of their respective types of concoction, they differ in that some essential (process-defining) features of the second end – but not the first – are supplied by what the capacities of the “underlying” patient (on which the agent acts) are for. The result is a distinction between two kinds of end-directed efficient causation. (shrink)

Si l'histoire de la pensee medievale inclut celle de ses influences, comme l'histoire de la pensee moderne celle de ses sources, il est alors doublement legitime de se demander ce que peut nous apprendre sur la pensee cartesienne sa confrontation historique avec la pensee medievale, au contact de laquelle elle s'est formee, et a l'encontre de laquelle elle s'est developpee. Prenant la suite de travaux anterieurs, cet ouvrage d'Etienne Gilson envisage tout d'abord la confrontation dans une perspective genetique (en cherchant (...) dans certaines doctrines medievales les sources de theses cartesiennes comme l'inneisme, l'etude des meteores ou de la circulation sanguine), avant de considerer plus precisement le rapport de la metaphysique cartesienne et de la metaphysique medievale a travers l'examen de certains points de doctrine particulierement delicats. C'est ici notamment que sont rencontres et eclaircis les problemes de la critique cartesienne des formes substantielles, du dialogue de Descartes avec saint Augustin a l'occasion du cogito, avec saint Thomas dans la preuve de l'existence de Dieu par la causalite de l'idee, et avec saint Anselme dans la preuve dite ontologique. Le caractere novateur de la pensee cartesienne se trouve ainsi etabli avec une acuite inedite. (shrink)

Peer review has long been regarded as the gold standard of scientific publication, essential to the integrity of science itself. But, as any publishing scientist knows, peer review has its downside, including long delays and reviewer bias. Until the coming of the Internet, there appeared to be no alternative. Now, articles appear online as preprints almost immediately upon submission. But they lack peer review and thus their scientific standing can be questioned. Post-publication discussion platforms such as PubPeer have proven useful, (...) but are no substitute for pre-publication peer review. Nevertheless, some may be tempted to believe that peer review can now be done without. This article challenges that view by analyzing a recent, non-peer-reviewed article in Skeptical Enquirer, a magazine published by the Committee for Skeptical Enquiry (CSI). The article, “Sodom Meteor Strike Claims Should Be Taken With a Pillar of Salt,” casts doubt on one of the most widely read scientific articles of the last decade and provides a stern warning of the cost of abandoning peer review. (shrink)

Ralf Dahrendorf (1929-2009) established modern sociology as a normal science in the traditional university in post-war Germany. After ten years as a Full Professor, he joins the German liberal party, then in opposition. He stands successfully in a regional and then a national election (Landtag, Bundestag). He serves as junior minister under chancellor Willy Brandt and becomes a European commissioner less than a year later. Upon his resignation from the European Commission, he makes the UK his home and becomes a (...) British subject, becomes knighted and later appointed Lord. The second half of his life, as an intellectual amid the powers and a liaison between England and the continent, as a self-described 'straddler', may have been even greater in importance than the first, with his meteoric rise as a highly visible professor of sociology and as German politician of national prominence. His analysis of society and democracy in Germany, though dated (1965) appears still for the most part as valid. Historically, his own elite positions mark transition periods in the process of generational change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Changing Theories of Undergraduate Theatre Studies, 1945–1980Anne Berkeley (bio)IntroductionThe history of theatre study in American undergraduate education is a story of prodigious quantitative success. Although it took two centuries to secure the right to perform plays at American colleges, it took only eighty years for the curriculum to grow from a few isolated courses at the turn of the twentieth century to well over 14,000 in the 1970s.1 By (...) far the steepest growth occurred during the unprecedented expansion of higher education between 1945 and 1979. But academic theatre's meteoric rise after the war years conceals more problematic qualitative achievements. Throughout its ascendancy, vexing questions persisted concerning the quality, standards, and evaluation of theatre programs. In academic journals and books, theorists explored with alacrity broad opportunities for educational theatre in the university. But they also bickered constantly about objectives and practices and their role in academe, ultimately providing a decidedly ambivalent assessment of accomplishment.According to Oscar G. Brockett, the fundamental questions are, What place, if any, should theatre have in a university? and, For what are students being educated?2 This study traces answers to these questions given by scholars and educators between 1945 and 1979.3 It explores the connections between the scholarship about theatre studies and the programs that developed, what scholars and educators wanted it to become, and what it became in the context of liberal arts education. These years are important because they are the golden age of higher education, a time of unprecedented expansion. Following World War II the G.I. Bill greatly increased student enrollment, and academic and research programs surged. At this time, the [End Page 57] university's governing interests were established by the politics of the Cold War, and the desire to surpass the Soviet Union at everything motivated the expansion of higher education.4 The National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 (legislation made possible by a prosperous economy) injected vast financial resources into program development, and federal programs such as the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) were established.An earlier study of theatre curriculum between, roughly, the Civil War and the Second World War provides a useful background against which to interpret the data for this later period.5 From the earlier study we learn that academic theatre suffered from religious hostility for two centuries but that by the end of the nineteenth century there were extracurricular dramatic clubs and productions. The emergence of the modern research university brought with it the expansion and diversification of knowledge, the differentiation of the colonial college's general curriculum into discrete disciplines, and the departmentalization of the curriculum. As principles and aims for liberal arts education, and the bachelor of arts degree, began to take shape, reconstruction of the curriculum included the introduction of departments of speech and literature, which included dramatic curricula.6 Academic theatre first began in classical and later modern language departments as a way of teaching literature in another language; later speech and English departments added courses in oral interpretation and playwriting.After George Pierce Baker opened the theatre department at Yale in 1925, theatre became an autonomous field of study in increasing numbers of universities. During this early period several developments took place: curriculum for theatrical studies developed out of extra-curricular theatre, theatre was identified and justified as a humanistic study, the seeds were planted for the university's eventual role in nonprofit and professional regional theatres, and the study of theatre as a legitimate academic discipline was developed. During this period, too, most theorists argued that theatre was one of the liberal arts and should be taught as part of the humanities. Late in the period there developed a small but increasingly vocal group of scholars and teachers who began to argue that theatre departments should teach technical skills of theatrical performance as well as humanistic inquiry. Thus was born the so-called craft or culture dichotomy: should educational theatre emphasize the crafts of performance or the humanism that prevailed in general (unspecialized) liberal study?The Forties and Fifties: The Curriculum Diversifies... (shrink)

HOME . ABOUT US . CONTACT US HELP . PUBLISH WITH US . LIBRARIANS Search in or Explore Browse Publications A-Z Browse Subjects A-Z Advanced Search University of Cambridge SIGN IN Register | Why Register? | Sign Out | Got a Voucher? prev abstract next Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes A Devout Catholic? Knowledge of The Mental Thought and Language Descartes as A Natural Philosopher Substance Dualism Notes Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes Author: Desmond M. Clarke (...) DOI: 10.1080/09608780902986680 Publication Frequency: 5 issues per year Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Issue 3 June 2009 , pages 601 - 616 John Cottingham: Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 40.00 (hb.). ISBN 978-0-19-922697-9 John Cottingham, in a new collection of essays, asks the question: 'what exactly did Descartes himself chiefly take himself to be doing?' (254). 1 While the question is relatively clear, and while it acknowledges implicitly that Descartes was probably doing a range of different things, the answer that is apparently proposed here emerges only on reading the whole collection. Cottingham distinguishes in Chapter 1 - which is a new, synoptic overview of what is discussed in the other chapters, all of which were previously published - between two approaches to reading Descartes. One is to see him as 'a dummy on which to drape various suspect doctrines (such as “Cartesian dualism”)' (3), which contemporary analytic philosophers have shown to be radically mistaken. Another approach is adopted by historians of ideas 'who make it their life's work to pay meticulous scholarly attention to the philosophical works of past ages' (3). Cottingham does not explicitly criticize either of these approaches, but he hints at situating his own as some kind of Aristotelian middle course between the two. Since the two reference points are dangerously close to straw men or what Cottingham calls 'extreme positions', the proposed middle way may simply combine elements of two approaches, each of which is entirely legitimate. I return to this question at the conclusion. In fact, many of these essays were intended to show (rightly!) that Descartes never held the philosophical positions that are often attributed to him. The interpretation of Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, provides a good example of how mistaken one can be: The Cogito ergo sum radically changed the way of doing philosophy … After Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought: all that is being- the created world, and even the Creator, is situated within the ambit of the Cogito, as contents of human consciousness. Philosophy is concerned with beings as contained in consciousness, and not as existing independently of it. (257) The only way to address such a caricature is to refer back to what Descartes actually wrote. Cottingham does precisely that, often quoting the original Latin or French texts. However, having shown successfully, by a close reading of the texts, that Descartes did not hold many of the views that are attributed to him, it still remains to say what Descartes did hold or teach about various philosophical problems that retain their perennial interest for us. This is how the question arises, intermittently, about what Descartes thought he was 'chiefly' doing, or what was his primary objective, in the course of an intellectual career that spanned three decades. However, the apparently legitimate desire to bring Descartes' intellectual endeavours into sharp focus may be frustrated by the evidence. His life and work manifestly lack the coherence or unity of purpose that one finds, for example, among many of his French or Dutch contemporaries. It is comparatively easy to 'read' the life of Gisbertus Voetius as that of an unwavering Calvinist theologian, to see Antoine Arnauld as a staunch and consistent theological defender of Port Royal, and even to interpret the obviously fragmentary contents of Pascal's unpublished notebooks (subsequently, the Penses) as an extended search for authentic religious faith, in opposition to what he perceived as the corruption of ecclesial structures. In contrast, Descartes' life reveals features that are difficult to integrate into a coherent pattern. He lived and published during a critical juncture in the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Although baptized into the Catholic Church soon after his birth in the Loire district of France, he chose to live most of his life in the aggressively Calvinist United Provinces, in which other religious practices were officially (though often ineffectively) banned. Descartes may have adopted the motto from Ovid, at least early in his career: 'bene vixit qui bene latuit' (he lives well who conceals himself well), and he seems genuinely to have wished to avoid theological controversies. However, he engaged in very public controversies with so many of his contemporaries - including Hobbes, Gassendi, the French Jesuits (collectively) and Father Dinet (in particular), Voetius and the University of Utrecht, Regius, Fermat, Roberval, Revius and other theologians at Leiden - that one might conclude that his claimed preference for a quiet life was a disingenuous mask. 2 Descartes published four books during his lifetime, and wrote at least one other that he had intended to publish. The latter was his first major composition, Le Monde, which he suppressed when he heard about Galileo's condemnation by Rome in 1633. This was followed, in 1637, by Descartes' first book (also written in French), which he tried to publish anonymously by withholding his name from the title page: the Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, & chercher la verit dans les sciences. Plus la dioptrique, les meteors, et la geometrie, qui sont des essais de cete methode. Four years later Descartes published the first edition (in Latin) of Meditationes de prima philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrator, which also included six sets of objections and replies. The Principia philosophiae appeared (in Latin) in Amsterdam in 1644, and was followed five years later by Les Passions de l'Ame (in French). 3 In parallel with these publications, Descartes carried on a very extensive correspondence over a thirty-year period (in both Latin and French), and preserved copies or drafts of his letters with a view to future publication. Given the range and variety of his interests, and the sheer volume of writings, published or otherwise, that have survived from his pen, one may be tempted to engage in a comparative evaluation, as Cottingham does, by selecting one of Descartes' books as his primary contribution to philosophy. Cottingham claims that the Meditations was Descartes''masterpiece' (44), 'the definitive statement of Descartes's philosophy' (45) and the 'definitive statement of his metaphysics' (68). He also describes the Meditations more narrowly as 'his metaphysical masterpiece' (259, 303) and, more broadly, as 'his philosophical masterpiece' (289), and he lists it with the Discours as one of Descartes' two 'masterworks' (280). The Principia offers some competition in this comparative judgement when it is described as 'the canonical presentation of his metaphysical views' (114), while 'the construction of a moral system … was the crowning aim of his philosophy' (231). Having pitched repeatedly for the Meditations as Descartes' primary text, Cottingham claims that its author was 'a devout Catholic' (215), that he was 'a devoutly religious philosopher' (256), and that he could not free himself 'from the influence of the long years of theological study he had dutifully completed at La Flche' (62). Accordingly, the Meditations should be read as 'in essence a work of theodicy' (220); 'what has pride of place in the construction of his philosophical system is … an appeal to God … the nature and existence of the Deity is something that lies at the very heart of his entire philosophical system' (255). Without quite saying so, there are hints here that Descartes was a devout Christian whose primary intellectual contribution was to write a work of metaphysics, in which God is central and in the course of which the author alternates between proving God's existence and contemplating God - the latter a seventeenth-century version of Bonaventure's Journey of the Soul to God. 'Descartes's attraction to a contemplative mode of philosophizing' (305) is reflected, in the Meditations, in 'the language of the soul's coming to rest in adoring contemplation of the light' (306). Cottingham also accepts the overwhelming evidence from Descartes' correspondence that he 'devoted most of his career not to metaphysics but to science' (108), although he quibbles elsewhere with those who adopt the shorthand term 'science' to describe part of what was called 'natural philosophy' in the seventeenth century (282). He also refers to the '(notoriously lame) argument for the essential incorporeality of the thinking self' in one of Descartes' masterworks (60), and he describes the 'strange, seemingly isolated world of his metaphysical meditations' (139), with its 'creaking ontology' (147), when read in isolation from the rest of his work as a natural philosopher. How should we read him, then, in the twenty-first century? A Devout Catholic? That Descartes was a devout Catholic is possible, unlikely and undecidable. He seems not to have studied theology at all while at school at La Flche, although he completed the pre-theology college cycle in the company of Jesuit students who then continued their studies in theology. Descartes consistently attempted to avoid public entanglement with religious and theological controversies, and said so frequently. 4 Given the alignments that prevailed at the time, both in France. (shrink)

Que lit-on de Descartes? Le Discours, souvent ampute des cinquieme et sixieme parties. Les Meditations, parce qu'elles s'inscrivent dans une querelle mondaine sur l'atheisme. Des extraits du Traite des Passions, et les doctes s'enfoncent encore parfois dans le dossier des Objections et Reponses. Et le Descartes du Monde, des Meteores ou du Traite de l'homme est abandonne a la patience curieuse des historiens des sciences, parce que, la, il delire. Nous restituer le Descartes contemporain de Theophile et de Cyrano, qui (...) evoque Cervantes et Calderon, qui, avant que sa trajectoire ne le laisse mourant dans les discours glaces du stoicisme, n'avait pour seul souci que la vie et la mort de la machine humaine, en esperant decouvrir le ressort capable de la maintenir en vie pour jamais, telle est l'action de ce livre ou le heros-philosophe de la tradition est aussi l'archetype du temps baroque. (shrink)

The article attempts to reveal the mutual relations between: the figure of the Greek god Dionysus, inseparable companion of the philosopher throughout his work, and, in contrast, the somewhat mysterious figure of the overman, who burst like a meteor in the first pages of the book “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”. Genetically linked not only to Greek mythology but also to Schopenhauer’s will, Nietzsche’s Dionysus already in “The Birth of Tragedy” appears on the other side of good and evil and sanctions the (...) supremacy of aesthetic values over moral values; in the middle stage of Nietzsche's work Dionysianism leads the philosopher to the idea of the eternal recurrence; finally, in the third stage Dionysus is drawn into a war with Christianity and is polemically sharpened in the formula “Dionysus Versus the Crucified”. At different stages of Nietzsche’s work almost all of his major philosophical ideas – except one – either derived directly from Dionysianism or were aligned with it. The image of the overman at the moment of its appearance was so out of the general picture of the philosopher's doctrine, that in the course of time he had to “correct” it. The overman loses his most outstanding, but, as it turned out, superfluous features in “Twilight of Idols”, “The Anti-Christian”, and “Ecce Homo”. Having lost interest in the idea of the overman, Nietzsche tries in his last works to structure and complete his philosophical doctrine, returning to Dionysus. By analysing his later works, the author hopes to draw the attention of researchers to these attempts of the philosopher. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to examine John Buridans’s view on scientific authority and to point out the social dimension of such an authority. Drawing mainly on Buridan’s natural philosophy (and in particular on the commentary on the Meteors), the essay identifies Buridan’s typology of scientific authority and points out how the community of masters is involved in the formation of such an authority. The important aspect of this shared formation is the openness of natural philosophy to the (...) idea of probable knowledge, and the break with a strong theoretical conception of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

On June 30, 1908, a mysterious explosion erupted in the skies over a vast woodland area of Siberia. Known as the Tunguska Event, it has been a source of wild conjecture over the past century, attributed to causes ranging from meteors to a small black hole to antimatter. In this imaginative book, Michael Hampe sets four fictional men based on real-life scholars—a physicist, a philosopher, a biologist, and a mathematician —adrift on the open ocean, in a dense fog, to (...) discuss what they think happened. The result is a playful and highly illuminating exploration of the definition of nature, mankind’s role within it, and what its end might be. Tunguska, Or the End of Nature uses its four-man setup to tackle some of today’s burning issues—such as climate change, environmental destruction, and resource management—from a diverse range of perspectives. With a kind of foreboding, it asks what the world was like, and will be like, without us, whether we are negligible and the universe random, whether nature can truly be explained, whether it is good or evil, or whether nature is simply a thought we think. This is a profoundly unique work, a thrillingly interdisciplinary piece of scholarly literature that probes the mysteries of nature and humans alike. (shrink)

Excerpt from Rene Descartes Descartes zieht sich in die Niederlande zuruck. Naheres uber die dortigen Zustande. 2. Verwerfung aller dog matiscben Voraussetzungen. Allgemeine metaphysische Grundlegung. 3. Es fehlt ihr noch die systematische Durch bildung. 4. Beschaftigung mit den mannigfachsten natur wissenschaftlichen Problemen. Heitere Stimmung des Philo 80phen. 5. Ausarbeitung einer Weltbildungstheorie. Die Grunde, weswegen das _werk nicht veroffentlicht wird. 6. Uber Descartes' Beurteilung der wissenschaftlichen Ver dienste Galileis 7. Liebesverhaltnis zwischen Descartes und einer Hollanderin. 8. Herausgabe einer Reihe wissenschaft licher (...) Werke. Charakteristik der Abhandlung uber die Methode. 9 Die Dioptrik. Technische Begabung des Philo 80phen. 10. Uber die Meteore. Ll. Geometrie. Uber die Ausdehnung und Grenzen der mathematischen Wissenschaft. Hohere Analysis. Descartes' Verhaltnis zu den abstrakten Problemen der Mathematik. Unvollkommenheit der Natur philosophie. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In the course of the twentieth century natural sciences became an integral part not only of the industrial production but also of the semiotics of audio-visual and literary cultures. In the absence of legitimating traditions the techno-scientific models and relations appear to be a readily available habitual source of creative dynamics. Yet this domination contains a paradox. The application of analogy in, for example, visual culture does not work the same way as in mathematics. In the latter when a relation (...) between two points is known it is always possible to assign to a third point its counterpart exactly. In the former it is only the potentiality of the fourth point that analogy can offer. To make the analogy work an onto-poetic step is needed. Repeated applications of such steps detach the model from the original source. The model re-emerges as pata-physics, in its new re-coded art form and territory of application. Models of, for example, atoms, rainbows, meteors, automatons, radiation, entropy, quantum effects, astro-catastrophic singularity, fractals, etc. find their way into literature and arts. This results in new divisions of space and time that in turn determine the shape of archetypal icons through which contemporary meanings are communicated and actualized. (shrink)

Le present volume analyse, non plus en amont la definition kantienne de la science, du savoir, de la scientificite en general, mais cette fois en aval la place des divers savoirs dont Kant a pu traiter. Par une serie d'etudes consacrees a diverses sciences en contexte kantien, le present volume etudie comment Kant assigne a chaque science une unite ideale, une region ontique (un domaine d'objets), une methode, voire une epistemologie, ainsi qu'un mode historique de constitution et de progression propres, (...) avec le constant souci (issu du criticisme) de distinguer les sciences, de ne jamais confondre leurs limites. Ce volume revele ainsi un Kant, non pas seulement theoricien de la science, mais theoricien, voire praticien des sciences en leur pluralite. Kant y apparait comme etant lui-meme un Naturforscher, physicien, scientifique, savant dans les sciences de la nature au sens le plus large. Ce volume souligne l'apport de Kant a un grand nombre de sciences de son temps (mathematique, physique, chimie, biologienaissante, geographie physique, cosmologie, astronomie, mais aussi sciences qualifiees aujourd'hui de sciences de l'esprit ou de l'homme, comme anthropologie ou psychologie), comme en attestent les nombreux opuscules scientifiques que Kant consacre, de 1754 a 1794, a divers sujets de science physique ou d'histoire naturelle (seismes, volcans, marees, climats, vents, influence de la Lune sur la Terre, modification de la vitesse de rotation axiale de la Terre, meteores, cometes, etc.). (shrink)

What does it mean to be human? This question has made a meteoric career for itself, becoming a focal point of almost every thread of the transhumanist debate. Significant as it is, the question eludes any definitive answer, since it directly engenders an array of related queries. This Special Issue questions our notions of the human being, human subjectivity, superiority and uniqueness, which tend to be underpinned by simplistic and simplifying dichotomies entrenched in western philosophy, science and art. Eclipsed by (...) the hierarchical vision of the world and dualistic metaphysics, the concept of the nonhuman (regardless of its biological form or ontological status) has always been dependent on its paring element (the human) losing its own significance and independent status. By articulating the problems we face in understanding and defining the human and the nonhuman, this Special Issue offers an insight into the current transhumanist discourse. Crossing the boundaries of disciplines and definitions, the contributors propose an assemblage of methodological and conceptual scaffoldings to build on in this project. They seek new ways and analytical strategies to advance the notions of ‘being one and many’ and ‘being-with’, and in doing so, they envision a new world where forging relations and co-existence with nonhuman agents lie at the core of human experience. The editorial gives some insight into the studies and concepts of this issue. (shrink)

This article explores the critical history and reception of Charles Churchill, the mid-eighteenth century satirist, looking in particular at his skepticism towards all authority as a questioning of traditional ideas of `enlightenment', and at the reasons for the meteoric but short-lived nature of his poetic success.

This article focuses on Alexei Losev’s literary texts that embrace his mythology of music: “I was 19 years old,” “A meteor,” “A woman-thinker,” “The Tchaikovsky trio,” and “An encounter.” It is shown that Losev’s musical mythology developed from his early musical-critical works—through the artistic-mythological episodes of his philosophical works per se —to his fiction of the 1930s. Losev’s intentionally abstract philosophy of music required to be complemented by the artistic, emotional, socially and historically specific expression. The main idea of Losev’s (...) musical myth in its historical-cultural aspect is to reflect the relevant self-consciousness of an individual. The epoch of religious super-individualism and “prayerful delight” is replaced by the epoch of “musical delight” and professed idealization of an individual. This change was a reason of the extreme ambivalence of music, which, on the one hand, expresses the highest order and harmony and, on the other, is a continuous evolvement and chaos, a substantive uncertainty. The novelty of the article consists, firstly, in the analysis of correspondence between musical ambivalence and drama in the lives of the heroes, especially heroines symbolizing music itself; and secondly, in identifying the constant features of Losev’s musical myth, as well as its specific features that emerge at different stages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The “Wider View”: André Hellegers’s Passionate, Integrating Intellect and the Creation of BioethicsWarren Thomas Reich* (bio)AbstractThis article provides an account of how André Hellegers, founder and first Director of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, laid medicine open to bioethics. Hellegers’s approach to bioethics, as to morality generally and also to medicine and biomedical science, involved taking the “wider view”—a value-filled vision that integrated and gave meaning (...) to what otherwise was disparate, precarious, and conflicting. This article shows how Hellegers’s wider view of bioethics was shaped by events in his own life, his resultant sense of the precariousness of life and health, his commitment to religious inclusiveness, his research in fetal medicine, his clinical experience in obstetrics, his role in the struggle to change the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church on fertility control, and his developing concepts of health and disease. Hellegers was committed to and worked toward bioethics as a self-consciously interdisciplinary field in which the contributing disciplines adapt to each other—rather than sustain themselves as autonomous disciplines—to create a dynamic and complex intellectual, clinical, and social activity.André Hellegers’s personality and life were like that of a meteor: brief appearance on the scene; high-speed, flaming trajectory; quick burn-out; its smallest residue worth examining for ages to come. You had to watch carefully, for otherwise you might miss what he was about—what he was really about. He had an unusually probing and unflagging mind, coupled with the ability to make people think; and in a very real sense, that is what he was always about. André was an extremely effective communicator. He was like Fred Astaire: he had flair and charm, and no matter how crowded the room, you instantly knew when he entered it. Like Astaire, he had a deep intensity and striving for perfection while making his art always look like great fun. He was an engaging [End Page 25] story-teller who also knew how to stun intelligent people with his insightful, often ironic and humorous thinking that got to the bottom of things very quickly, leaving his interlocutors with a huge agenda for further reflection. Yet in spite of all this alluring talent, André never attracted attention to himself in a vain way. Even as raconteur, he was always working, getting people to think and talk.There were three great passions in Hellegers’s life that enabled him to inspire and shape bioethics as he did. He had a passionate intellect that was constantly probing for new clarity at new levels of understanding and values, and he had the ability to infect other people with his intellectual passion. André Hellegers was deeply rooted in a Catholicism scarcely imaginable in the United States—an open, historically-conscious, northern European faith that kept him free of ideology while providing him a foundation on which he built a rich ecumenicity of theological and philosophical bioethics. Finally, and perhaps most decisively for his founding work in bioethics, Hellegers pushed and probed to get a world that was almost totally unaccustomed to communicating over disciplinary lines (incredibly, virtually no interdisciplinary conferences had taken place before his day) to dialogue and collaborate across the barriers of medicine, politics, and religion.IntroductionThe customary way of writing a history of someone’s involvement in the origins of something—say, the origins of a nation or, I suppose, the origins of bioethics—certainly would not customarily start with the foregoing type of vignette. It would have as its purpose to discuss such things as issues, events that raised issues, methods pursued and applied, and outcomes achieved. However, in this modest account of some of the major contributions of the late André E. Hellegers, M.D., to the development of the field of bioethics, I intend to focus on a different level of historical inquiry, one that portrays and explains the person, his world-view, and his motivation, as well as the cultural forces and events that conspired to make Hellegers and the people with whom he came into contact vibrant with a sense of innovative and creative—not to mention urgent—inquiry. I believe that... (shrink)

Summarization of legal case judgement documents is a practical and challenging problem, for which many summarization algorithms of different varieties have been tried. In this work, rather than developing yet another summarization algorithm, we investigate if intelligently ensembling (combining) the outputs of multiple (base) summarization algorithms can lead to better summaries of legal case judgements than any of the base algorithms. Using two datasets of case judgement documents from the Indian Supreme Court, one with extractive gold standard summaries and the (...) other with abstractive gold standard summaries, we apply various ensembling techniques on summaries generated by a wide variety of summarization algorithms. The ensembling methods applied range from simple voting-based methods to ranking-based and graph-based ensembling methods. We show that many of our ensembling methods yield summaries that are better than the summaries produced by any of the individual base algorithms, in terms of ROUGE and METEOR scores. (shrink)

An insider's provocative account of one of the most contentious debates in science today When Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, two of the world's leading evolutionary theorists, proposed a bold new theory of evolution—the theory of "punctuated equilibria"—they stood the standard interpretation of Darwin on its head. They also ignited a furious debate about the true nature of evolution. On the one side are the geneticists. They contend that evolution proceeds slowly but surely, driven by competition among organisms to (...) transmit their genes from generation to generation. On the other are the paleontologists, like Eldredge and Gould, who show in the fossil record that in fact evolution proceeds only sporadically. Long periods of no change—equilibria—are "punctuated" by episodes of rapid evolutionary activity. According to the paleontologists, this pattern shows that evolution is driven far more by environmental forces than by genetic competition. How can the prevailing views on evolution be so different? In Reinventing Darwin, Niles Eldredge offers a spirited account of the dispute and an impressive case for the paleontologists' side of the story. With the mastery that only a leading contributor to the debate can provide, he charts the course of theory from Darwin's day to the present and explores the fundamental mysteries and crucial questions that underlie the current quarrels. Is evolution fired by a gentle and persistent motor and fueled by the survival instincts of "selfish genes"? Or does it proceed in fits and starts, as the fossil record seems to show? What is the role of environmental changes such as habitat destruction and of cataclysmic events like meteor impacts? Are most species inherently stable, changing only very little until they succumb to extinction? Or are species highly adaptable, changing all the time? Eldredge sorts through the major findings and interpretations and presents a lively introduction to the leading edge of evolutionary theory today. Reinventing Darwin offers a rare insider's view of the sometimes contentious, but always stimulating work of scientific inquiry. PRAISE FOR NILES ELDREDGE'S PREVIOUS BOOKS The Miner's Canary: Unraveling the Mysteries of Extinction "The Miner's Canary rings with integrity. The author takes care to present opposing views. Some readers, indeed, might view Mr. Eldredge as a little too self-effacing; he is, after all, one of the world's leading experts in his field."—The New York Times Book Review Fossils: The Evolution and Extinction of Species "... an important and informative book. It is also delightfully idiosyncratic. This is no scholarly treatise defending academic argument. It is an essay for everyone interested in the story of earthly life."—The Christian Science Monitor Life Pulse: Episodes from the Story of the Fossil Record "This is Earth history on a grand scale; those who enjoy the works of Stephen Jay Gould will appreciate Life Pulse."—Publishers Weekly. (shrink)

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's texts on the philosophy of science (The Experiment as Mediator Between Object and Subject, 1793) and (Meteors of the Literary Sky, 1820) both discuss the fundamental epistemological question how knowledge emerges: They ask how scientists can gain universally valid knowledge by observing natural phenomena and to what extent the individual researcher is affected by the scientific community. In this paper, Goethe's writings are presented as alternatives to the contemporary discussions on scientific plagiarism. Goethe shows that (...) the linking of knowledge to an individual subject is less an effect of scientific practice than the result of a specific practice of attribution. Plagiarism thus appears as a logical consequence of the principle of priority in modern scientific culture. (shrink)

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was a Roman Stoic philosopher, dramatist, statesman, and adviser to the emperor Nero, all during the Silver Age of Latin literature. The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca is a fresh and compelling series of new English-language translations of his works in eight accessible volumes. Edited by world-renowned classicists Elizabeth Asmis, Shadi Bartsch, and Martha C. Nussbaum, this engaging collection restores Seneca—whose works have been highly praised by modern authors from Desiderius Erasmus to Ralph Waldo Emerson—to his (...) rightful place among the classical writers most widely studied in the humanities. Written near the end of Seneca’s life, Natural Questions is a work in which Seneca expounds and comments on the natural sciences of his day—rivers and earthquakes, wind and snow, meteors and comets—offering us a valuable look at the ancient scientific mind at work. The modern reader will find fascinating insights into ancient philosophical and scientific approaches to the physical world and also vivid evocations of the grandeur, beauty, and terror of nature. (shrink)