Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik scheinen zwei unterschiedliche, ja, sich ausschließende philosophische Ansätze zu sein. Bestimmt man aber Naturphilosophie als Metaphysik der Natur im Sinne des Projekts, im Ausgang von den naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen zu einer kohärenten und vollständigen Sicht der Welt zu gelangen, ergibt sich eine neue und überraschende Konstellation. Die Bezugnahme auf die Naturwissenschaften verleiht der Metaphysik einerseits die Berechtigung dazu, revisionär zu sein, das heißt, Erkenntnisansprüche, die aus dem alltäglichen Weltverständnis stammen, zu revidieren. Andererseits ist eine solche Metaphysik ebenso hypothetisch (...) wie die Wissenschaften selbst. Michael Esfeld zeigt zunächst, wie man in diesem Rahmen einen wissenschaftlichen Realismus vertreten kann, und begründet dann so umstrittene Thesen wie die eines vierdimensionalen Blockuniversums mit Ereignissen und Prozessen statt Substanzen oder die eines naturphilosophischen Holismus und Strukturenrealismus statt eines Atomismus und rehabilitiert die Idee notwendiger Verbindungen in der Natur. (shrink)

It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...) a crucial role—perhaps the only crucial role—in the justification of our noninferential beliefs. But Phenomenal Conservatism seems to conflict, in a number of ways, with externalist accounts of justification. As a result, the attractiveness of the intuitions appealed to in support of views like Phenomenal Conservatism present something of a challenge to externalism. The purpose of this paper is to deal with that challenge by developing and defending an externalist-friendly account of the role of seemings in the formation and justification of our noninferential beliefs—an account that incorporates what is attractive in views like Phenomenal Conservatism. Because this externalist-friendly account is compatible with both externalist accounts of justification and the plausible elements of views like Phenomenal Conservatism, the challenge to externalism inspired by such views is thereby undermined. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

Contemporary psycholinguistic models place significant emphasis on the cognitive processes involved in the acquisition, recognition, and production of language but neglect many issues related to the representation of language-related information in the mental lexicon. In contrast, a central tenet of network science is that the structure of a network influences the processes that operate in that system, making process and representation inextricably connected. Here, we consider how the structure found across phonological networks of several languages from different language families may (...) influence language processing as we age and experience diseases that affect cognition during the typical and atypical acquisition of new words, during typical perception and production of speech in adults, and during language change over time. We conclude that the network science approach may not only provide insights into specific language processes but also provide a way to connect the work from these domains, which are becoming increasingly balkanized. (shrink)

Many Sides is the first full-length study of Protagorean antilogic, an argumentative practice with deep roots in rhetorical history and renewed relevance for contemporary culture. Founded on the philosophical relativism of Protagoras, antilogic is a dynamic rather than a formal approach to argument, focused principally on the dialogical interaction of opposing positions (anti-logoi) in controversy. In ancient Athens, antilogic was the cardinal feature of Sophistic rhetoric. In Rome, Cicero redefined Sophistic argument in a concrete set of dialogical procedures. In turn, (...) Quintilian inherited this dialogical tradition and made it the centrepiece of his own rhetorical practice and pedagogy. Many Sides explores the history, theory, and pedagogy of this neglected rhetorical tradition and, by appeal to recent rhetorical and philosophical theory, reconceives the enduring features of antilogical practice in a dialogical approach to argumentation especially suited to the pluralism of our own age and the diversity of modern classrooms. (shrink)

In his article, ‘What's Wrong with Tooley's Argument from Evil?’, Calum Miller's goal was to show that the evidential argument from evil that I have advanced is unsound, and in support of that claim, Miller set out three main objections. First, he argued that I had failed to recognize that the actual occurrence of an event can by itself, at least in principle, constitute good evidence that it was not morally wrong for God to allow events of the kind in (...) question. Miller's second objection was then that, in attempting to show that it is unlikely that God exists, I had failed to consider either positive arguments in support of the existence of God or possible theodicies, and thus that I was unjustified in drawing any conclusions concerning the probability that theism is true in the light of the total evidence available. Miller's third and final objection was that one of the approaches to logical probability that I employed – namely, that based upon a structure-description equiprobability principle, rather than a state-description equiprobability principle – was unsound since it has clearly unacceptable implications. In response, I argue that all three of Miller's objections are unsound. The third objection, however, is nevertheless important since it shows that my type of argument from evil cannot be based merely on the evils found in the world. One must also consider good states of affairs, and their relations to bad ones. I show, however, that that deficiency can be addressed in a completely satisfactory manner. (shrink)

Intuitionism can be seen as a verificationism restricted to mathematical discourse. An attempt to generalize intuitionism to empirical discourse presents various challenges. One of those concerns the logical and semantical behavior of what has been called ' empirical negation'. An extension of intuitionistic logic with empirical negation was given by Michael De and a labelled tableaux system was there shown sound and complete. However, a Hilbert-style axiom system that is sound and complete was missing. In this paper we provide (...) the missing axiom system which is shown sound and complete with respect to its intended semantics. Along the way we consider some further applications of empirical negation. (shrink)

I consider two threats to the idea that on-line intelligent behaviour (the production of fluid and adaptable responses to ongoing sensory input) must or should be explained by appeal to neurally located representations. The first of these threats occurs when extra-neural factors account for the kind of behavioural richness and flexibility normally associated with representation-based control. I show how this anti-representational challenge can be met, if we apply the thought that, to be a representational system, an action-oriented neural system must (...) not only be the source of at least some of the observed behavioural richness and flexibility, it must also feature two architectural traits, namely arbitrariness and homuncularity. Unfortunately, however, this solution opens the door to our second threat to representation. The homuncularity condition will not be met by any system in which the causal contribution of each component is massively context-sensitive and variable over time. I end by discussing the empirical bet that biological nervous systems will not exhibit this style of causation. (shrink)

Chapter 1 presents BS, a basic syllogistic system based on Aristotle's logic, in natural deduction form. Chapters 2 and 3 treat the metatheory of BS: consitency, soundness, independence, and completeness. Chapter 4 and 5 deal with syllogistic and, in turn, propositional and predicate logic, chapter 6 is on existential import, chapter 7 on subject and predicate and chapter 8 on classes. Chapter 9 adds negative variables to BS, and proves its soundness and completeness.

Against arealist background, the paper starts by demonstrating the horror of the very popular doctrine, “Worldmaking”, according to which a known world is partly constructed by our imposition of concepts. The rest of the paper aims to make worldmaking hard. (i) It rejects the usual episternological and semantic paths to Worldmaking arguing that they use the wrong methodology and proceed in the wrong direction. (ii) It considers the relation between Worldmaking and the response-dependency theory of concepts. Philip Pettit has proposed (...) a global version of that theory: all our concepts are response-dependent. The paper argues that this theory provides an example of the semantic path to Worldmaking and for that reason alone should be rejected. (shrink)

Computational complexity theory is a branch of computer science dedicated to classifying computational problems in terms of their difficulty. While computability theory tells us what we can compute in principle, complexity theory informs us regarding our practical limits. In this chapter I argue that the science of \emph{quantum computing} illuminates complexity theory by emphasising that its fundamental concepts are not model-independent, but that this does not, as some suggest, force us to radically revise the foundations of the theory. For model-independence (...) never has been essential to those foundations. The fundamental aim of complexity theory is to describe what is achievable in practice under various models of computation for our various practical purposes. Reflecting on quantum computing illuminates complexity theory by reminding us of this, too often under-emphasised, fact. (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 280-298, October 2021.

What does the growing tide of displaced persons today teach us about the ongoing paradoxes of human rights regimes, which rely on the particular sovereignty of nation-states for their constitution and application but are framed and normatively justified as universal? Working with Arendt’s defense of ‘the right to have rights’ in response to the problem of statelessness which is the practical lynchpin of these historical and theoretical tensions, I specify that and why any person on earth, regardless of their legal (...) status as a national or resident or non-resident alien, can legitimately expect two things from the political community in which they reside: hospitality and membership. (shrink)

This interview took place through email during October-November, 2019. Michael: It’s a real pleasure to engage you in conversation. You were a foundation member of PESA and someone who in the pre-I...

Evolutionary biology distinguishes differences in survival and reproduction rates due to selection from those due to drift. The distinction is usually thought to be founded in probabilistic facts: a difference in (say) two variants' average lifespans over some period of time that is due to selection is explained by differences in the probabilities relevant to survival; in the purest cases of drift, by contrast, the survival probabilities are equal and the difference in lifespans is a matter of chance. When there (...) is a difference in actual average lifespans there is always a difference in causal histories, but in drift, the causal differences make no contribution to the relevant probabilities. Some writers have claimed that the framework that determines which causes contribute to the probabilities, and so the framework that determines when the relevant probabilities differ and when they are equal, is imposed by modelers rather than being an objective fact of nature, and so that the distinction between selection and drift, however practically useful, is unreal. This paper uses my work on biological probabilities (Bigger than Chaos) and probabilistic explanation (Depth) to argue for the objectivity of, and the importance of the objectivity of, the distinction between selection and drift. (shrink)

Rickert, value philosophy, and the primacy of practical reason -- Husserl, phenomenology, and lived-experience -- Heideggerian reflections on Paul Natorp -- Dilthey on life, lived-experience, and worldview philosophy -- Toward a fundamental ontology -- Philosophy as praxix.

Leo Strauss and his alleged political influence regarding the Iraq War have in recent years been the subject of significant media attention, including stories in the _Wall Street Journal _and _New York Times._ _Time_ magazine even called him “one of the most influential men in American politics.” With _The Truth about Leo Strauss_, Michael and Catherine Zuckert challenged the many claims and speculations about this notoriously complex thinker. Now, with _Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy_, they turn (...) their attention to a searching and more comprehensive interpretation of Strauss’s thought as a whole, using the many manifestations of the “problem of political philosophy” as their touchstone. For Strauss, political philosophy presented a “problem” to which there have been a variety of solutions proposed over the course of Western history. Strauss’s work, they show, revolved around recovering—and restoring—political philosophy to its original Socratic form. Since positivism and historicism represented two intellectual currents that undermined the possibility of a Socratic political philosophy, the first part of the book is devoted to Strauss’s critique of these two positions. Then, the authors explore Strauss’s interpretation of the history of philosophy and both ancient and modern canonical political philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Locke. Strauss’s often-unconventional readings of these philosophers, they argue, pointed to solutions to the problem of political philosophy. Finally, the authors examine Strauss’s thought in the context of the twentieth century, when his chief interlocutors were Schmitt, Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. The most penetrating and capacious treatment of the political philosophy of this complex and often misunderstood thinker, from his early years to his last works, _Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy_ reveals Strauss’s writings as an attempt to show that the distinctive characteristics of ancient and modern thought derive from different modes of solving the problem of political philosophy and reveal why he considered the ancient solution both philosophically and politically superior. (shrink)

For many years now, much of BonJour’s work has focused on ways of developing a dilemma he finds in the work of Wilfred Sellars. In his earlier work, BonJour argued against internalist foundationalism using this Sellarsian dilemma. But he has since switched his allegiance and now wants to offer a solution to this dilemma on behalf of internalist foundationalism. He believes that if his solution fails, internalist foundationalism is in serious trouble. I agree with that conditional and my aim in (...) sections 1-3 will be to argue that his solution does fail. In the final section, I will briefly defend externalism against one of BonJour’s objections to it. (shrink)

Written by well-known professor and author Michael Boylan, Morality and Global Justice is an accessible examination of the moral and normative underpinnings of ...

On December 10th, 1947, John von Neumann wrote to the Spanish translator of his Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: 1Your questions on the nature of mathematical physics and theoretical physics are interesting but a little difficult to answer with precision in my own mind. I have always drawn a somewhat vague line of demarcation between the two subjects, but it was really more a difference in distribution of emphases. I think that in theoretical physics the main emphasis is on the (...) connection with experimental physics and those methodological processes which lead to new theories and new formulations, whereas mathematical physics deals with the actual solution and mathematical execution of a theory which is assumed to be correct per se, or assumed to be correct for the sake of the discussion. In other words, I would say that theoretical physics deals rather with the formation and mathematical physics rather with the exploitation of physical theories. However, when a new theory has to be evaluated and compared with experience, both aspects mix. (shrink)

Nuno Venturinha holds that the contextualist epistemology adumbrated in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--the most powerful response to philosophical skepticism yet developed-- falls short of providing a complete answer to Cartesian radical skepticism about knowledge of the external world. I argue that Venturinha underestimates the range and complexity of Wittgenstein’s epistemological. He does so because he reads Wittgenstein along the lines of so-called ‘hinge epistemology’. Hinge epistemology indeed fails as a diagnosis of skepticism. But it also fails as a reading of Wittgenstein. (...) A more adequate understanding of Wittgenstein suggests that Venturinha’s pessimistic conclusion can be avoided. (shrink)

Was leistete der Gedanke der selbstandigen Auswahl (Eklektik) in der Geschichte der Philosophie von Aristoteles bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, wo liegen die Anwendungsgebiete, wo seine Grenzen und warum kam der Begriff der Eklektik schon im 18. Jahrhundert zur Bezeichnung unselbstandiger Vermischung herunter? Der Schwerpunkt der umfangreichen Arbeit liegt in der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft des 17. Jahrhunderts; sie reicht aber bis zur eklektischen Psychotherapie der Gegenwart.

Examines the dialogues from Plato's early and middle periods and illustrates the similarities and differences between Plators"s concept of craft knowledge and ...

This paper begins the development of a pragmatics of emotion based on the pragma-dialectical programme, Externalization, Socialization, Functionalization, and Dialectification, applied to the emotional mode of argumentation. The first step points out a systematic equivocation within pragma-dialectics between the notion of argument and that of 'dialectics.' With this cleared, it is shown that each of the first three main assumptions can be altered to accommodate a non-logical mode of communication. However, dialectification, insofar as it is actually defining of the dialectical (...) mode, must be created anew. A defining assumption for emotionality is presented as a replacement for dialectification. (shrink)

The history of building automated theorem provers for higher-order logic is almost as old as the field of deduction systems itself. The first successful attempts to mechanize and implement higher-order logic were those of Huet [13] and Jensen and Pietrzykowski [17]. They combine the resolution principle for higher-order logic (first studied in [1]) with higher-order unification. The unification problem in typed λ-calculi is much more complex than that for first-order terms, since it has to take the theory of αβη-equality into (...) account. As a consequence, the higher-order unification problem is undecidable and sets of solutions need not even always have most general elements that represent them. Thus the mentioned calculi for higher-order logic have take special measures to circumvent the problems posed by the theoretical complexity of higher-order unification. In this paper, we will exemplify the methods and proof- and model-theoretic tools needed for extending first-order automated theorem proving to higherorder logic. For the sake of simplicity take the tableau method as a basis (for a general introduction to first-order tableaux see part I.1) and discuss the higherorder tableau calculi HT and HTE first presented in [19]. The methods in this paper also apply to higher-order resolution calculi [1, 13, 6] or the higher-order matings method of Peter [3], which extend their first-order counterparts in much the same way. Since higher-order calculi cannot be complete for the standard semantics by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem [11], only the weaker notion of Henkin models [12] leads to a meaningful notion of completeness in higher-order logic. It turns out that the calculi in [1, 13, 3, 19] are not Henkin-complete, since they fail to capture the extensionality principles of higher-order logic. We will characterize the deductive power of our calculus HT (which is roughly equivalent to these calculi) by the semantics of functional Σ-models. To arrive at a calculus that is complete with respect to Henkin models, we build on ideas from [6] and augment HT with tableau construction rules that use the extensionality principles in a goal-oriented way.. (shrink)

Through autobiography, I explain why I cannot accept conventional Christianity or any other form of religious belief. I sketch how, through modern evolutionary theory, I try to find an alternative world‐picture, one which is, however, essentially agnostic about ultimate meanings. I characterize my position as being that of “David Hume brought up‐to‐date by Charles Darwin.” I express sad skepticism about ever realizing the hopes on which Zygon was founded.