As is perhaps more well-known than the contents of the book itself, Siegfried Kracauer’s Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality, while deemed an important work of “classical” film theory, has never been fully embraced by film theorists.1 Agreeing with Miriam Bratu Hansen that Kracauer’s work is “often misread as ordaining a ‘naively realist’ theory of film”, the purpose of this article is to examine what Kracauer actually means when he writes, “My book differs from most (...) writings in the field in that it is a material aesthetics, not a formal one. It is concerned with content. […] Films come into their own when they record and reveal physical reality”. My.. (shrink)

Adriano Ardovino, Raccogliere il mondo. Per una fenomenologia della rete [Angela Maiello] • Clive Bell, L’Arte [Filippo Focosi] • Alessandro Bertinetto, Il pensiero dei suoni. Temi di filosofia della musica [Domenica Lentini] • Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature. How Mind Emerged From Matter [Mariagrazia Portera] • Roger Scruton, La bellezza. Ragione ed esperienza estetica [Filippo Focosi] • Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Experience. Sigfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin and Theoder W. Adorno [Domenico Spinosa] • Lawrence Barsalou, scritti sulla “Grounded (...) Cognition” [Gialuca Consoli] • Dis-forme , Università degli Studi di Palermo, 28-29 maggio 2012 [Michele Bertolini e Pietro Conte]. (shrink)

The G7 should address new, unprecedented and highly disruptive issues that characterize our complex world, rather than well-understood international problems that fit into existing categories. We argue that the G7 can do this by playing to its strengths – informality and like-mindedness in particular – in addressing emerging and transversal issues such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrencies.

Miriam and I were born in 1949, only a month apart. The world we were born to was deeply marked by then-recent history. Our playgrounds were the rubble fields in the streets and the extended woods between Frankfurt, where I grew up, and Darmstadt, where Miriam grew up, some twenty-five miles apart.

Although with “aura” Benjamin designates more a “family”, or a “constellation” of phenomena, than a univocal concept, the analogical traits of these phenomena are grounded in an aesthetic unity of sense. The aesthetic (as distinguished from the “artistic”) understanding of “aura” is not juxtaposed to the “anthropological, perceptual-mnemonic, and visionary” dimension of it (Bratu Hansen), but it is rather its root. As a transcendental aspect of perception and imagination, though, the aura marks our experience in different ways, according (...) to determinate historical conditions. If, in a post-traditional society, every attempt to produce auratic experiences is doomed to produce phony auratic phenomena, the potentialities of the aura are nevertheless not exhausted: the “room-for-play” (Spielraum) of experimentation invoked by Benjamin can be maintained open only in the interplay of auratic and non-auratic polarities: attention vs. distraction, distance vs. nearness, tactile vs. optical, determined vs. undetermined. (shrink)

Is the term ‘racist’ being applied so widely that it is losing its moral force? Theorists and pundits from across the political spectrum think that it is. They call such a change of meaning “conceptual inflation” and argue that we should try to stop it by restricting the use of ‘racist’ or replacing ‘racist’ with new expressions. But what evidence do we have that ‘racist’ is inflated? Economists do not track currency inflation with mere vibes; they use measurements such as (...) the consumer price index. For example, using CPI, it is observable that there has been considerable US dollar inflation over the last three decades or so: $1.00 in 1989 has the purchasing power of $2.54 in 2024. If ‘racist’ has undergone a similar transformation, as critics of conceptual inflation contend, how could that be measured? Before plunging into the normative debate about whether conceptual inflation is good or bad, we should gather systematic empirical evidence about whether the purported conceptual inflation of ‘racist’ is in fact happening. That is what we do in this paper: we use an apparent time study, a technique drawn from sociolinguistics, to measure whether ‘racist’ is undergoing conceptual inflation. An apparent time study looks at the linguistic behavior of people of different ages as a way of measuring linguistic variation over time. We distinguish two processes that constitute conceptual inflation: extension expansion and intensity bleaching. Across three studies, we found some equivocal evidence that ‘racist’ has undergone extension expansion—its reference class may have slightly expanded—but no evidence that it has undergone intensity bleaching—its moral force remains the same. By comparing ‘racist’ with other terms that have plausibly undergone meaning change, like ‘queer’, we argue that claims about the conceptual inflation of ‘racist’, as they are standardly understood, are overblown. (shrink)

When experimental participants are given the chance to reflect and revise their initial judgments in a dynamic conversational context, do their responses to philosophical scenarios differ from responses to those same scenarios presented in a traditional static survey? In three experiments comparing responses given in conversational contexts with responses to traditional static surveys, we find no consistent evidence that responses differ in these different formats. This aligns with recent findings that various manipulations of reflectiveness have no effect on participants’ judgments (...) about philosophical scenarios. Although we did not find a consistent quantitative effect of format (conversation vs. static survey), conversational experiments still provide qualitative insights into debates about how participants are understanding (or misunderstanding) the scenarios they read in experimental studies, whether they are replacing difficult questions with questions that are more easily answered, and how participants are imagining the scenarios they read in ways that differ from what is explicitly stated by experimenters. We argue that conversational experiments—"Socratic questionnaires"—help show what is going on “under the hood” of traditional survey designs in the experimental investigation of philosophical questions. (shrink)

The question naturally arises: Is public art inherently violent, or is it a provocation to violence? Is violence built into the monument in its very conception? Or is violence simply an accident that befalls some monuments, a matter of the fortunes of history? The historical record suggests that if violence is simply an accident that happens to public art, it is one that is always waiting to happen. The principal media and materials of public art are stone and metal sculpture (...) not so much by choice as by necessity. “A public sculpture,” says Lawrence Alloway, “should be invulnerable or inaccessible. It should have the material strength to resist attack or be easily cleanable, but it also needs a formal structure that is not wrecked by alterations.”12 The violence that surrounds public art is more, however, than simply the ever-present possibility of an accident—the natural disaster or random act of vandalism. Much of the world’s public art—memorials, monuments, triumphal arches, obelisks, columns, and statues—has a rather direct reference to violence in the form of war or conquest. From Ozymandias to Caesar to Napoleon to Hitler, public art has served as a kind of monumentalizing of violence, and never more powerfully than when it presents the conqueror as a man of peace, imposing a Napoleonic code or a pax Romana on the world. Public sculpture that is too frank or explicit about this monumentalizing of violence, whether the Assyrian palace reliefs of the ninth century b.c., or Morris’s bomb sculpture proposal of 1981, is likely to offend the sensibilities of a public committed to the repression of its own complicity in violence.13 The very notion of public art as we receive it is inseparable from what Jürgen Habermas has called “the liberal model of the public sphere,” a dimension distinct from the economic, the private, and the political. This ideal realm provides the space in which disinterested citizens may contemplate a transparent emblem of their own inclusiveness and solidarity, and deliberate on the general good, free of coercion, violence, or private interests.14 12. Lawrence Alloway, “The Public Sculpture Problem,” Studio International 184 : 124.13. See Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, “The Forms of Violence,” October, no. 8 : 17-29, for an important critique of the “narrativization” of violence in Western art and an examination of the alternative suggested by the Assyrian palace reliefs.14. Habermas first introduced this concept in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence . First published in 1962, it has since become the focus of an extensive literature. See also Habermas’s short encyclopedia article, “The Public Sphere,” trans. Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, New German Critique 1 : 49-55, and the introduction to it by Peter Hohendahl in the same issue, pp. 45-48. I owe much to the guidance of Miriam Hansen and Lauren Berlant on this complex and crucial topic. W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is Gaylord Donnelly Distinguished Service Professor of English and art at the University of Chicago. His recent book is Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. (shrink)

The close ties between modes of governing, subjectivities and critique in contemporary societies challenge the role of critical social research. The classical normative ethos of the unmasking researcher unravelling various oppressive structures of dominant vs. dominated groups in society is inadequate when it comes to understand de-politicizing mechanisms and the struggles they bring about. This article argues that only a non-normative position can stay attentive to the constant and complex evolution of modes of governing and the critical operations actors themselves (...) engage in. The article outlines a non-normative but critical programme based on an ethos of re-politicizing contemporary pervasive modes of governing. The analytical advantages and limitations of such a programme are demonstrated by readings of both Foucauldian studies and the works of and debates regarding the French pragmatic sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot. (shrink)

Are plants sentient? Several researchers argue that plants might be sentient. They do so on the grounds that plants exhibit cognitive behaviour similar to that of sentient organisms and that they possess a vascular system which is functionally equivalent to the animal nervous system. This paper will not attempt to settle the issue of plant sentience. Instead, the paper has two goals. First, it provides a diagnosis of the current state of the debate on plant sentience. It is argued that (...) the current state of the debate on plant sentience cannot yield any progress because the behavioural and physiological similarities pointed to as a way of inferring consciousness are not, in themselves, indicative of consciousness. Second, the paper proposes we adopt the theory-light approach proposed by Birch (Noûs 56(1):133–153, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12351 ) whereby we start to test for clusters of cognitive abilities facilitated by consciousness in plants. Currently, there are no such tests and therefore no evidence for plant sentience. The paper proposes that the task for future research on plants be in line with the tests outlined in the theory-light approach. (shrink)

Film Theory addresses the core concepts and arguments created or used by academics, critical film theorists, and filmmakers, including the work of Dudley Andrew, Raymond Bellour, Mary Ann Doane, Miriam Hansen, bell hooks, Siegfried Kracauer, Raul Ruiz, P. Adams Sitney, Bernard Stiegler, and Pier Paolo Pasolini. This volume takes the position that film theory is a form of writing that produces a unique cinematic grammar; and like all grammars, it forms part of the system of rules that govern (...) a language, and is thus applicable to wider range of media forms. In their creation of authorial trends, identification of the technology of cinema as a creative force, and production of films as aesthetic markers, film theories contribute an epistemological resource that connects the technologies of filmmaking and film composition. This book explores these connections through film theorisations of processes of the diagrammatisation of cinematic matters of the filmic world. (shrink)

Bringing together 20 foundational texts in contemporary modernist criticism in one accessible volume, this book explores the debates that have transformed the field of modernist studies at the turn of the millennium and into the 21st century. The New Modernist Studies Reader features chapters covering the major topics central to the study of modernism today, including: Feminism, gender and sexuality; Empire and race; Print and media cultures; Historical and geographical debates. Each text includes an introductory summary of its historical and (...) intellectual contexts, as well as guides to further reading to help students and teachers explore the ideas further. Includes essential texts by leading critics such as: Pascale Casanova, Anne Anlin Cheng, Brent Hayes Edwards, Rita Felski, Susan Stanford Friedman, Mark Goble, Miriam Hansen, Andreas Huyssen, David James, Fredric Jameson, Heather K. Love, Douglas Mao, Mark S. Morrisson, Michael North, Jessica Pressman, Lawrence Rainey, Paul K. Saint-Amour, Bonnie Kime Scott, Urmila Seshagiri, Robert Spoo, and Rebecca Walkowitz. (shrink)

This article argues, contra-Derrida, that Foucault does not essentialize or pre-comprehend the meaning of life or bio- in his writings on biopolitics. Instead, Foucault problematizes life and provokes genealogical questions about the meaning of modernity more broadly. In The Order of Things, the 1974-75 lecture course at the Collège de France, and Herculine Barbin, the monster is an important figure of the uncertain shape of modernity and its entangled problems (life, sex, madness, criminality, etc). Engaging Foucault’s monsters, I show that (...) the problematization of life is far from a “desire for a threshold,” à la Derrida. It is a spur to interrogating and critiquing thresholds, a fraught question mark where we have “something to do.” As Foucault puts it in “The Lives of Infamous Men,” it an ambiguous frontier where beings lived and died and they appear to us “because of an encounter with power which, in striking down a life and turning it to ashes, makes it emerge, like a flash [...].”. (shrink)

An anthology of the most important historical sources, classical and modern, on the subjects of presumptions and burdens of proof In the last fifty years, the study of argumentation has become one of the most exciting intellectual crossroads in the modern academy. Two of the most central concepts of argumentation theory are presumptions and burdens of proof. Their functions have been explicitly recognized in legal theory since the middle ages, but their pervasive presence in all forms of argumentation and in (...) inquiries beyond the law--including politics, science, religion, philosophy, and interpersonal communication--have been the object of study since the nineteenth century. However, the documents and essays central to any discussion of presumptions and burdens of proof as devices of argumentation are scattered across a variety of remote sources in rhetoric, law, and philosophy. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof: An Anthology of Argumentation and the Law brings together for the first time key texts relating to the history of the theory of presumptions along with contemporary studies that identify and give insight into the issues facing students and scholars today. The collection's first half contains historical sources and begins with excerpts from Aristotle's Topics and goes on to include the locus classicus chapter from Bishop Whately's crucial Elements of Rhetoric as well as later reactions to Whately's views. The second half of the collection contains contemporary essays by contributors from the fields of law, philosophy, rhetoric, and argumentation and communication theory. These essays explore contemporary understandings of presumptions and burdens of proof and their role in numerous contexts today. This anthology is the definitive resource on the subject of these crucial rhetorical modes and will be a vital resource to all scholars of communication and rhetoric, as well as legal scholars and practicing jurists. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Obesity is a burgeoning challenge for healthcare systems worldwide. In times of demographic change, it also affects an increasing number of older persons, presenting substantial challenges to delivering health and nursing care in both acute and long-term care (LTC) settings. So far, a detailed analysis of the diverse group of 65+ in this field is missing, particularly in the area of LTC. The needs of neither care recipients, nor those of nurses and institutions are monitored, analyzed, (...) or systematically evaluated. Moreover, ethical implications of professional care for older persons with obesity have not yet been discussed in research and policy. Arguments We argue that a needs-based approach is appropriate to address these ethical complexities. We further argue that a comprehensive mapping of the ethical terrain is best from an interdisciplinary and mixed methods perspective. For this, we conduct a scoping review to synthesize the state-of-the-art in both the healthcare and LTC settings; and we focus on challenges reported in case studies from professional care settings in European and North American institutions. Conclusion Our findings point to a lack of research on ethical issues related to the LTC needs of older persons living with obesity and the challenges faced by their professional carers. From the limited number of (case) studies that can be found, however, a series of ethical concerns emerge that have direct import for access, utilization, and quality of care. Accordingly, a new research agenda is needed to inform an ethical approach for policy and practice. It must be rooted in a concern for both care recipients and caregivers in mixed methods studies. Future research should provide criteria for balancing needs, allocating resources and developing practical solutions for people who are confronted with multiple stigma. (shrink)

Cognitive Phenomenology Phenomenal states are mental states in which there is something that it is like for their subjects to be in; they are states with a phenomenology. What it is like to be in a mental state is that state´s phenomenal character. There is general agreement among philosophers of mind that the category of mental states includes at least some sensory states. For example, there is something that it is like to taste chocolate, to smell coffee, to feel the (...) wind in one´s hair, to see the blue sky and to feel a pain in one´s toe. Is there also something that it is like to consciously think, to consciously judge and to consciously believe something? Are such cognitive states, when conscious, phenomenal states? Is there a clear distinction between sensory states and cognitive states? Or, can our knowledge, thoughts and beliefs influence our sensory experiences? Is there a cognitive phenomenology? It is challenging to give a clear characterization of the cognitive phenomenology debate, since different contributors conceive of the debate in different ways. Central for the debate is the question of whether conscious thoughts possess a non-sensory phenomenology. Intuitively, there is something that it is like to consciously think, consciously judge and consciously believe something. However, the debate about cognitive phenomenology is not, strictly speaking, about whether there is something that it is like to consciously think. Rather, the debate concerns the nature of cognitive phenomenology. Is the phenomenology of cognitive states reducible to purely sensory phenomenology? Or, is there an irreducible cognitive phenomenology? A sceptic about cognitive phenomenology claims that conscious cognitive states are non-phenomenal. But, conscious cognitive states may seem to be phenomenal because they are accompanied by sensory states. For instance, when one thinks that ´Paris is a beautiful city`, one´s thought may be expressed in inner-speech and an image of Paris may accompany it. These accompanying sensory states are phenomenal states, and not the thought itself. Contrary to this, the proponent of cognitive phenomenology claims that a conscious cognitive state can have a phenomenology that is irreducible to purely sensory phenomenology. Other debates have also been placed under the ´cognitive phenomenology’ label. There is an ongoing debate within the philosophy of perception about how cognition influences our sensory experiences. Philosophers tend to agree that, for example, an expert ornithologist´s perceptual experience of a type of bird can differ from that of a novice, even if the viewing conditions for both expert and novice are the same. The expert´s knowledge of birds can influence her experience. However, what philosophers disagree about is how the expert´s knowledge influences her experience, and how her knowledge contributes to what her experience is like. (shrink)

Hate is widespread online, hits everyone, and carries negative consequences. Crowd moderation—user-assisted moderation through, e. g., reporting or counter-speech—is heralded as a potential remedy. We explore this potential by linking insights on online bystander interventions to the analogy of crowd moderation as a (lost) public good. We argue that the distribution of costs and benefits of engaging in crowd moderation forecasts a collective action problem. If the individual crowd member has limited incentive to react when witnessing hate, crowd moderation is (...) unlikely to manifest. We explore this argument empirically, investigating several preregistered hypotheses about the distribution of individual-level costs and benefits of response options to online hate using a large, nationally representative survey of Danish social media users (N = 24,996). In line with expectations, we find that bystander reactions, especially costly reactions, are rare. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between exposure to online hate and withdrawal motivations, and a negative (n-shaped) correlation with bystander reactions. (shrink)

This presentation seeks to understand informal logic as a set of methods for the logical evaluation of natural language arguments. Some of the methods identified are the fallacies method, deductivism, warrantism and argument schemes. A framework for comparing the adequacy of the methods is outlined consisting of the following categories: learner- and user-efficiency, subjective and objective reliability, and scope. Within this framework, it is also possible to compare informal and formal logic.

This paper explores how calculative cultures shape perceptions of models and practices of model use in the financial industry. A calculative culture comprises a specific set of practices and norms concerning data and model use in an organizational setting. Drawing on interviews with model users working in algorithmic securities trading, I argue that the introduction of complex machine-learning models changes the dynamics in calculative cultures, which leads to a displacement of human judgment in quantitative finance. In this paper, I distinguish (...) between three calculative cultures: an idealistic culture of undivided trust in models, a pragmatic culture of skepticism toward model accuracy, and a pragmatic idealist culture of early stage skepticism and implementation and production-phase idealism. Based on the empirical material, the analysis engages with examples of each of the three calculative cultures. The study contributes to the social studies of finance and science and technology studies more broadly by showing how perceptions of models shape and are shaped through model work in data-intensive, computerized finance. (shrink)

Since its inception in the late 1970s, behavioural economics has gone from being an outlier to a widely recognized yet still contested subset of the economic sciences. One of the basic arguments in behavioural economics is that a more realistic psychology ought to inform economic theories. While the history of behavioural economics is often portrayed and articulated as spanning no more than a few decades, the practice of utilizing ideas from psychology to rethink theories of economics is over a century (...) old. In the first three decades of the 20th century, several mostly American economists made efforts to refine fundamental economic assumptions by introducing ideas from psychology into economic thinking. In an echo of contemporary discussions in behavioural economics, the ambition of these psychology-keen economists was to strengthen the empirical accuracy of the fundamental assumptions of economic theory. In this article, we trace, examine, and discuss arguments for and against complementing economic theorizing with insights from psychology, as found in economic literature published between 1900 and 1930. The historical analysis sheds light on issues and challenges associated with the endeavour to improve one discipline’s theories by introducing ideas from another, and we argue that these are issues and challenges that behavioural economists continue to face today. (shrink)

Building on conceptual insights from the history and sociology of numbers, media and surveillance studies, and theories of governance and risk, this article analyzes the forms of transparency produced by the use of numbers in social life. It examines what it is about numbers that often makes their ‘truth claims’ so powerful, investigates the role that numerical operations play in the production of retrospective, real-time and anticipatory forms of transparency in contemporary politics and economic transactions, and discusses some of the (...) implications resulting from the increasingly abstract and machine-driven use of numbers. It argues that the forms of transparency generated by machine-driven numerical operations open up for individual and collective practices in ways that are intimately linked to precautionary and pre-emptive aspirations and interventions characteristic of contemporary governance. As such, these numerical operations raise important political and ethical questions that deserve further conceptual and empirical scrutiny. (shrink)

Visual Associative agnosia is a rare perceptual impairment generally resulting from lesions in the infero temporal cortex. Patients suffering from associative agnosia are able to make accurate copies of line drawings, but they are unable to visually recognize objects - including those represented in line drawings - as belonging to familiar high-level kinds. The Rich Content View claims that visual experience can represent high-level kind properties. The phenomenon of associative agnosia appears to present us with a strong case for the (...) Rich Content View. There are reasons for thinking that the experiences of an agnosic patient differ from those of a healthy subject. Given that there is a phenomenal contrast between the experiences of an associative agnosic and those of a healthy perceiver, one may argue that this contrast is due to differences in abilities to represent high-level kinds. I claim that there is indeed a phenomenal contrast between the visual experiences of an agnosic and those of a healthy perceiver. However, the explanation of this contrast that best fits the empirical data is compatible with the view that visual experience does not represent high-level kinds. (shrink)

Inappropriate behaviors in peer review may involve bullying and can have negative effects on authors and the dissemination of knowledge. In this paper, we have discussed the causes, forms, harms, and potential mitigation measures of bullying in peer review. We call for attention to these behaviors and advocate for future research within a reasonable framework.

In this article we will suggest that the traditional account of the freedom of expression needs revision. The emergence of Internet media has shown that the traditional ideal of a plurality of voices does not in itself lead to fruitful public spheres. Inspired by Foucault’s interpretation of the Greek concept parrhesia we suggest that the plurality of voices should be supplemented with an ideal of courageous truth-telling. We will furthermore argue that the notion of courage has two dimensions that should (...) be taken into account. On the one hand a Derridean reading of courage brings out a disruptive and aporetic feature of courage. On the other hand, courage also needs to be articulated through some kind of goal, which in a public setting calls for a deliberative dimension. We conclude by suggesting that public spheres with courageous truth-telling will facilitate societies in which strong voices and opinions are continuously challenged by less strong voices. (shrink)

Two reverse supertasks—one new and one invented by Pérez Laraudogoitia —are discussed. Contra Kerkvliet and Pérez Laraudogoitia, it is argued that these supertasks cannot be used to conduct fair infinite lotteries, i.e., lotteries on the set of natural numbers with a uniform probability distribution. The new supertask involves an infinity of gods who collectively select a natural number by each removing one ball from a collection of initially infinitely many balls in a reverse omega-sequence of actions.

© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Nanay provides an original and interesting discussion of the connections between aesthetics and the philosophy of perception. According to Nanay, many topics within aesthetics are about experiences of various kinds. Aesthetics is not philosophy of perception, but there are important questions within aesthetics that we can address in an interesting way (...) by using the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of perception.The main theme of this book is the role of attention in those perceptual experiences that are relevant for aesthetics. Nanay claims that in some paradigmatic examples of aesthetic experiences our attention is exercised in the way of being distributed across properties. He argues that various versions of distributed attention can explain our experiences of aesthetic... (shrink)

Due to the development of transnational communicative and economic structures, nation states are increasingly unable to be the starting point for journalistic regulation. In this chapter, therefore, I raise the question whether it is possible – and desirable – to have transnational rules for ethically good journalism. I argue that ethical evaluations should focus upon the meeting between normative ideals and factual realities. This meeting is always open because ideals can challenge reality, just as reality can challenge ideals. Ethical questions (...) are thus always raising a fundamental “maybe”. Traditionally the ideals of journalists have been articulated in close affiliation with ideas of the Fourth Estate. However, due to our globalised communicative structure, this articulation is in need of revision. I argue that the ethical requests change because the structure of Internet-based publics changes. Departing from this situation I suggest that journalistic products are ethically urgent insofar as they both bring communities together and give voice to the inarticulate or voiceless. I argue that in order to substantiate this approach it is important to articulate rules, because rules further the possibility of deliberating disagreements. The notion of deliberating disagreement is at the core of ethical discussions. I suggest that Habermas’ discourse ethics account may serve as a starting point for articulating a robust body of journalistic ethics. However, two moderations are important: On one hand, the rules and codes should be articulated against a “globalised we”, rather than against the nation state. On the other hand, it is important to realise that the rules do not robustly prescribe what to do. They should serve as a starting point for articulating and discussing disagreements. The openness of the global “maybe” does not call for global agreement but rather for the possibility of discussing disagreements. (shrink)

Recent evidence indicates that transcriptional bursts are intrinsically amplified by messenger RNA cytoplasmic processing to generate large stochastic fluctuations in protein levels. These fluctuations can be exploited by cells to enable probabilistic bet‐hedging decisions. But large fluctuations in gene expression can also destabilize cell‐fate commitment. Thus, it is unclear if cells temporally switch from high to low noise, and what mechanisms enable this switch. Here, the discovery of a post‐transcriptional mechanism that attenuates noise in HIV is reviewed. Early in its (...) life cycle, HIV amplifies transcriptional fluctuations to probabilistically select alternate fates, whereas at late times, HIV utilizes a post‐transcriptional feedback mechanism to commit to a specific fate. Reanalyzing various reported post‐transcriptional negative feedback architectures reveals that they attenuate noise more efficiently than classic transcriptional autorepression, leading to the derivation of an assay to detect post‐transcriptional motifs. It is hypothesized that coupling transcriptional and post‐transcriptional autoregulation enables efficient temporal noise control to benefit developmental bet‐hedging decisions. (shrink)

I argue that the absence of some of the ‘greatest hits’ of Western philosophy in Classical China can be explained by a Wittgensteinian take on the role of language in philosophy. One is the ‘Idea Theory’ of meaning which anchors Western Mind-Body dualism. Its attraction is removed when the writing reminds us that a picture does not by itself ‘give life to’ our language even while it plays a role of cross-linguistic communication. Another is the centrality of a law-command theory (...) of normativity which combines with mind-body dualism to give a natural push toward monotheistic supernaturalism. Western attempts to make the ‘God’ impulse logical (e.g., the Ontological Argument) fail because of differences in Chinese syntax. The upshot is we need not deny Chinese thinkers the status of philosophers for their failure to share our philosophical presuppositions and resultant agenda. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:277 HUME'S IMPRESSIONS OF BELIEF Introduction Hume's theory of belief is often taken to be fully stated in his opening remarks on the subject in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section VII: "An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."1 Taking this definition as Hume's final account leaves the reader with many (...) problems. What is it for an idea to be lively? How is an idea related to or associated with an impression? Is belief really so simple a phenomenon? I argue that Hume's theory of belief is much more complex than this, and that the Treatise contains only a rough, preliminary account of belief. By the time he wrote An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, Hume had developed his theory in full detail. As I show, in this latter account a belief is an intentional state involving a combination of Humean ideas and impressions. The nature of these ideas and impressions allows the mind to take note of a belief as something quite different from its other perceptions. In the Treatise, however, Hume did not have a clear understanding of how the mind could distinguish beliefs from other perceptions. He could only go so far as to say that an idea believed is livelier than other ideas. He argued that a present impression is capable of calling to mind an idea of something that has been associated with that impression in the past, and of transferring some of its own vivacity to that idea. As we look at the account of belief in the Treatise, we will see how the preliminary concepts of force and liveliness and a transference of vivacity lay the foundation for his 278 final account, yet point to a need for a fuller explication of the difference the mind notes between beliefs and other perceptions. We will see that in the Appendix to the Treatise Hume tried to work out this difference in terms of 'feeling' but this was unsuccessful without the notion of an intentional act. Finally, we will see that Hume concluded in the Enquiry that a belief is an intentional state in which a new impression of reflection arises about the idea believed. This new impression is the feeling of belief by which beliefs are distinguished from other 2 perceptions of the mind. The Account in the Treatise We begin our explication of Hume's theory of belief by looking at the account in A Treatise of Human Nature. Here Hume maintains that it is ideas which are believed, and that these beliefs differ from other ideas only in their "force and vivacity" (T 96). This force and vivacity is a result of the believed idea's relation to an impression. These theses lead us to the familiar Treatise definition of belief as "A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION" (T 96). Hume begins his analysis of belief in Section VII of the Treatise by stating that "the idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole" (T 94). The suggestion is that there is more to being in a state of belief than merely entertaining the idea believed. The simple phrase "belief o_f_ an object" leads us to presume that it is ideas that are believed, or that we have beliefs o_f ideas. We will need to examine Hume's meaning of 'idea' in enough depth to understand the role it plays in the theory of belief. 279 Hume gives some examples of the way we may conceive ideas without believing them: Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy'd in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; 'tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms (T 95). Note that Hume says one may form all the same ideas as another. Yet the ideas one forms are just what Hume had earlier called the propositions one... (shrink)

–Whether celebratory or critical, STS research on science-industry relations has focused on the blurring of boundaries and hybridization of codes and practices. However, the vocabulary of boundary and hybrid tends to reify science and industry as separate in the attempt to map their relation. Drawing on interviews with the head of a research center in plant biology, this article argues that biology and biotech are symbionts. In order to be viable and productive, symbiosis needs to be carefully managed and given (...) room for divergence within mutual dependence. This process does not take place as the negotiation of a preexisting science-industry boundary. Rather, viability is obtained through a strategy of circumventing the science-industry food chain and sequestering biotech components within the research center. Symbiosis allows academic scientists to do biology while at the same time demonstrating entrepreneurial spirit. (shrink)

In this paper I seek to deconstruct internet-based communication. I highlight Derrida’s focus on the margins and in-betweens of communication, and relate it to the genre of e-mail. I argue (i) that the silence between the dialogic turns becomes more marked, while (ii) the separation of present and previous statements becomes less marked. The visibility of the silence between the turns (i) can be a resource for increased awareness of how communicative exchanges are shaped by self-arrangements and -presentations. The dissolution (...) of the separation between present and previous statements (ii) can be a source for unfruitful quarrels. (shrink)

This article concerns existents as a contentious issue in contemporary Abelardian scholarship. More precisely, it concerns the ontological standing of forms in Abelard’s metaphysics. Take, for example, the apple on my desk. What ontological standing does its redness have? Is it an actual entity over and above the apple or is it in some sense “reducible” to it? Abelard, famously, was a nominalist, so the question is not about some purported universal redness. Rather, it is about the particular redness of (...) the particular apple on my desk. The issue is contentious in that the best current accounts of Abelard’s metaphysics disagree strongly about how to answer this question. Here, rather than focusing on Abelard’s own writings – which so far have yielded no definitive answer – I will consider some anonymously transmitted and mainly unedited logical texts from the twelfth century and show how his contemporaries understood Abelard’s view and how the followers of his philosophical nemesis, Alberic of Paris, reacted to it. (shrink)