Firstly, this paper aims to analyze how verbal and visual modes contribute to build two basic components of cartoons: the referenced situation and the fictional situation. Secondly, it aims to unravel the semiotics of this discursive genre by offering a fine-grained picture of modal variations and continuities of the rhetorical resources deployed, by means of which the fictional situation is displayed. The corpus is composed of 50 multimodal cartoons chosen by cartoonists of 22 nationalities as the most representative of (...) their work in the frame of a wide questionnaire. Category analysis and non-parametric statistics were applied. We identified and fleshed out four different types of modal functioning of resources: visual preference, verbal preference, modal flexibility, and genuine multimodal functioning. Even if visual and multimodal metaphor were often in charge of transferring meaning from fiction to the referenced situation, results show that other resources such as antithesis, irony, and syllepsis can become the key resources of cartoons. Findings highlight the multilayered functioning of cartoons, among which plastic features can play a significant role, and provide further evidence in favor of the hyperdetermination of humor hypothesis proposed by Attardo. (shrink)

The function of a trait token is usually defined in terms of some properties of other (past, present, future) tokens of the same trait type. I argue that this strategy is problematic, as trait types are (at least partly) individuated by their functional properties, which would lead to circularity. In order to avoid this problem, I suggest a way to define the function of a trait token in terms of the properties of the very same trait token. To able to (...) allow for the possibility of malfunctioning, some of these properties need to be modal ones: a function of a trait is to do F just in case its doing F would contribute to the inclusive fitness of the organism whose trait it is. Function attributions have modal force. Finally, I explore whether and how this theory of biological function could be modified to cover artifact function. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theory of 'function' and function as a deontic modal word and phenomenon. Kratzer’s account of the semantics for the deontic modals is invoked and using her approach a formal schema for the semantics of 'function'-sentences is proposed. My account of function is a modalized and extended version of Cummins’ systems-type account of function. In the biological and physical sciences, on this account, function is a complex empirical deontic modal property. It is built (...) on the property of X’s doing Y well enough to enable Z, which is implicitly deontic because of the evaluative but nonetheless empirical in its biological and physical applications. This account of function resolves many of the traditional puzzles about biological and physical function, and extends naturally to include the other types of function. With a variant treatment of the semantics, this account is argued also to apply to mathematical function, where it is shown to be interestingly related to Frege’s account of function. (shrink)

I clarify some of the details of the modal theory of function I outlined in Nanay (2010): (a) I explicate what it means that the function of a token biological trait is fixed by modal facts; (b) I address an objection to my trait type individuation argument against etiological function and (c) I examine the consequences of replacing the etiological theory of function with a modal theory for the prospects of using the concept of biological function to (...) explain mental content. (shrink)

Comparisons between modally and amodally completed regions show that perceptual filling-in is not merely the ignoring of absences. Illusory filled-in colour arises for modal completion, but not for amodal completion in comparable displays. We find that attention spreads automatically to modally but not amodally completed regions from their inducers, revealing a functional effect of filled-in colour.

What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This (...) split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments. In this paper, I develop this account of the function of modal judgment and to explore the extent to which it may improve upon contemporary alternatives. I focus on one particularly important challenge for the account: to explain why a distinction between the actual and the possible, rather than merely a distinction between the actual and the non-actual, is required. In order to answer this question, I supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity. (shrink)

It is a classic result in modal logic, often referred to as Jónsson-Tarski duality, that the category of modal algebras is dually equivalent to the category of descriptive frames. The latter are Kripke frames equipped with a Stone topology such that the binary relation is continuous. This duality generalizes the celebrated Stone duality for boolean algebras. Our goal is to generalize descriptive frames so that the topology is an arbitrary compact Hausdorff topology. For this, instead of working with (...) the boolean algebra of clopen subsets of a Stone space, we work with the ring of continuous real-valued functions on a compact Hausdorff space. The main novelty is to define a modal operator on such a ring utilizing a continuous relation on a compact Hausdorff space.Our starting point is the well-known Gelfand duality between the category ${\sf KHaus}$ of compact Hausdorff spaces and the category $\boldsymbol {\mathit {uba}\ell }$ of uniformly complete bounded archimedean $\ell $ -algebras. We endow a bounded archimedean $\ell $ -algebra with a modal operator, which results in the category $\boldsymbol {\mathit {mba}\ell }$ of modal bounded archimedean $\ell $ -algebras. Our main result establishes a dual adjunction between $\boldsymbol {\mathit {mba}\ell }$ and the category ${\sf KHF}$ of what we call compact Hausdorff frames; that is, Kripke frames equipped with a compact Hausdorff topology such that the binary relation is continuous. This dual adjunction restricts to a dual equivalence between ${\sf KHF}$ and the reflective subcategory $\boldsymbol {\mathit {muba}\ell }$ of $\boldsymbol {\mathit {mba}\ell }$ consisting of uniformly complete objects of $\boldsymbol {\mathit {mba}\ell }$. This generalizes both Gelfand duality and Jónsson-Tarski duality. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Bence Nanay has recently put forward and defended a new theory of function, which he calls the ‘Modal Theory of Function’. In this article, I critically address this theory and argue that it fails to fulfill some key desiderata that a satisfactory theory of function must comply with. As a result, I conclude that, whatever property Nanay’s notion of function refers to, it is not the property having the function that is standardly attributed in (...) science. (shrink)

Pragmatic Ambiguity: The Thetic Function of Modality The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of ambiguity present in deontic sentences, which may have three pragmatic functions: a prescriptive or a descriptive or a constitutive function. This type of ambiguity is investigated on the lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. The discussion focuses on the deontic constructions of the German verb sollen and the English shall as they are used in legal texts. It also (...) includes comments on the thetic function of the Latin imperative mood and the subjunctive mood. (shrink)

Let ${{\mathcal L}^{\square\circ}}$ be a propositional language with standard Boolean connectives plus two modalities: an S4-ish topological modality □ and a temporal modality ◦, understood as ‘next’. We extend the topological semantic for S4 to a semantics for the language ${{\mathcal L}^{\square\circ}}$ by interpreting ${{\mathcal L}^{\square\circ}}$ in dynamic topological systems, i.e., ordered pairs 〈X, f〉, where X is a topological space and f is a continuous function on X. Artemov, Davoren and Nerode have axiomatized a logic S4C, and have shown (...) that S4C is sound and complete for this semantics. S4C is also complete for continuous functions on Cantor space (Mints and Zhang, Kremer), and on the real plane (Fernández Duque); but incomplete for continuous functions on the real line (Kremer and Mints, Slavnov). Here we show that S4C is complete for continuous functions on the rational numbers. (shrink)

This paper replies to Nanay’s response to my recent paper. My suggestions are the following. First, “should” or “ought” does not need to be deontic. Second, etiological theories of function, like provability logic, do not need to attribute modal force to their explanans. Third, the explanans of the homological account of trait type individuation does not appeal to a trait’s etiological function, that is, what a trait should or ought to do. Finally, my reference to Cummins’s notion of function (...) was intended to note that the homological account is permitted to use this non-etiological notion of function. (shrink)

Naturalistic teleological accounts of mental content rely on an etiological theory of function. Nanay has raised a new objection to an etiological theory, and proposed an alternative theory of function that attributes modal force to claims about function. The aim of this paper is both to defend and to cast a new light on an etiological theory of function. I argue against Nanay’s “trait type individuation objection,” suggesting that an etiological theory also attributes modal force to claims about (...) function. An etiological theory of function can be thought to analyze claims about function with modal force, not relying on any theory of counterfactuals. (shrink)

The classical propositional logic is known to be sound and complete with respect to the set semantics that interprets connectives as set operations. The paper extends propositional language by a new binary modality that corresponds to partial recursive function type constructor under the above interpretation. The cases of deterministic and non-deterministic functions are considered and for both of them semantically complete modal logics are described and decidability of these logics is established.

Let $\mathcal{L}$ be a propositional language with standard Boolean connectives plus two modalities: an S4-ish topological modality $\square$ and a temporal modality $\bigcirc$ , understood as ‘next’. We extend the topological semantic for S4 to a semantics for the language $\mathcal{L}$ by interpreting $\mathcal{L}$ in dynamic topological systems, i.e. ordered pairs $\langle X, f\rangle$ , where X is a topological space and f is a continuous function on X. Artemov, Davoren and Nerode have axiomatized a logic S4C, and have shown (...) that S4C is sound and complete for this semantics. Zhang and Mints have shown that S4C is complete relative to a particular topological space, Cantor space. The current paper produces an alternate proof of the Zhang-Mints result. (shrink)

The Lewisian account of modality based on counterpart theory suffers from the problems of advanced modalizing, where claims about spatiotemporally disunified entities are modalized. In this paper, I first discuss a strategy to bypass the problem, one which treats cases of advanced modalizing as cases of equivocation lying outside the scope of the translation. I then argue that the strategy does not satisfactorily generalize to the case of advanced modal claims involving abstract entities. This failure not only reveals the (...) limitations of counterpart theory in handling abstracta, but also weakens the abductive argument for modal realism that posits it as a robust account of nominalism. Furthermore, advanced modalizing is an indispensable part of the Lewisian framework when doing metaphysics, since advanced modal claims made by Lewis himself strengthen his abductive argument for modal realism. Hence advanced modalizing plays a crucial role in the Lewisian project, and an account of advanced modalizing is needed for the Lewisian reduction of modality to succeed. (shrink)

The paper considers the role of modality in the rational reconstruction of standpoints and arguments. The paper examines in what conditions modal markers can act as argumentative indicators and what kind of cues they provide for the reconstruction of argument. The paper critically re-examines Toulmin’s hypothesis that the meaning of the modals can be analyzed in terms of a field-invariant argumentative force and field-dependent criteria in the light of the Theory of Relative Modality developed within linguistic semantics, showing how (...) this theory can provide a more adequate model for exploiting the modals as indicators. The resulting picture confirms Toulmin’s intuition only in part: on the one hand the modals are always relational in nature and dependent on a contextual conversational background of propositions; on the other hand only epistemic-doxastic modals directly express a speech-act level inferential relation between a set of premises and a standpoint. Other modalities express relations (e.g. causal or final relations) better seen as part of the content of the argument whose argumentative relevance depends on the argumentation scheme employed. Thus non-epistemic modals function as argumentative indicators only indirectly. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists widely hold that artifact categories – just like biological categories – are individuated by their function. But recent empirical findings in psychology question this assumption. My proposal is to suggest a way of squaring these findings with the central role function should play in individuating artifact categories. But in order to do so, we need to give up on the standard account of artifact function, according to which function is fixed by design, and replace it with a (...) more context-sensitive account, according to which function attributions depend on the explanatory context and, as a result, categorization also depends on the explanatory context, just as the empirical findings from psychology suggest. I argue that the recent ‘modal theory of function’ originally proposed to explain biological function, is capable of providing such an account of artifact function. (shrink)

The brain-computer interface based on functional near-infrared spectroscopy has received more and more attention due to its vast application potential in emotion recognition. However, the relatively insufficient investigation of the feature extraction algorithms limits its use in practice. In this article, to improve the performance of fNIRS-based BCI, we proposed a method named R-CSP-E, which introduces EEG signals when computing fNIRS signals’ features based on transfer learning and ensemble learning theory. In detail, we used the Independent Component Analysis algorithm for (...) the correspondence between the sources of the two signals. We then introduced the EEG signals when computing the spatial filter based on a modified Common Spatial Pattern algorithm. Experimental results on public datasets show that the proposed method in this paper outperforms traditional methods without transfer. In general, the mean classification accuracy can be increased by up to 5%. To our knowledge, it is an innovation that we tried to apply transfer learning between EEG and fNIRS. Our study’s findings not only prove the potential of the transfer learning algorithm in cross-model brain-computer interface, but also offer a new and innovative perspective to research the hybrid brain-computer interface. (shrink)

In previous works, we presented a modification of the usual possible world semantics by introducing an independent temporal structure in each world and using accessibility functions to represent the relation among them. Different properties ofthe accessibility functions have been considered and axiomatic systems which define these properties have been given. Only a few ofthese systems have been proved tobe complete. The aim ofthis paper is to make a progress in the study ofcompleteness for functional systems. For this end, (...) we use indexes as names for temporal flows and give new proofs of completeness. Specifically, we focus our attention on the system which defines injectivity, because the system which defines this property without using indexes was proved to be incomplete in previous works. The only system considered which remains incomplete is the one which defines surjectivity, even ifwe consider a sequence ofnatural extensions ofthe previous one. (shrink)

modal adverbs and discourse implicatures semantics.

Łukasiewicz presented two different analyses of modal notions by means of many-valued logics: the linearly ordered systems Ł3,..., Open image in new window,..., \; the 4-valued logic Ł he defined in the last years of his career. Unfortunately, all these systems contain “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. On the other hand, Brady’s 4-valued logic BN4 is the basic 4-valued bilattice logic. The aim of this paper is to show that BN4 can be strengthened with modal operators following Łukasiewicz’s strategy for (...) defining truth-functional modal logics. The systems we define lack “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. Following Brady, we endow them with Belnap–Dunn type bivalent semantics. (shrink)

We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \. We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.

This paper contains a positive development and a negative argument. It develops a theory of function loss and shows how this undermines an objection raised against the etiological theory of function in support of the modal theory of function. Then it raises two internal problems for the modal theory of function.

Modals in St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish) show two differences from their counterparts in English. First, they have variable quantificational force, systematically allowing both possibility and necessity interpretations; and second, they lexically restrict the conversational background, distinguishing for example between deontic and (several kinds of) epistemic modality. We provide an analysis of the St’át’imcets modals according to which they are akin to specific indefinites in the nominal domain. They introduce choice function variables which select a subset of the accessible worlds. Following Klinedinst, (...) we assume distributivity over the resulting set of worlds. St’át’imcets modals thus receive a uniform interpretation as (distributive) pluralities. The appearance of variability in modal force arises because the choice function can select a larger or smaller subset of accessible worlds. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for the investigation of modal systems in other languages. (shrink)