In this volume, originally published in 1983, W Montgomery Watt looks at the meeting of Christianity and Islam, how they see and have seen each other, and considers how they can aid each other in dealing with the problems of the world today. He emphasizes those beliefs which Christianity and Islam have in common, and shows how they may be justified intellectually.

The Umayyad period. The beginnings of sectarianism ; The Khārijites ; The Shīʻtes ; The Murjiʼites and other moderates -- The first wave of Hellenism 750-950. The historical background ; The translators and the first philosophers ; The expansion of Shīʻism ; The Muʻtazilites ; The consolidation of Sunnism ; Al-Ashʻarī -- The second wave of Hellenism 950-1258. The historical background ;The flowering of philosophy ; The vicissitudes of Shīʻism ; The progress of Sunnite theology ; Al-Ghazālī ; Sunnite theology (...) from 1100 to 1250 ; Theology and philosophy in the Islamic west -- The period of darkness. The historical background ; The sclerosis of philosophical theology ; The vitality of the Ḥanbalites ; The transformation of Shīʻism -- The new dawn. The prospect for theology. (shrink)

This is the standard general account in English of Islamic philosophy and theology. It takes the reader from the religio-political sects of the Kharijites and the Shiites through to the assimilation of Greek thought in the medieval period, and onto the early modern period. Watt concludes with an analysis of Western influences on modern Islamic theology.

Originally published in 1967, this Companion is designed to help readers of the Qur’an by giving them necessary background information. An account is given of ideas peculiar to the Qur’an, and the main variant interpretations are noted. A full index of Qur’anic proper names and an index of words commented on has been provided. Based on A J Arberry’s translation, this Companion can be used with other translations, or indeed with the original text, since the verses are numbered.

A study of the struggle and achievement of al-Ghazālī, which examines his life and thought as a whole within the context of the time in which he lived. al-Ghazālī has been acclaimed as the greatest Muslim after Muḥammad, and is certainly one of the greatest. His outlook, too, closer than that of many Muslims to the outlook of modern Europe and America, and will be more easily comprehended today.

Makalede İlâhî vahyin insanın ontolojik gerçekliğini göz ardı etmediğini, ontolojik gerçekliği üzerinden insanlara mesaj verdiği konusu ele alınmıştır. Bu durum, rüya ve şeriatlerin farklılığıyla ispat edilmeye, bu fikre temayül gösteren ancak Kur’ân hakkında olumsuz bir argüman olarak kullanan Montgomery Watt gibi müsteşriklere de cevap verilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu yapılırken ilk önce bilinçaltının anlaşılması hususunda bazı örnekler verilmiş sonra rüya sembollerinde baskın olan kültürel unsurlara temas edilmiştir. Rüyalardaki sembollerin şekillenmesinde mantıksal bağı irdeleyen İslam ulemasının açıklamalarına ve rüya tevillerine de yer (...) verilmiştir. Bu yorum ve tevillerden anlaşıldığı kadarıyla insanlarda ortak görülen sembollerin Jung’un arketip, İslam ulemasının ise zihinsel kalıp ve manaların elbisesi dediği bir nevi kültürün kodlarından oluşan bilinçaltı alfabesi tarafından formlaştığı anlaşılmaktadır. Dini değer ve ifadeler Müslüman kültürde en dominant öğeler olduğundan Müslüman yorumcular genelde rüya sembollerini Kur’an ve hadisteki sözler veya bu sembolleri çağrıştıran ifadelerle yorumlamaya çalışmışlardır. Bu mantıktan hareketle tefsirde büyük problem olarak görülen Hz. İbrahim’in, oğlu İsmail’i kurban etme olayı ele alınmış ve nasıl anlaşılmasının gerektiği üzerinde durulmuştur. Bunun, baskın kültür altında sembolleşen bir rüya olduğu ve İsrail Oğullarına ‘Bakar’ kesme emriyle toplumun yanlış algısının değiştirilmesinin amaçlanması gibi çocukların tanrılara kurban edildiği ortamdaki yanlışlığın giderilmesi, kurban ritüelini tebdil edilmesinin amaçlandığı ifade edilmiştir. Daha sonra şeriat-ontolojik gerçeklik ilişkisi irdelenmiş, dinde bütün insanların ortak fıtratının esas alındığı ve bundan dolayı dinin bütün insanlar için değişmeyen bir olgu, şeriatlerin ise kültürün baskın olduğu ve dolayısıyla bir yönüyle ilişki içinde olduğu toplumsal bilinçaltı olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Kur’ân’da, dinin temel prensipleri ve resullerin üzerine birleştikleri kapsamlı şeriat kanunları dile getirilmiştir. Genel hatlarıyla din, Allah’ın varlıkları üzerine yarattığı (insanın tabiatının kolektif değişmezliğine dayalı) ve bütün mahlûkata sevimli geleni, marufu emretmeyi, münkerden nehyi, temiz şeyleri helal eden, zararlı olan şeyleri haramı eden emirleri içermektedir. İslam ulemasına göre bütün semavi dinlerde esas olan Allah’a, meleklerine, resullerine, kitaplarına ve ahiret gününe iman etmek, insanın yaptığı takdirde Müslüman olacağı fiilleri işlemektir. Bu iman da doğal olarak dünyadan yüz çevirmeyi, ahirete yönelmeyi, güzel ahlakı edinmeyi ve kötü ahlaktan da kaçınmayı gerektirir. Ancak şeriatlar ise birbirinden farklılık gösterebilir. Çünkü şeriatlar dinin indiği toplumun hallerini ve maslahatlarını esas aldığından değişiklik arz eder. Şeriatların farklılaşmasında toplumsal bilinçaltının göz ardı edilmediğini göstermek bağlamında Kur’ân’dan örnekler verilmek suretiyle savunulan tez ispat edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bunlardan birisi, Kur’ân’da Arapların ortak duygularının esas alınması, kültürel bazı unsurların kullanılması, bir diğeri de yabancı isimlerin Arapların ifade ettiği şekliyle, ümmi anlayışa uygun kullanılmasıdır. Ayrıca bu konuda bazı helal yiyeceklerin Yahudilere haram kılınması ve diğer şeriatlerde yer alan bazı farklılıklar üzerinde durulmuştur. Helal yiyeceklerin haram kılınması konusunda Hz. Yakub’un yakalandığı ağır hastalıktan iyileştiği takdirde sevdiği yiyecekleri yememeyi nezretmesi, buna bağlı olarak iyileşince deve eti ve sütünü yiyip içmemesi, daha sonra çocukları ve ümmetinin de bu yiyeceklerden uzak durması sonucunda Tevrat’ta bunların haram kılınması örneği üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu örnek, şeriatlerin farklılaşmasının nedeninin bir şeye karşı tavrın toplumsal bir alışkanlık halini almasının sonucu olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Nitekim teravih namazının Müslümanlarca toplu kılınması ve buna devam edilmesi durumunda farz kılınır endişesiyle evlerinde kılmalarını tavsiye eden Allah Resulünün endişesinin de bunu pekiştirdiği dile getirilmiştir. Diğer şeriatlerde bazı farklılıklar konusunda ise orucun öncekilere farz kılınmasına rağmen keyfiyetinin farklı olması üzerinde durulmuştur. Aynı şekilde namaz, zekât ve haccın semavî dinlerinin hepsinde olmasına rağmen keyfiyetinin değiştiği örneklerle izah edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda milletlerin yaşam tarzlarının ve kültürünün dolayısıyla toplumsal bilinçaltı şeriatlerin farklılığında gözönüne alındığı ifade edilmiştir. Nitekim İsâ peygambere tabi olanların kendilerine emredilmemekle birlikte Allah’ın rızasını elde etmek için ruhbanlığı kendilerine farz kılmaları ve buna devam etmeleri karşısında Allah’ın buna itibar ederek, ruhbanlıkta bulunanlara ücretlerini verdiğini ifade etmesi de bu durumu pekiştirmektedir. Sonuç olarak din ve dine taalluk eden her şeyin insanlığın ortak fıtratını esas aldığını, şeriatten şeriate değişiklik gösteren unsurların da kültürel ve bir yönüyle toplumsal bilinçaltıyla ilgili olan hususlar olduğu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

Although Dirār b. ʿAmr is the most important mutakallim of the second century, he is unfortunately one of the unjustified names in the history of kalām. Dirâr is a mutakallim whose name is rarely mentioned in theological publications published in both Turkish and foreign languages until recently, and his importance and position are still not noticed. As a matter of fact, Josef van Ess and W. Montgomery Watt, who are famous orientalists, discovered this tragic fact and tried to (...) make up for this deficiency to some extent with their studies. Dirâr wrote a refutation of Aristotle's theory of substance and accident, opened a new way with his understanding of existence based on accidents and led Ash'ari with the theory of kasb and Ebu'l-Huzayl al-‘Allaf with his kalām accumulation. Undoubtedly, one of the things that makes Dirār important is that he had views that went beyond his time and caused him to contradict his contemporaries as early as the second century in terms of the history of Islamic thought. Considering the list of works that have not survived, except for one, in such a period when the mainstream sects were not yet formed and they were on the eve of their formation, Dirār was generally in a critical dialogue with the Islamic and non-Islamic movements he encountered and knew. For this reason, it is almost impossible to place him in any religious sect mentioned in his period. Because he often preferred to follow his own ideas rather than the opinions of others on many issues. Naturally, this makes it difficult to place Dirār in a certain school and frees him from all kinds of bonds. Yes, in the sources we come across many allegations, accusations and slanders that Dirār is a Cahmi/Jabri, he is a Mu‘tazili, he is an innovator with malignant ideas, he is an infidel to put a bounty on his head. Understanding the reasons for these depends on getting to know Dirār, understanding his ideas, and determining his position. If we say in the context of our study, the position of Dirār is actually a state of non-position, and we think that the concept that best expresses this situation in a new interpretation is "nawābit". In the light of our analysis, we see that, with the exception of a name, nawābit is used as a concept with a negative content and connotation in both theology and philosophy. The exceptional person is the famous philosopher Ibn Bājja (Avempace) from Andalusia, the contemporary of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). While Mu‘tazili mutakallims use nawābit to humiliate groups such as Ahl-i hadith and Hashviyye, which adopt the narration-oriented line that puts reason and acumen to the second place, Al-Fārābī also uses the fault types and the sick characters in his virtuous city that he has constructed to describe. Ibn Bājja, on the other hand, considers the people called nawābit within his project to be equivalent to the "mutawahhid" (alone human) whose "precaution" he aims; this usage which corresponds with the context of the concept in the study. Because, in our study, nawābit is not considered as an identity, but as a representation of a character. (shrink)

* A selection of key writings on the problem of war and peace* Introduces students to general issues in ethics and moral theology. * Key contributors from around the world.This reader samples a wide range of modern moral and religious discussions on the subject of war and peace. In addition to providing material on pacifism, the just war debate, the nuclear option, genocide, and the concept of a holy war, it introduces students to general issues in ethics and moral theology, (...) using the morality of war as a powerful and pertinent worked example.Contributors include Elizabeth Anscombe, George Bell, Charles Curran, Y. Harkabi, Richard Harries, Stanley Hauerwas, Paul Ramsey, W. Montgomery Watt, Rowan Williams. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Elements of Eleatic Ontology' MONTGOMERY FURTH THE TASKOF AN INTERPRETERof Parmenides is to find the simplest, historically most plausible, and philosophically most comprehensible set of assumptions that imply (in a suitably loose sense) the doctrine of 'being' set out in Parmenides' poem. In what follows I offer an interpretation that certainly is simple and that I think should be found comprehensible. Historically, only more cautious claims are possible, (...) for several portions of the general view from which I 'deduce the poem' are not clearly stated in the poem itself; my explanation of this is that they are operating as tac/t assumptions, and indeed that the poem is best thought of as an attempt to force these very assumptions to the surface for formulation and criticism -that the poem is a challenge. To be sure, there are dangers in pretending, as for dramatic purposes I shall, that ideas are definite and explicit which for Parmenides himself must have been tacit or vague--that Parmenides knew what he was doing as clearly as I represent him; I try to avoid them, but the risk must be taken. I even believe that not to take it, in the name of preserving his thought pure from anachronous contamination, actually prevents us from seeing the extent to which he, pioneer, was ahead of his timc the argument works both ways. So let me hedge my historical claim in this way: the view I shall discuss could have been an active-indeed a controlling---element of Eleaticism; to suppose that Parmenides held it not only explains the poem, but also helps explain the subsequent reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato (though there is not space to elaborate this here). In addition, it brings his thought astonishingly close to some contemporary philosophical preoccupations. In the first of the following sections, I lay down some sketchy but necessary groundwork concerning the early Greek concept of 'being.' Then in Section 2 an interpretation is given of what I take to be the central Parmenidean doctrine, that 'it cannot be said that anything is not.' This section is the lengthiest and most involved, but it also contains all the moves that appear to be important. Of the remaining sections, Section 3 exp]Mn.qthe principle: 'of what is, all that can be said is: it is,' Section 4 deals briefly with the remaining cosmology of "The Way of Truth," and Section 5 considers the question whether Parmenides himself believed the fantastic conclusions of his argument. There is a short postscript on a point of methodology. 1. A Word on 6v If we are to examine Parmenides' reasoning profitably, an indispensable pre1This paper wasprepared while the author was beneficiary of a Grant-in-Aid of Research from the American Council of Learned Societies, hereby gratefully acknowledged. [111] 112 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY liminary is to estabhsh at least a provisional reading for the Greek words translated "is" or "it is" (tar,v), "what is" or "being" (Sv,rb 5v), "to be" (alva0. For while it is evident enough that in his poem Parmenides purports to be delivering an insight of the utmost significance concerning rb tbv (as he calls it), still the construction which he puts upon the term and its cognates, and the understanding which he expects of his listener, are not so clear and have been topics of dispute. Especially notable, and often noted, is the fact that Parmenides' discussion of 'being' shows no sign of the conceptual distinction considered elementary nowadays, between the "is" linking subject and predicate and the "is" of existence; and in fact it needs no documentation here that this distinction was not reflected in either ordinary or philosophical Greek idiom until, at least, a much later date than his, the word tare expressing both concepts. Also highly visible in the poem is the abundance of occurrences of tare used absolutely, unaccompanied by any predicate expression. As a result of this last, the poem can create in the contemporary reader the impression that r5 tSv is being used to mean what is in the existential sense only, to mean what there is; indeed some students of the poem conclude not only that Parmenides... (shrink)

Health services internationally struggle to ensure health care is “person-centered” (or similar). In part, this is because there are many interpretations of “person-centered care” (and near synonyms), some of which seem unrealistic for some patients or situations and obscure the intrinsic value of patients’ experiences of health care delivery. The general concern behind calls for person-centered care is an ethical one: Patients should be “treated as persons.” We made novel use of insights from the capabilities approach to characterize person-centered care (...) as care that recognizes and cultivates the capabilities associated with the concept of persons. This characterization unifies key features from previous characterisations and can render person-centered care applicable to diverse patients and situations. By tying person-centered care to intrinsically valuable capability outcomes, it incorporates a requirement for responsiveness to individuals and explains why person-centered care is required independently of any contribution it may make to health gain. (shrink)

This guide is an exploration of political reality as understood by Eric Voegelin. Voegelin employed the revolutionary concepts found in ancient Greek noetic and Christian pneumatic philosophy that describe political reality and the means to know it. This guide begins with a biographical sketch of Voegelin, the historical milieu that inspired his resistance to "unreality" and terms and symbols he uses to identify the spiritual sickness he believes is destroying Western civilization's traditional basis of order, it then examines Voegelin's theories (...) of consciousness, philosophy and science fundamental to understanding reality. Given the extensive nature and volume of his work, a consolidation and explanation of it is offered, and an example on how to apply it is outlined. Critiques of Voegelin's work are detailed to outline weaknesses in his theories and methods. This guide concludes by defining political reality, how to use Voegelinian techniques to analyze reality, and how to live a life that cultivates the pursuit of human knowledge in keeping with Western philosophic traditions. Book jacket. (shrink)

A cross-species affective neuroscience strategy for understanding the primary-process (basic) emotions is defended. The need for analyzing the brain and mind in terms of evolutionary stratification of functions into at least primary (instinctual), secondary (learned), and tertiary (thought-related) processes is advanced. When viewed in this context, the contentious battles between basic-emotion theorists and dimensional-constructivist approaches can be seen to be largely nonsubstantial differences among investigators working at different levels of analysis.

This book is a re-thinking of Aristotle's metaphysical theory of material substances. The view of the author is that the 'substances' are the living things, the organisms: chiefly, the animals. There are three main parts to the book: Part I, a treatment of the concepts of substance and nonsubstance in Aristotle's Categories; Part III, which discusses some important features of biological objects as Aristotelian substances, as analysed in Aristotle's biological treatises and the de Anima; and Part V, which attempts to (...) relate the conception of substance as interpreted so far to that of the Metaphysics itself. The main aim of the study is to recreate in modern imagination a vivid, intuitive understanding of Aristotle's concept of material substance: a certain distinctive concept of what an individual material object is. (shrink)

In his 1942 lectures on Hölderlin’s der Ister, Heidegger discerns within Hölderlin’s poetry a movement beyond the strictures of metaphysics and its representational language. This movement finds its most explicit articulation in the figure of the appropriative journey of the poet from the home into the land of the foreign fire. I argue that Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin is rendered problematic by Heidegger’s own treatment of Plato’s ‘Myth of Er’ as it appears in his 1942–1943 Parmenides lectures, and that Heidegger’s (...) reading of der Ister is itself a creative re-inscription of Plato’s ‘myth of Er.’. (shrink)