Care theory is used to describe an approach to global ethics and moral education. After a brief introduction to care ethics, the theory is applied to global ethics. The paper concludes with a discussion of moral education for personal, political, and global domains.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Compared to other approaches, it is virtue ethics that puts greatest emphasis on moral education. This results from its focus on moral agent and his or her moral condition as the main object of ethical enquiry. The aim of this paper is to outline the moral education within the framework of virtue ethics. I intend to explain how such education embraces the cognitive, affective, and behavioral elements. In the first part of the article, (...) I present the concept of ethical virtue to contrast it with certain misunderstandings which might lead to unnecessary fear of introducing the category of virtue into moral education. In the second part, I respond to various objections raised against virtue ethics, the most important being the objection of indoctrination and undermining autonomy of the educated. Another objection to which I pay special attention is the objection that there is no one catalogue of virtues but many different catalogues praised by different cultures, which especially poses a problem in multicultural societies. I am also trying to show the advantages of virtue education over other, nondirective approaches to moral education. (shrink)

After decades of marginalization in the secularized twentieth-century academy, moral education has enjoyed a recent resurgence in American higher education, with the establishment of more than 100 ethics centers and programs on campuses across the country. Yet the idea that the university has a civic responsibility to teach its undergraduate students ethics and morality has been met with skepticism, suspicion, and even outright rejection from both inside and outside the academy. In this collection, renowned scholars of philosophy, (...) politics, and religion debate the role of ethics in the university, investigating whether universities should proactively cultivate morality and ethics, what teaching ethics entails, and what moral education should accomplish. The essays quickly open up to broader questions regarding the very purpose of a university education in modern society. Editors Elizabeth Kiss and J. Peter Euben survey the history of ethics in higher education, then engage with provocative recent writings by Stanley Fish in which he argues that universities should not be involved in moral education. Stanley Hauerwas responds, offering a theological perspective on the university’s purpose. Contributors look at the place of politics in moral education; suggest that increasingly diverse, multicultural student bodies are resources for the teaching of ethics; and show how the debate over civic education in public grade-schools provides valuable lessons for higher education. Others reflect on the virtues and character traits that a moral education should foster in students—such as honesty, tolerance, and integrity—and the ways that ethical training formally and informally happens on campuses today, from the classroom to the basketball court. _Debating Moral Education_ is a critical contribution to the ongoing discussion of the role and evolution of ethics education in the modern liberal arts university. _Contributors_. Lawrence Blum, Romand Coles, J. Peter Euben, Stanley Fish, Michael Allen Gillespie, Ruth W. Grant, Stanley Hauerwas, David A. Hoekema, Elizabeth Kiss, Patchen Markell, Susan Jane McWilliams, Wilson Carey McWilliams, J. Donald Moon, James Bernard Murphy, Noah Pickus, Julie A. Reuben, George Shulman, Elizabeth V. Spelman. (shrink)

Kant’s commitment to autonomy raises difficult questions about the very possibility of Kantian moral education, since appeal to external pedagogical guidance threatens to be in contradiction with autonomous virtue. Furthermore, moral education seems to involve getting good at something through repetition; but Kant seems to eschew the notion of repeated natural activity as antithetical to autonomy. Things become even trickier once we remember that Kant also views autonomous human beings as radically evil: we are capable of (...) choosing rationally and autonomously, but, left to our own devices, that same capacity for reason might tempt us to choose only out of a concern to satisfy our happiness. We thus need a moral education which realizes autonomy while dodging the dual bullets of external natural forces and internal evil forces. Ultimately, his concerns about external natural forces and internal evil forces do not lead Kant to reject either moral education or a role for repeated activity in it. Rathe... (shrink)

This article argues that there should be a stronger emphasis on morality, involving a clear articulation of a normative point of view, in education as well as in child raising, with a continuity from early childhood to higher age levels, such that the asymmetry of roles (child – adult) gradually gives way to genuine reciprocity and a shared sense of responsibility. Drawing on Zygmunt Bauman’s work, we explore the historical conditions of moral education. Solid modernity was an (...) age of authorities, sometimes changing into authoritarian education and politics. This prompted a reaction in the form of liquid modernity, followed by anxiety and indecision among parents and teachers now that the old certainties informing normative thinking and practice were gone. Today, wee again witness a reaction and a change in cultural trends: a rebirth of solidity that carries a potential for a new normativity, a potential we consider betrayed in the current wave of claims of productivity, competitiveness and self‐sufficiency in neoliberalism, notions we regard as difficult to unify with moral education, if not in outright conflict with its deeper aspiration. Accordingly, authority in school these days is a matter of obtaining discipline and achievement, not promoting values or serious engagement with moral issues. This calls for a new discussion about education as well as an extended framework of morality. We urge that such a framework question the anthropocentric premises on which Bauman’s understanding of the discontents of late modernity is premised, highlighting the crises and pathologies involving human society at the expense of those affecting nonhumans. (shrink)

Despite increasing studies and applications of Vygotsky’s theory of learning and development, little has been written connecting Vygotsky specifically to moral education. The most comprehensive attempt at formulating such an account is given by Mark Tappan. I critically evaluate Tappan’s account before raising several problems for his approach. I then offer suggestions for resolving these issues by turning to research in socialization theory and recommending additional sociocultural artifacts that can supplement moral education.

Background: While nursing ethics education is commonly provided for undergraduate nursing students in most nursing colleges, consensus on the content and teaching modules for these ethics courses have still not been established. Objectives: This study aimed to examine the effects of nursing ethics education on the moral sensitivity and critical thinking disposition of nursing students in Korea. Research design: A one-group pre- and post-test design was used. Moral sensitivity was measured using the Korean version of the (...) Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire. Critical thinking disposition was measured using the Critical Thinking Disposition Questionnaire. Participants and research context: Participants were 70 undergraduate nursing students who were attending a university located in Seoul, Korea. The nursing ethics education was provided 7 times, from September to December 2010, and comprised 90-min sessions each week. Ethical considerations: This study was conducted in accordance with the Human Subject Research Ethics Committee guidelines. Findings: After the education, the levels for the patient-oriented care, a sub-domain of moral sensitivity, and inquisitiveness, a sub-domain of critical thinking disposition, significantly improved. There were no changes in overall scores for moral sensitivity and critical thinking disposition. There were significant positive correlations between moral sensitivity and critical thinking disposition both pre- and post-intervention. Conclusion: These results reflect the need for ongoing efforts to develop innovative content, structure, and instructional methods for undergraduate nursing ethics education programs. (shrink)

Peter J Arnold; Sport, Moral Education and the Development of Character, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 275–281, htt.

This study compared the effects of three education models, namely, the bag-of-virtues, values clarification, and virtue ethics models, through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the quantitative study, a between-subjects design was adopted in sampling 120 freshman cadets from a Taiwanese military academy. For the qualitative study, focus group interviews were conducted with 10 freshman cadets. The results show that the VC model was the most effective among the three moral education models, followed by the VE and BV (...) models. (shrink)

Sufism has been neglected in the religious discourse and educational practices of modernist Muslims in the Islamic world, including Indonesia, where Kiai Moechtar Boechari (1899-1926) had emerged as an early activist in the Muhammadiyah Surakarta and Sufism. This research aims to examine Kiai Boechari’s religious thought, emphasizing the idea of Sufism as a practice of moral education (_akhlaq_). The data of research comprised mainly documentation and library archives. The findings reveal that Kiai Boechari’s religious thinking was driven by (...) persistence in reformulating Islam to be relevant and able to answer the challenges of the modern era based on purification and dynamization. Boechari emphasized on the problem of purifying faith (_aqidah_), the dynamics of worldly _muamalah_ problems, comparative religions, women’s emancipation, and moral Sufism. Kiai Boechari’s Sufism thought emphasized the purification of _aq__i__dah_, guided by the Quran and Sunnah, respect for the Shari’a, and the practice of individual social moral education, which are characteristics of the typology of Sufism (_transcendental mysticism_), moral Sufism, and orthodox/prophetic Sufism. This was known as neo-Sufism formulated by Kiai Boechari to practice moral education. It requires persistence to carry out the process of purifying oneself from despicable and immoral traits (_takhalli_), such as anger, envy, arrogance, pride, riya, and the urge to lust; which eventually starts the process of internalizing good qualities (_tahalli_), culminating in _mahabbah_, the disappearance of the human hijab (_tajalli_), giving a peak of spiritual experience. This study implicates that, in the prophetic orientation of Sufism, spiritual experience is not an end in itself, for the sake of the experience itself, but to give meaning to actions in history. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 267–281, https://doi.or.

Children must be taught morality. They must be taught to recognise the authority of moral standards and to understand what makes them authoritative. But there’s a problem: the content and justification of morality are matters of reasonable disagreement among reasonable people. This makes it hard to see how educators can secure children’s commitment to moral standards without indoctrinating them. -/- In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand tackles this problem head on. He sets out to (...) show that moral education can and should be fully rational. It is true that many moral standards and justificatory theories are controversial, and educators have an obligation to teach these nondirectively, with the aim of enabling children to form their own considered views. But reasonable moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some basic moral standards are robustly justified, and these should be taught directively, with the aim of bringing children to recognise and understand their authority. -/- This is an original and important contribution to the philosophy of moral education, which lays a new theoretical foundation for the urgent practical task of teaching right from wrong. (shrink)

This article examines the psychological process of moral rationalization as a function of reason that adopts immoral decision defensively and suggests moral coherence as a way to overcome moral rationalization by avoiding the cognitive dissonance, desire for self-unity according to moral identity. Through this study, I have proposed a strategy for moral coherence using moral self - identity and avoidance cognitive dissonance as a way to refuse moral rationalization and cultivate moral coherence. (...) Through these discussions, I hope to provide more diverse moral educational perspectives for moral decision making. (shrink)

Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices (...) themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but rather of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them. (shrink)

Educational Theory, Volume 71, Issue 6, Page 703-716, December 2021.

In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue (...) that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both. (shrink)

Matthew Clayton, David Stevens and Laura D’Olimpio have advanced a series of objections to arguments I set out in my recent book A Theory of Moral Education – in particular to the problem-of-sociality justification for basic moral standards. Here I reply to their objections.

Compared with children, adults are widely assumed to possess more mature moral understanding thus justifying deference to their moral authority and testimony. This paper examines philosophical discussions regarding this child-adult moral relation and its implications for moral education, particularly accounts suggesting that the moral status of children constitute grounds for treating them paternalistically. I contend that descriptions and justifications of this paternalistic attitude towards children are either unacceptably crude or mistaken. While certain instances justify (...) paternalistic treatment towards children, in the context of moral education the paternalistic attitude is largely irrelevant and even counterproductive. I make a case that children can readily meet minimal standards for moral understanding and engagement. Even when children have no final say, there is still a significant normative difference between deferring paternalistically to the adult's moral testimony and interacting with the child in moral conversation. These considered, I defend a social-contextualist account of moral education that incorporates a participatory (over a paternalistic) pedagogical attitude. Further, instead of portraying moral education in terms of stages (as argued by Kohlberg), moral education should be characterized more as a gradual appreciation of and sensitivity to normative demands that apply in various shared contexts and spheres of human concern. (shrink)

Moral Philosophy and Moral Education considers the interconnections of ethics, education, and the philosophy of culture as related to the human concern with self-knowledge. The individual self finds its inner life writ large in the forms of culture such as religion, art, and history. Such forms of cultural life represent and embody normative ideals that can provide the necessary content to shape the character and the conduct of civic life. Thora Ilin Bayer draws upon the ancient (...) Greek view of education as paideia and the conception of Bildung of the German idealist philosophers. These two ideas of education aim at the development of the whole person as distinct from training in a particular skill, subject matter, technique, or occupation. The education of the whole person aims at the production in the individual of a broad mental outlook harmoniously joined with a knowledge of the great perspectives and principles of human culture as it takes its various shapes within the history of humanity. Moral philosophy requires both culture and the individual as its terms of inquiry, and moral education requires a vision of how to have these two terms interact to form a whole. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that although the Republic’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the Laws, it continues to inform the Laws from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, I argue that the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the Laws (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). I examine the (...) programs of musical and gymnastic education in the Laws and highlight parallels to the accounts of the spirited part of the soul and its role in moral education and virtue that are offered in Republic and Timaeus. I also examine the educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia, and I suggest that the education provided through them is largely directed at the spirited part of the soul as well. (shrink)

I wish to prove in this article that Aristotle divides the ideal scheme of moral education into three stages: first, preliminary education, the most important part of which is the young’s musical-poetic education presented in Politics VIII.5–7; second, moral habituation, in the strict sense explained in Nicomachean Ethics II.1–4, which corresponds to the adult citizens’ military and subordinate political life, in which they learn how to rule through being ruled; finally, theoretical moral education, (...) which means the learning of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics by those mature statesmen who wish to become excellent public educators. (shrink)

In the foregoing articles, David Aldridge, Doret de Ruyter and John Tillson offer some weighty and wide-ranging criticisms of my recent book, A Theory of Moral Education (Hand, 2018a). I cannot hope to do justice to the detail of their criticisms in the space available to me, but I shall attempt, in what follows, to defend my account of moral education against their principal lines of attack. I am grateful to Aldridge, de Ruyter and Tillson for (...) their close engagement with the book and for the opportunity their objections afford me to clarify aspects of my argument. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of calls for moral education to receive greater public attention. In our pluralist society, however, it is difficult to find agreement on what exactly moral education requires. Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education develops a detailed philosophical defence of the claim that teachers should engage students in ethical discussions to promote moral competence and strengthen moral character. Paying particular attention to the teacher's (...) role, this book highlights the justification for, and methods of, creating a classroom community of ethical inquiry. (shrink)

The different sorts of virtuous people who display various virtues to a remarkable degree have brought the issue of individualisation of moral character to the forefront. It signals a more personal dimension of character development which is notoriously ignored in the current discourse on character education. The case is made that since in practice, the individualisation of moral character must, by necessity, advance side by side with the cultivation of virtues, a full account of character education (...) needs to give consideration to both concerns. After analysing the specific ways which temperament, social roles, and occupations respectively contribute to the individualisation of moral character, some practical implications are drawn to shed new light on the common practice of the inculcation of virtues. Firstly, since the varieties of moral personality is the norm, it is appropriate to encourage the educated to become virtuous people of different sorts. Secondly, given the influence that temperament may exert on virtue, having good knowledge of each child’s temperament, identifying the specific difficulties possibly confronting him/her accordingly, and then providing more opportunities to strengthen the cultivation of the related virtues are crucial. Thirdly, since children with different temperaments are inclined to identify with different sorts of moral exemplars, it is valuable to present them a great variety of moral models, from which they can choose the kind of virtuous people they would want to emulate. Lastly, since assuming different occupations and social roles is liable to result in various moral characters, character formation cannot be confined to the family or school. Among others, workplaces and communities are also important variables. (shrink)

The virtues have been a neglected aspect of morality; only recently has reference been made to their place in professional ethics. Unfashionable as Florence Nightingale is, it is nonetheless worth noting that she was instrumental in continuing the Aristotelian tradition of being concerned with the moral character of persons. Nurses who came under Nightingale’s sphere of influence were expected to develop certain exemplary habits of behaviour. A corollary can be drawn with the current UK professional body: nurses are expected (...) to behave in certain ways and to display particular kinds of disposition. The difference lies in the fact that, while Nightingale was clear about the need for moral education, current emphasis is placed on ethical theory and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Spinoza’s claim that self-preservation is the foundation of virtue makes for the point of departure of this philosophical investigation into what a Spinozistic model of moral education might look like. It is argued that Spinoza’s metaphysics places constraints on moral education insofar as an educational account would be affected by Spinoza’s denial of the objectivity of moral knowledge, his denial of the existence of free will, and of moral responsibility. This article discusses these challenges (...) in some detail, seeking to construe a credible account of moral education based on the insight that self-preservation is not at odds with benevolence, but that the self-preservation of the teacher is instead conditioned by the intellectual deliberation of the students. However, it is also concluded that while benevolence retains an important place in Spinoza’s ethics, his causal determinism poses a severe threat to a convincing account of moral education insofar as moral education is commonly understood to involve an effort to influence the actions of students relative to some desirable goal. (shrink)

In this essay, I distinguish two significant act-utilitarian theories of moral education: the traditional rule of thumb view and the Harian intuition view. I argue that there are problems with the traditional view and that an act-utilitarian ought to adopt a version of the Harian view. I then explain and respond to a major objection to the intuition view given by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that the system of moral thought which the Harian view advocates we teach (...) is inherently unstable and is certain to undermine itself. I argue that there is reason to expect a great deal of stability in this system. (shrink)

America’s moral educators have continually splintered our humanity throughout higher education’s history. Unable to agree upon a common ethical understanding of our humanity, educators turned to shards of our identity to help students find their moral bearings. The Dismantling of Moral Education explains why and how we arrived at this situation.

Christopher Winch; Moral Education, Rules and Particular Cases, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 129–134, https://doi.

In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore the similarities and differences between our theories. In the first part of the paper, I outline what Hirst calls the ‘sophisticated view of education’, which I wholeheartedly endorse, and highlight his attention to (...) the noncognitive as well as the cognitive aspects of morality. In the second part, I explain how Hirst’s transcendental justification of morality differs from my contractarian justification and trace the implications of this difference for our respective accounts of moral education. (shrink)

Both science and ethics are embedded in cultural traditions where truths are shared through education; both need competent critics educated within such traditions. Education in both ought to be directed although moral education demands levels of responsible agency that science education does not. Evolutionary science often carries an implicit or explicit understanding of who and what humans are, one which may not be coherent with the implicit or explicit human self‐understanding in moral education. (...) The latter in turn may not be coherent with classical human self‐understandings. Moral education may enlighten and elevate the human nature that has evolved biologically. (shrink)

Narrative representations can change our moral actions and thoughts, for better or for worse. In this article, I develop a theory of fictions' capacity for moral education and moral corruption that is fully sensitive to the diversity of fictions. Specifically, I argue that the way a fiction influences our moral actions and thoughts importantly depends on its genre. This theory promises new insights into practical ethical debates over pornography and media violence.

An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Annual Retreat (February 2005) of the Ethics Committee of the South Carolina Medical Association. The subject was moral education in medical schools. A brief selection, “Creating An Effective Pedagogy for Moral Education” was published in the Journal of the S.C. Medical Association. The present paper examines the state of 'moral education' in contemporary education and other public institutions.

The present study aimed to examine how to improve the effectiveness of moral exemplar-applied interventions based on the pillars of the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) framework, autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Past research has mainly focused on the relatedness and attainability of moral exemplars for predicting motivation outcomes. The data for this study consisted of synthesized data sets from previous studies examining the motivational impacts of distinct moral exemplars and intervention methods. The main syntheses for these data sets used (...) Multilevel Modeling (MLM) focusing on relatability, attainability, and intervention methods, corresponding to relatedness, competence, and autonomy in the SDT, respectively, as predictors. In general, there was a significant interaction effect between the attainability or relatability, and the intervention method. Autonomous instruction methods, which support autonomy, were demonstrated to boost motivational outcomes. Implications from this study support the employment of SDT to examine the use of moral exemplars in moral education and were consistent with previous exemplar studies. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to character education have been viewed by many educators as an attempt to establish self control within students to habituate them to prescribed behaviour and as nothing more than a ‘bits‐and‐pieces’ approach to moral education. While this is accurate for many character education programmes, integrated multi‐dimensional character education embraces both moral education and character formation. Students learn to identify and process social conventions within the core values of the school and community (...) and have opportunities to learn practical reasoning skills in schools where character education is integrated into all aspects of the schooling process. Reported in this article are several studies, including two large‐scale experimental investigations, that show integrated character education results in an improved school environment, student pro‐social and moral behaviour, and reading and maths test scores. Schools become more caring communities; student discipline referrals drop significantly, particularly in areas related to bullying behaviour; and test scores in moderately achieving schools increase nearly 50%. (shrink)

While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper (...) demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant's moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures. (shrink)

Overpopulation, overexploitation of natural resources, overconsumerism, the predictions of environmental experts do not bode well for us.

Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.

Questions of identity such as ‘Who am I?’ are often answered by appeals to one or more affiliations with a specific nation (citizenship), culture, ethnicity, religion, etc. Taking as given the idea that identity over time—including identification and re-identification—for objects of a particular kind requires that there be criteria of identity appropriate to things of that kind, I argue that citizenship, as a ‘collectivist’ concept, does not generate such criteria for individual citizens, but that the concept person—which specifies the kind (...) of entity that I am—does generate such criteria. Confusion on this point has led some writers on citizenship to equivocate between identity for individuals and what is properly called self-determination in terms of their group affiliations and commitments. In the second part of the paper, I articulate and defend a relational view of personhood, and argue that it provides adequate grounding for morality in general, and moral education in particular. While not denying the value of civics or citizenship education, the link between morality and citizenship is derivative, at best. Finally, I examine the implications of a relational conception of personhood for the specific context of schools and classrooms, arguing that this conception is appropriately represented when the classroom functions as a community of inquiry, in which each member is encouraged to see her/himself as one among others. Drawing on the theory and practice of Philosophy for Children, I conclude with a call to reunite citizenship and moral education with their philosophical roots. (shrink)

The paper inculcates the path of modern education by implementing cum ensuing the form and content of moral education from the stances of prescriptivist R. M Hare and existentialist Sartre. In the first part of the paper, Hare’s tune for language-centric moral concepts and its prescriptive plus universalistic application for society enhance an outlook for moral education where learners should be taught to apply morality from a prescriptive sense, not by memorizing it in a (...) descriptive manner. Besides, Sartre’s existentialist appeal delineates moral education as a free choice of a learner where any institutional hegemony becomes trivial. The second part of the paper focuses on the content of moral education. What sort of moral laws make the content of moral education justifiable? Here Russell’s approach takes a pertinent role. We should secure modern education from the social and state’s anarchism. A way out that I depict in the last section of the paper stresses on moral education that evades itself from the repression of the pedagogue or rigid principles. Modern education should quest for why and liberal neutrality not by following the rigid rules obediently. Moral education teaches children about their own rights and the rights of the other in a beneficial manner. (shrink)