People are unable to report how they decide whether to move backwards or forwards to catch a ball. When asked to imagine how their angle of elevation of gaze would change when they caught a ball, most people are unable to describe what happens although their interception strategy is based on controlling changes in this angle. Just after catching a ball, many people are unable to recognise a description of how their angle of gaze changed during the catch. Some people (...) confidently choose incorrect descriptions that would guarantee failure of interception demonstrating unconscious knowledge co-existing with systematically different conscious beliefs. Where simple solutions to important evolutionary problems exist, unconscious perception needs to be impervious to conscious beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore and describe what is needed to allow connected and automated vehicles to break traffic rules in order to minimise road safety risk and to operate with appropriate transparency. Reviewing current traffic rules with particular reference to two driving situations, we illustrate why current traffic rules are not suitable for CAVs and why making new traffic rules specifically for CAVs would be inappropriate. In defining an alternative approach to achieving safe CAV driving behaviours, we describe the (...) use of ethical goal functions as part of hybrid AI systems, suggesting that functions should be defined by governmental bodies with input from citizens and stakeholders. Ethical goal functions for CAVs would enable developers to optimise driving behaviours for safety under conditions of uncertainty whilst allowing for differentiation of products according to brand values. Such functions can differ between regions according to preferences for safety behaviours within that region and can be updated over time, responding to continual socio-technological feedback loops. We conclude that defining ethical goal functions is an urgent and necessary step from governmental bodies to enable the safe and transparent operation of CAVs and accelerate the reduction in road casualties they promise to achieve. (shrink)

Political polarisation in the United States offers opportunities to explore how beliefs about candidates – that they could save or destroy American society – impact people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Participants forecast their future emotional responses to the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, and reported their actual responses after the election outcome. Stronger beliefs about candidates were associated with forecasts of greater emotion in response to the election, but the strength of this relationship differed based on candidate preference. Trump supporters’ (...) forecast happiness more strongly related to beliefs that their candidate would save society than for Biden supporters. Biden supporters’ forecast anger and fear were more strongly related to beliefs that Trump would destroy society than vice versa. These forecasts mattered: predictions of lower happiness and greater anger if the non-preferred candidate won predicted voting, with Biden supporters voting more than Trump supporters. Generally, participants forecast more emotion than they experienced, but beliefs altered this tendency. Stronger beliefs predicted experiencing more happiness or more anger and fear about the election outcome than had been forecast. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms through which political polarisation and rhetoric can influence voting behaviour. (shrink)

We agree with Grossmann that fear often builds cooperative relationships. Yet he neglects much extant literature. Prior researchers have discussed how fear (and other emotions) build cooperative relationships, have questioned whether fear per se evolved to serve this purpose, and have emphasized that human cooperation takes many forms. Grossmann's theory would benefit from a wider consideration of this work.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 114-116, April 2022. The question “what is emotion?” has long been at the core of theoretical debates. The IAC-E is a useful framework for understanding relationships among responses in emotional situations. However, this approach cannot address the nature of emotion. Researchers determine what counts as emotion in the IAC-E, and this decision impacts the relationships detected and inferences made. The assumptions of researchers about emotion change the output. Further, the model is not theoretically (...) agnostic and is best suited to examine emotion perception/knowledge, as in the simulations presented. According to some theories, experienced emotion is qualitatively different than situations that involve perceiving others' emotion or semantic knowledge. Addressing the nature of emotion requires empirical examination of the assumptions made in each theory. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The question “what is emotion?” has long been at the core of theoretical debates. The IAC-E is a useful framework for understanding relationships among responses in emotional situations. However, this approach cannot address the nature of emotion. Researchers determine what counts as emotion in the IAC-E, and this decision impacts the relationships detected and inferences made. The assumptions of researchers about emotion change the output. Further, the model is not theoretically agnostic and is best suited (...) to examine emotion perception/knowledge, as in the simulations presented. According to some theories, experienced emotion is qualitatively different than situations that involve perceiving others' emotion or semantic knowledge. Addressing the nature of emotion requires empirical examination of the assumptions made in each theory. (shrink)

Tacitus is writing about Ireland. In 1967 Ogilvie commented, ‘In melius cannot be taken either with differunt, since it contradicts haud multum, nor with cogniti, since it cannot be imagined that Tacitus was so ignorant of the truth as to suppose that Ireland was better known than England.’ He therefore followed earlier editors in deleting in melius as a possible interpolation by ‘patriotic Irish monks’.

The first passage quoted above is the only certain evidence we have about Tacitus' early career, until we come to his tenure of the praetorship in A.D. 88. His career before that date has been the subject of much speculation, so it is surprising that no notice has been taken of the second passage. Syme does not even mention it, and C.W. Mendell merely describes it as ‘curious’. The reason for its dismissal is presumably that the post of a bibliothecis (...) was equestrian, while Tacitus was a senator. Yet in view of our lack of other evidence about his early career, it seems at least worth considering how Pastrengo came to make his statement, even if we conclude he was wrong. (shrink)

Many reasons have been put forward to explain why Aeneas and the Sibyl should depart through the gate of ivory, which lets out ‘false dreams’. The two views which have perhaps been found the least unsatisfactory are those of W. Everett and the one most recently championed by Brooks Otis. Everett suggested that it was a common belief in antiquity that false dreams occur before midnight, and true dreams after midnight; he went on to suggest that Aeneas left Hades before (...) midnight, when only the ivory gate would be open. That there was such a common belief has been disputed by, among others, H. R. Steiner. (shrink)