Partially automated vehicle technology is increasingly common on-road. While this technology can provide safety benefits to drivers, it also introduces new concerns about driver attention. In particular, during partially automated driving, drivers are expected to stay vigilant so they can readily respond to important events in their environment. However, using partially automated vehicles on the highway places drivers in monotonous situations and requires them to do very little. This can place the driver in a state of cognitive underload in which (...) they experience a very small amount of cognitive demand. In this situation, drivers can exhibit vigilance decrements which impact their ability to respond to on-road threats. This is of particular concern in situations when the partially automated vehicle fails to respond to a potentially critical situation and leaves all responsibility to safely navigate to the driver. This paper reviews situations that lead to vigilance decrements and characterizes the different methodologies of measuring driver vigilance during PAD, highlighting their advantages and limitations. Based on our reading of the literature, we summarize several factors future research on vigilance decrements in PAD should consider. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce ed. by Cornelis de WaalRoger WardThe Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce Cornelis de Waal, editor. Oxford, 2024.As scholars of the American tradition, we know Charles Sanders Peirce as an original thinker with personal foibles and complex ideas, a primary source and yet an enigma in the main channel of the tradition. He is most profound in developing an architectonic system (...) that rivals and proceeds beyond Kant in the interest of furthering the inquiry necessary for self-control and the development of the community of inquiry. The object of the Real consistently appears as a figure to Peirce's inquiry as its true home, and the community of self-and-other correcting minds sharing this goal of inquiry may bring themselves together in experience and work. This handbook is an example of such work that extends beyond this immediate occasion, as Peirce reminds us, because once alive within us, how could we conceive of such inquiry ever ending?The vision of Peirce that comes clear in this volume arises from the coherence of his philosophical, logical, and mathematical thought, drawn out by historical as well as recent applications. The significant advance of this handbook is the combination of US and international scholars drawing upon a wide circle of Peirce's influence and interest. The depth and breadth of analysis speaks to the power of Peirce's method of self-correction; it is the engine of his method. We can assess the changes, the principles, and the expressed sentiments, but the origin or character of Peirce's sentiments themselves or the full ground of the emergence of his ideas remains obscure. De Waal organizes the book in six parts. What follows is an interpretation of the content of these parts via summaries of the chapters and a brief concluding observation.Part I examines Peirce's personal life and interactions with organizations in order to qualify his successes and failures and perhaps explain why this genius had such a difficult life. Daniel L. Everett (chap. 1) represents Peirce as a special case of academic genius and faults the leadership of Johns Hopkins and Harvard for failing to accommodate his behavior and eccentricities and also includes touching narratives of children who knew and cared for the Peirces in Milford (17). Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena (chap. 2) examine Peirce's career through his five European trips and their importance for his collaborative scientific ventures, encounters with beauty (39), and as occasions of family drama with first wife Zina Fay and later with Juliette Froissy. [End Page 78] Cheryl Misak (chap. 3) focuses on the difficult behavior of Peirce that finds its complement in the personal animus of Simon Newcomb, who assailed Peirce both at Johns Hopkins and at the US Coast Survey (51, 54). Despite these attacks, Peirce's genius was recognized by Venn, C. I. Lewis, and—through Lady Welby—by Ramsey and Wittgenstein. Pierce's uniqueness as a scientist, philosopher, and logician was mishandled by Charles Eliot and Daniel Gilman, who failed to recognize him as America's leading thinker (55). This beginning brings Peirce's personality forward as an angle of vision on his philosophical and scientific production, setting the ground for the technical evaluations of Peirce's philosophical and scientific career and the lasting impact of his logic and metaphysics after his death.Part II develops the topics of phenomenology and the normative sciences in six chapters. Richard Kenneth Atkins (chap. 4) provides a brilliantly clear description of the development of Peirce's categories and the phaneron that "needs no special tools and is open to all" to engage "whatever comes before the mind" (71). But this does not exhaust the "phaneron" due to the Real that remains beyond the representation by minds. Nathan Houser (chap. 5) develops Peirce's empiricism as the "rain of percepts" that is the inflow of phenomenal content: the "deeper levels of our bottomless lake of consciousness and subconscious mind consists mainly of conceptual or intellectual content based on our perceptual judgments" (88). This challenges Locke's and Dennett's attempts to articulate a completely materialist account of reality. Tiago da Costa... (shrink)

The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.

The ArgumentOver the years national styles have been invoked or denigrated in the writing of the history of science. This paper is an attempt to give the concept of national style a degree of precision and clarity enabling scholars to understand when and how it may be invoked and when and how its use would be dubious or even forbidden. The example of the United States of America is used because the history of the sciences in the United States was (...) often written loosely in terms supposedly conducive to national style analyses. We first discuss the problem of commonalities, factors widely present within all countries in the Western tradition, which, by definition, cannot be exclusive national attributes. Here the problem is to somehow determine whether the supposed national style attribute is a case of a significantly different degree of intensity than some presumed norm in the Western tradition.The principal thesis advanced is that pre-existing historiographic assumptions largely determine whether or not a scholar finds or does not find a national style. This is discussed in terms of some examples for the U.S. case. More particularly, a number of examples are discussed from the three principal genres or schools in current writing in the history of science: the knowledge-centered; the doing-science; and the context-oriented. Based on the analysis of the examples, an attempt is made to sketch an approach to a more rigorous use of the concept of national style. (shrink)

The concept of the 'social Trinity', which posits three conscious subjects in God, radically revised the traditional Christian idea of the Creator. It promoted a view of God as a passionate, creative and responsive source of all being. Keith Ward argues that social Trinitarian thinking threatens the unity of God, however, and that this new view of God does not require a 'social' component. Expanding on the work of theologians such as Barth and Rahner, who insisted that there was (...) only one mind of God, Ward offers a coherent, wholly monotheistic interpretation of the Trinity. Christ and the Cosmos analyses theistic belief in a scientific context, demonstrating the necessity of cosmology to theological thinking that is often overly myopic and anthropomorphic. This important volume will benefit those who seek to understand what the Trinity is, why it matters and how it fits into a scientific account of the universe. (shrink)

Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...) where, intuitively, they should not be able to do so. I argue that there are cases where a belief that p can behave like an appearance that p and thereby make it seem to one that p. (shrink)

In this report, the phenomenology of two blind users of a sensory substitution device – “The vOICe” – that converts visual images to auditory signals is described. The users both report detailed visual phenomenology that developed within months of immersive use and has continued to evolve over a period of years. This visual phenomenology, although triggered through use of The vOICe, is likely to depend not only on online visualization of the auditory signal but also on the users’ previous (albeit (...) distant) experience of veridical vision (e.g. knowledge of shapes and visual perspective). Once established, the sensory substitution mapping between the auditory and visual domains is not confined to when the device is worn and, thus, may constitute an example of acquired synaesthesia. (shrink)

This paper examines some aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics of the essences of modes.2 I situate Spinoza's use of the notion of essence as a response to traditional, Aristotelian, ways of thinking about essence. I argue that, although Spinoza rejects part of the Aristotelian conception of essence, according to which it is in virtue of its essence that a thing is a member of a kind, he nevertheless retains a different part of such a conception, according to which an essence is (...) some structural feature of a thing which causally explains other, non-essential features. I go on to develop an account of Spinoza's metaphysics of essence, according to which essences, what he sometimes calls formal essences, are produced by the divine essence prior to and independent of the creation of finite modes, and according to which essences are the formal or exemplar causes of finite modes. I then argue that finite modes, in virtue of the formal essences which they actualize, are genuine causal relata. Finally, I offer some speculations about Spinoza's answer to the question, "Why, in a necessitarian cosmos filled with formal essences, should there be temporal finite modes at all?". (shrink)

In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...) validity of the categories in the objective deduction. I challenge this standard reading of the subjective deduction, arguing, first, that there is little textual evidence for it, and, second, that it encourages a problematic conception of how the deduction works. In its place, I present a new reading of the subjective deduction. Rather than being a broad investigation of our cognitive faculties, it should be seen as addressing a specific worry that arises in the course of the objective deduction. The latter establishes the need for a necessary connection between our capacities for thinking and being given objects, but Kant acknowledges that his readers might struggle to comprehend how these seemingly independent capacities are coordinated. Even worse, they might well believe that in asserting this necessary connection, Kant’s position amounts to an implausible subjective idealism. The subjective deduction ismeant to allay these concerns by showing that they rest on a misunderstanding of the relation between these faculties. This new reading of the subjective deduction offers a better fit with Kant’s text. It also has broader implications, for it reveals the more philosophically plausible account of our relation to the world as thinkers that Kant is defending – an account that is largely obscured by the standard reading of the subjective deduction. (shrink)

Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that ‘knowledge excludes luck’ and that knowledge depends on ‘purely epistemic’ factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, ‘anti-luck epistemology,’ which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ on knowledge. Anti-luck epistemologists hoping to resist encroachment must accept a controversial thesis about true belief or (...) a dubious claim about luck and value and interests. (shrink)

In recent debates over permissivism and uniqueness—two theses concerning the relationship between evidence and epistemic rationality—some philosophers have claimed that permissivism has an intuitive advantage over uniqueness. I examine the cases alleged to intuitively motivate permissivism and suggest they do not provide prima facie support for permissivism. I conclude by explaining how my discussion bears on whether permissivism can defeat skeptical arguments based on recognized peer disagreement and the historical contingency of our beliefs.

Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.

I reviewed Pope Francis’s Address as one acutely aware of the extremely murky psycho-political cloud surrounding womb-determinism in the United States, and coming to it without any religion-based predisposition on the issue.I made note that Pope Francis’s main point is not proscriptive. He gives a low profile to any dogmatic definition of the sanctity of life. His tone is humane, not doctrinal.The Pope proposes that the fetus, like the child who follows, is basically a messenger, communicating from the womb and (...) creating the universe that will define the mother, the family, and the wider community. This point is not moral—he calls it “pre-religious”—but semiotic, concerned with the nature and structure of how we... (shrink)

This chapter attempts to improve our conception of objectivity in general, especially in journalism and other media work. It defends the twin theses that: Global news media needs a new conception of objectivity and the conception of pragmatic objectivity is a viable candidate, and pragmatic objectivity is part of a radical rethinking of journalism and media ethics. It is an alternative to the professional objective model, a still-influential traditional idea of the objective journalist as a neutral stenographer of fact. Journalists (...) need to disrupt this model of good journalism. The chapter reconstructs objectivity as a natural evaluative capacity of humans that is situated and holistic. Then, it uses this naturalistic perspective to articulate pragmatic objectivity and apply it to journalism. (shrink)

I criticize Richard Fumerton’s fallibilist acquaintance theory of noninferential justification.

Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject’s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not the other? I argue that (...) these cases and the relationship between them can be made sense of in light of an existing view of colour perception. Understanding colours as ways in which objects and surfaces modify light, perceived through grasping patterns and variations in colour appearances, provides a framework from which the cases and their apparent disanalogy can be predicted and explained. This theory’s ability to accommodate these cases constitutes further empirical evidence in its favour. (shrink)

This paper explores Aristotle ’s discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics of the relation between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul to make sense of his claim that “we cannot be fully good without prudence [practical wisdom], or prudent without virtue of character.” The significance of this interpretive project for an understanding of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole cannot be understated. While Aristotle ’s conception of human excellence clearly incorporates both cognitive and conative capacities – which he calls (...) virtues of the intellect and virtues of character –, Aristotle ’s commitment to the biconditional relation between these capacities is less obvious. It follows that to understand his account of either form of virtue is to understand both, as well as the ways in which they are related. By attending to his account of the process through which an ethically undeveloped human being becomes a virtuous person, I approach this interpretive challenge from an angle too often neglected by contemporary readers of Aristotle. Although the Nicomachean Ethics contains no sustained treatment of the virtuous person’s development through time, the text is rich with materials that emerge in a variety of contexts and indicate the extent to which the very possibility of virtue itself depends on how one is brought up. By attending to the details of the developmental story, we will put ourselves in a much better position both to make sense of Aristotle ’s characterization of the fully developed virtuous person,, and to respond to the interpretive challenges articulated above. (shrink)

Summary With the help of psychological and biological concepts it is possible todescribe adequately a fundamental class of inductive inferences that are intuitively correct. Moreover, by relying on evolutionary theories it is possible tojustify them, because they reflect innate, hence useful, capacities. These inferences, however, refer to the past, i.e. the inferred generalization is of the form All Awere B . The reason is that evolutionary theories only claim that innate capacitieshad survival value. With respect to inductive inferences about the (...) future the situation is different. In particular, they are affected by the Goodman paradox. In the article, a method is proposed which enables us to describe adequately a basic class of inductive inferences about the future which are intuitively correct. These inferences can also be justified, but their justification requires a very specific assumption. The conclusions arrived at in the article can be viewed as a satisfactory solution to the Goodman paradox. (shrink)

This paper considers the disciplines of literature and history and the contributions each makes to the discourse of bioethics. In each case I note the pedagogic ends that can be enacted though the appropriate use of the each of these disciplines in the sphere of medical education, particularly in the medical ethics classroom.1 I then explore the contribution that both these disciplines and their respective methodologies can and do bring to the academic field of bioethics. I conclude with a brief (...) consideration of the relations between literature and history with particular attention to the possibilities for a future bioethics informed by history and literature after the empirical turn. (shrink)

The book sets out to address and answer three questions from the point of view of Christian theology. The first is, from where does theology speak? The second is, what are the mechanisms whereby cultures change? The third is, how might we conceive the relationship between the contemporary production of theological discourse and the transformation of cultures more generally? Drawing upon the work of standpoint epistemologists, cultural anthropologists and social scientists, the book argues that public acts of interpretation are involvements (...) in renegotiating the future direction of cultural change. Though the enquiry is conducted from one particular standpoint - Christian theology - the observations and suggestions it makes regarding cultural transformation and the defense it makes of syncretism have more general application. (shrink)