Emerging biotechnology may soon allow the creation of genetically human organs inside animals, with non-human primates and pigs being the best candidate species. This prospect raises the question of whether creating organs in primates in order to then transplant them into humans would be more acceptable than using them for research. In this paper, we examine the validity of the purported moral distinction between primates and other animals, and analyze the ethical acceptability of using primates to create organs for (...) human use. (shrink)

In this chapter we outline the need to develop ethical frameworks to guide research on the role of animal-orientated health, therapeutic, and service interventions. We discuss findings from our research on uses of animals in therapeutic settings and benefits of human–canine interactions for human health. These stories from the field reveal that current ethics review processes do not recognise the animal as an equal partner in the potential reciprocal benefits and risks of therapeutic human–animal relationships. We explore how these review (...) processes frame research on the relationships between humans and non-human animals and use the ethical review system of Aotearoa/New Zealand as an example. We propose an ethical framework that goes beyond animal welfare legislation and recognises a range of non-human animal capacities. (shrink)

Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for moral status. Further, I illustrate some (...) practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question. (shrink)

Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non‐human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call thespecificity problem. After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely thetheory‐light approachproposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term themodest theoretical approach, arguing that (...) it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable. (shrink)

One important trend in political philosophy is to hold that non-human animals don't directly place demands of justice on us. Another important trend is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorising about social/political institutions. This situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. Either we need a theory of justice that gives facts about non-human animals a non-derivative explanatory role in the determination of facts about what justice involves, or else we should (...) be wary of the default normative priority that considerations of justice have in much of contemporary political philosophy. This discussion brings out important general methodological points tied to the role of concept and word choice in normative theorising about our social/political institutions. These methodological points, I argue, matter for a range of discussions in contemporary political philosophy, including those about global justice. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the implications arising from the commonplace premise that the nature of being admits in ontological kinds. That is, there are actual, fundamentally different genera of being in the world, namely human and non-human beings. That for entities to be considered suitable for valuation under the same ethical rubric, it must be assumed that the general character of their mental states is commensurate. However, if we accent that it is indeterminable what kind of being an entity (...) is without access to the phenomenological character of its experiences, then it may be argued that the ethical standards for non-human animals which follow from our inductive descriptions will always remain a matter of opinion, expressed from a particular point of view delimited within the metaphysical commitments derived from a human ontology of being. (shrink)

Following the publication of the Weatherall report on the use of non-human primates in research, this paper reflects on how to provide appropriate and ethical models for research beneficial to humankind. Two of the main justifications for the use of non-human primates in biomedical research are analysed. These are the “least-harm/greatest-good” argument and the “capacity” argument. This paper argues that these are equally applicable when considering whether humans are appropriate subjects of biomedical research.

In environmental ethics, the legal and political representation of non-humans is a widespread aspiration. Its supporters see representative institutions that give voice to non-humans’ interests as a promising strategy for responding to the illegitimate worldwide exploitation of non-human beings. In this article I engage critically with those who support this form of representation, and address two issues central to any account concerned with the legal and political representation of non-human living beings: what should be represented? And what are (...) the conditions of such a representation? The answers I provide to these queries count as a first step towards a comprehensive account of the institutional representation of non-human nature. (shrink)

The complexity and variation of sound emission by members of the animal kingdom, primarily produced by the orders Passeriformes (songbirds), Cetacea (whales), but also reported in species belonging to the Exopterygota (insects) and Carnivora (mammals), has attracted human attention since the Middle Ages, where birds’ calls were used in compositions of that time. However, the focus of this paper will be on sound productions of birds and whales, as recent scientific and musicological research concentrates on these two animals.

Générations futures, animaux, rivières, espèces, écosystèmes, œuvres d’art, androïdes. La liste des entités non-humaines (ou non-individuelles) aspirant à la personnalité juridique s’allonge. Un nombre croissant d’État leur attribuent des droits dans le but de les protéger, avec plus ou moins de succès, en tant qu’entité à part entière. L’article 71 de la Constitution de l’Équateur figure parmi les exemples les plus marquants puisqu’il fait de la Nature ( Pacha Mama ) un sujet de droits au nom desquels on compte le (...) droit au respect de son existence et le droit à la régénération de ses cycles vitaux. La vulnérabilité de ces entités non-humaines appelle une protection dépassant les intérêts individuels. Souvent dépourvues de la personnalité juridique, ces entités ne peuvent pas agir en justice par elles-mêmes. Leurs intérêts, bien que de plus en plus protégés par les normes juridiques, demeurent partiellement défendus par l’appareil juridictionnel. Au-delà de la résistance de nos imaginaires politiques, cela s’explique par la difficulté théorique et pratique d’ouvrir l’accès au prétoire à des requérants agissant au nom d’autrui, en l’occurrence de ces entités. Ce sont les obstacles juridiques que nous tentons ici de lever. Le principe Nul ne plaide par procureur interdit à toute personne d’agir en défense d’un droit subjectif qui ne lui appartiendrait pas en propre, sans requérir un mandat de représentation du bénéficiaire du droit. L’intérêt pour agir que l’on présente comme la condition sine qua non de recevabilité de l’action se caractérise, en substance, par l’intérêt lésé du requérant. Les actions en justice dans l’intérêt d’autrui ne sont admises que par exception et sans que les concepts doctrinaux ne les embrassent pleinement. L’action en justice tout autant que la protection juridique des intérêts ont été pensées presque exclusivement par le prisme des intérêts et des besoins humains et individuels. La reconnaissance de droits aux non-humains rebat les cartes du droit processuel. Il faut repenser l’intérêt à agir comme condition de recevabilité susceptible d’être caractérisée par une motivation du requérant qui puisse être autre que la lésion de son propre droit. Il faut élargir la catégorie des bénéficiaires de droit aux entités, quelles qu’elles soient, dont les intérêts sont objectivement protégés par des normes juridiques. Il faut concevoir l’action en justice comme subordonnées non pas à un intérêt personnel du requérant mais à une norme d’habilitation dont le contenu est laissé à la décision des autorités normatives. Les voies processuelles peuvent accueillir une grande diversité de configurations. Il appartient à la sphère politique de pondérer la nécessité de garantir les droits sans encourager l’engorgement du prétoire. Toutefois, intégré au sein de ce que l’on appelle les « grandes causes », le contentieux des droits des non-humains participe à la transformation du rôle la justice dans nos systèmes. En dépassant le règlement des conflits individuels, elle doit aujourd’hui se prononcer sur des questions qui sont habituellement discutées au sein des arènes démocratiques ( cause lawyering ). JEL Codes : K380, K410. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 23-25.

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals (...) since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections. (shrink)

Philosophers have understood propositional contents in many different ways, some of them imposing stricter demands on cognition than others. In this paper, I want to characterize a specific sub-type of propositional content that shares many core features with full-blown propositional contents while lacking others. I will call them modest propositional contents, and I will be especially interested in examining which behavioral patterns would justify their attribution to non-human animals. To accomplish these tasks, I will begin by contrasting modest propositional contents (...) with primitive feature-placing contents: a kind of content that, according to some philosophers, can explain the behavior of non-human animals. I will examine which cognitive abilities are involved in having mental states with each of these contents and which sorts of behavioral patterns would provide evidence that an animal has one of them or another. Finally, I will present some empirical evidence which strongly suggests that some non-human animals have mental states with modest propositional contents. (shrink)

The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowed with information-processing capacities are analysed. It is (...) hypothesized that metacognition offers an evolutionary stable response to the various demands of the internal and external flows of information in a competitive environment. Metacognition provides a form of process-reflexivity that can, but does not have to be redeployed through metarepresentations. Finally the claim that rationality so conceived involves normativity is discussed. (shrink)

At first glance, it looks like Aristotle can’t make up his mind about the ethical or moral status of non-human animals in his ethical treatises. Somewhat infamously, the Nicomachean Ethics claims that “there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things, nor is there towards an ox or a horse” (EN 8.11.1161b1–2). Since Aristotle thinks that friendship and justice are co-extensive (EN 8.9.1159b25–32), scholars have often read this passage to entail that humans have no ethical obligations to non-human animals. (...) By contrast, although the Eudemian Ethics denies that non-human animals can participate in “primary” friendships, EE 7.2 claims that “the other kinds of friendship are also found among animals; and it is evident that utility is present to some extent among them both in relation to humankind, in the case of tame animals, and in relation to each other” (EE 7.2.1236b3–11). Does the Nicomachean account of non-human animals contradict that of the Eudemian Ethics? Ultimately, I believe the Nicomachean account is consistent with the Eudemian account. Nonetheless, I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of non-human animals differs significantly in the two texts. My chapter explores this difference in greater detail and considers the ramifications of such a difference for our understanding of Aristotle’s place in the philosophical tradition concerning the ethical status of non-human animals. (shrink)

Many different methodological approaches have been proposed to infer the presence of consciousness in non-human systems. In this paper, a version of the theory-heavy approach is defended. Theory-heavy approaches rely heavily on considerations from theories of consciousness to make inferences about non-human consciousness. Recently, the theory-heavy approach has been critiqued in the form of Birch's (Noûs, 56(1): 133-153, 2022) dilemma of demandingness and Shevlin's (Mind & Language, 36(2): 297-314, 2021) specificity problem. However, both challenges implicitly assume an inapt characterization of (...) the theory-heavy approach. I argue that an alternative characterization of the approach, what I call a credence-based theory-heavy approach, avoids these challenges. Theorists can generate interpretations of their theory, at different levels of generality, and operationalize these into theory-informed markers. These theory-informed are assigned a likelihood and are used to assess the probability that a target system is conscious. In providing this characterization, and mapping out the possible ways in which a credence-based theory-heavy approach can be fleshed out, the aim is to situate the theory-heavy approach as a more compelling approach than it is currently being perceived as. Our attention, then, needs to towards remaining challenges such as the consensus problem and the problem of calibrating the likelihoods associated with theory-informed markers. I also explore methodological pluralism and assess how the credence-based theory-heavy approach can benefit from other methodological approaches. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the use of non-human animals in ritual sacrifices is not necessary for the Confucian tradition. I draw upon resources found within other religious traditions as well as Confucianism concerning carrying out even the most mundane, ordinary actions as expressions of reverence. I argue that this practice of manifesting deep reverence toward God through simple actions, which I call everyday reverence, reveals a way for Confucians to maintain the deep reverence that is essential for Confucianism, (...) while abandoning the use of non-human animal sacrifice. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psychopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of (...) a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism – either human or non-human – capable of detecting its own misrepresentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, ex hypothesi, unable to detect error in such representations. To solve this problem, we argue that adding a historical dimension – as in Millikan’s view on mental representations – to Bickhard’s account of function makes mental misrepresentation of mentally-ill minds possible. Using Bickhard’s dynamic account of function, it is possible to explain why delusions and other mental disorders can be seen as locally functional. However, an etiological dimension can further explain why misrepresentations seem to be globally dysfunctional. Even if representational or biosemiotic hypotheses about non-human psychopathology are difficult to confirm empirically, we defend the view that they can enrich our understanding of the causes and development of such pathologies, and may constitute a new progressive research programme. (shrink)

It is widely held that moral obligations to non-human beings do not involve considerations of justice. For such a view, nonhuman interests are always prone to be trumped by human interests. Rawlsian contractarianism comprises an example of such a view. Through analysis of such theories, this essay highlights the problem of reconciling the claim that humans have obligations to non-humans with the claim that our treatment of the latter is not a matter of justice. We argue that if (...) it is granted that the basic interests of non-human beings sometimes count for more than the peripheral interests of humans, then our understandings of obligation and of justice must be aligned, so that what we say about obligation is not countered by assumptions about the invariable priority of humans in matters of justice. We further consider whether such a conclusion can be endorsed by those who adopt certain alternative theories to contractarianism. We conclude that adherents of a range of theories including sentientism and biocentrism must accept that human interests can sometimes be superseded by animal interests, and that this applies not least in matters of justice. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Calum Miller skillfully and creatively argues for the counterintuitive view that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense. By Miller’s lights, such reasons are either weak in their own right or they also favor the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. In this paper, I explain why Miller’s view is mistaken. In particular, I sketch a very reasonable abductive argument for (...) the conclusion that non-human animals feel morally relevant pain. This argument shows that, even in the face of Miller’s moderate skepticism about whether non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense, it’s still more epistemically reasonable to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense than not. In which case, I conclude that Miller has failed to show that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals don’t feel pain in a morally relevant sense that don’t also count in favor of the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between information and abductive reasoning in the context of problem-solving, focusing on non-human animals. Two questions guide our investigation: What is the relation between information and abductive reasoning in the context of human and non-human animals? Do non-human animals perform discovery based on inferential processes such as abductive reasoning? In order to answer these questions, we discuss the semiotic concept of information in relation to the concept of abductive reasoning and, (...) more specifically, to the notion of manipulative abduction proposed by Magnani. Finally, we investigate a case study of corvids’ intelligence, namely, their capacity of causal cognition. (shrink)

German phenomenologist and sociologist Max Scheler accorded sympathy a central role in his philosophy, arguing that sympathy enables not only ethical behaviour, but also knowledge of animate and inanimate others. Influenced by Catholicism and especially St Francis, Scheler envisioned a broad, cosmic sympathy forming the hidden basis for all human values, with the “higher” religious, artistic, philosophic and other cultural values enabled by a more basic regard for non-human nature and insights gained from the human situation within the non-human world. (...) Sympathy for the non-human is thus both integral and fundamental to the cultivation of other values in the development of both the human person and humanity in general. Scheler’s concept of sympathy is valuable for contemporary animal ethics because it insists on acknowledgement of and respect for difference as constitutive for the experience of sympathy. By thus allowing for sympathy to occur in the absence of complete knowledge of other subjectivities, Scheler’s phenomenology of sympathy eliminates the need for complete understanding of the consciousness of other animals as a prerequisite for interspecies sympathy. Despite their inability to completely inhabit non-human perspectives, humans can thus sympathize with other creatures. While Scheler is a foundational thinker and, to a large degree, maintains hierarchical structures contested by many contemporary animal theorists, he remains a valuable source for contemporary theory insofar as he acknowledges a “fundamental basis of connection” between species and affirms that all animal bodies are communicative. The occasioning of sympathy by gestural signification opens a path of insight that can increase human openness to non-human others. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007. (shrink)

Some argue that animals and non-human figures in the Zhuangzi help displace the significance of humans. According to others the Zhuangzi suggests a certain time of ‘animalism,’ asking us to be more like various types of fauna and flora that do not share our self-centeredness. In this paper the use of non-human characters in the Zhuangzi will be examined through a survey of traditional Chinese commentary, comparisons with the Lunyu, and placing the use of non-human characters within the larger (...) context of the Zhuangzi. Thus we find that while anti-anthropocentric and animalistic perspectives can be philosophized with the Zhuangzi, the text itself is not overly concerned with these subjects. Animals and non-human characters are mainly allegorical or metaphorical, allowing the Zhuangzito 1) make broadly applicable arguments; 2) playfully discuss ideas that may be unappealing at first glance, and; 3) create a distance that allows the text to resist ossification. (shrink)

Exploring Topics in Non/human Coexistence serves as a unifying platform for individuals from diverse backgrounds who share a common goal of achieving total liberation and fostering coexistence between humans and nonhumans beyond the confines of our shared planet. The chapters delve into a wide range of subjects, including critical analyses of human/nonhuman interactions, strategies for enhancing liberation efforts, and the significance of drawing inspiration from nonhuman entities. Several chapters within this book push the field towards innovative pathways by proposing (...) solutions to detrimental practices and organizational frameworks. Moreover, they underscore the interconnectedness of animal advocacy with other social justice movements, thereby fostering collaboration among advocates of various liberation causes. Veganism, in its broadest sense, emerges as a recurring motif that threads together the diverse themes explored in this book, facilitating a cohesive approach towards anti-oppressive endeavors. To amplify the voices of marginalized communities, the editors have strategically positioned chapters authored by individuals of color and other underrepresented groups at the forefront of this book, granting them prominent roles in sections such as the foreword, preface, and afterword. This arrangement challenges content creators to redefine their understanding of 'meaningful' content creation, urging them to prioritize original insights, emotionally resonant narratives, and incisive critiques over recycled ideas that may saturate discourse and stifle diverse perspectives. Readers are encouraged to actively engage in alleviating nonhuman suffering while respecting the autonomy of nonhuman entities to flourish, equipping themselves with the skills necessary to discern between the two. This call to action underscores the imperative of fostering empathy and understanding in our interactions with the nonhuman world, paving the way for a more compassionate and inclusive future. (shrink)

Reification is a concept of critical theory that denotes certain problematic, habitualised forms of objectification. In this article, I examine whether the concept can be applied in environmental philosophy and what value it has for environmental critical theory. I begin by introducing the concept and the two senses in which reification of the non-human world has been discussed in the literature: first, denoting the misrecognition of others’ attitudes towards the natural world; and second, denoting a misconceived relationship between humans (...) and their environment. After this, I introduce two potentially new subjects of reification: non-human animals and non-human nature. I also discuss two phenomena that could count as reification: industrial meat production and the commodification of ecological systems. (shrink)

The article has two aims. First, it provides a view of why the standard liberal-democratic political theory is unfit for the Anthropocene. Then, it defends two claims: that the fittest politics for the Anthropocene is to be fully non-anthropocentric and that the best model of a non-anthropocentric political theory is to be grounded in the notion of ‘ecological citizenship’, which can be easily extended to non-human living beings and even to non-living objects, such as ecosystems. The latter claim is defended (...) by endorsing and enlarging Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s views of animal citizenship rights and by putting forward a view of the Anthropocene as an age of massive domestication of non-human nature. (shrink)

The author analyses normative acts regulating the protection of animals, both at the national level (especially in the Republic of Serbia) and at the level of supranational organisations and state unions (the Council of Europe and the European Union), but also attempts to conceptualise the terms used in the documents observing the protection of animals. From the practical and philosophical perspective, this paper considers the terms (I) “animal” (“any vertebrate animal capable of experiencing pain, suffering, fear and stress”), (II) “welfare” (...) (“the provision of conditions in which animals can exercise their physiological and other species-specific needs”), (III) “abuse” (“any treatment or disregard of animals, that causes pain, suffering, fear, stress, injury, damages the genetic integrity of the animal and causes death intentionally or through negligence”), and other terms relevant to understanding the prevailing anthropocentric approach to animals. The paper also examines the difficulties in implementing the adopted legislation on the protection and welfare of animals caused by an insufficiently internalised sensitivity of official institutions as well as citizens towards so-called non-human living beings. In the author’s view, it is important that they do not fall below the achieved civilisational standards of ethical and moral culture in their cognitions and insights, and that they consider various topics related to animals with due caution and awareness of the dilemmas they may encounter in their professional work and lives. An appropriate pluriperspective approach and a consciousness of responsibility should eventually lead to a more sensitive attitude of said subjects towards the non-human part of the animal creation. (shrink)

Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BCE) originates the study of zoology and political science. But whereas his zoology identifies a continuum between human and non-human animals, in his political and ethical works he appears to view human and non-human animals as different in kind in order to illustrate the superiority of the former and justify the instrumental use of the latter. For instance, Aristotle’s account of the virtue of moderation (namely that which concerns how humans experience pleasure) depicts non-human animals (...) as predators who only view other animals as a meal and immoderate human animals as beast-like and disgraceful because they act, “not insofar as they are human beings but insofar as they are animals” (EN 3.10.1118b2–3). Nonetheless, Aristotle wrote another ethical treatise, the Eudemian Ethics, that offers discussions that parallel those in the Nicomachean Ethics but that eschew negative characterizations of non-human animals—as if Aristotle had excised all such negative depictions of non-human animals from the Eudemian text on rhetorical grounds. I argue that the reason that Aristotle treats pleasure so differently is the result of his contrast between ethics as a function of political science (as found in the Nicomachean Ethics) and a “non-political” ethical reflection (as found in the Eudemian Ethics) that is more in line with Aristotle the zoologist. (shrink)

Rather than focus on effects, the isolatable and measureable outcomes of events and interventions, the papers assembled here offer different perspectives on the affective dimension of the meaning and politics of human/non-human relations. The authors begin by drawing attention to the constructed discontinuity between humans and non-humans, and to the kinds of knowledge and socialities that this discontinuity sustains, including those underpinned by nature-culture, subject-object, body-mind, individual-society polarities. The articles presented track human/non-human relations through different domains, including: (...) class='Hi'>humans/non-humans in history and animal welfare science (Fudge and Buller); the relationship between the way we live, the effects on our natural environment and contested knowledges about ‘nature’ (Whatmore); choreographies of everyday life and everyday science practices with non-human animals such as horses, meerkats, mice, and wolves (Latimer, Candea, Davies, Despret). Each paper also goes on to offer different perspectives on the human/non-human not just as division, or even as an asymmetrical relation, but as relations that are mutually affective, however invisible and inexpressible in the domain of science. Thus the collection contributes to new epistemologies/ontologies that undercut the usual ordering of relations and their dichotomies, particularly in that dominant domain of contemporary culture that we call science. Indeed, in their impetus to capture ‘affect’, the collection goes beyond the usual turn towards a more inclusive ontology, and contributes to the radical shift in the epistemology and philosophy of science’s terms of engagement. (shrink)

This paper calls into question the ontological privilege of the human species that rests on many misguided ideas. One of these ideas is that Homo sapiens is the only species that possess culture. In this sense, the problem of culture is emphasised in the context of the so called minimalist and expansionist definitions. Furthermore, this paper details examples of cultural behaviour in non-human animals. The components commonly considered necessary to speak of true culture are also critically analysed. These components are (...) social learning, language, symbols, the theory of mind, history, tradition, natural pedagogy, and the cumulativeness of culture. Finally, this paper brings attention to the implications of a more adequate, expansionist and naturalistic, definition of culture based on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

It is widely held that moral obligations to non-human beings do not involve considerations of justice. For such a view, nonhuman interests are always prone to be trumped by human interests. Rawlsian contractarianism comprises an example of such a view. Through analysis of such theories, this essay highlights the problem of reconciling the claim that humans have obligations to non-humans with the claim that our treatment of the latter is not a matter of justice. We argue that if (...) it is granted that the basic interests of non-human beings sometimes count for more than the peripheral interests of humans, then our understandings of obligation and of justice must be aligned, so that what we say about obligation is not countered by assumptions about the invariable priority of humans in matters of justice. We further consider whether such a conclusion can be endorsed by those who adopt certain alternative theories to contractarianism. We conclude that adherents of a range of theories including sentientism and biocentrism must accept that human interests can sometimes be superseded by animal interests, and that this applies not least in matters of justice. (shrink)

This paper takes its departure from Michel Henry’s criticism of a technological view that “extends its reign to the whole planet, sowing desolation and ruin everywhere” ( I am the Truth , 271). It argues that although Henry’s critique of technology is helpful and important, it does not go far enough, inasmuch as it excludes all non-human beings from the Truth of “Life” he advocates against the destructive truths of technology and therefore cannot fully articulate the way in which technology (...) does in fact cause “desolation and ruin” on the entire planet. At the same time I suggest that this strict division between human and non-human life is not essential to Henry’s project, which may well have resources for a more environmentally friendly proposal. The first part of the paper lays out Henry’s critique of technology in some detail, highlighting the ways in which it contains important insights for our contemporary situation. The second part of the paper explores the stark division Henry draws between human generation from the divine life and the creation of everything else, including his rejection of any identification of humans with “protozoa and honey bees,” which would seem to suggest a complete lack of concern for non-human life. The final part of the paper seeks to find a way beyond this dichotomy by showing how non-human life may be included in Henry’s proposal in a way that extends his critique of technology in environmentally conscious ways without losing his phenomenological insights about the human condition. (shrink)

Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different animals may recombine their concepts. More specifically, I propose to (...) differentiate between a) narrow causal-counterfactual recombination; b) broad causal-counterfactual recombination; c) lean spontaneous recombination; d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. I also provide several empirical examples suggesting that some animals display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts. (shrink)

The paper focuses on processes of normalization through which dis/ability is simultaneously produced in specific collectives, networks, and socio-technological systems that enable the construction of such demarcations. Our point of departure is the cochlear implant, a neuroprosthetic device intended to replace and/or augment the function of the damaged inner ear. Unlike hearing aids, which amplify sounds, the CI does the work of damaged hair cells in the inner ear by providing sound signals to the brain. We examine the processes of (...) the CI’s genesis as well as its specific uses by and interrelations to the different and divergent actors that the CI assembles. We argue that the technological device and the implicated normalization process mobilize complex effects in varying socio-technical arrangements. The CI is conceived as a “boundary object” [89] or a “quasi-object” [49, 83], i.e., a metastabilized medium of translation that coordinates social, cultural, and technological action. Although intended to transform non-hearing or hard of hearing people into competent and “normal” hearing subjects, the CI system reproduces the asymmetrical structures of the disability discourse [14] through its function of “developing and maintaining coherence between intersecting social worlds” [89, 393]. Additionally, it initiates controversial discourses that have resulted in new forms of biosocial collectivities ranging from cochlear implantees with normal human hearing to human configurations who have passed through human enhancement. Our approach is thus situated at the intersection of disability and media studies and tackles the particular conditions technological media configurations impose upon the production of dis/ability. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between environmental thought and geographic spatial theory. Both lines of thought problematize the role of non-humans in political and ethical life. Although both environmental and spatial thinkers argue for a dynamic exchange between humans and nature, the environment, the built environment, or their non-human surroundings, they tend to focus on different elements of those non-human surroundings and deploy different conceptual frameworks to analyze them. Additionally, environmental thinkers attend more to the ability of the (...) non-human world to thwart, interfere with, or otherwise constitute social action, a trend that, when combined with spatial thinkers’ broad understanding of non-humans and developed conceptual categories, such as place and scale, can produce richer, fuller accounts of how non-humans figure into political life. (shrink)

The field of language evolution has recently made Gricean pragmatics central to its task, particularly within comparative studies between human and non-human primate communication. The standard model of Gricean communication requires a set of complex cognitive abilities, such as belief attribution and understanding nested higher-order mental states. On this model, non-human primate communication is then of a radically different kind to ours. Moreover, the cognitive demands in the standard view are also too high for human infants, who nevertheless do engage (...) in communication. In this paper I critically assess the standard view and contrast it with an alternative, minimal model of Gricean communication recently advanced by Richard Moore. I then raise two objections to the minimal model. The upshot is that this model is conceptually unstable and fails to constitute a suitable alternative as a middle ground between full-fledged human communication and simpler forms of non-human animal communication. (shrink)

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second (...) part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established. (shrink)