Results for 'Numerical Identity'

984 found
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  1. The Numerical Identity of the Self and its Objects in Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Pierre Keller - 1991 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...)
     
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  2. Numerical Identity: Process and Substance Metaphysics.Sahana Rajan - manuscript
    Numerical identity is the non-relational sameness of an object to itself. It is concerned with understanding how entities undergo change and maintain their identity. In substance metaphysics, an entity is considered a substance with an essence and such an essence is the source of its power. However, such a framework fails to explain the sense in which an entity is still the entity it was, amidst changes. Those who claim that essence is unaffected by existence are faced (...)
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  3.  64
    Numerical Identity and the Constitution of Transcendence in Transcendental Phenomenology.Burt C. Hopkins - 2016 - Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):205-220.
    _ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 205 - 220 I investigate the phenomenological significance of Husserl’s appeal to the “numerical identity” of _irreality_ as it appears in recollected manifolds of lived-experience in his mature account of the transcendental constitution of transcendence and find it wanting. I show that what is at stake for Husserl in this appeal is the descriptive mark that exhibits the distinction between a unit of meaning as it is constituted in psychologically determined lived-experience (...)
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  4. Plasticity, Numerical Identity, and Transitivity.Samuel Kahn - 2022 - International Philosophical Quarterly 62 (3):289-299.
    In a recent paper, Chunghyoung Lee argues that, because zygotes are developmentally plastic, they cannot be numerically identical to the singletons into which they develop, thereby undermining conceptionism. In this short paper, I respond to Lee. I argue, first, that, on the most popular theories of personal identity, zygotic plasticity does not undermine conceptionism, and, second, that, even overlooking this first issue, Lee’s plasticity argument is problematic. My goal in all of this is not to take a stand in (...)
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  5. Numerical identity and accidental predication in Aristotle.Mauro Mariani - 2000 - Topoi 19 (2):99-110.
    Two different definitions of numerical identity occur in Aristotle's works, namely: (i) "A" and "B" are both names of one thing; (ii) A and B constitute unity. These definitions can be traced back respectively to the following theories of predication: (i)' the sentences whose subjects are accidents are actually ill-formed; (ii)' in some cases the accidents are not eliminable subjects. Since (i)' and (ii)' are irreparably inconsistent, the theory of identity is inconsistent too; in this paper are (...)
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  6. Numerical identity and objecthood.Berent Enç - 1975 - Mind 84 (333):10-26.
    There is a category of objects such that for any two occurrences of an object in that category, Establishing the highest degree of their qualitative identity will not be sufficient to establish that the object involved is one and the same. It is first argued that objects in this category occupy positions in a spatio-Temporal continuum and obey certain principles of conservation. And then two criteria for the numerical identity of these objects are developed: (a) that there (...)
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  7. Three Medieval Aristotelians on Numerical Identity and Time.John Morrison - 2012 - In John Marenbon (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan all claim that a person can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in size, shape, and color. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility across time? Almost all contemporary metaphysicians regard the Indiscernibility of Identicals as axiomatic. But I will argue that Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan would reject it, perhaps in favor of a principle restricted to indiscernibility at a time.
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  8.  3
    The Numerical Identity of Composite Artifacts: Intentions, Functions, History, and the Case of the Ship of Theseus.Mark T. Lafrenz - 2024 - Global Philosophy 34 (1):1-15.
    Criteria for the transtemporal identity of composite artifacts are best understood in terms of functions, histories, and the intentions their makers. As long as certain background-conditions are fulfilled, composite artifacts can undergo changes in all of their parts with no breakdown in their identities, even to the point of being unrecognizable as sharing their identities with themselves as they were originally constituted. They can be repaired, modified, or improved without a resulting breakdown of transitivity. I defend this view against (...)
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  9. Hathersage Numerical Identity Lab: Marsden, The New Freewoman, and The Egoist again.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2022 - IJRDO Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 7 (4):9-12.
    In this paper, I respond to Scholes’s question of whether The Freewoman, The New Freewoman, and The Egoist, all of which were edited by Dora Marsden, were one journal or three.
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  10. Numerical identity.Michael Durrant - 1973 - Mind 82 (325):95-103.
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  11.  72
    Do Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques Affect Qualitative or Numerical Identity?S. Matthew Liao - 2016 - Bioethics 31 (1):20-26.
    Mitochondrial replacement techniques, known in the popular media as 'three-parent' or 'three-person' IVFs, have the potential to enable women with mitochondrial diseases to have children who are genetically related to them but without such diseases. In the debate regarding whether MRTs should be made available, an issue that has garnered considerable attention is whether MRTs affect the characteristics of an existing individual or whether they result in the creation of a new individual, given that MRTs involve the genetic manipulation of (...)
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  12.  38
    Spinoza on Numerical Identity and Time.John Morrison - 2021 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 189–203.
    Spinoza claims that a person's body can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in its size, shape, and speed. This chapter argues that he would reject the Indiscernibility of Identicals. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is often taken to have profound implications for one's view of change. Spinoza seems to deny the existence of times, because he similarly classifies them as “beings of reason”. As Spinoza understands instantiation, whenever a property is instantiated by an object, it metaphysically depends on that (...)
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  13.  93
    Numerical identity and reference in the arts.Joseph Margolis - 1970 - British Journal of Aesthetics 10 (2):138-146.
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  14.  56
    Consciousness and numerical identity.Steve F. Sapontzis - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):107-117.
    This article criticizes the thesis, Suggested by wittgenstein and elaborated and defended by malcolm and others, That the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to pains, Afterimages, Sudden thoughts, And other contents of consciousness. I argue that the arguments offered in support of this thesis cannot account for much of our common practice and language concerning these contents while acknowledging that these categories apply to these contents can account for these practices and language as well (...)
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  15.  77
    Character, psychoanalytic identification, and numerical identity.Louise Braddock - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):1-18.
    Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity-thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition (...)
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  16. Coconsciousness and numerical identity of the person.Susan Leigh Anderson - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.
    The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem (...)
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  17.  31
    Sameness beyond Numerical Identity. A Defence of the One Object View of Kant´s Transcendental Idealism.Mattia Riccardi - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-17.
    Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of (...)
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  18.  61
    Descartes on Numerical Identity and Time.John Morrison - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):230-246.
    According to most contemporary philosophers, the Indiscernibility of Identicals is obviously true. We might therefore expect earlier philosophers to endorse it. But I will use a puzzle about identity over time to argue that Descartes would reject it.
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  19.  8
    The Problem of Numerical Identity of Dead and Resurrected Body: The Condemnation of 1277 Revisited. 정현석 - 2016 - The Catholic Philosophy 27:35-79.
    본 논문은 가톨릭신앙의 핵심을 다루는 1277년 3월 7일 파리대학 단죄 항목들인 “사멸한 신체가 수적으로 동일한 것으로 되돌아오는 일은 생기지 않으며, 수적으로 동일한 것이 되살아나지도 않을 것이다”와 “미래의 부활에 대해 철학자가 동의해서는 안 된다. 왜냐하면 이성으로 탐구할 수 없기 때문이다. - 이것은 오류다. 왜냐하면 철학자는 그리스도에게 순종토록 지성을 다잡아야하기 때문이다”를 중심으로 1277년 단죄 조치의 목적과 성격을 재조명한다. 이 과정에서 본 논문은 먼저 이 두 명제가 13세기 파리대학에서 활동하던 사상가들이 견지했던 사상과 일치하는 대상이 엄밀한 의미에서 없음을 보에티우스 다치아와 시제 브라방의 주요저작들을 분석하면서 (...)
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  20.  48
    Genome Modifying Reproductive Procedures and their Effects on Numerical Identity.Calum MacKellar - 2019 - The New Bioethics 25 (2):121-136.
    The advantages and risks of a number of new genome modifying procedures seeking to create healthy or enhanced individuals, such as Maternal Spindle Transfer, Pronuclear Transfer, Cytoplasmic Transfer and Genome Editing, are currently being assessed from an ethical perspective, by national and international policy organizations. One important aspect being examined concerns the effects of these procedures on different kinds of identity. In other words, whether or not a procedure only modifies the qualities or properties of an existing human being, (...)
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  21.  89
    Berkeley on the Numerical Identity of What Several Immediately Perceive (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous III 247–8). [REVIEW]Richard Glauser - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):517-530.
    Although several passages in Berkeley are related to the question whether two or more finite substances can simultaneously perceive numerically identical sensible ideas, it is only in TDHP (247–8) that he addresses the question explicitly and in some detail. Yet, Berkeley’s less than straightforward reply is notoriously difficult to pin down. Some commentators take Berkeley to be endorsing a clear‐cut positive reply, whereas others have him giving an emphatically negative one; others hold that for Berkeley there is no fact of (...)
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  22. Berkeley on the numerical identity of ideas.David Braybrooke - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):631-636.
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  23.  40
    Precise and numerical identity.E. E. C. Jones - 1908 - Mind 17 (67):384-393.
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  24. The Importance of Numerical Identity in Continued Personal Existence over Time.Jennifer-Wrae Primmer - 2009 - In Primmer Jennifer-Wrae (ed.), 46th Annual Meeting: Western Canadian Philosophical Association.
     
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  25. Spinoza on Mind, Body, and Numerical Identity.John Morrison - 2022 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 293-336.
    Spinoza claims that a person’s mind and body are one and the same. But he also claims that minds think and do not move, whereas bodies move and do not think. How can we reconcile these claims? I believe that Spinoza is building on a traditional view about identity over time. According to this view, identity over time is linked to essence, so that a thing that is now resting is identical to a thing that was previously moving, (...)
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  26. God or Natura Naturata? Spinoza on the Numerical Identity Between God’s Essence and all Things in Nature.Antonio Salgado Borge - 2025 - In Dan Taylor & Marie Wuth (eds.), New Perspectives on Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
  27. Human Identity and Bioethics.David DeGrazia - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of (...). Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life. (shrink)
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  28.  91
    Numerical and Qualitative Identity.Everett W. Hall - 1933 - The Monist 43 (1):88-104.
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  29.  29
    Identity and ontology.Benito Müller - 1997 - Dialectica 51 (3):189–223.
    SummaryA conception of numerical identity is introduced which, in accordance with a transcendental or imposition view of language, treats an identity predicate as having an ontologically generative function by genuinely being involved in the generation or construction of its domain of discourse. The proposed conception also allows for a plurality of identity predicates, each of which generating a domain, and it allows for the possibility that some such domains may not be unifiable with each other. All (...)
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  30. Subjective Theories of Personal Identity and Practical Concerns.Radim Bělohrad - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):282-301.
    This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical (...) of persons and its analysis provides the persistence conditions for persons. I argue that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. I argue that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well. (shrink)
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  31. Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity.Scott M. Williams - 2012 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 79 (1):109-148.
    I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. A real relation (relatio) is numerically the same thing (res) as its absolute (non-relative) foundation, without being identical to its foundation. This not only holds for creaturely real relations but also for the divine persons’ distinguishing real relations. A divine person who is constituted by a real relation (relatio) (...)
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  32. Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection.Christina van Dyke - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (4):373 - 394.
    Can the persistence of a human being's soul at death and prior to the bodily resurrection be sufficient to guarantee that the resurrected human being is numerically identical to the human being who died? According to Thomas Aquinas, it can. Yet, given that Aquinas holds that the human being is identical to the composite of soul and body and ceases to exist at death, it's difficult to see how he can maintain this view. In this paper, I address Aquinas's response (...)
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  33. Practical Identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - In Benjamin Matheson & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 391-411.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for those who believe in the afterlife: either we won’t survive death (or an eternal life) in the sense that most matters to us or we will become bored if we do. First, I argue that even if we – in a strict sense – survive death, there is practical sense in which we don’t survive death. This applies, I contend, to all accounts of the afterlife that: eventually, we lose our practical (...). I show that our practical identity is more important to us than our numerical identity. But, as we’ll see, our practical identity is not just lost in an afterlife, but also with an eternal or immortal life. Theists have a strategy to resist this line of argument: they can argue that God will help us to retain our current practical identities. However, those that pursue this line of argument fall onto the second horn of my proposed dilemma: if we cannot change our practical identities then it seems that eventually we will become bored, and eternally so. (shrink)
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  34. (1 other version)Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute generality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 369--89.
    In conversations between native speakers, words such as ‘same’ and ‘identical’ do not usually cause much difficulty. We take it for granted that others use them with the same sense as we do. If it is unclear whether numerical or qualitative identity is intended, a brief gloss such as ‘one thing not two’ for the former or ‘exactly alike’ for the latter removes the unclarity. In this paper, numerical identity is intended. A particularly conscientious and logically (...)
     
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  35. On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):269-293.
    This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement 'a is b' says that the names 'a' and 'b' codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a (...)
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  36. Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism.James Goetz - 2016 - Journal of Analytic Theology 4:128-146.
    Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.
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  37. Personal identity, transformative experiences, and the future self.Katja Crone - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):299-310.
    The article explores the relation between personal identity and life-changing decisions such as the decision for a certain career or the decision to become a parent. According to L.A. Paul, decisions of this kind involve “transformative experiences”, to the effect that - at the time we make a choice - we simply don’t know what it is like for us to experience the future situation. Importantly, she claims that some new experiences may be “personally transformative” by which she means (...)
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  38. Identities of Artefacts.Christoph Baumberger & Georg Brun - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):47-74.
    In non-philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numerical identity, qualitative identity and essence, but it (...)
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  39.  25
    Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.William Simkulet - 2024 - Bioethics 38 (5):419-424.
    Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value—a future “like ours” (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and (...)
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  40. Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  41. Personal Identity Online.Raffaele Rodogno - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):309-328.
    Philosophers concerned with the question of personal identity have typically been asking the so-called re-identification question: what are the conditions under which a person at one point in time is properly re-identified at another point in time? This is a rather technical question. In our everyday interactions, however, we do raise a number of personal identity questions that are quite distinct from it. In order to explore the variety of ways in which the Internet may affect personal (...), I propose in this study to broaden the typical philosophical horizon to other more mundane senses of the question. In Section 2, I describe a number of possible meanings of personal identity observed in everyday contexts and more philosophical ones. With some caveats, I argue that it is the specific context in which the question arises that disambiguates the meaning of the question. Online contexts are novel and peculiar insofar as they afford prolonged disembodied and anonymous interaction with others. In line with our previous conclusion, then, there is reason to suspect that such contexts generate new and sui generis answers to the personal identity question. In Section 3, I examine this question and, contrary to expectations, largely dispel this suspicion. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss the often-heard claim to the effect that disembodiment and anonymity foster the creation of distinct and incompatible online and offline identities. (shrink)
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  42.  70
    What is Identical?Marta Vlasáková - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (2):153-170.
    Numerical identity is standardly considered to be a relation between things. This means that two things are identical if they are only one thing. It is not only Wittgenstein who finds this claim rather odd. Another possibility is to understand identity as a relation between names which denote the same thing; or as a relation between the senses of those names which are modes of presentation of the same thing. Or identity statements can be considered as (...)
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  43. The insignificance of personal identity for bioethics.David Shoemaker - 2009 - Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
    It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – (...)
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  44. The proper treatment of identity in dialetheic metaphysics.Nicholas K. Jones - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):65-92.
    According to one prominent strand of mainstream logic and metaphysics, identity is indistinguishability. Priest has recently argued that this permits counterexamples to the transitivity and substitutivity of identity within dialetheic metaphysics, even in paradigmatically extensional contexts. This paper investigates two alternative regimentations of indistinguishability. Although classically equivalent to the standard regimentation on which Priest focuses, these alternatives are strictly stronger than it in dialetheic settings. Both regimentations are transitive, and one satisfies substitutivity. It is argued that both regimentations (...)
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  45.  44
    Must identity be necessary? (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako & Zdenka Brzović - 2021 - Metodicki Ogledi 28 (2):53-76.
    U radu se nudi opis konteksta unutar kojeg je formuliran poznati dokaz za nužnost identiteta. Iznosi se formalni prikaz ovog dokaza kako ga je formulirao poznati filozof i logičar Saul Kripke. Također se razmatra gledište filozofa Allana Gibbarda koji nasuprot Kripkeu brani tvrdnju da neki iskazi identiteta mogu biti kontingentni. Osnovni cilj rada je upoznati domaćeg čitatelja s formalnim aspektom rasprave o nužnosti identiteta te dati kratki pregled konteksta unutar kojeg su formulirani argumenti za nužnost identiteta. In the paper, we (...)
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  46.  48
    Generality, mathematical elegance, and evolution of numerical/object identity.Felice L. Bedford - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):654-655.
    Object identity, the apprehension that two glimpses refer to the same object, is offered as an example of combining generality, mathematics, and evolution. We argue that it applies to glimpses in time (apparent motion), modality (ventriloquism), and space (Gestalt grouping); that it has a mathematically elegant solution of nested geometries (Euclidean, Similarity, Affine, Projective, Topology); and that it is evolutionarily sound despite our Euclidean world. [Shepard].
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  47. (1 other version)The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves.Nicholas Stang - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):106-136.
    According to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to (...)
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  48. Absolute Identity and the Trinity.Chris Tweedt - 2023 - Religious Studies 59 (1):34-54.
    Trinitarians are charged with at least two contradictions. First, the Father is God and the Son is God, so it seems to follow that the Father is the Son. Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion, which seems contradictory. Second, the Father is a God, the Son is a God, and the Holy Spirit is a God, but the Father is not the Son, the Father is not the Holy Spirit, and the Son is not the Holy Spirit. This (...)
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  49.  66
    Disability and Resurrection Identity.Terrence Ehrman - 2015 - New Blackfriars 96 (1066):723-738.
    Christian hope of resurrection requires that the one raised be the same person who died. Philosophers and theologians alike seek to understand the coherence of bodily resurrection and what accounts for numerical identity between the earthly and risen person. I address this question from the perspective of disability. Is a person with a disability raised in the age to come with that disability? Many theologians argue that disability is essential to one's identity such that it could not (...)
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  50. Identity and Becoming.Robert Allen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):527-548.
    A material object is constituted by a sum of parts all of which are essential to the sum but some of which seem inessential to the object itself. Such object/sum of parts pairs include my body/its torso and appendages and my desk/its top, drawers, and legs. In these instances, we are dealing with objects and their components. But, fundamentally, we may also speak, as Locke does, of an object and its constitutive matter—a “mass of particles”—or even of that aggregate and (...)
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