In this paper, we aim to examine the relationships between four solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom—theological determinism, Molinism, simple foreknowledge and open theism—and divine providence and theodicy. Some of these solutions—theological determinism and Molinism, in particular—highlight God’s government of the world. Some others—simple foreknowledge and open theism—highlight human autonomy and freedom. In general, the more libertarian human freedom is highlighted, the less God’s government of the history of the world seems (...) possible. However, the task of theodicy becomes easier because humans are fully responsible for the evil they do. Conversely, the more God’s government is highlighted, the more human freedom seems to be restricted. Moreover, God seems to be directly or indirectly responsible for evil in the world. Because of the trade–off between control and freedom, each solution finds itself at ease with some problems, while on other fronts, it must adopt a defensive position. As we will see, no solution can solve all problems; thus, the pros and cons of each solution should be weighed carefully. (shrink)

Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument (...) that fatalism logically follows from the omnitemporality of truth. Hasker believes a distinction between hard and soft facts prevents fatalism, but I argue that his defense fails in light of arguments involving divine necessity. Additionally, I point out that Hasker’s philosophy of language concerning divine names faces problems that cannot be overcome, given the versions of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge that motivate LFOT. Thus, contra Hasker, Swinburne, and van Inwagen, open theism necessitates the alethic openness of the future. (shrink)

This new collection of philosophically rigorous essays critiques the interpretation of divine omniscience known as open theism, focusing primarily on philosophically motivated open theism and positing arguments that reject divine knowledge of future contingents in the face of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. The sixteen new essays in this collection, written by some of the most renowned philosophers on the topic of divine providence, represent a philosophical attempt to seriously consider open theism. They (...) cover a wide variety of issues, including: the ontology of time, systematic metaphysics, perfect being theology, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, the problem of evil, and the nature of divine knowledge in general. _Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism _advances the discussion by wrestling against the assertions of open theism, and will be of interest to both proponents and opponents of this controversial issue. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF -compatibilism. In this paper, I seek to answer this criticism in two ways. First, I demonstrate that most of the chief arguments against middle knowledge are guilty of begging the question of FF-incompatibilism and conclude that the simple charge of begging the question cannot (...) be as problematic as some suggest. Determinists and open theists incorporate FF-incompatibilist notions into their respective versions of the grounding objection, their conceptions of risk and libertarian freedom, and their requirements for divine foreknowledge. Thus, while I admit that Molinism does rely upon Ockhamist and Augustinian principles in its approach to the dilemma and is guilty of presupposing FF-compatibilism, I deny that this undermines its strength as a model of providence. Second, I argue that, although all models are guilty of question-begging moves, they are not all on par with one another. Molinism offers a more orthodox and robust approach to providence than open theism and process theology, and it handles empirical data better than all of its competitors. (shrink)

On Friday God knew everything, including f, a proposition about what Jones would do on Monday; we can write the time-indexed proposition that on Friday God believed f as Bgf. If Jones does not do the thing that makes f true, then the resulting state of affairs will be ∼f. So on Monday, before a certain time – ‘ t time’ – Jones has it in his power to bring it about that ∼f. It seems to follow that on Monday (...) Jones has it in his power to bring it about that on Friday God believed something false. Yet this is impossible, as Bgp ⊃ p . But if f is false – if Jones makes it so on Monday – then so is Bgf, and God is not infallible. So either Jones cannot not do the thing that makes f true, and he has no freewill, or God is not infallible. The traditional responses to this dilemma are subtle, time-honoured and, as I see it, almost completely unconvincing. According to Linda Zagzebski , there are five of them: the Ockhamist response that God’s Friday belief is a so-called ‘soft’ fact, itself a problematic notion; the confused Molinist claim that on Friday God has something called ‘middle knowledge’ , so that God knows what Jones would do, but does not will it or know what Jones would do if … ); and the more sensible but still perplexing solution of Boethius’s that God’s knowing is not in time, so that the time-indexed proposition Bgf is not true. (How does it help to move the knowing that is said to determine our actions from the past to the timeless? It seems to …. (shrink)

Open Theist theologians argue that their view of divine foreknowledge and providence is the correct interpretation of the Bible, and suggest some biblical evidence to support this claim. Among these theologians, Gregory A. Boyd’s case is the most systematic, and also the most comprehensive and rigorous. Taking into consideration (1) the main philosophical claims of Open Theism and its main rivals, namely Calvinism and Molinism, and (2) Open Theist theologians’ interpretative principles for the Bible, the biblical (...) evidence for Open Theism suggested by Boyd can be classified into three groups according to their strength. I will argue that the first group of themes has no evidential value for Open Theism, since these themes can be interpreted just as plausibly from a Calvinist or Molinist perspective. By contrast, the second group of themes has some evidential value and thus constitutes prima facie evidence for Open Theism, since these themes make most sense under an Open Theist interpretation. However, these themes also make some sense on a Molinist reading. The third group of themes, I argue, has most evidential value for Open Theism, since it seems hard to reconcile these themes either with Calvinism or Molinism. (shrink)

Open theists argue that God's relationship to time, as conceived in classical theism, is erroneous. They explain that it is contradictory for an atemporal being to act in a temporal universe, including experiencing its temporal successions. Contrary to the atemporalists, redemptive history has shown that God interacts with humans in time. This relational nature of God nullifies the classical notion of God as timelessly eternal. Therefore, it lacks a philosophical and theological basis. Because God is in time, He does (...) not know all future contingencies and, therefore, changes. This study examines open theism's appropriation of the A and B theories of time to the divine-human relationship. The study argues that divine temporality does not solve the tension of divine-human relationships, especially in relation to the future. Further, historical divine temporality does not negate the fact of divine atemporality. It mainly stems from God's choice to create temporal creatures and His relationship with them. Furthermore, if it is not logically and metaphysically contradictory for an omnipresent being to act in space, then it follows that an atemporal being can act in time. Whether time is understood from the metric or psychological point of view, it does not transcend God, and therefore, the limitation it places on human creatures with respect to the future does not apply to God. Lastly, although a few philosophers reject the notion of eternity as timelessly eternal, the doctrine has a philosophical and theological basis in the Scripture. (shrink)

The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David (...) Hunt, draws on the source incompatibilist position in the secular free debate. According to source incompatibilists, free will does not require alternative possibilities but is also not compatible with causal determinism. Hunt argues that because God’s foreknowledge does not eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will. In this paper, I challenge Hunt’s position using Kevin Timpe’s distinction between “wide” and “narrow” source incompatibilists. I argue that if one wishes to be an incompatibilist concerning free will and causal determinism, one must accept that alternatives are required for free will. And if one must accept that alternatives are a necessary condition for free will, then Hunt’s solution to the foreknowledge dilemma will not succeed. (shrink)

Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of (...) whom supports a different interpretation of the way God acts according to right reason. (shrink)

Open theists agree that God lacks what is normally called “comprehensive” foreknowledge, but why believe this? Open theists answer in three ways, which I call the narrow road, the wide road, and the shortcut to open theism. Here I argue that (1) the narrow road faces a difficulty concerning the doctrine of divine omniscience which doesn’t arise for the wide road, (2) the wide road is well-motivated and appealing, given certain philosophical commitments, (3) the shortcut is (...) too simple to work, and (4) William Lane Craig’s objections to the wide road fail. I conclude with some observations about the state of the dispute between open theists and their critics. (shrink)

The first chapter of this study presents the context for the current discussion. It looks at the reality of evil and the search for adequate answers to the problem of evil. The open theistic alternative is one among many struggles to find meaning in adversity. This chapter also presents the study method and the criteria adopted for analysing the open theistic proposal. -/- The second chapter examines earlier philosophical and theological conceptions of divine foreknowledge, divine control, (...) human freedom and contingencies. Two representatives were selected to explore three significant concepts of God: Classical Theism (CT), Molinism (M) and process theism (PT). -/- The third chapter answers when and why open theism started and what it represents. We have shown that although the coinage “open theism” (OT) was made by Richard Rice about forty years ago, the ideas this view propagates have precursory influences from a host of earlier philosophers and theologians like Jacob Arminius, Adam Clarke, Lorenzo McCabe, Jules Lequyer, and Gordon Olson. Also, there are traces of Socinianism and process theism in OT that open theists admit to. -/- The fourth chapter examines three attributes of God in OT: eternity, immutability, and divine aseity. Open theists argue that the classical notion of divine eternity is not biblical because such a notion amounts to a static view of time which does not help to resolve the tension between divine control and human freedom. OT claims that CT’s doctrine of divine immutability is a product of Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, which conflates divine immutability with immobility. Lastly, OT rejects the classical notion of divine aseity because God is relationally dependent upon His creatures, and in the end, He is a risk-taker. The fifth chapter deals with divine omniscience, divine control, human freedom and contingencies in OT. OT’s concept of divine control, omniscience and human freedom may be summarised thus: 1) At the dawn of creation, God endowed human beings with inherent powers and libertarian freedom. 2) The creation is an ongoing project with open routes. 3) Because of the openness and ongoing nature of the creation, new things are being supplied that were not part of the initial plan. 4) God accepts these additions, adjusts the divine plan, and takes responsibility for the outcome. 5) God’s knowledge is dynamic/present knowledge. The future is partly open and partly closed to God. 6) If God knows the future perfectly, humans would no longer be free since whatsoever God knows will necessarily come to pass. 7) Divine providence involves risk-taking as a result of the foregoing. -/- The sixth chapter is on OT’s concept of divine power, divine love and the problem of evil. OT denies that God could exemplify divine power and divine love maximally at the same time. As a result, love is the most essential attribute of God. OT argues that the classical doctrine of divine omnipotence is not biblical but a product of Greek philosophy. Open theists maintain that the New Testament understanding of Almightiness contradicts the loveless power that the classical notion of divine omnipotent propagates. -/- The last chapter first offers a personal reflection on the open view under three subheadings: 1) A few philosophical and theological issues in OT. 2) A theological/canonical reading of a few biblical passages that open theists reinterpreted, and 3) An argument that the supposed higher benefits of the open view might not be tenable. In the second place, it points out what might be learned from the open theistic alternative. Lastly, it makes some recommendations for further studies in the analytic philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. (shrink)

In the recent debate on Christian theism, the position called Open Theism (OT) tries to solve the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom. In OT, the key word of the human-divine relationship is “risk”: in his relationship with us, God is a risk-taker in that he adapts his plan to human decisions and to the situations that arise from them. “Risk” is the fundamental characteristic of any true love relationship. According to OT, God has no exhaustive knowledge of (...) how humans will use their will, and the divine plan for this world is not seen as fixed for eternity. OT distinguishes between meticulous providence and general providence and denies that the former can exist. After illustrating these positions and a particular view of OT called essential kenosis, I highlight some of their weaknesses and conclude by asking whether the concept of mystery (at least in some of its possible interpretations: I outline four “solutions”) can enable a reconciliation between classical theism and OT. By applying an approach to the notion of mystery usually connected to the Trinity, I show that the dilemma of omniscience, human freedom and providence does not compromise the plausibility of theism. (shrink)

In the following essay I will describe the cultural and disciplinary areas in which Open Theism has been developing and deal with the main authors, who has defended this new doctrine, and their main works. In the second section I will analyse their main theses about divine attributes, some theological questions, several objections to this new non-standard theism and their rebuttals. In the conclusion I will highlight the problems still open and evaluate the overall Open Theism’s (...) theoretical work. At the end, also the text "Omniscience, Freedom, and Mystery", a part of the article TRANSLATED into english. The issue of omniscience is one of the most debated in contemporary Analytical Philosophy of Religion. However, what is often lacking in this discussion is a deep understanding of the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom within a complete epistemological (what can we really say about the divine and the world), metaphysical and theological framework. For example, it is often forgotten to frame some issues within a clear definition of the notion of mystery. I defined what we can mean by “mystery” in this forthcoming article: "Trinity and Mystery. Three Models: Aquinas, Leibniz, and Hegel" In the same article (and also in the first article mentioned above) can be found a reflection on the analogical use of terms, which involve the terms (the notions) of “freedom” and “omniscience”. This use, therefore, could make possible to develop the argument I propose. (shrink)

Afin d'aller au-delà de la critique formulée par Rowe sur la défense de la prescience divine et du libre-arbitre par Augustin, l'A. affirme qu'il y a deux raisonnements dans le De Liberio Arbitrio III, ii-iv. Il fait la distinction entre la capacité à vouloir x, la capacité à vouloir simpliciter et le pouvoir d'accomplir la volonté. La capacité à vouloir simpliciter fait partie du pouvoir de l'individu. Ainsi, pour Augustin, la capacité à vouloir se réduit à la capacité à (...) vouloir simpliciter. Son argumentation est cohérente du point de vue interne. (shrink)

In this article I suggest that in arguing that God has only present knowledge, falling short of the classical understanding of divine forekowledge, openview theologians imply a paradigmatic change in the hermeneutical principles of theological methodology. This change takes place when they abandon t..

Metaphysical determinism argues that God divinely predetermines everything, including human suffering. Contrary to metaphysical determinism, free will or libertarianism argues that not everything is predetermined by God. Therefore, evil does not serve any divine purpose. Libertarianism argues that metaphysical determinism is simply incoherent because it holds that God can predetermine an action and, at the same time, holds that He could stop such an action. This study seeks to find out which of these two views might be promising in (...) responding to the problem of suffering. Contrary to these two positions, this study argues that suffering must be understood contextually. The above-stated responses do not always provide viable answers to the problem of suffering because they are often generalised and conceived from the God-eye view without considering the sufferers’ perspectives.Contribution: Although there are a plethora of publications on metaphysical determinism and freewill, this study re-examined both and sheds a nuance for a further development of these two competing views. The article argues that none of these two responses offers the best response to the problem; rather, each has its strengths and weaknesses because they seem to focus on God rather than the sufferer. (shrink)

This chapter describes the three main theories of divine providence (what the author calls the Molinist, the Thomist, and the Open Theist views) and considers the implications that endorsing one or another theory might have for what kind of theodicy (and what kind of defense) one can offer in response to arguments from evil. The chapter also briefly considers the author's reasons for thinking that the Molinist position leaves one the best equipped to deal with such arguments.

Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these models (...) fail. (shrink)

In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions (...) of the Accidental Necessity argument that Zagzebski considers, fails when confronted with a stronger version of the Accidental Necessity line of argument. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply foreknowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how God’s foreknowledge is accessed according (...) to simple foreknowledge. These two versions are then utilized to examine seven different areas of divine providence to assess the utility of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF affords no greater providential control than PK. (shrink)

Recent criticisms of theodicies express a conflict between theoretical and practical responses to the existence of evil. Theodicies, and defenses, seek to provide a resolution to the question of why there is evil if there is God. In providing an answer, theodicies offer an explanation for evil that responds to the existence of evil in a theoretical manner. In contrast to those theoretical responses, there have been a number of responses to the existence of evil that have emphasized acting against (...) evil. These practical responses have stressed human actions to lessen the occurrence and impact of evil. Examining the criticisms of theodicies and the responses that have been made to those criticisms opens up the possibility of an interaction between theoretical and practical responses to evil. A survey of the changing understanding of divine omnipotence demonstrates the reciprocal interaction between theoretical and practical responses to evil leading to a more a comprehensive response to the existence of evil and God’s relationship to evil. (shrink)

One of the most mind-boggling topics in philosophical theology is the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If God has a complete knowledge of the future due to his epistemic perfection, how can a human being be free with respect to his future action?

Compares and contrasts Open Theism with Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Process Theism.

-/- This article analyzes Richard Swinburne’s arguments in the problem of evil and raises new criticism and understanding regarding genocides, especially the Holocaust. Genocides are the greatest challenge for theodicies and free-will defenses, yet they are rarely addressed in the scholarship. My empirical approach questions why a loving omnipotent God permits genocides of evil. Swinburne argues that evils are necessary for good free acts, such as the creation of moral virtues. However, future goods do not justify the millions of horrific (...) and unnecessary deaths and suffering in genocides. Swinburne’s theory that free will is so valuable that evil acts must be permitted is also very weak. Moreover, his position that God lacks foreknowledge of our free actions limits divine omniscience. Thus, Swinburne's theodicy cannot resolve the Problem of Evil and fails to justify or defend the omnipotent God. Ultimately, he relies on faith, not his arguments. (shrink)

If classical Western theism is correct that God's timeless omniscience is compatible with human free will, then it is incoherent to hold that this God can in any strict sense be immutable and a se as well as omniscient. That is my thesis. ‘Classical theism’ shall refer here to the tradition of philosophical theology centring on such mainstream authors as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. ‘Divine omniscience’ shall mean that the eternal God knows all events as a timeless observer of (...) them. ‘Human free will’ shall mean that human beings are, at least sometimes, self-determining agents who make choices not decisively caused to be what they are by external or internal factors other than the free willing itself – choices that these agents have the capacity and the freedom to make differently than they do. Except where stipulated otherwise, ‘divine immutability’ shall ‘mean that God is neither subject to, nor capable of, change in being, knowing, or willing, since God is immune to external influences, and without internal needs, of the sorts that might give rise to such change. Finally, ‘aseity’ shall be used to underline the divine immunity to external influences, since a being that is wholly a se or self-caused , cannot be open to such influences, cannot be made to be what or how it is by anything other than itself. (shrink)

Rik Peels ( 2016 ) treats divine repentance as a biblical theme and presents this theme as a paradox in which divine repentance, divine omniscience and divine moral perfect goodness are an inconsistent triad. To solve this paradox, Peels suggests that God does not know about some of his own future acts, and distinguishes his solution from open theism, although he accepts that open theism can also escape the paradox. In this work, I criticize (...) Peels’ account of divine repentance from an open theist perspective. My first criticism concerns his dismissal of open theism as an untenable account of divine omniscience. In my second criticism, I point out that the philosophical motivations of open theism entail its success in dealing with the paradox. On the other hand, I argue that Peels’ account of divine repentance is philosophically unmotivated, and as an ad hoc solution to the paradox, it undermines God’s omniscience and subordinates it to divine repentance. In my third criticism, I address three implications that Peels attributes to his view. I emphasize that these implications have been described by open theists as strengths of their view, and compare Peels’ account and open theism in relation to them. (shrink)

Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas refers (...) to Boethius many times in his systematic works and even devotes two commentaries to two of his theological opuscules, it is of special interest that both authors composed a commentary on the abovementioned work by Aristotle. The commentary of Saint Thomas does not interpret the whole book, but it does study the pages about future contingents in dialogue with Boethius. We will study such texts in our presentation. They constitute one of the greatest contributions of Aquinas to the problem of necessity and contingency and therefore to the vexata quaestio of divine intervention in the world and particularly in human free will. Not only Augustin but also Aristotle (read by Boethius) and Nemesius of Emesa will be decisive in Aquinas’ perception of this matter. (shrink)

Traditionally, Christians have hold the two following beliefs: the belief that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good on the one hand and the belief that God has actualized a possible world in which some people freely reject Christ and are damned eternally, while others freely accept Him and are saved on the other. The combination of these two beliefs seems to result in a contradiction. This serious and well-known problem is called the soteriological problem of evil. In this article (...) the author, on the basis of William Lane Craig's Molinist theory, argues that there is no contradiction between these beliefs and that, therefore, there is no soteriological problem of evil, unless one adds two premises. The theory of middle knowledge shows that there is no good reason to accept the second of these. Therefore, there is no contradiction between belief in a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent God and the eternal damnation of some people in this world. This Molinist account is defended against some philosophical and theological objections that have been raised against it. Finally, the author tries to show that, although Craig's concept of transworld damnation is helpful to offer a defense of the compatibility of the two traditional Christian beliefs mentioned above, it does not help us to offer a theodicy of post-mortem evil.ZusammenfassungIn der christlichen Tradition finden wir die folgenden beiden Überzeugungen: einerseits, dass Gott allwissend, allmächtig und vollkommen gut ist und anderseits, dass er eine mögliche Welt aktualisiert hat, in der einige Menschen Christus freiwillig ablehnen und ewig verloren gehen, während andere ihn freiwillig annehmen und gerettet werden. Es hat den Anschein, dass die Kombination dieser beiden Überzeugungen in einen Widerspruch mündet. Aufgrund der Molinistischen Theorie William Lane Craigs sucht Verfasser zu erweisen, dass diese beiden Überzeugungen sich nicht widersprechen – es sei denn, dass zwei fragwürdige Prämissen hinzugefügt würden. Die Theorie der scientia media zeigt, dass es keine guten Gründe gibt, um die zweite dieser Prämissen zu akzeptieren. Es besteht also kein Widerspruch zwischen der Überzeugung, dass Gott allwissend, allmächtig und vollkommen gut ist, und der Überzeugung, dass einige Menschen ewig verloren gehen. Diese Molinistische Theorie wird gegenüber einigen philosophischen und theologischen Einsprüchen verteidigt. Schliesslich versucht der Verfasser nachzuweisen, dass, obwohl Craigs Konzept der transworld damnation für eine Verteidigung des christlichen Glaubens gebraucht werden kann, es nicht gebraucht werden kann für eine Theodizee hinsichtlich postmortalem Übel. (shrink)

A family of objections to theism aims to show that certain key theological doctrines, when held in conjunction, are incompatible. The longstanding problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom represents one such objection. In this essay, we provide the theist an epistemic approach to the problem that allows for the rational affirmation of both divine foreknowledge and human freedom despite their prima facie incompatibility. Specifically, we apply James Anderson’s Rational Affirmation of Paradox Theology model to the problem, arguing (...) that the theist can stave off defeat that arises from a belief in the conjunction of both doctrines by appealing to paradox. In order to establish this thesis, we first define key terms as well as lay out the theological fatalist argument. Next, we explicate Anderson’s model and apply it to the foreknowledge and freedom problem. We conclude by addressing the objection that an appeal to paradox is simply special pleading for the theist, arguing that the naturalist can be found in a similar epistemic position. (shrink)

Divine Omniscience and the Problem of Evil from the Perspective of Open Theism In the first part of the article, I present the argument for theological fatalism consisting in the thesis that if God has an infallible knowledge of future contingents, then whatever happens in the world happens necessarily. Next, I discuss the open theism view, whose rejection of theological fatalism rests on the claim that God does not know future contingents in advance. In the second part (...) of the paper, I analyze the open theism view in the context of the evidential argument from evil. The evidential argument from evil says that the occurrence of great and pointless suffering in the world makes the existence of God very improbable. The open theism view implies that since God does not know the future contingents (great and pointless evils included), the occurrence of such evils does not compromise his omnipotence or his benevolence, and, hence, it does not make his existence improbable. In the last part of the article, I make some critical remarks on the theodicy of open theism recently put forth by William Hasker and I emphasize that this theodicy is based on axiological assumptions which are not evident enough in themselves. Keywords: problem of evil, open theism, evidential argument, divine omniscience. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that Augustine's discussion of divine foreknowledge in DcD 5.9 is distinguished by its anti-Ciceronian polemic, but no one has analyzed the philosophical structure of this polemic to determine if it is compelling. I argue that Augustine's presentation has significant philosophical merit for two reasons. First, Augustine's rigorous application of the principle, shared with Cicero, that "nothing occurs unless it is preceded by an efficient cause" is capable of answeringforcefully one of the chief difficulties that Cicero (...) poses against the possibility of divine omniscience of human choice-making. Second, Augustine's presentation contains the potential to answer persuasively the epistemological problem that Cicero states against divine foreknowledge in his De Jato and De divinatione but which Augustine ignores in DcD 5.9. (shrink)

Open theism denies that God has definite exhaustive foreknowledge, and affirms that God takes certain risks when creating the universe. Critics of open theism often complain that the risks are too high. Perhaps there is something morally wrong with God taking a risk in creating a universe with an open future. Open theists have tried to respond by clarifying how much risk is involved in God creating an open universe, though we argue that it remains (...) unclear how much risk is actually involved. We claim that open theists need to start developing theories about how God manages risks in order to bring about His purposes for the universe. In this article, we will take a philosophical and biological perspective on risk management that adds plausibility to open theism. We will consider how God can use different risk‐management, surveillance, and redundancy systems in the natural world in order to accomplish His goals. (shrink)

Studies resolve the applied subject of how heavenly faith might be perceived inside the Monotheistic confidence customs. Subsequent to recognizing a few conceivable states of faith inside the thoughtful writing, scholars exhibit two or three faith situations for exhibiting that heavenly belief isn't just reasonably conceivable (for example, viable with heavenly premonition). Yet, that heavenly belief is foremost understood as specific belief category - helpful belief. Specifically, research contends that heavenly belief targets motivating humanity's reliability. Scholar raises a design of (...) a general philosophy that forgoes "elective prospects" opportunity for "real succession" opportunity. Researchers believe that behaving openly doesn't mean an opportunity to perform in any case, & that behaving uninhibitedly is the opportunity part of ethical obligation. Utilizing such logical contraptions, scholars demonstrate that they might provide different significant components of a religious philosophy that utilizes just the thought of performing unreservedly. According to McNabb, divine foreknowledge is comprised of trustworthiness. For example, if God knows at creation time that I will get the coffee by tomorrow for breakfast, then it is sure that I will get it for breakfast. God cannot be mistaken about what He knows; what is in the past cannot be changed. God's foreknowledge includes not just knowing future actions but also knowing all factual statements about the future. (shrink)

In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this (...) change of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will. (shrink)

Traditionally, Christians have hold the two following beliefs: the belief that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good on the one hand and the belief that God has actualized a possible world in which some people freely reject Christ and are damned eternally, while others freely accept Him and are saved on the other. The combination of these two beliefs seems to result in a contradiction. This serious and well-known problem is called the soteriological problem of evil. In this article (...) the author, on the basis of William Lane Craig's Molinist theory, argues that there is no contradiction between these beliefs and that, therefore, there is no soteriological problem of evil, unless one adds two premises. The theory of middle knowledge shows that there is no good reason to accept the second of these. Therefore, there is no contradiction between belief in a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent God and the eternal damnation of some people in this world. This Molinist account is defended against some philosophical and theological objections that have been raised against it. Finally, the author tries to show that, although Craig's concept of transworld damnation is helpful to offer a defense of the compatibility of the two traditional Christian beliefs mentioned above, it does not help us to offer a theodicy of post-mortem evil. (shrink)

If God knows everything he must know the future, and if he knows the future he must know the future acts of his creatures. But then his creatures must act as he knows they will act. How then can they be free? This dilemma has a long history in Christian philosophy and is now as hotly disputed as ever. The medieval scholastics were virtually unanimous in claiming both that God is omniscient and that humans have free will, though they disagreed (...) in their accounts of how the two are compatible. With the Reformation the debate became even more lively since there were Protestant philosophers who denied both claims, and many philosophers ever since have either thought it impossible to reconcile them or have thought it possible only because they weaken one or the other. (shrink)

David Lewis’ contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such (...) a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis’ own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory. (shrink)

Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe (...) problem. A deep analysis of the arguments will reveal that, to avoid a fatalist conclusion, we must reject bivalence and adopt a specific kind of temporal ontology (presentism), which also forces the theist to embrace open theism. (shrink)

Marek Pepliński Editorial. On God’s Knowledge, Omnipotence, and Human FreedomAncient and mediaeval encounters between religious monotheistic faith and philosophical reason brings philosophers and theologians to task how to add up facts perceived from philosophical, natural and religious perspectives. There are several important points in which reason and faith seems to be in disagreement. One of them is the group of problems connected to the topics of coherence of divine attributes, particularly omniscience, foreknowledge and omnipotence, on the one hand, and (...) the human freedom, on the another. This editorial shows how are different angles of problems of human freedom, foreknowledge, middle knowledge, eternity, fatalism and open theism connected in papers of this volume of Filo-sofija journal. Keywords: omniscience; foreknowledge; omnipotence; coherence of faith and reason; open theism, immutability of God’s knowledge, libertarian account of freedom; eternal life; fourteenth-century theology. (shrink)

A number of thinkers today, including open theists, find reasons to attribute temporality to God. According to Robert W. Jenson, the Trinity is indispensable to a Christian concept of God, and divine temporality is essential to the meaning of the Trinity. Following the lead of early Christian thought, Jenson argues that the persons of the Trinity are relations, and these relations are temporal. Jenson’s insights are obscured, however, by problematic references to time as a sphere to which God (...) is related. Schubert M. Ogden gives the notion of divine temporality coherent content by arguing that God’s actuality is best understood as an unending succession of experiences. This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and (...) the differences between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Augustinian Is Aquinas's Basic Account of Free Decision?Jamie Anne SpieringIntroductionQuestions about Augustine's influence on Thomas Aquinas are always interesting. In the previous century, leading Thomists such as Marie Dominic Chenu, Jean-Pierre Torrell, and Étienne Gilson wrote about the influence of one great master on the other. However, no one thinks the investigation is complete: the contributions of the new century have begun and are expected to continue.1 In (...) this article, I would like to consider how Augustine influenced Aquinas's account of something known to both authors as liberum arbitrium: free choice, or free decision.2 When we speak of grace and [End Page 435] human freedom, Aquinas's debt to Augustine and the extent of his fidelity to the master have been frequently explored.3 The same is true with regard to the fairly advanced question of the relation between human freedom and divine foreknowledge.4 But in this article I would like to consider Thomas's treatment of what we might call the basic questions surrounding man's ability to choose freely—questions about its essence and its existence. What is this liberum arbitrium, which Augustine repeatedly calls "a gift of nature"? How should we understand its activity? How should we understand its origin? Thomas Aquinas deals with liberum arbitrium as a power of the soul in question 83 of Summa theologiae [ST] I, in question 24 of De veritate, and in chapter 48 of Summa contra gentiles [SCG] II. These texts are not about the role of grace or the causality of God—though they prepare for the discussion—but simply about the powers of an intellectual nature. How Augustinian is Aquinas's account in these texts?5 [End Page 436] I will try to explore the question with reasonable thoroughness in this paper.6It will surprise no one to hear that my answer to "was Aquinas an Augustinian in his basic treatment of free decision?" is "in a way, no, and in a way, yes." It is both surprising and notable how significantly Aquinas departs from the Augustinian path. The first part of this paper will discuss three major ways in which Aquinas's account of liberum arbitrium breaks openly (by medieval standards) from the type of careful loyalty we see in earlier authors. In the second part of the paper, I will argue that Aquinas's account follows Augustine in distinctive ways: instead of prioritizing Augustine's context and preferred evidence for free decision, Aquinas does more to locate free decision within the quest for happiness which provided the ultimate pattern for Augustine's thought. He is an Augustinian, but of a very different kind.Aquinas's Treatment of Liberum Arbitrium Represents a Significant Break with the Augustinian TraditionIt simply was not Thomas's practice to write statements such as: "I am going to treat this topic in a way different from that of Augustine, and I plan to make significant improvements." How, then, can we understand whether, and to what extent, he made a break with Augustine's ideas? Direct comparison of the authors' works is the obvious strategy, but such comparison is complicated by our ignorance of whether Aquinas had actually seen the work in question or was only familiar with quotations from it. So I will employ an additional strategy to reveal Aquinas's breaks with Augustine: I will compare Thomas's work to that of Peter Lombard and Anselm of Canterbury. We know Aquinas had read Peter's work thoroughly, because [End Page 437] he wrote a commentary on it, and citations in De veritate reveal that Thomas knew at least the highlights of Anselm's work on free decision. Both Peter and Anselm are faithful to many aspects of Augustine's treatment: they follow him in the way they contextualize the topic, and they are careful to use Augustinian language in defining it. Aquinas does not. He radically shifts the context for the liberum arbitrium discussion and rejects definitions that use Augustine's formulations. He uses a boldly Aristotelian framework to replace a number of elements in Augustine's treatment. Finally, unlike Augustine, Peter, or Anselm, he asks about the... (shrink)

On Limited Divine Knowledge in the structure of Open Theism ‘Open Theism,’ also known as ‘open theology,’ ‘open view’ and ‘openness of God’ is not a new philosophical position, but it has not been presented and analyzed in detail in the Polish philosophy of religion. Open theism is a significant modification of the traditional Christian concept of God, some important aspects of God’s nature and God’s relationship with the world created by Him. Briefly speaking, (...) ‘open theism’ is a philosophical model of God and His activity in the world, made on the basis of analytical philosophy of religion, referring to the biblical image of God, including such issues as God’s omniscience, human freedom, the problem of evil and providence. Sometimes ‘open theism’ is also referred to as ‘free will theism’, because it is concerned with the problem of the freedom of human will and the related question of God’s omniscience. It is this latter issue that seems to be regarded by advocates of ‘open theism’ as the essential point. So someone can get the impression that the central content of this philosophical position is the problem of God’s knowledge (His foreknowledge) and the limitations of this knowledgecharacteristic of ‘open theism’. In the light of a closer analysis, however, it turns out that it is important to define precisely the role of the concept of God’s limited knowledge in the structure of ‘open theism.’ This article aims to reconstruct and present the essential elements of the ‘open theism’ with particular emphasis on the role played in it by the concept of God’s limited foreknowledge, and to clarify the place of individual elements of the structure and their relationships. Keywords: open theism, God’s foreknowledge, free will, concept of God. (shrink)

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God’s power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures’ inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of (...) divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists’ notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity. (shrink)

In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world and whose concurrence prompted the image of an optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has (...) brought to existence both what is unworthy and what displays high degrees of excellence. On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility. (shrink)