We respond to Farah (1994) by making some general remarks about information encapsulation and locality and asking how these are violated in her computational models. Our point is not that we disagree, but rather that Farah's treatment of the issues is not sufficiently rigorous to allow an evaluation of her claims.

What were the earliest reactions to Gödel's incompleteness theorems? After a brief summary of previous work in this area I analyse, by means of unpublished archival material, the first reactions in Vienna and Berlin to Gödel's groundbreaking results. In particular, I look at how Carnap, Hempel, von Neumann, Kaufmann, and Chwistek, among others, dealt with the new results.

Some philosophers find the following thesis attractive: for every logical constant C there is a set of logical rules of inference R such that a subject knows the meaning of C if and only if she accepts the rules in R. I point out some obvious but, apparently, easily forgotten difficulties concerning this thesis.

On a traditional view, the semantics of natural language makes essential use of a context parameter, i.e. a set of coordinates that represents the situation of speech. In classical semantic frameworks, this parameter plays two key roles: first, context contributes to determining the content of utterance; second, it is crucial for defining logical consequence. I point out that recent empirical proposals about context shift in natural language (in particular, context-shifting semantics in the style of Anand and Nevins 2004) are incompatible (...) with the traditional view of context. At the same time, there is increasing cross-linguistic support for this brand of context shift. Hence I suggest that context has no place in semantic theory proper. We should revert back to so-called multiple-indexing frameworks that were developed by Montague and others, and relegate context to the postsemantic stage. (shrink)

Suppose you’re certain that a claim—say, ‘Frida is tall’—does not have a determinate truth value. What attitude should you take towards it? This is the question of the cognitive role of indeterminacy. This paper presents a puzzle for theories of cognitive role. Many of these theories vindicate a seemingly plausible principle: if you are fully certain that A, you are rationally required to be fully certain that A is determinate. Call this principle ‘Certainty’. We show that Certainty, in combination with (...) some minimal side premises, entails a very implausible claim: whenever you’re certain that it’s indeterminate whether A, it is rationally required that you reject A. This is a surprising result, which requires abandoning at least some intuitive views about indeterminacy and cognitive role. (shrink)

This article argues that Tolstoy’s What Is Art? had a direct influence on David Foster Wallace’s conception of literature, and most specifically that Wallace appropriated Tolstoy’s discourse (down to most of its most specific details) to found his literary project. The article seeks to prove this by exhibiting the striking extent of Wallace’s alignment with Tolstoy’s beliefs, by retracing the multiple direct references to Tolstoy in Wallace’s work, and by uncovering Wallace’s annotations on his own copy of What Is Art? (...) as further confirmation of what a careful comparative analysis of the works of the two authors makes manifest. (shrink)

In this paper I show that proofs by contradiction were a serious problem in seventeenth century mathematics and philosophy. Their status was put into question and positive mathematical developments emerged from such reflections. I analyse how mathematics, logic, and epistemology are intertwined in the issue at hand. The mathematical part describes Cavalieri's and Guldin's mathematical programmes of providing a development of parts of geometry free of proofs by contradiction. The logical part shows how the traditional Aristotelean doctrine that perfect demonstrations (...) are causal demonstrations influenced the reflection on proofs by contradiction. The main protagonist of this part is Wallis. Finally, I analyse some epistemological developments arising from the Cartesian tradition. In particular, I look at Arnauld's programme of providing an epistemologically motivated reformulation of Geometry free of proofs by contradiction. The conclusion explains in which sense these epistemological reflections can be compared with those informing contemporary intuitionism. (shrink)

This article argues that Sartre’s “What Is Literature?” had a profound and direct influence on David Foster Wallace’s conception of literature. At the very least, a number of factors oblige scholars to take this interpretation seriously. We know that Sartre’s existentialism pervades Wallace’s fiction, that Wallace repeatedly mentioned the Existentialists throughout his work, that he’d learned French to read them in the original, and that Sartre was one of his favorites, as testified by Zadie Smith. Most importantly, a comparative analysis (...) of Sartre’s text and Wallace’s nonfiction shows not only striking parallels but also almost exact repetitions in the writers’ fundamental ideals. In this sense, Sartre’s direct influence on Wallace appears so major as to invest multiple specific details of Wallace’s conception of literature both in its content and in the logical structuring of that content. In this article, we explore the extent of this influence through a structured investigation of its multiple features, showing that many of Wallace’s tenets – the rejection of Realism, the affirmation of meaning-as-use and of literature as a means to human communion and individual and social engagement, and many many more – follow from Sartre’s discourse. (shrink)

The homeopathic principle of similitude is not based on the principle of vaccination but on the more general principle of inversion of effects, a widespread medical phenomenon. Based on the systemic networks which play an important role in response to stress, this principle concerns the reorganization of regulation systems, through a coherent response to the medicine. This model is backed by a large number of published studies from our laboratory and others, by toxicological evidence such as the emerging fields of (...) ‘hormesis’, of neuropharmacology, and of systems biology. The immune system is just one example of the possible application of this law of similitude, which constitutes the true ‘heart’ of the homeopathic idea, and again ethically justifies the attempt to apply it to experimental pharmacology. (shrink)