The work is devoted to the philosophy of mastery presented in the tales of the Ural writer Pavel Petrovich Bazhov. The basis of the phenomenon of mastery is the classical philosophy of Plato in its Socratic version. The authors of the article see it as their goal to prove the close relationship between the practical handicraft Ural art, represented in the mythology and literature of P.P. Bazhov, and the classical metaphysical attitudes of European philosophy. The personality of the (...) master becomes a cementing link between the natural world and the world of culture. Mastery in its philosophical and practical form acts as a support for the natural attitude towards nature, art, and towards man in general. The authors decipher the phenomenon of mastery in the tales of P.P. Bazhov, analyze his modes and the specifics of manifestation. Ural tales of P.P. Bazhov in describing the phenomena of mastery and genuine creative attitude to nature repeat the structure of the classical attitude to the world and logically correspond to the structure of the creative attitude of the master poet to the object he creates. The specificity of the Ural artcraftsmanship lies in the fact that the personality of the master is embodied not in an ideologist, not in a religious preacher, not in an intellectual, but in a master who interacts with the elements of nature as concretely and closely as possible. The work immerses P.P. Bazhov’s legends, written during the Soviet period of Russian history, in the global context of research into the nature of genuine living creativity, and also emphasizes the regional and very special specific aspect in the Ural mastery. (shrink)

This book offers an unprecedented quantitative portrait of analytic philosophy focusing on two seemingly marginal features of philosophical texts: citations and acknowledgements in academic publications. Originating from a little network of philosophers based in Oxford, Cambridge, and Vienna, analytic philosophy has become during the Twentieth century a thriving philosophical community with thousands of members worldwide. Leveraging the most advanced techniques from bibliometrics, citations and acknowledgments are used in this book to shed light on both the epistemology and the sociology of (...) this philosophical field, illuminating the intellectual trajectory of analytic philosophy as well as the social characteristics of the analytic community. Special attention is dedicated to the last forty years, providing insights into a phase of analytic philosophy which is still understudied by historians of philosophy. In the eight chapters of the book, readers will find not only numerous quantitative investigations and technical explanations, but also a robust theoretical framework and epistemological reflections on the strengths and limitations of quantitative methods for the study of philosophy. With its strong interdisciplinary appeal, this book will engage a wide range of scholars, including historians of philosophy seeking new methodologies, analytic philosophers interested in a new look at their discipline, and scholars in digital humanities, bibliometrics, and quantitative studies of science, who will find many innovative techniques for investigating disciplinary fields. (shrink)

Chapter One: Constructions. Entities, constructions, and functions When one travels from Los Angeles to New York, going, say, by way of St. Louis, Chicago, ...

In the last decades, research in science mapping has delivered several powerful techniques, based on citation or textual analysis, for charting the intellectual organization of research fields. To map the social network underlying science and scholarship, by contrast, science mapping has mainly relied on one method, co-authorship analysis. This method, however, suffers from well-known limitations related to the practice of authorship. Moreover, it does not perform well on those fields where multi-authored publications are rare. In this study, a new method (...) for mapping the social structure of research fields is advanced, based on the analysis of the acknowledgments of academic publications. We first discuss the standard account of the function of acknowledgments in scholarly communication, then we introduce a new interpretative framework in which the acknowledgments are intended as positioning signals exchanged by researchers. Next, we provide the formal definition of the four acknowledgments-based networks that stand at the core of the method, and we test it on a humanities field, analytic philosophy. Results show that acknowledgement-based networks allow to reconstruct the fine-grained social structure of analytic philosophy from different perspectives. Furthermore, by comparing the citation-based maps of the field with the acknowledgments-based networks, it permits to shed light on the relationship between the intellectual and social layer of analytic philosophy. We conclude by presenting practical limitations of the method and by sketching some further research lines. (shrink)

A review of Jozef Kovalčik´s and Max Ryynänen´s Aesthetics of Popular Culture.

It was shown in [3] (see also [5]) that there is a duality between the category of bounded distributive lattices endowed with a join-homomorphism and the category of Priestley spaces endowed with a Priestley relation. In this paper, bounded distributive lattices endowed with a join-homomorphism, are considered as algebras and we characterize the congruences of these algebras in terms of the mentioned duality and certain closed subsets of Priestley spaces. This enable us to characterize the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras. (...) In particular, Priestley relations enable us to characterize the congruence lattice of the Q-distributive lattices considered in [4]. Moreover, these results give us an effective method to characterize the simple and subdirectly irreducible monadic De Morgan algebras [7].The duality considered in [4], was obtained in terms of the range of the quantifiers, and such a duality was enough to obtain the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras, but not to characterize the congruences. (shrink)

It is widely held that oblique contexts and indexical terms present difficulties to Frege's theory of sense. The aim of the present paper is to show that a simple device involving no revision of Frege's semantic doctrine resolves all the alleged difficulties. A simple extension of Frege's notation is proposed which makes it possible to translate oblique contexts into the concept script.

Standard citation-based bibliometric tools have severe limitations when they are applied to periods in the history of science and the humanities before the advent of now-current citation practices. This paper presents an alternative method involving the extracting and analysis of mentions to map and analyze links between scholars and texts in periods that fall outside the scope of citation-based studies. Focusing on one specific discipline in one particular period and language area—Anglophone philosophy between 1890 and 1979—we describe a procedure to (...) create a mention index by identifying, extracting, and disambiguating mentions in academic publications. Our mention index includes 1,095,765 mention links, extracted from 22,977 articles published in 12 journals. We successfully link 93% of these mentions to specific philosophers, with an estimated precision of 82% to 91%. Moreover, we integrate the mention index into a database named EDHIPHY, which includes data and metadata from multiple sources and enables multidimensional mention analyses. In the final part of the paper, we present four case studies conducted by domain experts, demonstrating the use and the potential of both EDHIPHY and mention analyses more generally. (shrink)

Purpose. To turn to the diaries and journalistic works by Leo Tolstoy, to study the content and method of his religious and ethical search. To doubt the faithfulness of his interpretation of the evangelical message of Christ. Theoretical basis. The author proceeded from the necessity of a dialectical understanding of the concepts of nonviolence, mercy, justice and a cultural-historical focus on the possibilities of society in realizing the spirituality principles. Originality. The author focuses on the unilateral nature of the methodology (...) that Leo Tolstoy uses to deny violence, as well as on the ambiguous role of Tolstoy's ideology in the morality of society. Conclusions. The spiritual activities an individual person is able to do and that are instructive for society from the point of view of its moral influence may not be sufficient means for educating moral responsibility in a society as a whole. Tolstoy's methodological approach to justifying the absoluteness of nonviolence principle is one-sided and not productive for a true interpretation of the spiritual nature of the Christ’s message about love and mercy. (shrink)

In my comment on Katerina Ierodiakonou’s paper, I outline my understanding of the programme of De anima and how it bears on Aristotle’s discussion of the transparent in De anima 2.7, in contrast with his discussion of the transparent in De sensu 3. I then explore Aristotle’s notion of transparency and sketch an alternative to Ierodiakonou’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views as to how colours are generated in physical objects. At the end, I raise two objections to Alexander’s interpretation of the (...) transparent as discussed by Ierodiakonou. (shrink)

This article provides a brief analysis of the life, work, and character of Nikolai Berdyaev. He is described as both a captive and apologist of freedom, and as an influential representative of existential personalism.

Buzaglo (as well as Manders (J Philos LXXXVI(10):553–562, 1989)) shows the way in which it is rational even for a realist to consider ‘development of concepts’, and documents the theory by numerous examples from the area of mathematics. A natural question arises: in which way can the phenomenon of expanding mathematical concepts influence empirical concepts? But at the same time a more general question can be formulated: in which way do the mathematical concepts influence empirical concepts? What I want to (...) show in the present paper can be described as follows. The problem articulated by Buzaglo deserves some semantic refinements. Following explications are needed: What is meaning? (In particular: What are concepts?) What are questions? (Or, equivalently: Semantics of interrogative sentences.) -/- Further, a useful notion will be the notion of problem. Taking over the notion of conceptual system from Materna (Conceptual Systems. Logos, Berlin, 2004) and using Tichý’s Transparent intensional logic (TIL) I can try to solve the problem of the relation between mathematical and empirical concepts (not only for the case of expanding some mathematical concepts). (shrink)

Attempting to steer moral philosophy away from abstract theorizing, Moral Disquiet and Human Life argues that moral philosophy should be a practical, rational, and argumentative engagement with reality, and that moral reflection should have direct effects on our lives and the world in which we live. Illustrating her discussion with vivid examples from literature, music, drama, and current events, the noted French philosopher Monique Canto-Sperber resumes the most ancient pursuit of philosophy: the examination of human life itself. What did Socrates (...) mean when he said that the unexamined life is not worth living? How can reflecting on one's existence incorporate human singularity, the contingency of events, the certainty of death, the presence of the past, or the irreversibility of time? Carefully analyzing and proposing answers to such questions, Moral Disquiet and Human Life eloquently calls for a redefinition of the task of moral philosophy and of its limits. (shrink)

The paper deals with the etymology of the personal names Qunï Säŋün and Toŋra Simä appearing in the ninth line of the Old Turkic Tonyukuk inscription. These names are borne by the envoys sent by the kagan of the Tokuz Oghuz to the Chinese and Khitan, respectively, to conclude a military alliance against the Turks. Both names have the same structure, a combination of an ethnonym vs. toŋra), referring to a tribal unit within the Tiele 鐵勒 confederation, and a title (...) of Chinese origin. Based on a thorough analysis of historical and philological data, the authors try to establish possible ethnolinguistic grounds for the Tokuz Oghuz mission, which have so far eluded researchers of the inscription and can be fully restored only in the light of the latest discoveries in the history and philology of Inner Asia of the Old Turkic period, e.g., the decipherment of the famous Khüis Tolgoi inscription from Mongolia. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Science maps are visual representations of the structure and dynamics of scholarly knowl­edge. They aim to show how fields, disciplines, journals, scientists, publications, and scientific terms relate to each other. Science mapping is the body of methods and techniques that have been developed for generating science maps. This entry is an introduction to science maps and science mapping. It focuses on the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues of science mapping, rather than on the mathematical formulation of science mapping techniques. After (...) a brief history of science mapping, we describe the general procedure for building a science map, presenting the data sources and the methods to select, clean, and pre-process the data. Next, we examine in detail how the most common types of science maps, namely the citation-based and the term-based, are generated. Both are based on networks: the former on the network of publications connected by citations, the latter on the network of terms co-occurring in publications. We review the rationale behind these mapping approaches, as well as the techniques and methods to build the maps. We also present less-common types of science maps, including co-authorship networks, interlocking editorship networks, maps based on patents’ data, and geographic maps of science. Moreover, we consider how time can be represented in science maps to investigate the dynamics of science. We also discuss some epistemological and sociological topics that can help in the interpretation, contextualization, and assessment of science maps. Then, we present some possible applications of science maps in science policy. In the conclusion, we point out why science mapping may be interesting for all the branches of meta-science, from knowl­edge organization to epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken by Peter (...) Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

We provide a quantitative analysis of the philosophy-neuroscience nexus using citation analysis. Combining bibliometric indicators of cross-field visibility with journal citation mapping techniques, we investigate four dimensions of the nexus: how the visibility of neuroscience in philosophy and of philosophy in neuroscience has changed over time, which areas of philosophy are more interested in neuroscience, which areas of neuroscience are more interested in philosophy, and how the trading zone between the two fields is configured. We also discuss two hypotheses: the (...) supposed occurrence of a neuro-revolution in philosophy and the role of psychology as the disciplinary link between neuroscience and philosophy. Both the visibility of neuroscience in philosophy and the visibility of philosophy in neuroscience have increased significantly from 1980 to 2020, albeit the latter remains an order of magnitude lower than the former. Neuroscience is particularly visible in philosophy of mind, applied ethics, philosophy of science, but not in ‘core’ areas of analytic philosophy. Philosophy is particularly visible in cognitive and systems neuroscience and neuropsychiatry, but not in biomedical neuroscience. As for the trading zone between philosophy and neuroscience, our data show that it works differently in philosophy and in neuroscience. While some philosophy journals are active loci of bidirectional communication, neuroscience journals are divided between journals ‘importing’ philosophy in neuroscience and journals ‘exporting’ neuroscience to philosophy. Lastly, data do not support the hypothesis that a widespread neuro-revolution has transformed philosophy radically, but support the hypothesis that psychology functions as a mediating disciplinary link between philosophy and neuroscience. (shrink)

The article offers a rigorous truth condition for subjunctively conditional statements. The theory is framed in the system of transparent intensional logic and takes connections (especially the cause-Effect relation) as basic. Counterexamples are given to rival theories based on the notion of world similarity.

Jan Patočka’s philosophical development was varied. Over the course of fifty years of philosophizing, he gradually, and to varying degrees, developed close to a dozen systematic projects, whose ambition was, at least initially, to present what he called a “unified philosophy.” However, the dynamism with which he changed his philosophical plans and incessantly embarked on new projects invites the question of how to approach the various and often mutually “contradictory” transformations of his philosophical thinking, if neither the continuity and integrity (...) of Patočka’s thought nor the essential specificity of any of these positions is to be lost. Through the notion of the “personal a priori” found in one of Jan Patočka’s early texts, and in a critical, “overcoming-preserving” reference to two antagonistic conceptions of Patočka’s philosophical development, the article attempts to sketch a solution to this general interpretative problem. In the context of the search for Patočka’s “basic position of seeing” as the integrating framework of his diverse philosophical attempts, it simultaneously reconstructs the early question about the meaning of philosophy in general, which Patočka developed in a series of texts from the 1930s, some of which are still available only in the Czech language. (shrink)

We give an exponential lower bound on number of proof-lines in the proof system K of modal logic, i.e., we give an example of K-tautologies ψ₁, ψ₂,... s.t. every K-proof of ψi must have a number of proof-lines exponential in terms of the size of ψi. The result extends, for the same sequence of K-tautologies, to the systems K4, Gödel—Löb's logic, S and S4. We also determine some speed-up relations between different systems of modal logic on formulas of modal-depth one.

There are no moral entitlements with respect to pollution prior to legal conventions that establish them, or so I will argue. While some moral entitlements precede legal conventions, pollution is part of a category of harms against interests that stands apart in this regard. More specifically, pollution is a problematic type of harm that creates liability only under certain conditions. Human interactions lead to harm and to the invasion of others’ space regularly, and therefore we need an account of undue (...) harm as a basis of assigning legal protections and obligations to different agents, which creates standards for holding those agents responsible for harm. Absent such positive standards with respect to pollution at the domestic or international level, it does not make sense to hold agents responsible. This fact has two fundamental implications. First, contrary to what some defenders of environmental justice argue, we cannot hold people responsible for polluting without a system of legal rights in place that assigns entitlements, protections, and obligations, and second, contrary to what opponents of environmental regulation claim, the lack of moral entitlements to pollute creates room for quite extensive legal restrictions on people’s ability to pollute for the sake of the environment and human health. Indeed the scope of those restrictions is wide and open-ended. (shrink)

Problems are defined as abstract procedures. An explication of procedures as used in Transparent Intensional Logic and called constructions is presented and the subclass of constructions called concepts is defined. Concepts as closed constructions modulo α- and η-conversion can be associated with meaningful expressions of a natural or professional language in harmony with Church’s conception. Thus every meaningful expression expresses a concept. Since every problem can be unambiguously determined by a concept we can state that every problem is a concept (...) and every concept can be viewed as a problem.Kolmogorov’s idea of a connection between problems and Heyting’s calculus is examined and the non-classical features of the latter are shown to be compatible with realistic logic using partial functions. (shrink)

_Abstract_: Fueled by the rapid development of neuroscientific tools and techniques, some scholars consider the shift from traditional cognitive psychology toward cognitive neuroscience to be a _revolution_ (most notably Boone and Piccinini). However, the term “revolution” in philosophy of science can easily be construed as involving a paradigm shift in the sense of Kuhn’s _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_. Is a Kuhnian account sound in the case at hand? To answer this question, we consider heuristic indicators of two features of (...) paradigm shifts: the incommensurability of ontologies; and a gap between scientific communities. Based on our evidence, we argue that no revolution has occurred (at least, not yet). _Keywords_: Cognitive Neuroscience; Cognitive Psychology; Philosophy of Science; Thomas Kuhn; Scientometrics _La “rivoluzione delle neuroscienze cognitive” non è una rivoluzione (in senso kuhniano). Evidenze scientometriche _ _Riassunto_:_ _Complice il rapido sviluppo di strumenti e tecniche in neuroscienze, alcuni studiosi (in particolare Boone e Piccinini) intendono il passaggio dalla psicologia cognitiva classica alla neuroscienza cognitiva nei termini di una _rivoluzione_. Tuttavia, il termine ‘rivoluzione’ in filosofia della scienza è strettamente associato alla nozione di successione di paradigmi esposta da Kuhn ne _La struttura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche_. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è capire se effettivamente la concezione kuhniana offra una corretta descrizione di questa dinamica storica. In particolare, prenderemo in esame due indicatori euristici delle rivoluzioni kuhniane: l’incommensurabilità ontologica trai due paradigmi e la diversa composizione demografica delle comunità scientifiche. Sulla base delle evidenze scientometriche che prenderemo in esame, affermeremo che non è avvenuta nessuna rivoluzione (almeno per ora). _Parole chiave_: Neuroscienze cognitive; Psicologia cognitiva; Filosofia della scienza; Thomas Kuhn; Scientometria. (shrink)

Pár slov úvodem k dopisu, který poslal Pavel Tichý z University of Otago Pavlu Maternovi (který v té době ´pracoval´ na brněnské univerzitě bez možnosti učení a publikování). K dataci dopisu: Shoduji se s odhadem Dr. Raclavského, že jde patrně o r. 1975. Ti, kdo neprožili normalizaci, si těžko představí situaci. To nebylo tak, že můj přítel Tichý momentálně působí na Novém Zélandě a píše mi z momentálního zahraničního pobytu. Tichý byl emigrant, což mj. znamenalo, že žádnou z jeho (...) odborných statí nebylo možno u nás citovat, dále že dík faktu, o kterém každý věděl, že dopisy emigrantů jsou u nás na příslušných institucích otvírány, znamenala korespondence s emigrantem kádrovou skvrnu. O tom jsem tehdy nepřemýšlel, už proto, že četba Tichého dopisů byla nesmírně zajímavá. Byl jsem na shromažďování korespondence lajdák. Moje krátkozrakost zavinila, že se z této korespondence zachoval nepatrný zlomek. Dopis, který následuje, je ovšem obzvlášť zajímavý, a to z následujícího důvodu: Tichý měl už od šedesátých let – ještě v Československu – v hlavě zárodky svého přístupu k logice a logické analýze přirozeného jazyka (svědčí o tom jeho stati v tehdejším Filosofickém časopise, zejména stať „Smysl a procedura“ z r. 1968). Dopis, který zde uveřejňujeme, má však hodnotu historického dokumentu. Jde o první ´neformální´ formulaci jeho pojetí tzv. konstrukcí a jeho postoje k logice, což se postupně promítlo do systému Transparentní intenzionální logiky (TIL), vyloženého souvisle v monografii The Foundations of Frege´s Logic, vydané asi 13 let po tomto dopisu. Ze vzhledu dopisu je patrné, že byl psán na psacím stroji, což v těch letech bylo standardní. Musíme omluvit překlepy (ostatně to byl osobní dopis), pokud jde o nespisovnosti, vím, že Tichý ovládal češtinu velmi dobře, ale dával přednost psát přirozeně, blízko k hovorové češtině. Jistě připustíte, že jeho jazyk je zde velmi živý a že úpravy směrem ke spisovnému jazyku by narušily kouzlo bezprostřednosti a jistého emocionálního zaujetí, které z dopisu vyzařuje. Tichý posílal mně a Pavlovi Cmorejovi i nadále jednak osobní dopisy, jednak rukopisy svých statí, takže jsme měli výhodu být účastni procesu budování TIL, kterou oba (a dnes už nejenom my) pokládáme za podstatný přínos ke světové logice. --Pavel Materna. (shrink)

Originally proposed by Prior, egocentric logic is a class of logical systems that capture properties of agents rather than of possible worlds. The article proposes a doxastic egocentric system with rigid names for reasoning about beliefs that an agent might have about herself.

Rédei and Gyenis recently displayed strong constraints of Bayesian learning. However, they also presented a positive result for Bayesianism. Despite the limited significance of this positive result, I find it useful to discuss its two possible strengthenings to present new results and open new questions about the limits of Bayesianism. First, I will show that one cannot strengthen the positive result by restricting the evidence to so-called “certain evidence”. Secondly, strengthening the result by restricting the partitions—as parts of one’s evidence—to (...) Jeffrey-independent partitions requires additional constraints on one’s evidence to preserve its commutativity. So, my results provide additional grounds for caution and support for the limitations of Bayesian learning. (shrink)

The article offers a rigorous explication of the intuitive notion of verisimilitude, I.E., Of the distance of a theory from the truth. The proposal is defended against charges of material inadequacy made by popper, Niniluoto, And miller.