This article starts from the observation that the Belgian level of adaptation to the requirements posed by its membership of the European Union is surprisingly low. Following an institutionalist line of thinking, it is argued that the impact of the European Union is seriously constrained by the characteristics of the Belgian federal system. This results into defining both cultural and structural indicators for the degree of Europeanisation: European opinions and awareness of political elites and the general public and the Belgian (...) domestic organisation of European co-ordination mechanisms. The article more concretely argues that the European opinions and European awareness of the political elites and the public opinion are coloured by an inwards-looking mentality that stems from the dominant focus on the ongoing federalisation process. In addition, it is also found that the limited Europeanised installation and outcomes ofthe European co-ordination mechanisms are at least partly shaped by hard and soft federal elements. (shrink)

The amount of European level organized interest groups has dramatically increased since the Single European Act came into force in 1987. In 1995 approximately 3000 lobby-groups, employing 10.000 lobbyists, are based in Brussels. This has resulted in a complex arrangement of European interest intermediation and caused important constraints on decision making procedures and institutional actors. The first part of this article offers a discription and evaluation of this proliferation and diversification of European interest groups. It alsosuggests a classification of all (...) European interest groups including professional lobbyists and actors that defend their interests by themselves. The second part gives a discription of the way in which both European Parliament and Commission have dealt with this proliferation and assesses the differences in approachbetween both institutions. (shrink)

This article argues that both hard and soft institutions shape the strategies and - to a lesser extent - the preferences of political actors in the European Union. First of all, it discusses the institutional perspective in political science and presents an institutional model of decision-making. Secondly the institutional argument is illustrated by a detailed account of the decision-makingprocess with respect to the Packaging Directive. An analysis of the actor configuration, the interactions between the involved actors and an overview of (...) the decision-making process itself, all show to what extent actor's strategies and preferences are constrained and empowerd by the European institutional context. (shrink)

This article examines the organisation and strategies of Belgian interest groups and their European peak-organisations with respect to the EU policy-making arena. It conceptualises the European Union as a of multi-level governance political system that consists ofmultiple interlocking government levels, governed by means of non-hierarchical actor configurations with a blurred boundary between the public and the private sphere. It further argues that the European policy-making can best be studied from a new-institutionalist perspective which emphasises that the preferences andthe behaviour of (...) political actors are shaped by the institutional context which provides opportunities and constraints. Evidence of the institutionalfactors within a multi-level governance setting is then given from the organisational structure and strategies of Belgian interest groups in general and from the environmental policy sector in particular. (shrink)

This article explores the use of the Multilevel Governance concept to understand why EU Member-States, such as Belgium, sometimes fail to transpose EU directives correctly or in time. Firstly, it discusses the nature and the value of the MLG concept. It is argued that a theoretical incorporation of the MLG concept in the Neo-Institutional paradigm is necessary to gain explanatory power. Secondly, an overview is presented of the Belgian implementation record. In the last part, the combined use of the MLG (...) concept and the NI theory identifies several factors to explain failing implementation. It is argued that governance as well as multilevel institutions can constrain the desired smooth implementation. Examples of such hard and soft institutions include the multi-layeredfederal structure of Belgium, the complex co-ordination and implementation mechanisms, the role of advisory bodies and the Council of State, the relation between administrations and 'cabinets', and cultural features such as knowledge of the EU. (shrink)