Between innocence and commitment: speculation and experience -- Reasonable commitment -- Some comparisons -- Commitment to reason and to scientific realism -- Humanist commitment -- Humanism and the cosmic agent -- Commitment to God -- Corollaries.

A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing’s criticisms of Arthur Eddington’s scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing’s critique of Eddington’s attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of “inexact language” to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th, 1938, (...) Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing’s ‘Philosophy and the Physicists’.” Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes are included as an Appendix to this paper. (shrink)

Protochemistry. The Program of a Methodical Foundation of Chemistry. "Protochemistry" - in analogy to protophysics - is sketched as the program of a methodical foundation of chemistry. "Foundation" means to reconstruct the methods (both linguistic and poietic) which lead from the prescientific every-day-practice of mastering properties of substances to scientific theories of modern chemistry. Four types of chemical terms are distinguished, depending on different methods of definition and different areas of reference. Consequences of the program if realized are pointed out.

SummaryLeśniewski presented his logical systems in a way which conformed to his nominalism, so the question arises whether Leśniewski's logic can be given a natural formal semantics which, unlike current versions, avoids commitment to abstract entities. Building on hints in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, I develop the idea of a way of meaning which is the basis for what I call combinatorial semantics. I then consider whether this commits us to abstract objects or an intensional metalogic.

This book offers a discussion of practical as well as theoretical autonomy.

Agricultural Enlightenment explores the economic underpinnings of the Enlightenment to argue the case that the expansion of the so-called knowledge economy in the second half of the eighteenth century powerfully influenced governments and all those who worked in agriculture, or who sought to derive profit from the productive use of the land.

Since 2007, I conduct philosophical walks as individual consultations, teachings or Socratic group exercises. A philosophical walk is intended to make participants think, to deepen thoughts and to become conscious of oneself in relation to the surroundings by walking. It is a form of philosophical practice, facilitating dialogue so that a meaningful story can be obtained. Participants are encouraged to (i) walk in such a way that they obtain space for thoughts and thinking, (ii) conceptualize, (iii) identify a place related (...) to a concept, (iv) question concepts, place and space, and (v) connect concepts with their experience. In this paper, I will describe the method of my philosophical walks and give an example: a philosophical walk at the campus of Nanjing University, China, in 2013. The aim is to provide readers a tool for conducting philosophical walks themselves and walk just like Lao-Tzu, Confucius, Socrates, Aristotle, Nietzsche and many other philosophers have done in order to philosophize and produce concepts related to life, person and place. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders Leibniz’s conception of the nature of possible things and offers a novel interpretation of the actualization of possible substances. This requires analyzing a largely neglected notion, the reality of individual essences. Thus far scholars have tended to construe essences as representational items in God’s intellect. We acknowledge that finite essences have being in the divine intellect but insist that they are also grounded in the infinite essence of God, as limitations of it. Indeed, we show that it (...) is critical to understand that this dependence on God’s essence is prior to the dependence on God through divine ideas. Here it is crucial to distinguish questions concerning the ontological status of essences from questions concerning their reality. This yields a fresh view of Leibniz’s theory of creation, which takes seriously his claim that the same thing is first a mere possibility but after creation an actually existent substance. (shrink)

The University of Warsaw has a splendid modern library with 60,000 m 2 of floor space. It resembles a shopping centre. The long and elegant modern building on ulica Dobra, on the low ground between the old University and the Vistula, was opened in 1998 replacing the previous hopelessly inadequate facilities. It has an imposing sequence of copper-green “great texts” on its front side in Greek, Arabic, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Latin, Polish, music, and mathematics. These are international symbols, posting Warsaw’s claim (...) to international status. But inside, once one has passed the mall -like coffee-shop. (shrink)

Résumé Birgit Jürgenssen introduit le féminisme dans le champ de l’art dès les années 1970. Elle se livre à une destruction en règle des assignations imposées aux femmes, celle en particulier de la « femme au foyer ». Échappant aux catégories du genre, s’inspirant du surréalisme et de l’ethnographie, elle met en lumière l’intersection entre divisions de classe, de race et de sexe. Le corps féminin devient dans ses dessins et photographies un territoire inconnu.

Fundamental differences between current and past knowledge in the field of biotechnology mean that we now have at our disposal the means to irreversibly change what is meant by ‘human nature’. This paper explores some of the ethical issues that accompany the attempt to increase scientific control over the human genetic code in what amounts to a diminishing of difference and the reduction of human life to scientific explanations at the expense of spiritual, cultural and communal considerations. Within such a (...) limited view, the critical role of education is reduced in favour of promoting psychological efficiency, with the possibility of accelerating learning and increasing intellectual capacity through genetic manipulation. A major concern expressed in the paper is the fine line between corrective therapy and psychological enhancement: Who should be defining the normal range of human difference? And what degree of caution should be required in redesigning future generations? The unknown dangers inherent in the application of genetic technology to human life suggests that current precautions may not go far enough in recognising that education is a contestable field. (shrink)

Comprised of classic and newly-commissioned papers from leading theorists, this volume provides a wide-ranging critical introduction to the thought of Jürgen Habermas. Some contributions explore the relation between Habermas's philosophy and the thought of major predecessors, including Kant, Hegel, Marx and Heidegger. Others elucidate the political context of Habermas's thinking, while a final section presents the responses of leading German contemporaries to his work. The result is a more rounded picture of Habermas's oeuvre and achievement than has previously been available. (...) Habermas emerges as a thinker whose outstanding powers of renewal and innovation are inseparable from his engagement with the major traditions of European thought, and his own intellectual and political context. (shrink)

In previous funding literature, ample attention has been devoted to the consequences of competition for project grants. These consequences tend to be fueled by status distinctions among grants, but scant attention has been directed toward how such distinctions are constructed. My aim with this paper is to develop new knowledge about the ways in which scientists ascribe meanings that construct status distinctions among grants. Employing qualitative data and a Bourdieu-inspired field perspective, I analyze how early-career scientists in Sweden attributed meanings (...) that constructed and distinguished the status of European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants (StGs) and Swedish Research Council (SRC) Reserve Grants (RGs), which were otherwise closely connected by common evaluation procedures and equivalent monetary amounts. My findings show how scientists – despite having received equivalent monetary amounts – ascribed starkly different meanings to ERC StGs and SRC RGs, building on perceptions of minimal, yet competition-grounded and expert-sanctioned, divisions introduced by panelists among top-graded applicants during the ERC’s evaluations. These divisions were amplified when scientists recast StGs as ‘prizes’ and RGs as ‘consolations’. Such recasting was largely unaltered by acknowledgments that ERC StGs generated much more administrative burdens and economic troubles than SRC RGs. Those burdens and troubles were approached by StG and RG recipients alike as the cost of status, and they believed universities adopted a similar approach. I use my findings to propose contributions, policy implications, and future inquiry avenues suggesting evaluation procedures may play a larger role than monetary amounts for the construction of status distinctions among grants. (shrink)

Brian Ribeiro’s slim volume presents a comparative study of three of the most important figures in the history of skepticism: Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne, and David Hume. Ribeiro’s rich text, like most of his work, is written in a colloquial, easy style that nearly masks the considerable erudition informing his thought. This text, in fact, gathers, synthesizes, and expands on the substantial work with which Ribeiro has been engaged for decades. Drawing from that precedent research, Ribeiro’s focus here is (...) the possible scope of skepticism, the implications of that scope for rationality, and the value skeptical philosophy promises. (Ribeiro makes clear that his objective is not to establish his reading as... (shrink)

In contrast to multicultural theory, which in discussions of respect for difference has primarily focussed on the state as the agent of respect, multicultural policy has instead tended to focus on citizens themselves as the potential agents of this sort of respect. This article examines the plausibility of this type of respect (which is advocated by some theorists too), and argues that is not a reasonable or necessary demand. While there are several different ways of understanding respect — most of (...) which focus on respecting persons — none seem capable of doing the work required for it to enable either the adequate or reasonable accommodation of diversity in a liberal society. More specifically, I use Darwall's influential distinction between appraisal and recognition respect — the latter in a broad non-moralised sense — to make my case. While appraisal respect for difference may be theoretically easy to dismiss, it is not uncommon in multicultural policy. On the other hand, recognition respect — which is more behavioural than attitudinal — may appear a more plausible candidate. Yet it too remains overly demanding for individual citizens, especially, and most importantly, in difficult cases. I conclude that tolerance of difference (coming out of respect for citizenship) is a more appropriate demand on the individual. (shrink)

In trying to make sense out of our behavior, we reach a point at which we stop talking about what we did and start talking about what we wish we had done, about what we mean to do next. But we think we are still talking about our motives and intentions in what we did. How do we know when we cross the line between finding out what actually happened and ascribing to a situation what we think ought to have (...) happened?This is a serious question, precisely because we usually do not know the difference between what we do and what we imagine that we do. For since all action is governed by our conception of “how we would have it” and “what we would bring about,” we can always honestly claim to have meant what we did for the best. We frequently find ourselves in the situation in which we don't know why we did what we did, but by casting about, we can always turn up a purpose for which our action must have been meant - a purpose which we now perceive.The reasons we ascribe to our actions, like our excuses, are governed by the demands made on us now, rather than by the factual content of what we did. Thus the behavior of reason-giving or excusing is meant to satisfy the social situation in which we presently find ourselves: the demand for explanation, the need to be “in the right,” the need to reinforce our convictions. The verbal account of what we did is thus literally about (as representing and serving) where we are now rather than what we did then.Our verbal account is about the context of social obligation in which we have to explain ourselves, not about the behavior we claim to interpret. This is why, proverbially, we will give any excuse which will satisfy the accuser and why “understanding” i.e. inventing reasons for our conduct, is no corrective. The addict, alcoholic, neurotic and criminal recidivist are frequently rational and even persuasive in giving reasons for what they do. And we wonder why if they understand their problems so well they can't do something about them. The problem is that the habitué doesn't understand his behavior at all. He is simply trained to give a certain after the fact explanation as a conditioned response to his habitual behavior. What he “understands” is not what makes him go back to the pill, the bottle or to crime, but what to tell people each time after he does. Naturally, when the habit-triggering occasion arises, it is never that reason - the stated one - which leads to repetition, but some new, special crisis, difficulty or impulse.Bluntly stated, our reasons and justifications have little or nothing to do with our actual behavior. We continue to suppose that we intend to do this or that immediately before we do it. But insofar as this intention is expressed it is a separate verbal act having its own conditions and consequences; insofar as it is unexpressed (and in general) intention is disclosed only through conduct. It is only the powerful social convention of justification that supports the illusion that verbal expressions are causal antecedents of acts.Two conclusions follow. First, the “sense” of our activity is either evident in the activity or else it is nonexistent, since not yet discovered meaning is meaning not yet achieved. Second, our verbal justifications are acts having a peculiar sense of their own. They express the relation of our convictions and objectives to the convictions and objectives of those to whom our explanations are addressed. Here is where, in the process of making sense of our activity, the crossover from discovery to invention occurs. This is why we may never discover the extent to which our justifications are inventions superimposed on the conduct they are supposed to represent. Insofar as our justification satisfies those to whom it is addressed, (including ourselves) it is right. But we take this rightness, which is actually the the compatibility of our values and objectives, to be the rightness of the act in question. The reasons we give for our actions make great sense, but despite our invincible “rightness” our actions, taken in themselves, make no more sense.What are our options? They are either to put ourselves in the power of those to whom we explain ourselves, or to take responsibility for our own nonsense. Take our conduct out of the medium of talk - of habitual justification - in which it is suspended and sustained, and what is it? Whatever has become of the “importance” of our appointments, our meetings, our appearances, our obligations, our consistency? Experience, not persuasion and reasoning, is the corrective. Only the direct experience of futility is powerful enough to break our addiction to justification. (shrink)

What is coercion? Not only is an answer to this question interesting in itself but it can also help us to better understand the nature of freedom of action. I start with a critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s conception of coercion and voluntary action. Despite several objections, it turns out that some of Frankfurt’s ideas and arguments can also be used in a different way and prove to be crucial for a more plausible conception of coercion and free action.

A discussion of the ethical problems posed by a form of social power which is directed at other persons' volitional attitudes.