A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows that the (...) theoretical arguments offered in support of Apperly’s account are nevertheless unconvincing, and that the data can be explained in other terms. A better view is that there is just a single mindreading system that exists throughout, but which undergoes gradual conceptual enrichment through infancy and childhood. This system can be used in ways that do, or do not, draw on executive resources and/or working memory. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of a theory of conscious emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences. In the standard versions of this view emotions are construed as, potentially, perceptual disclosures of values. The model has been widely debated and criticized. In this paper I reconstruct an early, qualified version of the perceptual model to be found in the classical phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Sartre. After outlining this version of the theory, I examine its (...) prospects against objections prominent in the current debate. (shrink)

This article examines the forces that have made federal scientific publication an essentially private enterprise. Particular attention is paid to the rise of the scientific community in the American political system. The period under review begins roughly with 1941 and American involvement in World War II, which coincides with the establishment of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (ORSD). The article examines OSRD's method of conducting federal scientific research, its contractual system, and the new publishing paradigm that it engendered. (...) The article concludes in the 1960s with congressional efforts to revise provisions in Title 17, the. (shrink)

Progress Unchained reinterprets the history of the idea of progress using parallels between evolutionary biology and changing views of human history. Early concepts of progress in both areas saw it as the ascent of a linear scale of development toward a final goal. The 'chain of being' defined a hierarchy of living things with humans at the head, while social thinkers interpreted history as a development toward a final paradise or utopia. Darwinism reconfigured biological progress as a 'tree of life' (...) with multiple lines of advance not necessarily leading to humans, each driven by the rare innovations that generate entirely new functions. Popular writers such as H. G. Wells used a similar model to depict human progress, with competing technological innovations producing ever-more rapid changes in society. Bowler shows that as the idea of progress has become open-ended and unpredictable, a variety of alternative futures have been imagined. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a novel version of the so-called Lucretian symmetry argument against the badness of death. Our argument has two features that make it particularly effective. First, it focuses on the preferences of rational agents. We believe the focus on preferences eliminates needless complications and emphasizes the urgency to respond to the argument. Second, our argument utilizes a principle that states that a rational agent's preferences should not vary in arbitrary ways. We argue that this principle underlies (...) our judgments of cognitive biases. We should therefore endorse the principle insofar as we think a cognitively biased agent fails to be rational. In the second half of the paper we survey potential ways to resist the new symmetry argument. We show that they all fail to meet the dialectical burden of our argument or involve highly controversial assumptions about the metaphysics of time or the limits of rational preferences. (shrink)

Protochemistry. The Program of a Methodical Foundation of Chemistry. "Protochemistry" - in analogy to protophysics - is sketched as the program of a methodical foundation of chemistry. "Foundation" means to reconstruct the methods (both linguistic and poietic) which lead from the prescientific every-day-practice of mastering properties of substances to scientific theories of modern chemistry. Four types of chemical terms are distinguished, depending on different methods of definition and different areas of reference. Consequences of the program if realized are pointed out.

images. But clearly, it only begs the deeper questions.

This book offers a discussion of practical as well as theoretical autonomy.

A good part of the early literature on deliberative democracy has focused on moral arguments for or against deliberative democracy. These arguments have typically been divided into instrumental and non‐instrumental arguments. More recently, there has been an epistemic turn in the literature on deliberative democracy. The main question under debate is no longer whether we have moral reasons to make our political decisions in deliberative democratic fashion, but whether or not we have epistemic reasons to do so. Epistemic arguments for (...) and against deliberative democracy can also be divided instrumental and non‐instrumental arguments. My chapter on the epistemology of deliberative democracy will give an overview over this new debate. (shrink)

Agricultural Enlightenment explores the economic underpinnings of the Enlightenment to argue the case that the expansion of the so-called knowledge economy in the second half of the eighteenth century powerfully influenced governments and all those who worked in agriculture, or who sought to derive profit from the productive use of the land.

The early modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities continues to have a significant impact on the debate about the nature of color. An aspect of this distinction that is still influential is the idea that the mind-independence of color requires that it is a primary quality. Thus, using shape as a paradigm example of a primary quality, a longstanding strategy for determining whether color is mind-independent is to consider whether it is sufficiently similar to shape to be a primary (...) quality. However, I’ll argue that the idea that the mind-independence of color requires that it is a primary quality is mistaken, and that, to the contrary, while color is not a primary quality, it is mind-independent. I’ll propose an alternative understanding of what the mind-independence of color requires. This alternative models color perception on an information filter. According to this model, mental qualities that I’ll call media qualities are involved in color perception. The involvement of mental qualities suggests mind-independence. However, I’ll argue, their involvement is modeled after the qualities of a kind of filter that provides access to, but does not constitute, filtered qualities. (shrink)

This book brings together the study of two great disciplines of the Islamic world: law and philosophy. In both sunni and shiite Islam, it became the norm for scholars to acquire a high level of expertise in the legal tradition. Thus some of the greatest names in the history of Aristotelianism were trained jurists, like Averroes, or commented on the status and nature of law, like al-Fārābī. While such authors sought to put law in its place relative to the philosophical (...) disciplines, others criticized philosophy from a legal viewpoint, like al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya. But this collection of papers does not only explore the relative standing of law and philosophy. It also looks at how philosophers, theologians, and jurists answered philosophical questions that arise from jurisprudence itself. What is the logical structure of a well-formed legal argument? What standard of certainty needs to be attained in passing down judgments, and how is that standard reached? What are the sources of valid legal judgment and what makes these sources authoritative? May a believer be excused on grounds of ignorance? Together the contributions provide an unprecedented demonstration of the close connections between philosophy and law in Islamic society, while also highlighting the philosophical interest of texts normally studied only by legal historians. (shrink)

This is a critique of Nietzsche's theory of culture that proposes an alternative paradigm allowing a defense of the humanities against such Nietzschians as Leo Strauss and Derrida.

This piece offers an edition, translation, and analysis of a newly discovered text by Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī, a leading Aristotelian of the Baghdad school in the tenth century. It briefly discusses what Aristotle meant, at the end of the Physics, by saying that the Prime Mover is “in” the outermost heaven. Ibn ʿAdī argues, in part through an exhaustive discussion of the senses of the word “in,” that God is in the sphere only in the sense that an object of (...) intellection is in an intellect. This solution is discussed against the background of ancient commentaries on the same passage. (shrink)

Immunofluorescent labelling demonstrates that human metaphase chromosomes contain hyperacetylated histone H4. With the exception of the inactive X chromosome in female cells, where the bulk of histone H4 is under‐acetylated, H4 hyperacetylation is non‐uniformly distributed along the chromosomes and clustered in cytologically resolvable chromatin domains that correspond, in general, with the R‐bands of conventional staining. The strongest immunolabelling is often found in T‐bands, the subset of intense R‐bands having the highest GC content. The majority of mapped genes also occurs in (...) R‐band regions, with the highest gene density in T‐bands. These observations are consistent with a model in which hyperacetylation of histone H4 marks the position of potentially active gene sequences on metaphase chromosomes. Since acetylation is maintained during mitosis, progeny cells receive an imprint of the histone H4 acetylation pattern that was present on the parental chromosomes before cell division. Histone acetylation could provide a mechanism for propagating cell memory, defined as the maintenance of committed states of gene expression through cell lineages. (shrink)

This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power (...) to influence the will and not just the behavior of other agents. In the last part of this paper we briefly discuss Steven Lukes’ alternative view of a “third dimension” of power and end with a sketch of a more promising way to account for this neglected form of power. (shrink)

Fundamental differences between current and past knowledge in the field of biotechnology mean that we now have at our disposal the means to irreversibly change what is meant by ‘human nature’. This paper explores some of the ethical issues that accompany the attempt to increase scientific control over the human genetic code in what amounts to a diminishing of difference and the reduction of human life to scientific explanations at the expense of spiritual, cultural and communal considerations. Within such a (...) limited view, the critical role of education is reduced in favour of promoting psychological efficiency, with the possibility of accelerating learning and increasing intellectual capacity through genetic manipulation. A major concern expressed in the paper is the fine line between corrective therapy and psychological enhancement: Who should be defining the normal range of human difference? And what degree of caution should be required in redesigning future generations? The unknown dangers inherent in the application of genetic technology to human life suggests that current precautions may not go far enough in recognising that education is a contestable field. (shrink)

Comprised of classic and newly-commissioned papers from leading theorists, this volume provides a wide-ranging critical introduction to the thought of Jürgen Habermas. Some contributions explore the relation between Habermas's philosophy and the thought of major predecessors, including Kant, Hegel, Marx and Heidegger. Others elucidate the political context of Habermas's thinking, while a final section presents the responses of leading German contemporaries to his work. The result is a more rounded picture of Habermas's oeuvre and achievement than has previously been available. (...) Habermas emerges as a thinker whose outstanding powers of renewal and innovation are inseparable from his engagement with the major traditions of European thought, and his own intellectual and political context. (shrink)

Few things can be more confusing, or confused, than the ancient reports about Empedocles' astronomy. Attempts in the modern literature at resolving the difficulties invariably either add to the confusion, or end by urging the need to ‘acknowledge the insufficiency of our data and suspend judgment’. In fact, as we will see, it is possible not only to reconstruct Empedocles' own ideas but also to retrace the history of their subsequent misunderstanding.

In previous funding literature, ample attention has been devoted to the consequences of competition for project grants. These consequences tend to be fueled by status distinctions among grants, but scant attention has been directed toward how such distinctions are constructed. My aim with this paper is to develop new knowledge about the ways in which scientists ascribe meanings that construct status distinctions among grants. Employing qualitative data and a Bourdieu-inspired field perspective, I analyze how early-career scientists in Sweden attributed meanings (...) that constructed and distinguished the status of European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants (StGs) and Swedish Research Council (SRC) Reserve Grants (RGs), which were otherwise closely connected by common evaluation procedures and equivalent monetary amounts. My findings show how scientists – despite having received equivalent monetary amounts – ascribed starkly different meanings to ERC StGs and SRC RGs, building on perceptions of minimal, yet competition-grounded and expert-sanctioned, divisions introduced by panelists among top-graded applicants during the ERC’s evaluations. These divisions were amplified when scientists recast StGs as ‘prizes’ and RGs as ‘consolations’. Such recasting was largely unaltered by acknowledgments that ERC StGs generated much more administrative burdens and economic troubles than SRC RGs. Those burdens and troubles were approached by StG and RG recipients alike as the cost of status, and they believed universities adopted a similar approach. I use my findings to propose contributions, policy implications, and future inquiry avenues suggesting evaluation procedures may play a larger role than monetary amounts for the construction of status distinctions among grants. (shrink)

This paper explores Nietzsche’s approach to the question of illness. It develops an account of Nietzsche’s ideas in the wake of Arthur W. Frank’s discussion of the shortcomings of modern medicine and narrative theory. Nietzsche’s approach to illness is then explored in the context of On the Genealogy of Morality and his conception of the human being as “the sick animal”. This account, it is argued, allows for Nietzsche to develop a conception of suffering that refuses to reduce it to (...) modernist restitutive conceptions of well-being. Instead, Nietzsche advocates a more nuanced conception of varying degrees of health. This, it is argued, can be developed into a model that allows for a more satisfying conception of the relation between medical practitioner and patient. (shrink)

Brian Ribeiro’s slim volume presents a comparative study of three of the most important figures in the history of skepticism: Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne, and David Hume. Ribeiro’s rich text, like most of his work, is written in a colloquial, easy style that nearly masks the considerable erudition informing his thought. This text, in fact, gathers, synthesizes, and expands on the substantial work with which Ribeiro has been engaged for decades. Drawing from that precedent research, Ribeiro’s focus here is (...) the possible scope of skepticism, the implications of that scope for rationality, and the value skeptical philosophy promises. (Ribeiro makes clear that his objective is not to establish his reading as... (shrink)

This paper argues that Badiou's and Lacan's theorizations of ethics offer a way to formulate an ethics of teaching and to explore what such an ethics might look like when teachers encounter events that disrupt their quotidian lives. Relying on the work of Badiou and Lacan, the paper critiques mainstream approaches to the ethics of teaching and sketches an alternative pedagogical ethics.

In contrast to multicultural theory, which in discussions of respect for difference has primarily focussed on the state as the agent of respect, multicultural policy has instead tended to focus on citizens themselves as the potential agents of this sort of respect. This article examines the plausibility of this type of respect (which is advocated by some theorists too), and argues that is not a reasonable or necessary demand. While there are several different ways of understanding respect — most of (...) which focus on respecting persons — none seem capable of doing the work required for it to enable either the adequate or reasonable accommodation of diversity in a liberal society. More specifically, I use Darwall's influential distinction between appraisal and recognition respect — the latter in a broad non-moralised sense — to make my case. While appraisal respect for difference may be theoretically easy to dismiss, it is not uncommon in multicultural policy. On the other hand, recognition respect — which is more behavioural than attitudinal — may appear a more plausible candidate. Yet it too remains overly demanding for individual citizens, especially, and most importantly, in difficult cases. I conclude that tolerance of difference (coming out of respect for citizenship) is a more appropriate demand on the individual. (shrink)

In trying to make sense out of our behavior, we reach a point at which we stop talking about what we did and start talking about what we wish we had done, about what we mean to do next. But we think we are still talking about our motives and intentions in what we did. How do we know when we cross the line between finding out what actually happened and ascribing to a situation what we think ought to have (...) happened?This is a serious question, precisely because we usually do not know the difference between what we do and what we imagine that we do. For since all action is governed by our conception of “how we would have it” and “what we would bring about,” we can always honestly claim to have meant what we did for the best. We frequently find ourselves in the situation in which we don't know why we did what we did, but by casting about, we can always turn up a purpose for which our action must have been meant - a purpose which we now perceive.The reasons we ascribe to our actions, like our excuses, are governed by the demands made on us now, rather than by the factual content of what we did. Thus the behavior of reason-giving or excusing is meant to satisfy the social situation in which we presently find ourselves: the demand for explanation, the need to be “in the right,” the need to reinforce our convictions. The verbal account of what we did is thus literally about (as representing and serving) where we are now rather than what we did then.Our verbal account is about the context of social obligation in which we have to explain ourselves, not about the behavior we claim to interpret. This is why, proverbially, we will give any excuse which will satisfy the accuser and why “understanding” i.e. inventing reasons for our conduct, is no corrective. The addict, alcoholic, neurotic and criminal recidivist are frequently rational and even persuasive in giving reasons for what they do. And we wonder why if they understand their problems so well they can't do something about them. The problem is that the habitué doesn't understand his behavior at all. He is simply trained to give a certain after the fact explanation as a conditioned response to his habitual behavior. What he “understands” is not what makes him go back to the pill, the bottle or to crime, but what to tell people each time after he does. Naturally, when the habit-triggering occasion arises, it is never that reason - the stated one - which leads to repetition, but some new, special crisis, difficulty or impulse.Bluntly stated, our reasons and justifications have little or nothing to do with our actual behavior. We continue to suppose that we intend to do this or that immediately before we do it. But insofar as this intention is expressed it is a separate verbal act having its own conditions and consequences; insofar as it is unexpressed (and in general) intention is disclosed only through conduct. It is only the powerful social convention of justification that supports the illusion that verbal expressions are causal antecedents of acts.Two conclusions follow. First, the “sense” of our activity is either evident in the activity or else it is nonexistent, since not yet discovered meaning is meaning not yet achieved. Second, our verbal justifications are acts having a peculiar sense of their own. They express the relation of our convictions and objectives to the convictions and objectives of those to whom our explanations are addressed. Here is where, in the process of making sense of our activity, the crossover from discovery to invention occurs. This is why we may never discover the extent to which our justifications are inventions superimposed on the conduct they are supposed to represent. Insofar as our justification satisfies those to whom it is addressed, (including ourselves) it is right. But we take this rightness, which is actually the the compatibility of our values and objectives, to be the rightness of the act in question. The reasons we give for our actions make great sense, but despite our invincible “rightness” our actions, taken in themselves, make no more sense.What are our options? They are either to put ourselves in the power of those to whom we explain ourselves, or to take responsibility for our own nonsense. Take our conduct out of the medium of talk - of habitual justification - in which it is suspended and sustained, and what is it? Whatever has become of the “importance” of our appointments, our meetings, our appearances, our obligations, our consistency? Experience, not persuasion and reasoning, is the corrective. Only the direct experience of futility is powerful enough to break our addiction to justification. (shrink)

A discussion of the ethical problems posed by a form of social power which is directed at other persons' volitional attitudes.

Coleman states that social phenomena cannot be directly accounted for by their social antecedents without analyzing three intervening steps: what motives the antecedents create, how these affect individual behavior, and the transition from the acts of interdependent individuals to social phenomena. The last is most important. I agree, but Foundations has its causal link upside down. Reanalyzing some of his cases, I try to show that macrostructures are not the product of microfoundations but the existential conditions that circumscribe individuals’ choices.

Taking as a point of departure three basic assumptions in Henri Bergson – that consciousness forms part of a pragmatic and of a refl exive circuit; that the formation of bodily habits and of contents of consciousness has an irreducible morphogenetical duration; that a basic asymmetry subsists between the given and the non-given, between knowledge and non-knowledge – some consequences of this asymmetry are sketched out: that learning is rythmical, that knowledge and ability are stratified, that the creative process is (...) of central pedagogical importance, that ideas of utility are unable to providea motivation for learning. The difference between linguistic and mathematical understanding is then outlined. From the irreducible morphogenetical duration, the maxims ‘as early and as much as possible’ are deduced, as well as the notion that curricula cannot aim entirely at applicability. Finally a notion of pedagogical seduction is presented, as well as a “founding aporia” for pedagogy: between problematization and automatization, seduction and interest, knowledge and ability. (shrink)