In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke’s investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being “constituted” by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France—especially the “phenomenology of the event” as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano—contributes to this Continental (...) discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger’s existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time. More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein’s relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger’s conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney’s conception of “eventful selfhood” in which he “completes” Heidegger’s conception of selfhood by describing Dasein’s openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events. Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano’s even more radical conception of the “happening subjectivity”, which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the “underlying thing” in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events? (shrink)

As is well known, Deleuze reproaches Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and other classical phenomenologists for having burdened their descriptions of experience with structures derived from the empirical (in which the world is differentiated into objects of consciousness). His transcendental empiricism, by contrast, investigates the very genesis of the empirical within the immediate flow of an asubjective transcendental field. However, both Deleuze in his texts and Deleuzian literature dealing with his relationship with phenomenology almost completely ignore contemporary French phenomenology focusing, similarly to (...) Deleuze, on the dynamic or eventful dimension of reality. This article examines some of the intersections between contemporary phenomenology in France (Maldiney, Richir, Marion) and Deleuze’s metaphysics with regard to the question common both to phenomenology and Deleuze: that of the crisis of humanity, especially with regard to its social aspect. The article’s main thesis is that the only possible solution to the crisis is an ethics of events, which includes a description of the deepest existential basis of social bonds, that is, the ‘common presence’ or ‘transcendental interfacticity’. (shrink)

While correctly emphasizing that the idea of theological inspiration in phenomenology and vice versa might be very fecund, the current discussion on the theological turn does not always affirm that Janicaud was simply wrong as regards the characterization of new French phenomenology. This is why it is necessary to create a more balanced image of the discussions on the theological turn and contemporary phenomenology. The paper achieves this aim 1) by demonstrating that there was no theological turn in French phenomenology; (...) 2) by analysing the true nature of the turn taking place in phenomenology. It concludes by affirming that contemporary French phenomenology—freed from the label “theological turn”—is a living branch of philosophy capable of contributing to the solution of some of the burning issues of today’s world, such as ecological crisis. (shrink)

Eco-phenomenology is a young branch of contemporary phenomenology and environmental ethics that attempts to put aside all preconceptions burdening the relationship between humans and nature, to describe it purely on the basis of how it appears phenomenologically, and to draw ethical implications that could contribute to solving the ecological crisis. Authors inspired by Levinas’ ethics play an important role in this project, asking whether it could be extended to non-human beings. The article addresses two of them in particular: it shows (...) how Ch. Diehm – who sees the core of Levinas’ ethics in sensitivity to the suffering of the vulnerable body – succeeded in comparison to his predecessor S. Benso and her ethics of things, but also marks the limits of his attempt, thus indicating what remains a challenge for Levinas-inspired eco-phenomenology in the future. (shrink)

This article embodies the result of a collective work that seeks to understand the manner in which the notion of conflict is transformed by the attempt to apply it to reality, according to the doctrines hereby comprise as “ontologies of conflict”. It seems that there are three resulting “logics of conflict” which may receive the following qualifications: logic of contradiction, logic of contrariety and logic of difference.

The paradox of the Anthropocene is that humankind has become the planetary superpower, and yet faces an unprecedented ecological crisis as well as other forces that it is not capable of controlling. The solution is not to be found in putting faith in technological innovations that do not yet exist, but in a completely new attitude of humanity towards itself and all non-human beings and entities: posthumanism. Nature in fact speaks with more voices than only human ones, and humans have (...) always and are still able to listen to these other voices. However, according to ecophenomenologist David Abram, this listening is becoming increasingly difficult, for these voices are being drowned out by the purely human logic of abstract thought and scientific-technical society. The article focuses on the meaning of Abram’s ideas from the point of view of posthumanism and ecophenomenology as such. By means of this, it tries to demonstrate in what lies the import of phenomenology when it is applied to one of the greatest challenges of our time and why it should go still further in this regard than did Abram. (shrink)