Several well-known theodicies, whatever their merits, seem to make little sense of animal suffering. Here we argue that the problem of animal suffering has more layers than has generally been acknowledged in the literature and thus poses an even greater challenge to traditional Judeo-Christian Theism than is normally thought. However, the Neo-Cartesian (NC) defence would succeed in defanging this Expanded Problem of Animal Suffering. Several contemporary philosophers have suggested that recent evidence either supports the NC view or at least should (...) decrease our incredulity with respect to it. We discuss new evidence that undermines the NC position and thus reassert the gravity of the Expanded Problem. (shrink)

Animal suffering seems to undermine several well-known traditional theistic responses to the problem(s) of evil, such as the appeal to the Fall of Humanity or to human free will. The soul-making theodicy is also inapplicable to non-human animals, if it should turn out that they do not have souls capable of being improved by suffering. Recently, however, it has been suggested by Trent Dougherty that when the soul-making theodicy is combined with the Adams-Chisholm notion of the defeat of evil and (...) other hypotheses regarding the animal afterlife, such a theodicy can overcome the challenge posed by animal suffering. We highlight problems for this strategy, showing that it ultimately keeps the fundamental reason for suffering obscure and requires the addition of several auxiliary hypotheses, thus offering no epistemic improvement over generic Skeptical Theism. We also consider the strategy in the light of a newer argument known as the Expanded Problem of Animal Suffering (EPAS), showing that this puts additional strain on Dougherty’s theodicy. (shrink)

Several influential philosophers and scientists have advanced a framework, often called Neo-Cartesianism (NC), according to which animal suffering is merely apparent. Drawing upon contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind, Neo-Cartesians challenge the mainstream position we shall call Evolutionary Continuity (EC), the view that humans are on a nonhierarchical continuum with other species and are thus not likely to be unique in consciously experiencing negative pain affect. We argue that some Neo-Cartesians have misconstrued the underlying science or tendentiously appropriated controversial views (...) in the philosophy of mind. We discuss recent evidence that undermines the simple neuroanatomical structure-function correlation thesis that undergirds many Neo-Cartesian arguments, has an important bearing on the recent controversy over pain in fish, and places the underlying epistemology framing the debate between NC and EC in a new light that strengthens the EC position. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that contemporary (...) cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway. (shrink)