Quine has moved toward "naturalism" in philosophy, which I applaud; at the same time his work has touched off a new round of pseudo-problems in philosophy, which I lament. I read the pseudo-problems as evidence that the shift toward naturalism has not been thorough-going enough. In this paper I undertake an extended discussion of sane of the problems and prospects of a thorough-going shift to a naturalistic viewpoint in philosophy, making frequent reference to Quine’s work. I suggest, in particular, that (...) the notions of truth and reference, so central to Quine’s views, are not likely to survive as theoretically central notions within the kind of theory of language and thought which a more perfect naturalism foresees and works toward. (shrink)

In a recent series of articles, and in his latest book, James Cornman has proposed and defended a definition of ‘observation term’. The original definition appeared in [3]; in [4] Cornman defended this definition against some criticisms offered by P. K. Machamer, and also revised it somewhat; the revised definition is restated in [2] and used there in Cornman's discussion of the identity theory of the mind. Finally, in [1], Cornman again invokes his definition in defending scientific instrumentalism, and defends (...) it against various generalized attacks on the very possibility of drawing a distinction between observational and theoretical terms which will do the sort of work Cornman wants it to do. (shrink)

Professor Plantinga's “scandalous” conclusion thatIf my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latterrests in part on the twin claims that the best reason we have for belief in other minds is the analogical argument, and the best reason we have for belief in God is the teleological argument. The conclusion also rests on Plantinga's analyses of these two arguments, which show that both fail for (...) very similar reasons. Thus the beliefs based on these arguments are “in the same epistemological boat,“ and Plantinga draws his conclusion. This is, as James Tomberlin says, “an ingenious argument for the conclusion that belief in God is justified in the absence of any good reason whatever.“In this paper I wish to consider the two claims mentioned above, that the best reasons we have for belief in other minds and belief in God are the analogical and teleological arguments, respectively. (shrink)