A treaty to regulate the global antimicrobial commons can be appropriately framed around the model provided by multilateral environmental agreements. At the same time, it is not clear that a comprehensive treaty is the only possible entry point and other options, such as an agreement on technology transfer or funding may be apt starting points. Any legal instrument adopted to regulate the global antimicrobial commons needs to reflect the global South-North dichotomy and integrate the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (...) and respective capabilities. Further, it would need to go beyond environmental instruments that have been structured around the sovereign interests of negotiating states even when dealing with issues of global concern, such as climate change. The proposed legal instrument would also need to be based not just on the precautionary principle as a marker of the necessity to address the negative environmental and health impacts, but also be based on the interests of patients and integrate concerns raised in terms of the human right to health. (shrink)

Avec un titre comme Luther et la philosophie, depuis le xviiie siècle et dans les milieux « libéraux » du xixe siècle, on aurait pu s’attendre à un exposé, bien sûr complet, de la philosophie du Réformateur. On trouve l’expression, par exemple, dans les tables analytiques de L’Encyclopédie, à l’entrée « luthéranisme ». Bien que Philippe Büttgen se soit donné comme objet, pour d’autres travaux, « la confessionnalisation de la philosophie ..

Qu'attendre des chercheurs en sciences sociales? Qu'ils fassent tout bonnement leur métier ou qu'à partir de leurs analyses ils s'impliquent dans les problèmes qui relèvent de leur compétence ou même qu'à partir de leur position de chercheur ils prennent publiquement position sur les grandes questions du jour? Ces alternatives sont loin d'épuiser le champ des possibles, mais les énoncer invite à s'interroger sur les rapports qu'entretiennent les travaux de recherche en sciences sociales avec les pratiques sociales qu'elles étudient. Ces questions (...) n'étaient pas étrangères à Philippe Lucas - et c'est peu dire. Elles sont aussi à l'origine de ce livre. Président de l'université Lumière-Lyon II avant d'être nommé recteur de l'Académie de Bordeaux puis de l'Académie de Caen, Philippe Lucas fut aussi et d'abord un chercheur qui concevait son travail de recherche comme un engagement. Sa " sociologie impliquée " supposait la confrontation des points de vue et le débat non seulement après coup, une fois le travail terminé, mais avant tout dès les premières investigations et tout au long de la recherche. Quel meilleur hommage rendre à Philippe Lucas que de reprendre aujourd'hui ces questions qui furent les siennes? Il les avait posées à sa manière mais leur actualité nous frappe, leur importance aussi. Ceux qui ont contribué à cet ouvrage collectif ont tenté d'y répondre et d'abord de les reformuler en proposant tantôt leur témoignage tantôt leurs réflexions de chercheurs sur l'implication et l'engagement : leur propre implication et celle de leurs disciplines, leur propre engagement et celui de leurs disciplines. (shrink)

The question of how inequality is generated and how it reproduces over time has been a major concern for social scientists for more than a century. Yet the relationship between inequality and the process of economic development is far from being well understood. These Raffaele Mattioli Lectures have brought together two of the world's leading economists, Professors Philippe Aghion and Jeffrey Williamson, to question the conventional wisdom on inequality and growth, and address its inability to explain recent economic experience. (...) Professor Aghion assesses the affects of inequality on growth, and asks whether inequality matters: if so why is excessive inequality bad for growth, and is it possible to reconcile aggregate findings with macroeconomic theories of incentives? In the second part Jeffrey Williamson discusses the Kuznets hypothesis, and focuses on the causes of the rise of wage and income inequality in developed economies. (shrink)

There are two main approaches to the problem of donkey anaphora (e.g. If John owns a donkey , he beats it ). Proponents of dynamic approaches take the pronoun to be a logical variable, but they revise the semantics of quantifiers so as to allow them to bind variables that are not within their syntactic scope. Older dynamic approaches took this measure to apply solely to existential quantifiers; recent dynamic approaches have extended it to all quantifiers. By contrast, proponents of (...) E-type analyses take the pronoun to have the semantics of a definite description (with it ≈ the donkey, or the donkey that John owns ). While competing accounts make very different claims about the patterns of coindexation that are found in the syntax, these are not morphologically realized in spoken languages. But they are in sign language, namely through locus assignment and pointing. We make two main claims on the basis of ASL and LSF data. First, sign language data favor dynamic over E-type theories: in those cases in which the two approaches make conflicting predictions about possible patterns of coindexation, dynamic analyses are at an advantage. Second, among dynamic theories, sign language data favor recent ones because the very same formal mechanism is used irrespective of the indefinite or non-indefinite nature of the antecedent. Going beyond this debate, we argue that dynamic theories should allow pronouns to be bound across negative expressions, as long as the pronoun is presupposed to have a non-empty denotation. Finally, an appendix displays and explains subtle differences between overt sign language pronouns and all other pronouns in examples involving ‘disjunctive antecedents’, and suggests that counterparts of sign language loci might be found in spoken language. (shrink)

When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed (...) as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life. (shrink)

Zum 65. Geburtstag des Kolner und Brusseler Agyptologie-Professors Philippe Derchain gratulierten ihm seine Freunde Kollegen und Schuler mit 33 Beitragen aus dem Gebiet der Religions- und Geistesgeschichte des Alten Agyptens: H. Altenmuller, J. Baines, E. Blumenthal, W. Boochs, M. Broze, Fr. de Cenival, W. Decker, M. Derchain-Urtel, E. Doetsch-Amberger, E. Graefe, J.Gw. Griffiths, M. Heerma van Oss, W. Helck, M. Herb, J.M. Kruchten, D. Kurth, Fr. Labrique, A. Loprieno, M. Malaise, D. Meeks, H. De Meulenaere, J. Quaegebeur, B. Radomska, (...) U. Rossler-Kohler, H.J. Thissen, CL. Traunecker, U. Verhoeven, P. Vernus, M. Weber, W. Westendorf, W. Wettengel, E. Winter, J. Zandree (+). Ein Schriftenverzeichnis Philippe Derchains und diverse Indices beschliessen den Band. (shrink)

Philippe Stern, qui fut conservateur en chef du Musée Guimet à Paris, est surtout connu comme historien des arts de l'Inde et de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Il a sinon créé, du moins perfectionné la méthode qui consiste à suivre l'évolution, à travers la vie d'un art, de motifs spécialement choisis pour en découvrir la chronologie jusque-là inconnue. Il a fait de cette méthode un outil sûr qui a permis en particulier de redresser la chronologie erronée de l'art khmer, d'établir (...) la chronologie de l'art cham de l'Annam ancien, de préciser la chronologie des temples hypogées de l'Inde classique et celles des nombreuses fondations du dernier grand roi khmer, Jayavarman VII. Mais cet archéologue, cet historien, ce conservateur de Musée fut surtout un amant du beau, préoccupé par la nature et le rôle profond de l'expérience esthétique. Ainsi mûrit lentement à travers toute une existence une oeuvre dont Beauté-Clef (Peter Lang, 1989) est un premier volet et dont voici le second volet. (shrink)

This paper argues that besides mechanistic explanations, there is a kind of explanation that relies upon “topological” properties of systems in order to derive the explanandum as a consequence, and which does not consider mechanisms or causal processes. I first investigate topological explanations in the case of ecological research on the stability of ecosystems. Then I contrast them with mechanistic explanations, thereby distinguishing the kind of realization they involve from the realization relations entailed by mechanistic explanations, and explain how both (...) kinds of explanations may be articulated in practice. The second section, expanding on the case of ecological stability, considers the phenomenon of robustness at all levels of the biological hierarchy in order to show that topological explanations are indeed pervasive there. Reasons are suggested for this, in which “neutral network” explanations are singled out as a form of topological explanation that spans across many levels. Finally, I appeal to the distinction of explanatory regimes to cast light on a controversy in philosophy of biology, the issue of contingence in evolution, which is shown to essentially involve issues about realization. (shrink)

Polysemous concepts with multiple related meanings pervade natural languages, yet some philosophers argue that we should eliminate them to avoid miscommunication and pointless debates in scientific discourse. This paper defends the legitimacy of polysemous concepts in science against this eliminativist challenge. My approach analyses such concepts as patchworks with multiple scale-dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-targeting uses (patches). I demonstrate the generality of my approach by applying it to "hardness" in materials science, "homology" in evolutionary biology, "gold" in chemistry and "cortical (...) column" in neuroscience. Such patchwork concepts are legitimate if the techniques used to apply them produce reliable results, the domains to which they are applied are homogenous, and the properties they refer to are significant to describe, classify or explain the behavior of entities in the extension of the concept. By following these normative constraints, researchers can avoid miscommunication and pointless debates without having to eliminate polysemous patchwork concepts in scientific discourse. (shrink)

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox asa normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so (...) much with therationality of choicesas with therationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists inletting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today. (shrink)

The Pareto principle states that if the members of society express the same preference judgment between two options, this judgment is compelling for society. A building block of normative economics and social choice theory, and often borrowed by contemporary political philosophy, the principle has rarely been subjected to philosophical criticism. The paper objects to it on the ground that it indifferently applies to those cases in which the individuals agree on both their expressed preferences and their reasons for entertaining them, (...) and those cases in which they agree on their expressed preferences, while differing on their reasons. The latter are cases of "spurious unanimity", and it is normatively inappropriate, or so the paper argues, to defend unanimity preservation at the social level for them, so the Pareto principle is formulated much too broadly. The objection seems especially powerful when the principle is applied in an ex ante context of uncertainty, in which individuals can disagree on both their probabilities and utilities, and nonetheless agree on their preferences over prospects. (shrink)

We have entered a new long-term war regime. This regime is multiform, and deployed on two mutually interpenetrating fronts: one internal, the other external. The military and the forces of a law and order » cooperate with each other to face a supposed common enemy: international terrorism, both actual and potential. If, in this war regime, the American government occupies a leadership position, several other governments are engaged at the sane level, France and Russia amongst them. This state of affairs (...) cannot be reduced to a simple model of American imperialism. This article argues that the principal cause is at once the deepest and largest: it reflects the fear of globality, of the subversive emergence of a humanity at once globalised and mixed, which in multiple ways, shifts future prospects: shaking up dominations, confronting the big, global problems, without playing the game of conflicts of force and territory. It is this, fear which, whilst it motivates those promoting this new regime, also poses to us, a real challenge: that of expressing, more than they can suppress, the virtualities of this globality. (shrink)

: In the 1980s, the analysis of presupposition projection contributed to a ‘dynamic turn’ in semantics: the classical notion of meanings as truth conditions was replaced with a dynamic notion of meanings as Context Change Potentials. We argue that this move was misguided, and we offer an alternative in which presupposition projection follows from the combination of a fully classical semantics and a new pragmatic principle, which we call Be Articulate. This principle requires that a meaning pp’ conceptualized as involving (...) a pre-condition p should be articulated as … … rather than as … pp’ …, unless the full conjunction is ruled out because the first or the second conjunct is semantically idle. In particular, … … is infelicitous - and hence … pp’ … is acceptable - if one can determine as soon as p and is uttered that no matter how the sentence ends these words could be eliminated without affecting its contextual meaning. An equivalence theorem guarantees that this condition suffices to derive Heim’s results in almost all cases. Extensions of the condition lead to several new predictions, in particular concerning some ‘symmetric readings’, as well as presupposition projection in quantified structures, which displays a complex interaction between the nature of the trigger and the monotonicity of the quantifier. (shrink)

Sedufidelity—the contraction of seduction and fidelity—offers an interesting perspective for reflecting on the role of relationships and the ethics of care in highly technical healthcare settings. Understanding sedufidelity could help mitigate the observed social ruptures and promote a more humane approach to healthcare. However, challenges remain regarding its implementation, particularly in terms of building trust and loyalty towards management and healthcare policymakers. Furthermore, initiatives such as the ‘haie de déshonneur’ (‘hedge of dishonour’) can highlight the need and form of recognition (...) sought by caregivers, given their strong symbolism. However, other actions can also be considered to strengthen relationships and attention paid to caregivers, such as a prior consultation. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "La guerre peut-elle être juste? Peut-elle s'affubler d'un qualificatif juste sans injustice? Les récits cosmogoniques sont la merveilleuse monstration que les hommes se sont toujours fait la guerre. L'attitude belliqueuse de certains souverains et les atrocités des champs de bataille ont amené des analystes à définir des critères stricts pour limiter la souffrance humaine. Désormais, tout Etat qui n'observerait pas scrupuleusement les linéaments de cet édit risque d'être déclaré Hostis humani generis. Dans sa conception (...) traditionnelle in stricto sensu, la théorie de la guerre dite juste comporte, d'une part, le jus ad bellum (droit à la guerre) ou droit de faire la guerre et, d'autre part, le jus in bello qui règlemente la conduite de la guerre. Qu'en est-il de l'après-guerre et du jus post bellum? Cet ouvrage, importante contribution au débat sur la théorie de la guerre juste, répond justement à ce questionnement.". (shrink)

Il est courant de rappeler que l’Union européenne a un défaut d’intelligibilité et que sa forme politique demeure hésitante. Les catégories les plus prégnantes demeurent issues de la théorie de l’État et imposent une alternative insatisfaisante entre confédération d’États souverains et État fédéral. Afin d’y échapper, certains auteurs suggèrent de penser l’UE à partir du paradigme cosmopolitique. Le propos de cet article est de souligner l’intérêt mais aussi les contradictions du modèle cosmopolitique appliqué à l’UE en raison de l’essentielle finitude (...) du projet européen. Nous suggérons de chercher plus loin la spécificité formelle de l’UE, telle qu’elle se présente concrètement et réellement. Il apparaît alors que le schème de la construction remplace celui de la fondation, que la parité entre les deux ordres juridiques se substitue à l’exclusivité de la souveraineté et que les principes finissent par faire place aux valeurs. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences justify. When I look at the black laptop in front of me and my perceptual experience presents me with a black laptop placed on my desk, my perceptual experience has justificatory force with respect to the proposition that there is black laptop on the desk. The present paper addresses the question of why perceptual experiences are a source of immediate justification: What gives them their justificatory force? I shall argue that the most plausible and the most straightforward answer (...) to this question consists in what I call the phenomenological conception of perceptual justification. Perceptual experiences justify by virtue of their distinctive presentive phenomenology. This is a truly internalist conception that enjoys significant advantages over rival conceptions. In the course of his paper, I demonstrate the advantages of the phenomenological conception and defend it against a recent objection. (shrink)

Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimised—not excluded—in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scientific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed (...) by proponents of the VLT, it proposes four prerequisites which any model for values in the acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry should respect, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: (1) the truth of scientific knowledge must be ensured; (2) the uncertainties associated with scientific claims must be stated clearly; (3) claims accepted into the scientific corpus must be distinguished from claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of (4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from international institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Betz’s conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) and Hansson’s corpus model (ensuring the truth of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) is proposed. Additional prerequisites are finally suggested for future research, stemming from the requirement for philosophy of science to self-reflect on its own values: (5) any model for values in science must be descriptively and normatively relevant; and (6) its consequences must be thoroughly assessed. (shrink)

According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow’s and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

In 1981, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel received the Nobel Prize for their research on cortical columns—vertical bands of neurons with similar functional properties. This success led to the view that “cortical column” refers to the basic building block of the mammalian neocortex. Since the 1990s, however, critics questioned this building block picture of “cortical column” and debated whether this concept is useless and should be replaced with successor concepts. This paper inquires which experimental results after 1981 challenged the building (...) block picture and whether these challenges warrant the elimination “cortical column” from neuroscientific discourse. I argue that the proliferation of experimental techniques led to a patchwork of locally adapted uses of the column concept. Each use refers to a different kind of cortical structure, rather than a neocortical building block. Once we acknowledge this diverse-kinds picture of “cortical column”, the elimination of column concept becomes unnecessary. Rather, I suggest that “cortical column” has reached conceptual retirement: although it cannot be used to identify a neocortical building block, column research is still useful as a guide and cautionary tale for ongoing research. At the same time, neuroscientists should search for alternative concepts when studying the functional architecture of the neocortex. keywords: Cortical column, conceptual development, history of neuroscience, patchwork, eliminativism, conceptual retirement. (shrink)

The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show why the extensional models (...) offers no credible ground for positing such a difference. (shrink)

Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.

This paper concerns Aristotle's kind‐crossing prohibition. My aim is twofold. I argue that the traditional accounts of the prohibition are subject to serious internal difficulties and should be questioned. According to these accounts, Aristotle's prohibition is based on the individuation of scientific disciplines and the general kind that a discipline is about, and it says that scientific demonstrations must not cross from one discipline, and corresponding kind, to another. I propose a very different account of the prohibition. The prohibition is (...) based on Aristotle's scientific and metaphysical essentialism, according to which a scientific demonstration must take as its starting point a set of per se properties of a subject, if these make up a single, unitary definition. The subject of demonstration here is a kind, although not the general kind associated with a discipline, but rather the particular kind that the particular demonstration is about. (shrink)

Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative (...) principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed to initiate scientific change. (shrink)

Qu'ont de commun Pascal et la peinture de La Tour? La théologie de Thomas d'Aquin et les fresques de Fra Angelico? La philosophie de Schelling et la musique de Liszt? La pensée de Diderot et les toiles de Fragonard, ou encore la phénoménologie de Maldiney et les sculptures de Giacometti? Et si œuvres d'art et œuvres philosophiques, dans leurs façons d'être au monde, tissaient de profondes correspondances, souvent même à l'insu de leur créateur? C'est la thèse de Philippe Grosos (...) qui revisite ici les grandes œuvres de la pensée humaine et les plus belles productions de l'art pour en dévoiler les liens les plus intimes et les intuitions communes. De telles correspondances, qui entendent mettre en évidence des gestes communs à l'élaboration de leurs œuvres, supposent alors que ce que nous nommons esthétique a bien davantage à voir avec l'existence qu'avec la seule œuvre d'art ou le jugement de goût. (shrink)

Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such as: “For every metal (...) there is a melting point.” All-and-some statements are both universally and existentially quantified in that order. Watkins argued that AS should be regarded as both nonfalsifiable and nonverifiable, for they partake in the logical fate of both universal and existential statements. This claim is subject to the proviso that the bound variables are “uncircumscribed” ; i.e., that the universe of discourse is infinite. (shrink)

Reports on beliefs, desires, and other attitudes continue to raise foundational questions about linguistic meaning and the pragmatics of utterance interpretation. There is a strong intuition that an attitude report like ‘John believes that Mary smokes’ can simply convey the singular proposition that the individual Mary is believed by John to have the property of smoking. Yet, there is also a strong intuition that ‘Lois believes that Superman can fly’ can additionally convey how an individual is represented . Cases of (...) this sort can be generated with any name in a suitable context . It is far from settled how this should be explained. I propose the Open Instruction Theory , according to which the linguistic meaning of attitude report sentences consists in instructions to create mental models, where those instructions leave open, depending on the state of the discourse, the possibility of singular interpretations as well as of complex interpretations including information about ways of representing. The account makes precise the idea that attitude report sentences with proper names are semantically nonspecific , rather than indexical , yielding predictions about syntactic constraints on interpretation. On this view, linguistic meaning itself does not provide determinate propositions. Since Gricean pragmatics requires determinate propositions as input, I propose new principles of pragmatics for literal utterance interpretation that do not require them but remain strongly constrained by linguistic meaning. The core principle is “inference to the most responsive interpretation.” Roughly, among the range of literal interpretations allowed by linguistic meaning, the listener generates the one that most fully answers the background question she seeks to answer by engaging in discourse. The pragmatics of literal utterance interpretation is the pragmatics of interpreting potential answers, even if communicative intention may be more important for conversational implicature. The account predicts cases in which our interpretations differ from what we would take the speaker to have had in mind. Singular interpretations of attitude reports have a special status as default interpretations. I suggest some advantages of OIT over indexicalist, DRT, and free enrichment theories. I argue that to the extent that we have to go beyond a strict principle of linguistic constraint , we should aim toward a principle of psychological constraint. (shrink)

Biographie de B. Lévy, évoquant son parcours, de son adhésion au projet révolutionnaire à son retour à la tradition juive après avoir été le secrétaire de J.-P. Sartre.

The focus of this paper are the ethical, legal and social challenges for ensuring the responsible use of “big brain data”—the recording, collection and analysis of individuals’ brain data on a large scale with clinical and consumer-directed neurotechnological devices. First, I highlight the benefits of big data and machine learning analytics in neuroscience for basic and translational research. Then, I describe some of the technological, social and psychological barriers for securing brain data from unwarranted access. In this context, I then (...) examine ways in which safeguards at the hardware and software level, as well as increasing “data literacy” in society, may enhance the security of neurotechnological devices and protect the privacy of personal brain data. Regarding ethical and legal ramifications of big brain data, I first discuss effects on the autonomy, the sense of agency and authenticity, as well as the self that may result from the interaction between users and intelligent, particularly closed-loop, neurotechnological devices. I then discuss the impact of the “datafication” in basic and clinical neuroscience research on the just distribution of resources and access to these transformative technologies. In the legal realm, I examine possible legal consequences that arises from the increasing abilities to decode brain states and their corresponding subjective phenomenological experiences on the hitherto inaccessible privacy of these information. Finally, I discuss the implications of big brain data for national and international regulatory policies and models of good data governance. (shrink)

Public announcement logic is an extension of multiagent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after any announcement: after which , does it hold that Kφ? We give various semantic results and show completeness for a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic. There is a natural generalization to a logic for arbitrary events.