Are widely used measurements in the human sciences (say happiness surveys or depression scales) quantitative or merely ordinal? If they are merely ordinal, could they be developed into quantitative measurements, just like in the progression from thermoscopes to thermometers? Taking inspiration from recent philosophy of measurement, some practitioners express optimism about future human science measurements. The so-called quantity objection stands out for having the only chance of settling the debate in favour of the pessimists. It claims that the problem lies (...) not with current, or likely future, measurement practices in the human sciences, but with human science attributes themselves—they just are not quantitative, but merely ordinal. Hence, they cannot not (thus will not) be measured quantitatively. The argument has a long and distinguished pedigree. This paper assesses old and recent versions of it, namely: the objection made originally to Fechner’s psychophysics by von Kries (among others) and Michell’s recent version of this objection. To do so, the paper first draws important distinctions between different versions of the argument that have been overlooked. Then, it argues that none of the versions of the quantity objection provide a good reason for the optimists to give up their optimism. In particular, Michell’s argument characterizes the measurand (that is, the attribute to be measured) in a way that optimists do not and need not accept. Yet the optimists’ defence articulated here brings with it serious burdens to discharge. The ball is in their court. (shrink)

Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in making average comparisons even if their measurements are not linear.

While practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: practitioners’ strong preference for randomized studies can be defended in some cases, while still offering a nuanced (...) approach to evidence-appraisal, one where not all non-randomized studies are treated equally. (shrink)

Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)— of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action-guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal-theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces (...) remains even under the aims/means distinction, because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested. (shrink)

There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s ([1946]) theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically limits the research that the social and biomedical sciences can conduct. I provide a Bayesian analysis of (...) this inferential problem, determining when measurements from ordinal scales can be used to confirm hypotheses about relative group averages. The prohibition, I conclude, cannot be upheld, even in a qualified sense. The beliefs needed to make average comparisons are less demanding than those appropriate for quantitative scales. I illustrate with the alleged paradigm ordinal scale, Mohs’ scale of mineral hardness, arguing that the literature has mischaracterized it. (shrink)

There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval distinction as too coarse grained and thus the received view as too restrictive of a framework for measurement research.

Measurement practices are central to most sciences. In the human sciences, however, it remains controversial whether the measurement of human attributes—depression, happiness, intelligence, etc.—has been successful. Are, say, widely used depression questionnaires valid measuring instruments? Can we trust self-reported happiness scales to deliver quantitative measurements as it is sometimes claimed? These and related questions are till today hotly disputed. There are two main frameworks under which human measurements are studied and criticized. One is the so-called construct validity framework. Here, criticisms (...) to human measurements are typically of the form “this instrument is not valid: it does not actually measure the attribute we set out to measure”. The second framework is the standard typology of measurement scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio). Human measurements are commonly challenged for being merely ordinal—not quantitative: interval or ratio—despite the fact that many researchers use measurement results as if they were quantitative. The first part of the dissertation studies how adequate these frameworks are for evaluating measuring instruments and the inferences they afford. Regarding the concept of validity, it is commonly understood unconditionally, that is, without restricting validity judgments about measuring instruments to context-specific situations. Instruments are said to be (in)valid simpliciter. In Chapter 2, I argue against this conception of validity and in favor of a contextual one. Regarding the second main framework, the standard typology of scales is typically linked to a set of prescriptions regarding (un)justified measurement inferences. I call this classification-cum-prescriptions the “received view” on measurement scales. In chapters 3 and 4, I question the idea that the received view is an impeccable guide for clarifying the kinds of inferences we are licensed to make from measurement results in human science contexts. I motivate general doubts about the adequacy of the received view in Chapter 3, and I articulate these doubts in detail for the specific case of average group comparisons in Chapter 4. The upshot of this first part of the dissertation is a deeper awareness of the complexity surrounding which inferences can legitimately be made from measuring instruments. The first part of the dissertation is largely framed under the assumption that some human attributes are indeed quantitative, even if they are not currently being measured quantitatively. The second part addresses two important issues raised by that assumption. Chapter 5 tackles the so-called “quantity objection”: that human science attributes are themselves not quantitative, thus they cannot be quantitatively measured. This objection has been deployed to argue against optimistic positions regarding human quantification. I argue that the quantity objection is not successful in this sense—it begs the question to these optimistic human scientists that, just like their colleagues in the physical sciences have done, postulate theoretical quantitative attributes as working hypotheses. But what does treating human attributes quantitatively as working hypotheses amount to? And what are, or can be, “amounts” of depression, happiness, etc.? Chapter 6 argues that there is not one but various approaches for quantitatively conceiving of human attributes, each with its own success conditions. This chapter offers a conceptual framework for making progress on debates about controversial human measurements. (shrink)

What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics and research context. In this paper, I cast doubt (...) on the possibility of a context-independent causal account of validity (what I call unconditional validity). I assess several versions, arguing that all of them fail to judge the validity of measuring instruments correctly. Because different research purposes require different properties from measuring instruments, no account of validity succeeds without referring to the specific research purpose that creates the need for measurement in the first place. (shrink)

Die voranschreitenden Forschungen zum Nachlass Hans Blumenbergs zeichnen ein immer scharferes Bild eines Denkers, der sowohl umfangreiche Arbeiten zur Geistes- und Technikgeschichte vorlegte als auch das offentliche Denken beeinflusst hat - unter anderem durch Prasenz im Radio und regelmassige Beitrage zum Feuilleton von FAZ und NZZ. Der Sammelband wird durch ein bisher unveroffentlichtes Forschungsmanuskript Hans Blumenbergs aus dem Themenbereich der Technikphilosophie abgerundet, das fur den Band transkribiert und kommentiert wurde. Mit Beitragen von Hans Blumenberg (aus dem Nachlass), Alberto Fragio, Andrew (...) Hines, Sandra Markewitz, Marco Mauerer, Angus Nicholls, Martina Philippi, Josefa Ros Velasco, Nicola Zambon und Rudiger Zill. (shrink)

Romantic love is associated with mind wandering about the beloved. We tested associations between mind wandering about the beloved and infatuation, attachment, self-reported distraction, task performance, and enjoyment. Participants who were in love completed self-report measures and a sustained attention response task with thought probes. Participants reported thinking about their beloved for 67% of the time in general and up to 42% of the time during task performance. Thinking about the beloved in general was positively associated with infatuation (passionate love) (...) but not with attachment (companionate love). The more time participants reported thinking about their beloved in general, the more distracting they found it and the less they could withhold a response to no go stimuli. The more participants thought about their beloved during the task, the slower their responses to go stimuli were. In contrast to the negative terminology typically used to describe frequent thoughts about the beloved, such as intrusive or obsessive thinking, participants overwhelmingly enjoyed thinking about their beloved. The findings suggest that romantic love impairs cognitive task performance because people are thinking about their beloved instead, which may negatively impact performance at school and work. Nevertheless, people seem to greatly enjoy thinking about their beloved. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper contrasts the research strategies of two women reformers, Florence Kelley and Ellen Swallow Richards, which entailed different strategies of social reform. In the early 1890s, social activist Florence Kelley used the social survey as a weapon for legal reform of the working conditions of women and children in Chicago’s sweatshop system. Kelley’s case shows that her surveys were most effective as “grounded” knowledge, rooted in a local community with which she was well acquainted. Her social survey, re-enacted by (...) lawmakers and the press, provided the evidence that moved her target audience to legal action. Chemist and propagator of the Home Economics Movement Ellen Richards situated the social problem, and hence its solution, not in exploitative working conditions, but in the inefficient and wasteful usage of available resources by the poor. Laboratory work, she argued, would enable the development of optimal standards, and educational programs should bring these standards to the household by means of models and exhibits. With this aim, she constructed public spaces that she ran as food laboratories and sanitary experiments. Kelley and Richards thus crossed the doorsteps of the household in very different ways. While Florence Kelley entered the household to change the living and working conditions of the poor by changing the law, Richards flipped the household inside out by bringing women into hybrid public laboratory spaces to change their behavior by experiment and instruction. (shrink)

Seit Cyriacus von Ancona haben Reisende, die durch die Gegend von Philippi kamen, dort Inschriften abgeschrieben. Mitte des 19. Jh. begann die systematische Erforschung der Ruinen, die im 20. Jh. zu französischen und griechischen Grabungen führte. Seitdem sind knapp 700 Inschriften gefunden worden, eine Gesamtpublikation ist jedoch bisher unterblieben. Nun hat es der Neutestamentler P(ilhofer) im Rahmen einer Arbeit zur Sozialgeschichte der frühchristlichen Gemeinde (P. P., Philippi I: Die erste christliche Gemeinde Europas, Tübingen 1995) unternommen, die Inschriften der (...) Region Philippi von der archaischen bis in die frühbyzantinische Zeit (zuzüglich der mittelbyzantinischen Inschriften Nr. 115a und Nr. 162) in einem Katalog vorzulegen. Dafür, daß er sich dieser Mühe unterzogen hat, gebührt ihm lebhafter Dank. Dies um so mehr, als er sich, soweit es ihm möglich war, darum bemüht hat, Lesungen am Stein zu überprüfen. (shrink)

It is a critical study of Philippa Foot’s conception of natural normativity set forth in her recent book Natural Goodness. The book is essentially devoted to two main subjects. The first one consists of presentation of a new, naturalistic and objectivistic, metaethical standpoint. When viewed from this standpoint, evaluations of characteristics and operations of all living things share the same structure. In virtue of that structure, goodness or badness ascribed to an individual organism are determined by the relation of that (...) individual to its life form. The second significant theme of Natural Goodness deals with the relationship between morality and practical rationality. Goodness of an act is a necessary condition of that act being practically rational. The author’s general assessment of Ph. Foot’s book is rather negative. Her argument seems to lack methodological order, coherence and intellectual clarity. The very conception of natural normativity seems to contain a lot of fundamental flaws. It precludes, e.g. the possibility that any living thing could be evaluated as bad. (shrink)

The Roman Marble Sculptures from the Sanctuary of Pan at Caesarea Philippi/Panias. By Elise A. Friedland. American Schools of Oriental Research Archaeological Reports, vol. 17. Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, 2012. Pp. xiii + 186, illus. $89.95. [Distributed by ISD, Bristol, Conn.].

L’article exploite l’occasion rare d’étudier ensemble une statue et la construction où elle était présentée et mise en valeur. Les fragments de la statue comme de son baldaquin ont été trouvés ensemble lors de la fouille de 1931. Le baldaquin consiste en un petit édicule corinthien à deux colonnes, ouvert en façade et sur les côtés, accolé au mur Sud de la curie. La légèreté de sa construction comparée à la massivité de la statue exécutée d’un seul bloc, implique qu’il (...) a été construit autour de la statue, après sa mise en place et son achèvement. La statue assise de Fortuna se présentait de face, tournée vers l’espace qui tenait lieu de basilique civile au forum. L’emplacement où elle se trouve lui donne ainsi tout son sens. L’ensemble a été mis en place au moment des grands travaux de la deuxième phase architecturale du forum, dans le troisième quart du iie s. p.C., et détruit par le séisme qui a gravement affecté les bâtiments du forum vers le début du vie s. (shrink)

Toward the beginning of one of her notebooks, Simone Weil interrupts a dense series of reflections on war, force and prestige to write, in parentheses: “(To think on God, to love God, is nothing else than a certain way of thinking on the world.)” In some respects, this one sentence is a crystallization of everything Weil wrote about God. The thought of God is somehow inseparable from a new mode of attention to and valuation of things “here below”; that is, (...) from “a certain way of thinking.” In the discussion that follows I reflect on how this “certain way of thinking” might be understood, in dialogue with a few exemplary moments from Derrida’s late work, Martin Hägglund’s reading of Derrida, as well as some biblical scholarship on Philippians 2: 5-11, and a number of richly suggestive comments from Weil’s notebooks. I show that the conceptual aporias that, on Derrida’s account, reliably emerge from ethical reflection are inchoately affirmed by Weil and (a certain reading of) the Philippi hymn. More than this, I will suggest that when read in this way, the latter allows for a new interrogation of the role that the experience of conceptual aporia may play in metanoia, the changing of mind. (shrink)

Alberto Fragio, Martina Philippi und Josefa Ros Velasco (Hrsg.), Metaphorologie, Anthropologie, Phänomenologie. Neue Forschungen zum Nachlass Hans Blumenbergs, Freiburg u. a.: Karl Alber 2019.

The following paper argues that issues in paradigmatic proposals for solving the new demarcation problem stem from absolutist assumptions about judgments of value legitimacy. Both the problem of uninformativeness (Larroulet Philippi 2020; Fernandez-Pinto 2014, 2015) and the problem of ambiguous judgments of cases (Hicks 2014; Intemann 2017) are explained by an absolutist pretension contained in one of the main aims of these proposals: providing criteria for differentiating legitimate from illegitimate uses of values, without qualification. After presenting the problems and (...) showing how they stem from that common source, we will sketch a way forward, inspired mainly by Joseph Rouse’s Beyond Epistemic Sovereignty (1996), advancing routes that can allow philosophers of science to evade these pitfalls and engage with scientific practice in a more salutary manner. (shrink)