A new approach to the historiography of the history of philosophy was first proposed near the end of the eighteenth century. It is useful to regard it as an alternative to two others, sometimes conceived of as exhausting the possibilities: a purely philosophical approach, and a purely historical one, both of which I consider in section I. The bulk of the paper is devoted to what I call "the modern historiography of the history of philosophy" . Its origins are (...) closely tied to the renewal of philology. Section III recounts the methodological innovations of the New Philology and their relevance for approaching texts--including philosophical ones--from the past. In section IV, I consider some moves made by early proponents of "modern historiography"--in particular their implicit demand for an internal rather than an external history of philosophy, that is, an account that allows us to understand how and why philosophy has changed through time, in terms of philosophical factors: how, for example, one set of philosophical considerations led to a certain view; how reflecting on that view led philosophers to perceive various difficulties, and to perceive philosophical responses to those difficulties, and so on. The goal is to exclude, to as great an extent as possible, external factors, that is, factors which are not themselves philosophical views or arguments. In section V, I turn to Christian A. Brandis whose methodological reflections and historiographical practice mark an enormous advance over his predecessors and even over some of his successors, like W. Jaeger. I conclude by arguing that some "philosophical" objections brought against the way of proceeding advocated by Brandis fail. In the course of describing this new approach and its origins, I hope also to make clear why it is more attractive than the two other possibilities briefly considered in section I. (shrink)

This book investigates how, from the seventeenth century onward, philosophers, philologists and historians described various world "cultures", colonized the past (or national pasts), and thus invented Europe's philosophical nature. In the recent past, critical discussions concerning notions such as "cultural area" and "area studies", as well as their relativizations by means of conceptions that avoid splitting clearly identified areas (inter alia, "third space", "hybridity", "diaspora", or "cosmopolitism"), drew attention to the long history of cultural territorialization. This book attempts to open (...) the history of philosophy to reflexive and globalizing tendencies elaborated in the field of "world history". From the seventeenth century onward, in both modern Europe and North America, historical sciences - notably philosophical historiography and cultural history - colonized both the past (or national pasts) and the "rest" of the world. The contributions gathered in the present volume address both phenomena to the extent that they have been linked with modern historicization of philosophy, sciences, and culture. (shrink)

This chapter addresses major tendencies in the history of academic French historiographies of philosophy, from the establishment of history of philosophy as a university discipline in the early nineteenth century to feminist critiques of the philosophical canon in the twentieth century. Focusing on the ways in which the philosophical character of the history of philosophy has been conceptualised, it argues that the history of the historiography of philosophy in France is marked in two ways by the intellectual legacy of Victor (...) Cousin. At the level of canon-formation, this history has involved continuity and reproduction of those authors and texts which Cousin regarded as central to the history of philosophy. At the level of theoretical accounts of the relation between the practice and the past of philosophy, this history has involved discontinuity and the contestation of the spiritualist eclectic framework within which Cousin himself accounted for this relation. With feminist historiographies of philosophy, the theory-constitutive function of the canon itself comes into question, thus opening a new field of inquiry as to what should be counted as properly ‘philosophical’. (shrink)

This paper outlines the case for a future research program that uses the tools of experimental cognitive science to investigate questions that traditionally fall under the remit of the philosophy of historiography. The central idea is this – the epistemic profile of historians’ representations of the past is largely an empirical matter, determined in no small part by the cognitive processes that produce these representations. However, as the philosophy of historiography is not presently equipped to investigate such cognitive questions, legitimate (...) concerns about evidential quality go largely overlooked. The case of mental state representation provides an excellent illustration of this. Representations of past mental states – the thoughts and fears and knowledge and desires of past agents – play much the same evidential role in historiography as in everyday life, serving in the causal explanation of agents’ behaviors and supporting normative evaluation of those behaviors. However, we have good reason to suspect that the theory of mind processes that support these representations may be more susceptible to error when deployed in the context of historiography than under everyday conditions. This raises worries about the quality of evidence that theory of mind can provide historiography, worries which require experimental cognitive science to properly address. (shrink)

Alan J. Holland. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Philosophy, its history and historiography. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference; v. 1983) ...

By way of essays and a selection of primary sources in parallel text, Biography, Historiography, and Modes of Philosophizing provides an introduction to a vast, significant, but neglected corpus of early modern literature: collective biography. It focuses especially on the various related strands of political, philosophical, and intellectual and cultural biography as well as on the intersection between biography, historiography, and philosophy. Individual texts from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century are presented as examples of how the ancient collective (...) biographical tradition--as represented above all by Plutarch, Suetonius, Diogenes Laertius, and Jerome--was received and transformed in the Renaissance and beyond in accordance with the needs of humanism, religious controversy, politics, and the development of modern philosophy and science"--Provided by publisehr. (shrink)

It is tempting to dismiss the first half of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. At first blush, it would not seem to be essential to Dewey’s foremost concern to provide a naturalized account of knowing that avoids the hoary philosophical dualisms of body/mind, thing/person, material/ideal, and practical/theoretical. The load-bearing chapters would seem to be in the latter philosophical half in which he takes on the task of developing a positive account rather than the early historical...

Building on Bernard Williams’ thesis about the intertwining of history and political philosophy, the essay explores how the problem of the history of dēmokratia after the late-eighteenth and over the nineteenth-century in Britain constituted a primary and critical field in which the philosophical meaning of democracy was debated. Configuring a new temporal perspective grounded in the relationship between ancient and modern democracy, historiographical works by John Gillies, William Mitford, and George Grote put forth an understanding of the concept as (...) a battlefield, involving several conflicting meanings, narratives and historical forces. This historiographical tradition highlighted the tensions underpinning the definition of democracy in the long-term temporal frame linking antiquity and modernity. So even more than contemporary philosophical and political writings, historical understanding constituted a unique concept of democracy that both concentrated and dispersed meaning; it was not just one vision of democracy, among others, but one that acquired the paradoxical power to forge some semantic stability and coherence over time, and to accentuate the threat of the concept’s break up into distinct political premises and historical moments that constituted it. (shrink)

This volume continues this discussion with particular reference to medieval philosophy.Inglis shows that the modern historiography of medieval philosophy had ...

Well-known for its criticism of totalizing accounts of reason and truth, postmodern thought also makes positive contributions to our understanding of the sensual, ideological, and linguistic contingencies that inform modernist representations of self, history, and the world. The positive side of postmodernity includes structuralism and poststructuralism, particularly as expressed by theorists concerned with practices of the body (Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze), commodity differences (Adorno, Althusser), language (Derrida), and gender (Kristeva, Irigaray). Though these challenges to modernity do not privilege subjectivity, they suggest (...) provocative new strategies for appreciating the work of thinkers from Bacon to Kant. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In his 1981–82 lectures The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault claims that a significant portion of the modern historiography of ancient philosophy tends to discredit the ethical framework of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). The thematic analysis of knowledge in the historiography of ancient philosophy overshadows the theme of care of the self. Taking Foucault’s claim as a point of departure, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper provides a genealogy of the early (...) Hellenistic Academy, from Polemo to Arcesilaus. Second, the paper demonstrates that for Arcesilaus, the alleged pioneer of what modern historiography has designated the Academy’s epistemological scepticism, philosophy is not restricted to a continual search for knowledge at a theoretically rarefied level of challenging arguments or discursive statements. This paper situates Arcesilaus’ opposition to early Stoic epistemology within the framework of Academic epimeleia heautou, and defends the thesis that under Arcesilaus the Hellenistic Academy undergoes a shift in the practice of care of the self. (shrink)

The sixteen essays in this volume confront the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and its history. On the one hand intellectual historians commonly accuse philosophers of writing bad - anachronistic - history of philosophy, and on the other, philosophers have accused intellectual historians of writing bad - antiquarian - history of philosophy. The essays here address this controversy and ask what purpose the history of philosophy should serve. Part I contains more purely theoretical and methodological discussion, of such (...) questions as whether there are 'timeless' philosophical problems, whether the issues of one epoch are commensurable with those of another, and what style is appropriate to the historiography of the subject. The essays in Part II consider a number of case-histories. They present important revisionist scholarship and original contributions on topics drawn from ancient, early modern and more recent philosophy. All the essays have been specially commissioned, and the contributors include many of the leading figures in the field. The volume as a whole will be of vital interest to everyone concerned with the study of philosophy and of its history. (shrink)

20世纪初是德语世界正式出版关于中国哲学史著作的起点。1909—1924年之间德语世界出版了若干关于中国哲学史的论文和专著，通过调查作者们的教育背景和研究成果，以及其代表作的写作背景、内容框架及其影响 ，可以勾勒出这一时期德语学界中国哲学研究的概况。从分析当时德语学界对中国哲学的认识范围和中国哲学史框架构建的一般情况，可以看出欧洲对中国哲学和哲学史研究的一些核心问题所在。前现代中国哲学史在德语地区接 纳和传播的过程与方式，这一至今德国与中国学界尚未涉足的空白领域，值得研究并填补。[The beginning of the twentieth century was the starting point for the production of works on the history of Chinese philosophy in the German-speaking world. Between 1909 and 1924, a number of essays and monographs on the history of Chinese philosophy were published in the German-speaking contexts, and by investigating the educational backgrounds and research results of the authors, as well as the backgrounds of the authors, the frameworks for presenting the content, and the influence of these works, an overview (...) of the study of Chinese philosophy in in the German language during that period can be outlined. By analyzing the scope of knowledge of Chinese philosophy and the general construction of the framework for the history of Chinese philosophy in German-speaking academia at that time, it is possible to discern some of the core issues at stake in the study of Chinese philosophy and the history of philosophy in Europe. The process and manner of the reception and dissemination of the history of pre-modern Chinese philosophy in the German-speaking region, a field that has not yet been addressed sufficiently by German and Chinese academics, deserves to be studied and completed.]. (shrink)

This paper examines the formation of the philosophical canon in the period immediately after Kant. After a general introduction to the “historiography of philosophy,” it brings together three strands of contemporary scholarship in this area: a historical criticism of the empiricism/rationalism distinction that is often still used to understand early modern philosophy (Vanzo), histories of the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy in the late eighteenth century (O’Neill), and histories of the exclusion of non-European philosophy (Park). Though (...) these scholars have different agendas, their studies share many conclusions, including the key claim that the little-known Kantian historian of philosophy Wilhelm Tennemann is the central figure in the formation of the standard story. The paper closes by comparing the main outline of Tennemann’s surprisingly familiar narrative of the history of philosophy with the standard text from before the Kantian revolution in the historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.Many chapters articulate new, detailed methods of doing history of philosophy. These present conflicting visions of the history of philosophy as an autonomous sub-discipline of professional philosophy. Several other chapters offer new approaches to integrating history into one's philosophy by re-telling the history of recent philosophy. A number (...) of chapters explore the relationship between history of philosophy and history of science.Among the topics discussed and debated in the volume are: the status of the principle of charity; the nature of reading texts; the role of historiography within the history of philosophy; the nature of establishing proper context. (shrink)

In the 19th century, the history of philosophy becomes the history of a particular science. Modern philosophical historiography is an ambivalent project. On the one hand, we find an affirmative concept of Bildung through tradition and historical insight; on the other, there arises a critical reflection on historical education in the light of an emerging critique of modern culture. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the debate.

This article seeks to combine two lines of thought that have been little studied: a model history of early modern historiography, and a theory of the impact of historiography on a political society. Under the former heading, it traces the growth of a narrative of European history as a series of sequels to the Roman empire, and a history of historiography as passing from classical narrative to antiquarian study and Enlightened philosophy. Under the latter, it considers the effect on (...) political life of being narrated in a plurality of contexts, and asks whether a modern society can survive if deprived of the capacity for debating its history. (shrink)

In the mid-seventeenth century a movement of self-styled experimental philosophers emerged in Britain. Originating in the discipline of natural philosophy amongst Fellows of the fledgling Royal Society of London, it soon spread to medicine and by the eighteenth century had impacted moral and political philosophy and even aesthetics. Early modern experimental philosophers gave epistemic priority to observation and experiment over theorising and speculation. They decried the use of hypotheses and system-building without recourse to experiment and, in some quarters, developed (...) a philosophy of experiment. The movement spread to the Netherlands and France in the early eighteenth century and later impacted Germany. Its important role in early modern philosophy was subsequently eclipsed by the widespread adoption of the Kantian historiography of modern philosophy, which emphasised the distinction between rationalism and empiricism and had no place for the historical phenomenon of early modern experimental philosophy. The re-emergence of interest in early modern experimental philosophy roughly coincided with the development of contemporary x-phi and there are some important similarities between the two. (shrink)

This article argues that we can improve the way we teach early modern political philosophy if we introduce students to alternative views about the development of the state. First, it summarizes the work of contemporary philosophers and historians who are critical of the modern state. Second, it points out ways in which early social contract theorists take the state for granted. Third, it argues that alternative views about the development of the state can help students take a more (...) critical perspective on standard works of early modern political philosophy. Fourth, it argues that these alternative views will help students better understand dissenting voices in early modern political philosophy. (shrink)

This Encyclopedia offers a fresh, integrated and creative perspective on the formation and foundations of philosophy and science in European modernity. Combining careful contextual reconstruction with arguments from traditional philosophy, the book examines methodological dimensions, breaks down traditional oppositions such as rationalism vs. empiricism, calls attention to gender issues, to ‘insiders and outsiders’, minor figures in philosophy, and underground movements, among many other topics. In addition, and in line with important recent transformations in the fields of history of science and (...) early modern philosophy, the volume recognizes the specificity and significance of early modern science and discusses important developments including issues of historiography (such as historical epistemology), the interplay between the material culture and modes of knowledge, expert knowledge and craft knowledge. This book stands at the crossroads of different disciplines and combines their approaches – particularly the history of science, the history of philosophy, contemporary philosophy of science, and intellectual and cultural history. It brings together over 100 philosophers, historians of science, historians of mathematics, and medicine offering a comprehensive view of early modern philosophy and the sciences. It combines and discusses recent results from two very active fields: early modern philosophy and the history of (early modern) science. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that Thales was (...) the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

The volume is a collection of papers on certain aspects of Indian history, historiography and culture. The papers are fundamental, insightful and path-breaking to some extent. Combining literary, archaeological, scientific and other perspectives, they cover a range of subjects stretching from ancient to modern India. The volume deals with the Greek historians, the Indian epic and Puranic tradition of historiography, colonial and cultural expansion of the Aryans, the early history of north-west India, society, trade and commerce in ancient India, (...) economic, political and cultural contacts of India with other parts of Asia in ancient and medieval periods, and the 1857 War of Independence in India. It takes up some very interesting and new subjects like role of Brahmanas in the anti-Alexander movement in north-west India and the concept of national integration in ancient India. It explores the sources of history of Uttar Pradesh and the antiquity of Ayodhya and historicity of Rama in an interesting study. The volume will be of immense use to historians and scholars of philosophy. (shrink)

Although Bernard Lonergan is known primarily for his cognitional theory and theological methodology, he long sought to formulate a modern philosophy of history free of progressive and Marxist biases. Yet he never addressed this in any single work, and his reflections on the subject are scattered in various writings. In this pioneering work, Thomas McPartland shows how Lonergan’s overall philosophical position offers a fresh and comprehensive basis for considering historiography. Taking Lonergan’s philosophy of historical existence into the realm of (...) an epistemological philosophy of history, he demonstrates how the philosopher’s approach builds on the actual performance of historians and, as a result, integrates the insights of historical specialists into a framework of functional complementarity. McPartland draws on all of Lonergan’s philosophical writing—as well as on the vast literature of historiography—to detail Lonergan’s notions of historical method, historical objectivity, and historical knowledge. Along the way, he explains what Lonergan means by hermeneutics; by historical description, explanation, ideal-types, and narrative; by evaluative and dialectical analyses; and how these elements are all functionally related to each other. He also delineates the defining features of psychohistory, cultural history, intellectual history, history of ideas, and history of philosophy, indicating how these disciplines play complementary roles in the critical encounter with the past. Ultimately, McPartland argues that Lonergan has established the principles of a historical discipline—the history of consciousness—that weaves together a philosophy of consciousness with rigorous historical research to grasp long-term trends resulting from “differentiations of consciousness.” His work offers a distinct perspective on historical method that takes historical objectivity seriously while providing new insight into the thought of this important philosopher. (shrink)

The distinction between ancient and modern modes of historical thought is characterized by the growing complexity of the discipline of history in modernity. Consequently, the epistemological and methodological standard of ancient historiography is typically held as inferior against the modern ideal. This book serves to address this apparent deficit. Its scope is three-fold. Firstly, it aims at encountering ancient modes of historical and historiographical thought within the province of their own horizon. Secondly, this book considers the possibility of (...) a dialogue between ancient and modern philosophies of history concerning the influence of ancient historical thought on the development of modern philosophy of history and the utility of modern philosophy of history in the interpretation of ancient historiography. Thirdly, this book explores the continuities and discontinuities in historical method and thought from antiquity to modernity. Ultimately, this volume demonstrates the necessity of re-evaluating our assumptions about the relation of ancient and modern historical thought and lays the groundwork for a more fruitful dialogue in the future. (shrink)

This book focuses on the emergence and development of philosophical historiography as a university discipline in the 18th and 19th centuries. During that period historians of philosophy evaluated medieval philosophical theories through the lenses of modern leitmotifs and assigned to medieval thinkers positions within an imaginary map of cultural identities based on the juxtaposition of 'self' and 'other'. Some medieval philosophers were regarded as 'forerunners' who had constructively paved the way for modern rationality; whereas others, viewed as 'outsiders', (...) had contributed to the same effect by way of their struggle against established forms of philosophy. The contributions gathered in this volume each deal with the creative reception of a particular figure in modern history of philosophy. From the 9th century, with al-Farabi, to the 16th century, these philosophers belong to four historical worlds which have been characterized by European cultural history or have defined themselves as such: the (Jewish-)Arabic world (al-Farabi, Avicenna, Maimonides), Latin scholasticism (Roger Bacon, Henry of Ghent, William of Ockham, Marsilius of Padua), medieval lay philosophy (Ramon Lull, Petrarch), and Humanism in a broader sense (Nicholas of Cusa, Petrus Ramus, Andrea Cesalpino). (shrink)

Où en est l'étude de la philosophie arabe? Ce livre propose un état des lieux. Il s'agit de dresser un premier bilan des travaux menés dans ce vaste champ. On examine l'historiographie, les dénominations employées; on s'interroge sur les thématiques, les objets retenus et les méthodes d'analyse mises en oeuvre ; on y présente aussi des études sur des auteurs, des traditions ou des concepts, qui montrent comment le travail progresse, quelles tensions perdurent, quelles sont les perspectives."--Page 4 of cover.

Change in the human past, studied by historians, includes changes in philosophy's past, which can be explained by causes, motives and reasons. In the case of philosophy, must explanatory antecedents of change always be philosophical? Should philosophers ever treat non-philosophical reasons as belonging to the history of philosophy? Saying ‘never’ is absolutely internalist, while ‘sometimes’ rejects this absolutely internalist rule. To show that ‘sometimes’ is the better answer, I examine two case histories from the early modern period: these cases, (...) framed by a taxonomy of historical narrative, eliminate absolute internalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 217 [Access article in PDF] Bogoljub Sijakovic. Bibliographica Praesocratica: A Bibliographical Guide to the Studies of Early Greek Philosophy in its Religious and Scientific Contexts with an Introductory Bibliography on the Historiography of Philosophy. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001. Pp. 700. Cloth, €18,00. Professor Sijakovic has given us an invaluable reference work for the Presocratics and for early Greek thought generally: (...) a bibliography of 17,664 entries covering the period 1450-2000. It has some advantages over its principal predecessor, Paquet et al., Les Présocratiques: Bibliographie Analytique (Montreal and Paris, 1988-95), which covers work up to 1980. Sijakovic includes more recent material and aims at complete coverage of works in the Slavic languages and Modern Greek. He does not cover the Sophists, but does include works on topics that extend more widely than the Presocratics. Unlike Paquet, Sijakovic does not provide summaries of articles nor does he list reviews of books, unless they have interest in their own right, or include translations of works into other modern languages. He provides indexes of subjects, Greek terms, proper names, and authors.The ambition of the work is revealed by the subject headings other than those on familiar Presocratic thinkers and the issues they treated. The bibliography begins with a long section on Historiography and Philosophy of the History of Philosophy (with 932 entries) and concludes with one on Presocratics in the Intellectual Tradition (590) from before Plato to the present, with subsections on figures such as Francis Bacon (5), Nietzsche (74), Heidegger (56), and Popper (6). Other sections are labelled Theories of Myth (550), Greek Mythmaking and Religion (667), Orpheus and Orphism (642), Homer (154), Hesiod (147), Theogonies, Greek and Oriental (159), From Myth to Philosophy (365), Mathematics (137), Medicine (86), and Hippocrates of Cos (199). It is here that ambition leads to weakness, since the section on Homer, for example, is obviously not a complete bibliography of Homeric studies, and yet it is not restricted to works on Homer that bear on "presocratic" topics. The absence of an explanatory preface to these sections leaves the principles of selection mysterious and decreases their usefulness.Another feature that limits the value of the book is the arrangement within sections. This is generally chronological, but not always. The irregularities are so pervasive that the cause must be due to some unannounced division into unlabelled subsections, and the result is that we must read through more entries than we should have to. Two other minor complaints: the language of the book is English (aside from the trilingual prefatory material), but there are mistakes of usage and grammar which a copyreader should have caught; and there are occasional unexplained words at the end of entries, frequently in a different type-face, that are not part of the bibliographical entry.I do not mean to detract from the great service Professor Sijakovic has done (seemingly laboring alone over many years) for all who work in the area of early Greek thought—and principally, he notes in a preface, written as NATO was bombing his country, scholars from Western Europe and the United States. We are deeply indebted to him. The book has replaced Paquet as my primary bibliographical resource on the Presocratics. Richard McKirahan Pomona College... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy by John InglisMark D. JordanJohn Inglis. Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, volume 81. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998. Pp. x + 324. Cloth, $99.50.Modern philosophers have shown themselves quite unphilosophical about the academic history of their own discipline. Content with grand stories that move from Plato to (...) themselves, they have treated institutional histories, recent histories, and bibliographical histories as unworthy of attention. John Inglis sets out to change all that for the study of medieval philosophy. He demonstrates by the book’s end that we have failed to recognize our historiographical procedures as conventions—with very particular histories of their own.The first part of the book traces the genealogy of the dominant (one might say, hegemonic) model in recent studies of medieval philosophy. The genealogy is prefaced with two chapters that show how various were the motives for reconstructions of medieval thought before 1850 in authors such as Billuart, Goudin, and Brucker or Hegel, Ritter, and Hauréau. These chapters might be dismissed by contemporary scholars as so much antiquarianism. There can be no dismissing the relevance to contemporary work of Inglis’s main genealogy, which runs with surprising directness from Joseph Kleutgen (1811–1883) and Albert Stöckl (1823–1895) to Norman Kretzmann and Anthony Kenny.It adds to the piquancy of Inglis’s argument that most specialists in medieval philosophy will not even recognize the names of Kleutgen and Stöckl, much less feel kinship with them. But Inglis shows convincingly what Kleutgen and Stöckl did to make the study of medieval philosophy possible in modern universities. Kleutgen mapped the medieval texts onto a system of “spheres,” of fields or topics, recognizable to professors of philosophy. This means that he necessarily privileged epistemology, as he necessarily connected a medieval thinker’s views across the “spheres” into a system—or a failed attempt at one. Kleutgen then emphasized the reason/revelation dichotomy and an allegiance to what he understood as the system of Thomas Aquinas. Put these elements together and you have a surprisingly familiar story. It remained for Stöckl to write it up as an erudite and monumental narration.Inglis follows this „Kleutgen-Stöckl model” through a number of more familiar authors, including De Wulf, Gilson, Boehner, Weinberg, and the editors of the Cambridge [End Page 530] History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Of course, in reducing the genealogy to a list of famous names I ignore two of its great virtues. The first is the detail with which it retells the institutional circumstances and the forgotten intermediaries of the scholarly tradition. Behind the genealogy, around its borders, there stands Inglis’s enormous effort of original research, much of it archival. The genealogy’s second virtue is the dialectical subtlety with which it locates continuities under contradictions. Gilson is usually touted as the antithesis of De Wulf, and Kretzmann of Gilson. Inglis makes such antitheses seem superficial by comparing them with an abiding if tacit agreement about how medieval texts can be appropriated within modern philosophy. To seal the comparison, Inglis suggests in the book’s second part what a real antithesis to the Kleutgen-Stöckl model might be. He reconstructs, in his last two chapters, Thomas’s accounts of human knowledge and of theology’s relations to philosophy in opposition to that model’s prescriptions.No review can represent—or even adequately praise—the enormous learnedness of this book. Moreover, since the book already discusses so much, it must seem ungrateful to suggest that it ought to discuss anything else. Let me end then rather by posing two questions beyond the book’s end. First, does Inglis’s genealogy mean to suggest that the Kleutgen-Stöckl model is now chiefly received in English-speaking philosophy departments? I wonder, for example, how far Inglis might judge Alain de Libera’s Penser au Moyen Age (Paris: Éds. de Seuil, 1991) an alternative to that model. Certainly de Libera shows more self-consciousness about the culturally determined history behind our historiography. His emphasis on the thirteenth-century recovery... (shrink)

Historians, the good ones, mark a century by intellectual and social boundaries rather than by the turn of the calendar page. Only through fortuitous accident might occasions of consequence occur at the very beginning of a century. Imaginative historians do tend, however, to invest a date like 1800 with powers that attract events of significance. It is thus both fortunate and condign that Abiology@ came to linguistic and conceptual birth with the new century. Precisely in 1800, Karl Friedrich Burdach, a (...) romantic naturalist, suggested that his coinage Biologie be used to indicate the study of human beings from a morphological, physiological, and psychological perspective.i Many other neologisms of the period (and Burdach issued quite a few) were stillborn or survived only for a short while. Biologie, though, fit the time, and with slight adjustment received its modern meaning two years later at the hands of the Naturphilosoph Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus. In his multi-volume treatise Biologie, oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur (1802-1822), Treviranus announced: AThe objects of our research will be the different forms and manifestations of life, the conditions and laws under which these phenomena occur, and the causes through which they have been effected. The science that concerns itself with these objects we will indicate by the name biology [Biologie] or the doctrine of life [Lebenslehre].@ii Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, also in 1802, employed the term with comparable intention.iii In the work of both of these biologists, the word became immediately associated with the theory of the transmutation of speciesCa new term in recognition of the new laws of life. Treviranus thought the progressive deposition of fossils.. (shrink)

The emergence of experimental philosophy was one of the most significant developments in the early modern period. However, it is often overlooked in modern scholarship, despite being associated with leading figures such as Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, David Hume and Christian Wolff. Ranging from the early Royal Society of London in the seventeenth century to the uptake of experimental philosophy in Paris and Berlin in the eighteenth, this book provides new terms of (...) reference for understanding early modern philosophy and science, and its eventual eclipse in the shadow of post-Kantian notions of empiricism and rationalism. Experimental Philosophy and the Origins of Empiricism is an integrated history of early modern experimental philosophy which challenges the rationalism and empiricism historiography that has dominated Anglophone history of philosophy for more than a century. (shrink)

The Renaissance has a peculiar status in philosophical historiography: it tends to disappear from the dominant narrative-as Charles Schmitt famously noticed-but it also resurfaces unexpectedly in marginal reception histories. This book casts light on intellectual constellations or geographical areas, which have traditionally been considered peripheral to the emergence of the Renaissance. The case studies presented in the book explore philosophical historiography as a political practice, showing how, in times of cultural crisis or change, the scholarly rediscovery of the Renaissance often (...) served to develop or legitimise an ideal of social, religious or moral reform. Driven by personal concerns and political choices, historiography is revealed as an act of dissent against mainstream reconstructions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Socializing Minds: Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Philosophy by Martin LenzBenjamin HillMartin Lenz. Socializing Minds: Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 272. Hardback, $80.00.What Lenz proposes in this book is nothing short of revolutionary: rejecting the hegemony of individualistic interpretations of early modern philosophies of mind and replacing (some of) them with intersubjectivist interpretations. It is a brash but intriguing (...) thesis.According to Lenz, the hegemonic character of early modern individualism results from a “Rylean” historiography, namely, interpretative approaches assuming that “mentalism” (that mind is characterized in opposition to physical behavior) entails individualism (that minds develop independently of other minds). To counteract this, Lenz aims to show how three canonical figures—Spinoza, Locke, and Hume—held strong intersubjective accounts of the mind despite being mentalists. They came to recognize, argues Lenz, that there was a “contact problem” (3) between mentalistic minds, and they used intersubjective principles [End Page 665] to resolve this contact problem. Thus, because of the intersubjectivist ways they addressed the contact problem, they should be interpreted as intersubjectivists about the mind (3–6).Lenz identifies all three philosophers as intersubjectivists. But because each resolved the contact problem in different ways, each offered a different model of intersubjectivity. Spinoza offered a “metaphysical model” (9) that sees interactions between minds arising from their contrary natures. Locke offered a “linguistic model” (9) that sees interactions between minds happening through language, which is “socially determined.” Finally, Hume offered a “medical model” (9) that sees mental states as sympathetically shared between minds (9). Lenz claims he chose these three authors because they “provide the ‘clearest’ accounts by beginning to work toward a solution to the ‘contact problem’ without already having one at hand.... [Thus,] I wish to present the chosen authors as case studies of the proposed models. Roughly put, all three authors encountered a theory of ideas that they must have thought needed revision so as to accommodate the interaction of minds” (13). The real challenge, then, for Lenz is to defend his attribution of these models of intersubjectivity to Spinoza, Locke, and Hume, respectively.In the Ethics, says Lenz, Spinoza confronted a peculiar form of the contact problem. Human minds contain prejudices, unfounded assumptions, and superstitions. Humans are largely ignorant of, if not mistaken about, the causes of these unfortunate beliefs and ideas. Many of these causes lie outside of us, and some of them even lie within other minds. These connections with other minds arise because the causes of ideas are themselves ideas and because human minds, being nothing more than bundles of ideas, are complex ideas themselves. Therefore, many of our ideas and beliefs come from other minds. But the situation for Spinoza is even more peculiar, according to Lenz. In some cases, the ideas and beliefs that come into one’s mind are the mistaken beliefs of another mind. So, Spinoza’s mind-mind interactions determine ideas by literally sharing ideas—in other words, by one mind placing its ideas into another mind. Thus, the question “how can those minds come into contact in order to determine and share ideas” is Spinoza’s version of the contact problem. Spinoza’s answer, says Lenz, involves the conatus of ideas. (Because minds have a conatus and minds are nothing but complex ideas, all individual ideas have their own conatus, argues Lenz.) The conatus of an idea is its will to affirm the existence of its object. Minds interact through the struggle of contrary conatus to affirm the existence of their objects. Because this struggle is a metaphysically dynamic event, rather than a merely logical one, Spinoza’s intersubjectivism takes the form of a metaphysical model. As a result, the holism of ideas that Spinoza develops is an intersubjective holism, what Lenz calls an “ecosystem of ideas” (77).Lenz sees Locke’s contact problem as arising from his “essence agnosticism” (101) (the idea that real essences are cognitively inaccessible). This essence agnosticism cuts Locke off from Aristotle’s answer for why we share cognitive content about substance ideas (viz. that our concepts derive from the same essences being contained in external objects). Because of this, says Lenz, Locke saw... (shrink)

This essay examines the method and context that underlie Josiah Royce's The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (SMP). I locate this work among Royce's German influences, and I argue that SMP represents a considerable departure from his early Neo-Kantianism. In the concluding sections, I outline the ethical approach to historiography that Royce practices in SMP. Focusing on his polemic against Hans Vaihinger, I then draw from Royce some suggestions concerning how we should study and write the history of philosophy.

How do we write history of philosophy? What models and methods do we use when engaging with the philosophical past and where did they come from? One influential mode of writing history of philosophy is the biographical account, found famously in Diogenes Laertius's De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum. The impact of Diogenes Laertius, especially during the early modern period, is clearly documented by the volume under review. However, this volume is not dedicated to biographical writing on philosophers exclusively, but (...) to "collective biography" as such, although philosophers and history of philosophy play a certain role in the majority of the volume's seven parts. The aim of the volume is, in the words of the editor... (shrink)

Arguably the most decisive shift in the history of ideas in modern times was the complete demolition during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - in the wake of the Scientific Revolution - of traditional structures of authority, scientific thought, and belief by the new philosophy and the philosophes, culminating in Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. In this revolutionary process which effectively overthrew all justicfication for monarchy, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical power, as well as man's dominance over woman, theological dominance of (...) education, and slavery, substituting the modern principles of equality, democracy, and universality, the Radical Enlightenment played a crucially important part. Despite the present day interest in the revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the origins and rise of the Radical Enlightenment have been astonishingly little studied doubtless largely because of its very wide international sweep and the obvious difficulty of fitting in into the restrictive conventions of 'national history' which until recently tended to dominate all historiography. The greatest obstacle to the Radical Enlightenment finding its proper place in modern historical writing is simply that it was not French, British, German, Italian, Jewish or Dutch, but all of these at the same time. In this novel interpretation of the Radical Enlightenment down to La Mettie and Diderot, two of its key exponents, particular stress is placed on the pivotal role of Spinoza and the widespread underground international philosophical movement known before 1750 as Spinozism. (shrink)