Development of the Physicist's Conception of Nature P. A. M. Dime When one looks back over the development of physics, one sees that it can be pictured as a ...

This book is a cultural phenomenology of doing physics. It describes the ways physicists actually do their work--their motives, and their ways of making sense of the world--so that outsiders can understand it. Martin H. Krieger explains that physicists employ a small number of everyday notions to get at the world experimentally and conceptually.

The physicist not only observes phenomena, but he also has an active role in the formulation of some laws. For instance, laws involving irreversibility refer explicitly to what can or cannot be done by physicists. As the abilities of the latter may vary, we obtain sequences of laws, the convergence of which is discussed.

Kernphysiker in einer neuen Welt: Die Emigranten der dreißiger Jahre in Amerika. - Unter der großen Anzahl derjenigen, die durch Nationalsozialismus zur Emigration gezwungen wurden und zwischen 1933 und 1941 in die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika einwanderten, befanden sich auch mehr als hundert Physiker, und unter ihnen einige der genialsten Kernphysiker der Welt. Die Physik in Amerika hatte damals den Status einer voll ausgereiften Wissenschaft erreicht, und so kam es zu einem bedeutsamen und facettenreichen Zusammenwirken zwischen den emigrierten und den (...) einheimischen Kernphysikern, zumal sie die verschiedenen Forschungsgebiete vertraten, die sich durch die Entdeckungen und Erfindungen des Jahres 1932 (Neutron, Deuterium, Positron, Cockcroft-Walton-Beschleuniger, Zyklotron) aufgetan hatten. Von besonderer Bedeutung Für die Konsolidierung und Entwicklung der gesamten Kernphysik war dabei die Veröffentlichung von drei Artikeln in den Reviews of Modern Physics von 1936 und 1937, bekannt als die „Bethe-Bibel”︁. Nach der Entdeckung der Kernspaltung von 1938 und dem Ausbruch des Krieges 1939 in Europa wirkte die Befürchtung, daß Hitler eine Atomwaffe erhalten könnte, als mächtige, Emigranten und Nicht-Emigranten gleichermaßen erfassende einigende Kraft unter den Atomphysikern in Amerika, und die meisten von ihnen stellten ihre Fähigkeiten in den Dienst der US-Regierung und arbeiteten am Manhatten-Projekt und an anderen militärischen Forschungsvorhaben mit. Bei Kriegsende waren die in den dreißiger Jahren emigrierten Kernphysiker wie so viele Flüchtlinge vor ihnen Amerikaner geworden, und keiner von ihnen kehrte in sein Geburtsland zurück.Among the large number of refugees from Nazism and Fascism entering the United States between 1933 and 1941 were more than 100 physicists, including some of the most gifted nuclear physicists in the world. By that time physics in America had come of age, and a remarkable and multifaceted symbiosis occurred between the émigré and native-born nuclear physicists as they pursued the many avenues of research opened up by the discoveries and inventions of 1932 (neutron, deuterium, positron, Cockcroft-Walton accelerator, cyclotron). Of particular importance for the consolidation and development of the entire field of nuclear physics was the publication in 1936–37 of the three articles in the Revieus of Modern Physics known as the „Bethe Bible”︁. With the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938 and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the fear that a nuclear weapon might fall into Hitler's hands served as a powerful unifying force among nuclear physicists in Amerika, émigrés and non-émigrés alike, and most placed their talents in the service of the United States Government working on the Manhattan Project and other wartime research. By the end of the war, like so many refugees before them, the émigré nuclear physicists of the 1930s had become Americans, and not one of them returned to the country of his birth. (shrink)

Presents the inside story of the creation of the atomic bomb in terms understandable to the layman, and discusses the crisis of conscience following the demonstration of the bomb's destructive effects on Hiroshima.

The central thesis of this paper is that physicists have as much to learn from scientifically oriented philosophy as philosophers have to learn from physics. To begin with, any discussion of basic physical ideas and procedures is bound to be conducted in the light of some philosophy or other. Now, the standard philosophy of physics of our century is operationism. And philosophers, with the help of recent developments in semantics, epistemology and the theory of scientific inference, have shown that (...) operationism is untenable. Thus most physicists are dragging a dead philosophy that may not be of any help in conceiving of new ideas and procedures. This, then, is a first contribution philosophy can make to physics, namely to overhaul its philosophy. A second contribution is to the organization of physics, in particular to the axiomatic reconstruction of physical theories and the analysis and validation of empirical procedures. The various theses and antitheses discussed in the article are illustrated with examples taken from contemporary physics. (shrink)

Today, we take international collaborations as a necessity, but 150 years ago, when travel was not so convenient, it involved an enduring and time-consuming challenge. This paper presents letters and reports written by German physicist Julius Plücker to his wife, Antonie née Altstädten describing his travels to Great Britain and France between 1853 and 1866. These letters provide a view into how international collaboration and communication were developed and maintained as well as how friendships were built within the scientific community (...) during the early industrial age, prior to telegraph, telephone, email, and internet. (shrink)

Explores in some depth the relationship between physics and philosophy of science. Here the author exposes misconceptions regarding philosophy of science that seem to pervade the attitudes of many physicists. He tries to show that philosophy of science is not the pointless enterprise that one famous physicist, Steven Weinberg, takes it to be. He discusses the anthropic principle, explanations of generalizations, explanatory asymmetry, and the possibility of a final theory. Because his argument depends crucially on explanation in physics, this (...) essay is a fitting conclusion for the entire set of essays in this book. (shrink)

Traditionally, historians have taken it for granted that Britain’s National Physical Laboratory was created as the result of demands from a “professional” body of university-based physicists for a state-funded scientific institution. Yet paying detailed attention to the history of the NPL’s originating institution, Kew Observatory, shows that the story is not so clear-cut. Starting in the 1850s, Kew Observatory was partly a center for testing meteorological instruments and other scientific equipment in return for fees. Long after the 1850s, the (...) observatory was run by self-funded devotees of science. Paid university physicists only assumed a dominant role on its governing committee in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, by which time instrument-testing was already the observatory’s main role. This paper argues that the rise of the university physicists – together with the desire of some of these physicists for a national institution that tested electrical standards – can only partially explain the origins of the NPL, and that Kew was in some ways a national physical laboratory before there were many physics teaching posts in British universities. This paper is a case study that illustrates a need to reassess the importance of university physicists in shaping British science at the end of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

When the layman reads a book or two of popularized physics and then moves solemnly forth, as occasionally happens, to expound some comprehensive doctrine purporting to be built directly out of the materials he has picked up, the type of comment which the physicist will make is plain enough in advance. But why does it so rarely occur to the physicist that others may think of his epistemologizing much what he is sure to think of their quantizing?

This contribution is a translated, edited and much abbreviated version of chapter 2 in Andreas Losch, Jenseits der Konflikte. I thank the publisher Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht for the permission to make use of the material.

Do physicists believe that general relativity is true, and that electrons and phonons exist, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We (...) received responses from 384 physicists and 151 philosophers. Our main findings are (1) On average, physicists tend toward scientific realism, and slightly more so than philosophers of science. (2) Physicists can be clustered into five groups. Three show variants of scientific realism, one is instrumentalist, and one seems undecided or incoherent. (3) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with approval of building a bigger particle collider. (4) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with the seniority of physicists. (5) We did not find correlations with other factors, such as whether physicists focus on theoretical or experimental research and whether they engage with applied or basic research. (shrink)

A biography of Lev Landau, one of the greatest Soviet theoretical physicists, whose career was cut short by a catastrophic car accident in 1962 and who was still only sixty when he died six years later. He won the Nobel Prize 'for pioneering work on the theory of the condensed state of matter, particularly liquid helium'. But the book shows that Landau's characterisation of himself as 'one of the last of the universal men of theoretical physics' was fully justified. (...) Clearly and concisely it describes his achievements in all areas of theoretical physics from hydrodynamics to the quantum theory of fields. Attention is also paid to his genius as a teacher and mentor of young scientists, and throughout the book the true humanity of the man is evident. (shrink)

Untimely -- "More Einsteinian than Einstein" -- Science or philosophy? -- The twin paradox -- Bergson's achilles' heel -- Worth mentioning? -- Bergson writes to Lorentz -- Bergson meets Michelson -- The debate spreads -- Back from Paris -- Two months later -- Logical positivism -- The immediate aftermath -- An imaginary dialog -- "Full-blooded" time -- The previous spring -- The church -- The end of universal time -- Quantum mechanics -- Things -- Clocks and wristwatches -- Telegraph, telephone, (...) and radio -- Atoms and molecules -- Einstein's films: reversible -- Bergson's movies: out-of-control -- Microbes and ghosts -- One new point: recording devices -- Bergson's last comments -- Einstein's last thoughts. (shrink)

The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time.

In this paper I investigate two views of theoretical explanation in quantum chemistry, advocated by John Clarke Slater and Charles Coulson. Slater argued for quantum‐mechanical rigor, and the primacy of fundamental principles in models of chemical bonding. Coulson emphasized systematic explanatory power within chemistry, and continuity with existing chemical explanations. I relate these views to the epistemic contexts of their disciplines.

The aim of this paper is to invalidate the hypothesis that human consciousness is necessary in the quantum measurement process. In order to achieve this target, I propose a considerable modification of the Schrödinger’s cat and the Dead-Alive Physicist thought experiments, called “PIAR”, short for “Physicist Inside the Ambiguous Room”. A specific strategy has enabled me to plan the experiment in such a way as to logically justify the inconsistency of the above hypothesis and to oblige its supporters to rely (...) on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which a real world of phenomena exists independently of our conscious mind and where observers play no special role. Moreover, the description of the measurement apparatus will be complete, in the sense that the experiment, given that it includes also the experimenter, will begin and end exclusively within a sealed room. Hence, my analysis will provide a logical explanation of the relationship between the observer and the objects of her/his experimental observation; this and a few other implications will be discussed in the fourth section and in the conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide the first in-depth discussion of Susan Stebbing’s views concerning our experience of the passage of time – a key issue for many metaphysicians writing in the first half of the twentieth century. I focus on Stebbing’s claims about the passage of time in Philosophy and the Physicists and her disagreement with Arthur Eddington over how best to account for that experience. I show that Stebbing’s concern is that any attempt to provide a scientific account (...) of the passage of time will face problems, since the events described by physics are necessarily measured against the passage of time. I then identify views elsewhere in her philosophical corpus that can help shed light on this claim. Ultimately, I argue, Stebbing’s views on time should be construed as part of her wider commitment to ‘realism’. To be a realist, for Stebbing, is to accept a set of propositions which are a pre-requisite for even beginning to analyse the world around us. For Stebbing, I argue, part of what it means to be a realist is to accept our experience of the passage of time as something fundamental that cannot itself be subject to analysis. (shrink)

A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Arthur Eddington's scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing's critique of Eddington's attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of ‘inexact language’ to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th 1938, (...) Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing's ‘Philosophy and the Physicists'”. Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes is included as an Appendix to this paper. (shrink)

The work of Georges Matisse (1874–1961), a French physicist, philosopher, epistemologist, and translator, has been largely overlooked, particularly his contributions to the history of science in the first half of the 20th century. His work focused on the emerging field of cybernetics and provided a philosophical perspective on new physics. His books delved into the philosophical underpinnings of scientific doctrines, viewing them as systems of reference and modes of representation rather than expressions of absolute truths. Although he could not personally (...) attend the Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science in 1936, his talk was presented, offering a unique case study on uncertainty and determinism. Matisse employed an expanded notion of causality to study concrete facts in human societies, arguing against a universal law of history. His final book was dedicated to Bachelard. This paper offers initial insights into Matisse’s sociology program, discusses his methodological approaches within logical empiricism, and outlines his perspective on the purpose of nature. The study concludes that Matisse’s interdisciplinary approach, which included a theory on the relationship between religion and science, was based on his robust understanding of biophysics and scientific history. (shrink)

New York Times Book Review, June 24, 2007.

The aim of this paper is to refute the hypothesis that the observer’s consciousness is necessary in the quantum mechanics measurement process. In order to achieve our target, we propose and investigate a variation of the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment called “DAP”, short for “Dead-Alive Physicist”, in which a human being replaces the cat. This strategy enables us to logically disprove the consistency of the above hypothesis, and to oblige its supporters either to be trapped in solipsism or to rely (...) on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the conscious observer plays the sole role of acknowledging the experimental results. Our analysis hence provides support to clarify the relationship between the observer and the objects of her/his experimental observation; this and a few other implications are discussed in the fourth section and in the conclusions. (shrink)

Hailed by the Journal of the History of Astronomy as "charming and witty," this chronicle by a renowned physicist traces the development of scientific thought from the works of the "founding fathers" — Galileo, Huygens, and Newton — to the more recent discoveries of Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Gibbs. 1984 edition.

A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing’s criticisms of Arthur Eddington’s scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing’s critique of Eddington’s attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of “inexact language” to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th, 1938, (...) Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing’s ‘Philosophy and the Physicists’.” Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes are included as an Appendix to this paper. (shrink)

Professor Bridgman is a physicist of distinction who has contributed to the philosophy of physics. Dissatisfied with the traditional obscurities and irrationalities of certain branches of his subject, he evolved for himself a logic of modern physics, and focussed his attention on that aspect of scientific method which he called “operational”. His name has been associated with “operational research” and “operational definition” ever since. The present volume, a second and enlarged edition, is a collection of non-technical writings that illustrate what (...) the operational point of view can lead to. The papers are of varying length, some of them quite slight, and the quality is likewise variable. It seems to me the book would improve with pruning, and editing. Besides some irksome mannerisms, there are crudities of style that one would wish to see removed. (shrink)